I'm not thinking there is any 'container' any particular region or lobe associated with consciousness other than the the brain itself. I do think there are neurons that are part of the 'fabric' of consciousness that are distributed throughout the brain. I would also think the concentration of them is greater in some parts than others, but wouldn't swear by it. So much we don't know....so difficult to probe and measure and test....

What I mean by addicted is he is still trying to find that killer theory about some mechanism that will suddenly give us the satisfactory feeling of having an explanation. It reminds me of the alchemists looking for that magic combination to make gold from ochre and lead.

kennyc wrote:I'm not thinking there is any 'container' any particular region or lobe associated with consciousness other than the the brain itself. I do think there are neurons that are part of the 'fabric' of consciousness that are distributed throughout the brain. I would also think the concentration of them is greater in some parts than others, but wouldn't swear by it. So much we don't know....so difficult to probe and measure and test....

There is truth in that. The pyramidal neurons are the favorite in that theory.

I guess the problem I eventually had with all of this is that I heard so damned many plausible theories and each had a different champion. So I'm attempting some kind of integration of all the theories. What I kept coming up with is what you allude to above. It's The Brain! Then in the last few years I started to ask the question about why I was stopping at the boundaries of that organ.

So a novel idea. There is no container but there most certainly is a vast array of continually changing content.

I'd agree that 'there is no container'. I'm thinking of the 'model' as dynamic and free ranging ('flock of starlings'), wherever contexts intersect. I think we should follow the data flow rather than the landscape, the wires or brain structures it flows through.

Focus on the body map, and the ways in which sensation is body-centric, and those rare cases where it seems not to be. Note what Graziano said about the complex dynamic nature of the body map. 'No homunculus' - rubber hand, out of body illusion. These are big clues.

GrahamH wrote:I'd agree that 'there is no container'. I'm thinking of the 'model' as dynamic and free ranging ('flock of starlings'), wherever contexts intersect. I think we should follow the data flow rather than the landscape, the wires or brain structures it flows through.

Focus on the body map, and the ways in which sensation is body-centric, and those rare cases where it seems not to be. Note what Graziano said about the complex dynamic nature of the body map. 'No homunculus' - rubber hand, out of body illusion. These are big clues.

The flock is a consciousness alien to ours. Thermostat too.

Imagine. My consciousness yesterday is a series of mental states(hate that word's baggage but it's a simplifying tool).
C1..Cn
Now lets' generalize and create a set of all human mental states that occurred yesterday. Ch1..Chn
Now let's consider the mental states of all animals. And I suppose given the other thread all plants?
Now lets' consider the mental states yesterday of all alien intelligences.
Now let's pretend we have conscious machines and we can include all of those mental states.

We have a big set and we could consider removing any elements where there is no consciousness. Simple worm mental states can be removed for instance.

Questions.
How are we going to do that? Determine which are conscious mental states and which are not?
If we are looking for neural correlates what is the NCC of the C of all the things left in our set?
What do they have in common?

You are a bit of a functionalist, as am I, so if it's function and not actual physical structure we are looking for how do we determine which of the states in our set are a result of that function?

What are the elements of that function and how do we pare it down to a minimal sufficient set?

What experiments can be done? Hooking me up to a Mars rover for instance. At what point does C magically disappear?

Graziano says the self model is testable. I didn't spot how, but maybe it's in the book.

The concept that C is self-model-of-mind is a starting point for thinking about the problem. Think about it. How does it fit the neuroscience? How does it fit your introspection? How does it fit psychology (attributing agency to everything, multiple personality disorders etc). Are there any observations that contradict it? Is it falsifiable?

Asking when C disappears is one approach, but perhaps more interesting is asking how does C alter?

Damage brain-stem and C stops, as far as anyone can tell, so Maybe lizards are conscious and brainstem is enough for basic experience. Maybe not.

The core of the concept is that you are conscious because your brain can make a model of a mind and identify with it. It's information. It's the semantics of neural networks (hence my earlier questions on that). What do you know about that?

My take on it is that physical reality grounds and tests the meaning of the networks. Meaningless activity most likely get's you killed. Significance is rooted in survival and reproduction. A sensori-motor system build the semantics of motion, positional awareness. Meaning sort of bottoms out at 'know it when you sense it'. The qualia fans get that too, with the 'ineffability' of supposed elementary qualia ('redness'). We can deal with 'know it when you sense it', with similarity and difference, combination and context dependence.

Many of the C-states I listed above have no brainstem. So...

GrahamH wrote:Graziano says the self model is testable. I didn't spot how, but maybe it's in the book.

The concept that C is self-model-of-mind is a starting point for thinking about the problem. Think about it. How does it fit the neuroscience? How does it fit your introspection? How does it fit psychology (attributing agency to everything, multiple personality disorders etc). Are there any observations that contradict it? Is it falsifiable?

Asking when C disappears is one approach, but perhaps more interesting is asking how does C alter?

Damage brain-stem and C stops, as far as anyone can tell, so Maybe lizards are conscious and brainstem is enough for basic experience. Maybe not.

The core of the concept is that you are conscious because your brain can make a model of a mind and identify with it. It's information. It's the semantics of neural networks (hence my earlier questions on that). What do you know about that?

My take on it is that physical reality grounds and tests the meaning of the networks. Meaningless activity most likely get's you killed. Significance is rooted in survival and reproduction. A sensori-motor system build the semantics of motion, positional awareness. Meaning sort of bottoms out at 'know it when you sense it'. The qualia fans get that too, with the 'ineffability' of supposed elementary qualia ('redness'). We can deal with 'know it when you sense it', with similarity and difference, combination and context dependence.

How would we give a thermostat a self-model? what new things could it do if it had one?

Damage brain-stem and C stops, as far as anyone can tell, so Maybe lizards are conscious and brainstem is enough for basic experience. Maybe not.

Try removing the brainstem one neuron at a time.

SpeedOfSound wrote:Many of the C-states I listed above have no brainstem. So...

You assumed various 'C-states', but you have no idea if such exist. It doesn't help things on the assumption of alien minds or robots. You can't say 'robots are conscious yet they have no brainstem, therefore brainstem is not necessary for consciousness.'

SpeedOfSound wrote:

kennyc wrote:I'm not thinking there is any 'container' any particular region or lobe associated with consciousness other than the the brain itself. I do think there are neurons that are part of the 'fabric' of consciousness that are distributed throughout the brain. I would also think the concentration of them is greater in some parts than others, but wouldn't swear by it. So much we don't know....so difficult to probe and measure and test....

There is truth in that. The pyramidal neurons are the favorite in that theory.

I guess the problem I eventually had with all of this is that I heard so damned many plausible theories and each had a different champion. So I'm attempting some kind of integration of all the theories. What I kept coming up with is what you allude to above. It's The Brain! Then in the last few years I started to ask the question about why I was stopping at the boundaries of that organ.

So a novel idea. There is no container but there most certainly is a vast array of continually changing content.

The association between pyramidal cells and the "seat of C" is misleading, because, as Koch hints at in his later book ("C ...") on the subject, it is the kind of neural circuitry that matters, not just the cell-types involved. Similar cells types can be involved in different functions, and it just so happens that one of the important cell-types in the T-PFC-T loops is pyramidal. The fact that similar basic cell types are also involved in other functions is possibly causing some people to conclude incorrectly that C arises from all over the brain. However, the circuit types are not the same all over the brain.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pyramidal_cell

Pyramidal cell

Pyramidal neurons (pyramidal cells) are a type of neuron found in areas of the brain including the cerebral cortex, the hippocampus, and the amygdala. Pyramidal neurons are the primary excitation units of the mammalian prefrontal cortex and the corticospinal tract. Pyramidal neurons were first discovered and studied by Santiago Ramón y Cajal.[1][2] Since then, studies on pyramidal neurons have focused on topics ranging from neuroplasticity to cognition.

GrahamH wrote:

SpeedOfSound wrote:Many of the C-states I listed above have no brainstem. So...

You assumed various 'C-states', but you have no idea if such exist. It doesn't help things on the assumption of alien minds or robots. You can't say 'robots are conscious yet they have no brainstem, therefore brainstem is not necessary for consciousness.'

Do you think there is something about our brains that makes them conscious and that machines and aliens could not possibly be?

The idea here Graham is to find out how difficult it would be to get at the semantics of 'self-model'. It's a wonderful thing to say out loud but is that all we got? Nice sound for a happy intuition?

DavidMcC wrote:

SpeedOfSound wrote:

kennyc wrote:I'm not thinking there is any 'container' any particular region or lobe associated with consciousness other than the the brain itself. I do think there are neurons that are part of the 'fabric' of consciousness that are distributed throughout the brain. I would also think the concentration of them is greater in some parts than others, but wouldn't swear by it. So much we don't know....so difficult to probe and measure and test....

There is truth in that. The pyramidal neurons are the favorite in that theory.

I guess the problem I eventually had with all of this is that I heard so damned many plausible theories and each had a different champion. So I'm attempting some kind of integration of all the theories. What I kept coming up with is what you allude to above. It's The Brain! Then in the last few years I started to ask the question about why I was stopping at the boundaries of that organ.

So a novel idea. There is no container but there most certainly is a vast array of continually changing content.

The association between pyramidal cells and the "seat of C" is misleading, because, as Koch hints at in his later book ("C ...") on the subject, it is the kind of neural circuitry that matters, not just the cell-types involved. Similar cells types can be involved in different functions, and it just so happens that one of the important cell-types in the T-PFC-T loops is pyramidal. The fact that similar basic cell types are also involved in other functions is possibly causing some people to conclude incorrectly that C arises from all over the brain. However, the circuit types are not the same all over the brain.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pyramidal_cell

Pyramidal cell

Pyramidal neurons (pyramidal cells) are a type of neuron found in areas of the brain including the cerebral cortex, the hippocampus, and the amygdala. Pyramidal neurons are the primary excitation units of the mammalian prefrontal cortex and the corticospinal tract. Pyramidal neurons were first discovered and studied by Santiago Ramón y Cajal.[1][2] Since then, studies on pyramidal neurons have focused on topics ranging from neuroplasticity to cognition.

Nice try. Cell structure is what we are after here. Look at the pyramidal neurons structure. Does it have anything to do with the kind of circuit it may support?

SpeedOfSound wrote:The idea here Graham is to find out how difficult it would be to get at the semantics of 'self-model'. It's a wonderful thing to say out loud but is that all we got? Nice sound for a happy intuition?

Well not really. The idea was to respond to the ideas expressed in the initial video by Michio Kaku, not to go over all this same ol' shit that we've been over a hundred thousand times (exaggeration probably).

Perhaps that's my clue to unsubscribe from my own thread.

SpeedOfSound wrote:

DavidMcC wrote:

SpeedOfSound wrote:

kennyc wrote:I'm not thinking there is any 'container' any particular region or lobe associated with consciousness other than the the brain itself. I do think there are neurons that are part of the 'fabric' of consciousness that are distributed throughout the brain. I would also think the concentration of them is greater in some parts than others, but wouldn't swear by it. So much we don't know....so difficult to probe and measure and test....

There is truth in that. The pyramidal neurons are the favorite in that theory.

I guess the problem I eventually had with all of this is that I heard so damned many plausible theories and each had a different champion. So I'm attempting some kind of integration of all the theories. What I kept coming up with is what you allude to above. It's The Brain! Then in the last few years I started to ask the question about why I was stopping at the boundaries of that organ.

So a novel idea. There is no container but there most certainly is a vast array of continually changing content.

The association between pyramidal cells and the "seat of C" is misleading, because, as Koch hints at in his later book ("C ...") on the subject, it is the kind of neural circuitry that matters, not just the cell-types involved. Similar cells types can be involved in different functions, and it just so happens that one of the important cell-types in the T-PFC-T loops is pyramidal. The fact that similar basic cell types are also involved in other functions is possibly causing some people to conclude incorrectly that C arises from all over the brain. However, the circuit types are not the same all over the brain.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pyramidal_cell

Pyramidal cell

Pyramidal neurons (pyramidal cells) are a type of neuron found in areas of the brain including the cerebral cortex, the hippocampus, and the amygdala. Pyramidal neurons are the primary excitation units of the mammalian prefrontal cortex and the corticospinal tract. Pyramidal neurons were first discovered and studied by Santiago Ramón y Cajal.[1][2] Since then, studies on pyramidal neurons have focused on topics ranging from neuroplasticity to cognition.

Nice try. Cell structure is what we are after here. Look at the pyramidal neurons structure. Does it have anything to do with the kind of circuit it may support?

Why do you think cell structure is ""what we are after here"? No doubt, cell structure is, in some way, related to circuit type, though this is not obviously the case - it could be the case (as it could affect cell-cell connectivity, both within the cell type and to other cell types).
EDIT: But, then it would only be indirectly related to function -circuit type (and connections to other regions) remains the fundamental property affecting function, IMO.

kennyc wrote:

SpeedOfSound wrote:The idea here Graham is to find out how difficult it would be to get at the semantics of 'self-model'. It's a wonderful thing to say out loud but is that all we got? Nice sound for a happy intuition?

Well not really. The idea was to respond to the ideas expressed in the initial video by Michio Kaku, not to go over all this same ol' shit that we've been over a hundred thousand times (exaggeration probably).

Perhaps that's my queue to unsubscribe from my own thread.

I thought we had covered that?
Anyway. Graham objected to the video and insisted a self-model was required. I'm still working on that suggestion. thermostats do not have much of a self-model. They do have a rough model of the temperature of the house they regulate though so I might insist that this is a rudimentary self-model.

SpeedOfSound wrote:How would we give a thermostat a self-model? what new things could it do if it had one?

A heating system (not a thermostat) can model it's own function. A PID control calculation is a model of the heating system. It isn't a model of mind.

I suppose we could make a heating system that spoke of 'feeling chilly' or say 'I hope I can warm the place up quickly', but these are word games of the programmer. We come back again to how physical systems can generate semantics. We could work on that.

SpeedOfSound wrote:Try removing the brainstem one neuron at a time.

Try taking out one starling at a time. Take one grain of sand at a time from a dune. There will a stage when there is no flocking, no dune, but it isn't a definite threshold. We could think of 'the C-process' as resonance. Back to David's T-C loops and the sustain function. I think that relates to flocking. To maintain the flock takes some imprecise level of interaction. Same with a flame. If the heat feedback falls too low to liberate enough flammable gas the flame goes out.

For the model, context, interactions have to me maintained.

Even in the heating control, if the sampling /update rate falls too low the PID function fails to control temperature.

If the content of heating control is temperature the content of the self model is experience.
Temperature is a grossly simplified model of a hugely complex system of particle interactions.
Experience is a vastly simplified model of vastly complex physical / sensory interactions.

DavidMcC wrote:

SpeedOfSound wrote:

DavidMcC wrote:

SpeedOfSound wrote:
There is truth in that. The pyramidal neurons are the favorite in that theory.

I guess the problem I eventually had with all of this is that I heard so damned many plausible theories and each had a different champion. So I'm attempting some kind of integration of all the theories. What I kept coming up with is what you allude to above. It's The Brain! Then in the last few years I started to ask the question about why I was stopping at the boundaries of that organ.

So a novel idea. There is no container but there most certainly is a vast array of continually changing content.

The association between pyramidal cells and the "seat of C" is misleading, because, as Koch hints at in his later book ("C ...") on the subject, it is the kind of neural circuitry that matters, not just the cell-types involved. Similar cells types can be involved in different functions, and it just so happens that one of the important cell-types in the T-PFC-T loops is pyramidal. The fact that similar basic cell types are also involved in other functions is possibly causing some people to conclude incorrectly that C arises from all over the brain. However, the circuit types are not the same all over the brain.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pyramidal_cell

Pyramidal cell

Pyramidal neurons (pyramidal cells) are a type of neuron found in areas of the brain including the cerebral cortex, the hippocampus, and the amygdala. Pyramidal neurons are the primary excitation units of the mammalian prefrontal cortex and the corticospinal tract. Pyramidal neurons were first discovered and studied by Santiago Ramón y Cajal.[1][2] Since then, studies on pyramidal neurons have focused on topics ranging from neuroplasticity to cognition.

Nice try. Cell structure is what we are after here. Look at the pyramidal neurons structure. Does it have anything to do with the kind of circuit it may support?

Why do you think cell structure is ""what we are after here"? No doubt, cell structure is, in some way, related to circuit type, though this is not obviously the case - it could be the case (as it could affect cell-cell connectivity, both within the cell type and to other cell types).
EDIT: But, then it would only be indirectly related to function -circuit type (and connections to other regions) remains the fundamental property affecting function, IMO.

It is very obviously the case with pyr neurons. They have over 50,000 inputs on average and increase in quantity and complexity toward the frontal cortex. They are the cpu of the cortex.

SpeedOfSound wrote:

GrahamH wrote:

SpeedOfSound wrote:Many of the C-states I listed above have no brainstem. So...

You assumed various 'C-states', but you have no idea if such exist. It doesn't help things on the assumption of alien minds or robots. You can't say 'robots are conscious yet they have no brainstem, therefore brainstem is not necessary for consciousness.'

Do you think there is something about our brains that makes them conscious and that machines and aliens could not possibly be?

I think that might be possible. but we really don't know.
If C is a model of mind then conscious machines are possible (and we are such machines). Multiple realisability seems more likely than not.

Frankly, there is a huge problem in determining the internal semantics of any system (assuming we allow that physical systems can generate semantics at all).

GrahamH wrote:

SpeedOfSound wrote:How would we give a thermostat a self-model? what new things could it do if it had one?

A heating system (not a thermostat) can model it's own function. A PID control calculation is a model of the heating system. It isn't a model of mind.

I suppose we could make a heating system that spoke of 'feeling chilly' or say 'I hope I can warm the place up quickly', but these are word games of the programmer. We come back again to how physical systems can generate semantics. We could work on that.

SpeedOfSound wrote:Try removing the brainstem one neuron at a time.

Try taking out one starling at a time. Take one grain of sand at a time from a dune. There will a stage when there is no flocking, no dune, but it isn't a definite threshold. We could think of 'the C-process' as resonance. Back to David's T-C loops and the sustain function. I think that relates to flocking. To maintain the flock takes some imprecise level of interaction. Same with a flame. If the heat feedback falls too low to liberate enough flammable gas the flame goes out.

For the model, context, interactions have to me maintained.

Even in the heating control, if the sampling /update rate falls too low the PID function fails to control temperature.

If the content of heating control is temperature the content of the self model is experience.
Temperature is a grossly simplified model of a hugely complex system of particle interactions.
Experience is a vastly simplified model of vastly complex physical / sensory interactions.

If we remove one starling is the flock pattern changed? If we remove one neuron from out cortex in the area activated during one of my C-states will there be a difference in what is 'felt'?

notice your use in the blue part of how we feel. I find that all very suspicious. Is C just being able to report how we feel or is it also in part the feeling itself? How complex is this feel part?