Shagz wrote:Mr. Chesterson's long-winded bullshit is easily dismissed.
According to Chesterson, people never make shit up, and we have to believe every single thing that anyone says; otherwise, we are either prejudiced towards the teller, or prejudiced towards the story. Well, I have an invisible satyr living in my closet, Mr. Chesterson, and he gives me a hand job every night while I sleep. This must be true, because if you don't believe me, it's either because you are prejudiced towards "peasants" like myself, or you are prejudiced towards stories of satyrs in closets.
I think Chesterton's problem goes deeper than that, even.
There is a relevant discussion going on at the
Sandwalk blog, which Rumraket and I frequent, of a post made by creationist VJ Torley on the Discovery Institute's blog, in which he argues that St. Joseph of Cupertino had the ability to fly, based on a number of eyewitness reports from the 1600's. That seems quite similar to the argument Chesterton makes, so lets use it as an illustrative example.
The problem with Chesterton's argument, IMHO, is that he sets different ground rules for the person who accepts the existence of the supernatural, and for those who do not. The skeptic is required to provide explanations consistent w/ science and other empirical evidence, whereas the supernaturalist is able to propose any scenario he wishes, no matter how outlandish. It's as if Chesterton is playing a tennis game in which his opponent has to keep his shots strictly within the lines, but Chesterton can aim his shots any old place he wishes.
That's not very fair, is it? Instead, in a debate, the rules should apply equally to both participants. So say, for the sake of argument, that Chesterton wanted to prove that St. Joseph actually could fly and, in his defence, he cites thousands of signed affidavits. The authenticity of these affidavits is beyond question and, moreoever, we know that every single witness has never met with any of the other witnesses, and yet all of the accounts are completely consistent down to the last detail. Chesterton, I presume, would think this was pretty convincing evidence. However, the skeptic need only say "I think all those people are lying." To which Chesterton might respond, "But how is that possible? How could thousands of people, who never met each other come up with exactly the same lie? It's impossible!"
To which the skeptic need only reply. "I know. It's a miracle!"
Or suppose the skeptic says he does not believe these affidavits even exist, so Chesterton dutifully rounds them all up and places them before his interlocutor. Triumphantly, he says, "There. Believe me now?" To which the skeptic, again, need only reply, "Isn't this amazing! These affidavits do not exist. And yet, here we are: Both of us are convinced that we are seeing the affidavits right before our eyes. There is only one explanation: By some remarkable process beyone human understanding, we are both having the same hallucination at the same time. It's a miracle!"
And so forth.
Far from providing intellectual support for his religious presuppositions, Chesterton's argument only succeeds in removing any possible basis to accept any claim as true. If one disregards the evidence provided by science in determining whether something could actually happen, then there is no means by which a claim could be disputed. Assessments based on probability or possibility have to be thrown out the window, and one's conclusions and explanations limited only by one's imagination. Or one's ideological presuppositions.