Somebody quoted this on facebook:

Natural Law is the belief that there are moral truths all people can know easily simply by virtue of being human and do not need to be specifically revealed

I have heard the expression before but did not know of it and do not want to discuss the philosophy of it either.

Instead I wondered if there are 'morals' that would have became embedded in our psyche from an evolutionary perspective? I know the statement above is vague but might there be something we (Humans) share in the context as a result of gaining a survival advantage.

John

I believe the trolley problem is a classic example. I've heard that tribespeople in the Amazon, with canoes substituted for trolleys, give the same answer - it's OK to push a switch to save five people by killing one, but actually pushing one person to his death to save five is not OK. The evolutionary thinking is not obvious, but it seems to be wired in.

2 links:
Three-year old children intervene in third-party moral transgressions

Young children share the spoils after collaboration

Both examples of very young children showing an ability to collaborate in an organised way, which is likely to be an evolved ability central to human success.

Hmm. Is there any thinking to expect that this is a genetic thing? This could just as easily be a socially learned thing.

Edit: this post is in relation to your first response, Zoon.

There's reports of monkeys showing clear evidence of a sense of fairness. For me, the golden rule is as natural as anything will ever be, it's seen in game theory in tit-for-tat strategies winning many broad swaths of situations, it's the only thing that works for social beings, isn't difficult to understand, police, etc. And you know what, the only important thing is jeebus says it alright with him

rEvolutionist wrote:Hmm. Is there any thinking to expect that this is a genetic thing? This could just as easily be a socially learned thing.

I wouldn’t make a sharp distinction between innate and learned behaviour. Very little human social behaviour is entirely innate, not learned at all. Conversely, all learning has to be to some extent under genetic control (and evolved through natural selection), since the complex structures which make learning possible are built up by the proteins which are coded for by genes. For example, although nobody can speak a language without learning it, it’s clear that the ability to learn language is innate in humans and not in other species.

I think the OP was about whether some parts of morality are relatively invariant, or whether they can all vary in the same sort of way that all the words in one language can be different from the words in another language. As you say, there is a possibility that all those who say that it’s OK to flick a switch to save 5 people and kill one, but not OK to save 5 people by actively pushing one to his death, have learnt these two things and could have learnt otherwise as easily as children learn a different word for “mother” in different languages. But people from different cultures do seem to give similar answers to those questions, so it’s at least less likely to vary than the forms of language. Also, the logic behind that pair of answers isn’t entirely obvious to anyone, professionals or lay people, and typically people explain fluently that it’s right to save five people at the expense of one in the first scenario, then struggle to explain why it’s not right to save five people at the expense of one in the second scenario. This suggests that it’s not something that is taught explicitly, but something that our brains are wired to learn easily but not consciously, like the grammar of one’s native language.

x

THE NATURAL LAW TRADITION IN ETHICS: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/natural-law-ethics

NATURAL LAW: http://www.iep.utm.edu/natlaw/

zoon wrote:

rEvolutionist wrote:Hmm. Is there any thinking to expect that this is a genetic thing? This could just as easily be a socially learned thing.

I wouldn’t make a sharp distinction between innate and learned behaviour. Very little human social behaviour is entirely innate, not learned at all. Conversely, all learning has to be to some extent under genetic control (and evolved through natural selection), since the complex structures which make learning possible are built up by the proteins which are coded for by genes. For example, although nobody can speak a language without learning it, it’s clear that the ability to learn language is innate in humans and not in other species.

I think the OP was about whether some parts of morality are relatively invariant, or whether they can all vary in the same sort of way that all the words in one language can be different from the words in another language. As you say, there is a possibility that all those who say that it’s OK to flick a switch to save 5 people and kill one, but not OK to save 5 people by actively pushing one to his death, have learnt these two things and could have learnt otherwise as easily as children learn a different word for “mother” in different languages. But people from different cultures do seem to give similar answers to those questions, so it’s at least less likely to vary than the forms of language. Also, the logic behind that pair of answers isn’t entirely obvious to anyone, professionals or lay people, and typically people explain fluently that it’s right to save five people at the expense of one in the first scenario, then struggle to explain why it’s not right to save five people at the expense of one in the second scenario. This suggests that it’s not something that is taught explicitly, but something that our brains are wired to learn easily but not consciously, like the grammar of one’s native language.

The way I'd view it is this: There is a stronger genetic underpinning to our communal nature than there is to morality, but certain moral "rules"(?) logically flow forth from that communal nature. As you intimate in your first paragraph, ALL behaviours and traits are ultimately genetically based, but there comes a point where that description becomes useless. I'd imagine considering morality as genetic would be passed that point.

zoon wrote:

rEvolutionist wrote:Hmm. Is there any thinking to expect that this is a genetic thing? This could just as easily be a socially learned thing.

I wouldn’t make a sharp distinction between innate and learned behaviour. Very little human social behaviour is entirely innate, not learned at all. Conversely, all learning has to be to some extent under genetic control (and evolved through natural selection), since the complex structures which make learning possible are built up by the proteins which are coded for by genes.

This is partially true, in that it is of course difficult to distinguish between innate and learnt behaviors in people, however, if someone makes the claims that "there are moral truths that are known simply by virtue of being human" then this is a very specific claim that needs to be supported. It specifically claims that there are moral truths which are innate.

zoon wrote:For example, although nobody can speak a language without learning it, it’s clear that the ability to learn language is innate in humans and not in other species.

Highly debatable claim, but I'll leave that for another thread..

zoon wrote:I think the OP was about whether some parts of morality are relatively invariant, or whether they can all vary in the same sort of way that all the words in one language can be different from the words in another language. As you say, there is a possibility that all those who say that it’s OK to flick a switch to save 5 people and kill one, but not OK to save 5 people by actively pushing one to his death, have learnt these two things and could have learnt otherwise as easily as children learn a different word for “mother” in different languages. But people from different cultures do seem to give similar answers to those questions, so it’s at least less likely to vary than the forms of language. Also, the logic behind that pair of answers isn’t entirely obvious to anyone, professionals or lay people, and typically people explain fluently that it’s right to save five people at the expense of one in the first scenario, then struggle to explain why it’s not right to save five people at the expense of one in the second scenario. This suggests that it’s not something that is taught explicitly, but something that our brains are wired to learn easily but not consciously, like the grammar of one’s native language.

The problem here would be to demonstrate that this "moral truth" is a domain-specific adaptation, rather than the product of a more general ability - for example, if you present someone with a comparable non-moral situation like "Would you rather throw away 5 apples or 1 apple?" then invariably, across cultures, people will choose to save the 5 apples at the cost of losing 1 apple. This isn't because of some evolved "apple-saving morality", it comes from the simple fact that we understand basic numbers and, all things being equal, more is better than less.

This is the part of the scientific methodology that causes evolutionary psychology to be mocked by scientists - they start off well by finding a cultural universal trait, but instead of finding evidence that this cultural universal trait is innate or evolved, they just stop there and assert it anyway. Very often the evo psychologists fail to demonstrate that an evolved explanation is preferable to it being a product of a species-specific constraint.

rEvolutionist wrote:The way I'd view it is this: There is a stronger genetic underpinning to our communal nature than there is to morality, but certain moral "rules"(?) logically flow forth from that communal nature. As you intimate in your first paragraph, ALL behaviours and traits are ultimately genetically based, but there comes a point where that description becomes useless. I'd imagine considering morality as genetic would be passed that point.

Indeed. It's actually a situation that is almost perfectly comparable to the supposed finding that there is an innate predisposition towards sniffing out cheaters in a population, known as the "cheater detection module". It was supposed to be innate because all people (even across cultures) made the same cognitive mistake in the Wason selection task, but when presented with content relevant to detecting cheaters, the success rate increased dramatically.

For years evo psychologists believed that it must have been an adaptation because it was culturally universal, however, it was eventually shown that this is unlikely - instead the evidence strongly suggests that it's a product of more general cognitive processes. Russell Gray discusses the research in a section here (and is, in general, a brilliant article on evo psych).

Mr.Samsa wrote:

zoon wrote:

rEvolutionist wrote:Hmm. Is there any thinking to expect that this is a genetic thing? This could just as easily be a socially learned thing.

I wouldn’t make a sharp distinction between innate and learned behaviour. Very little human social behaviour is entirely innate, not learned at all. Conversely, all learning has to be to some extent under genetic control (and evolved through natural selection), since the complex structures which make learning possible are built up by the proteins which are coded for by genes.

This is partially true, in that it is of course difficult to distinguish between innate and learnt behaviors in people, however, if someone makes the claims that "there are moral truths that are known simply by virtue of being human" then this is a very specific claim that needs to be supported. It specifically claims that there are moral truths which are innate.

Might they not be innate now because they have evolved in the past? This is really what the question is for me.

John

z8000783 wrote:

Mr.Samsa wrote:This is partially true, in that it is of course difficult to distinguish between innate and learnt behaviors in people, however, if someone makes the claims that "there are moral truths that are known simply by virtue of being human" then this is a very specific claim that needs to be supported. It specifically claims that there are moral truths which are innate.

Might they not be innate now because they have evolved in the past? This is really what the question is for me.

John

I'm not quite sure I understand your question, John. If the moral truths had evolved in the past, then they would necessarily be innate. When we debate whether something is innate (or has a significant innate component) we are debating whether it evolved or not.

Yes, has anything that we would normally equate to being a 'moral truth' become innate?

John

z8000783 wrote:Yes, has anything that we would normally equate to being a 'moral truth' become innate?

John

I'd say 'no' based on what I've read on the topic, at least nothing as specific as a moral truth. The closest would be some research which has presented evidence that altruism might be an evolved trait, and so we can make some good arguments for this. However, there is still a lot of work to be done in that area and it's certainly far from clear whether it is innate or the product of a more general learning process.

I recall reading / hearing about a study where subjects were given various scenarios involving trams and people on tracks etc... The results seemed to show that there was a 'moral' spot in our brain which lit up and then communicated to the cognitive parts.

I have no idea where to find this source, perhaps someone can point the way?

But, it does seem to show that there is some inherent moral 'mechanism' in us all.

campermon wrote:I recall reading / hearing about a study where subjects were given various scenarios involving trams and people on tracks etc... The results seemed to show that there was a 'moral' spot in our brain which lit up and then communicated to the cognitive parts.

I have no idea where to find this source, perhaps someone can point the way?

I think you might be referring to some of Joshua Greene's experiments (or at the very least, he's probably referenced them here).

campermon wrote:But, it does seem to show that there is some inherent moral 'mechanism' in us all.

Not at all, unless we're dualists. In other words, our behavior is a product of our brain. Our brain is a product of genetics and experience. To say something is "inherent" (i.e. genetic), we need to demonstrate that the part of the brain generating the behavior is genetically-based (keeping in mind that we physically grow structures in our brain as a response to the environment). The finding that there is a part of the brain that lights up when we do stuff is simply neuroscience - if a part of the brain didn't light up, then that would be news. My favourite blog post that explains this common misunderstanding of neuroscience is Neuroskeptic's "Brain Scans Prove that the Brain Does Stuff". To appropriate his comments and apply it to this situation:

But let's grant that the results are valid. This doesn't tell us anything we didn't already know. We know [that people make moral choices] - because that's the whole point of the study. And we know that this must be something to do with their brain, because the brain is where [moral choices], and every other mental event, happen.

So we already know that [moral choice] "has a physical origin", but only in the sense that everything does; being a Democrat or a Republican has a physical origin; being Christian or Muslim has a physical origin; speaking French as opposed to English has a physical origin; etc. etc. None of which is interesting or surprising in the slightest.

The point is that the fact that something is physical doesn't stop it being also psychological. Because psychology happens in the brain. Suppose you see a massive bear roaring and charging towards you, and as a result, you feel scared. The fear has a physical basis, and plenty of physical correlates like raised blood pressure, adrenaline release, etc.

But if someone asks "Why are you scared?", you would answer "Because there's a bear about to eat us", and you'd be right. Someone who came along and said, no, your anxiety is purely physical - I can measure all these physiological differences between you and a normal person - would be an idiot (and eaten).

Unfortunately Neuroskeptic isn't discussing the same topic we are with the "innateness" aspect, but hopefully it's clear how his comments relate to what we're discussing. If you apply the same logic of "innateness" to the other things he's listed there (political position, religion, language) then hopefully it's clear that finding a physical basis of a behavior in no way at all supports the idea that it is innate.

campermon wrote:I recall reading / hearing about a study where subjects were given various scenarios involving trams and people on tracks etc... The results seemed to show that there was a 'moral' spot in our brain which lit up and then communicated to the cognitive parts.

I have no idea where to find this source, perhaps someone can point the way?

But, it does seem to show that there is some inherent moral 'mechanism' in us all.

Zoon refers to it here. The yanks call trams "trolleys".

Hey Mr Samsa,
Is that Morticia in your avatar? It sure looks like an Addams:


Anywho, we have that many traits thought to be genetic, are really some other mechanism-"a product of more general cognitive processes". This makes me think it difficult to impossible to untangle this stuff. Much of it could be a kind of cultural evolution, we do things because they work, do things often enough that rewires the brain. How do you get to a point to distinguish a brain is genetically wired to do 'A' and a genetically-wired brained rewired itself to do 'A' and doing 'A' rewired the genetic wiring? And what if the genetic-wiring is what causes the brain to make the culturally universal decisions that are "a product of more general cognitive processes"? If some genetically run, general optimization routine leads inevitably [pan-culturally] to behaviour 'A', though the situation is entirely environmental, that behavior is genetic or learned?

Mr.Samsa wrote:

zoon wrote:

rEvolutionist wrote:Hmm. Is there any thinking to expect that this is a genetic thing? This could just as easily be a socially learned thing.

I wouldn’t make a sharp distinction between innate and learned behaviour. Very little human social behaviour is entirely innate, not learned at all. Conversely, all learning has to be to some extent under genetic control (and evolved through natural selection), since the complex structures which make learning possible are built up by the proteins which are coded for by genes.

This is partially true, in that it is of course difficult to distinguish between innate and learnt behaviors in people, however, if someone makes the claims that "there are moral truths that are known simply by virtue of being human" then this is a very specific claim that needs to be supported. It specifically claims that there are moral truths which are innate.

It’s true, I wasn’t paying attention to the bit about “moral truths” in the OP. That would imply normative morality, thinking something is essentially-in-itself right or wrong, which I don’t agree with. I’m discussing descriptive morality, the rules people live by in practice.

Mr.Samsa wrote:

zoon wrote:I think the OP was about whether some parts of morality are relatively invariant, or whether they can all vary in the same sort of way that all the words in one language can be different from the words in another language. As you say, there is a possibility that all those who say that it’s OK to flick a switch to save 5 people and kill one, but not OK to save 5 people by actively pushing one to his death, have learnt these two things and could have learnt otherwise as easily as children learn a different word for “mother” in different languages. But people from different cultures do seem to give similar answers to those questions, so it’s at least less likely to vary than the forms of language. Also, the logic behind that pair of answers isn’t entirely obvious to anyone, professionals or lay people, and typically people explain fluently that it’s right to save five people at the expense of one in the first scenario, then struggle to explain why it’s not right to save five people at the expense of one in the second scenario. This suggests that it’s not something that is taught explicitly, but something that our brains are wired to learn easily but not consciously, like the grammar of one’s native language.

The problem here would be to demonstrate that this "moral truth" is a domain-specific adaptation, rather than the product of a more general ability - for example, if you present someone with a comparable non-moral situation like "Would you rather throw away 5 apples or 1 apple?" then invariably, across cultures, people will choose to save the 5 apples at the cost of losing 1 apple. This isn't because of some evolved "apple-saving morality", it comes from the simple fact that we understand basic numbers and, all things being equal, more is better than less.

This is the part of the scientific methodology that causes evolutionary psychology to be mocked by scientists - they start off well by finding a cultural universal trait, but instead of finding evidence that this cultural universal trait is innate or evolved, they just stop there and assert it anyway. Very often the evo psychologists fail to demonstrate that an evolved explanation is preferable to it being a product of a species-specific constraint.

Your remarks are entirely correct, as applied only to the first part of the trolley problem. Yes, indeed, choosing to save 5 people at the expense of 1 makes numerical sense, and doesn’t say anything specifically about social decision-making. If that was the whole of the trolley problem, it would be wholly uninteresting, for the reasons you give.

The interesting part comes with the second question, is it right to push the fat guy off the bridge to save 5 people by killing him? At that point, for most people, numerical sense goes out of the window. Most of us suddenly have a powerful intuition that it is not at all right to push the man to his death, even though the upshot, choosing to save 5 people and kill one, is the same as in the first scenario, where most of us are happy to flick the fatal switch. The underlying logic of this second decision is harder to analyse. Actually laying hands on someone to harm them becomes punishable in a way that indirect harm does not (even when the indirect harm has clearly been caused by a person), and this looks more like a specifically social response.

rEvolutionist wrote:The way I'd view it is this: There is a stronger genetic underpinning to our communal nature than there is to morality, but certain moral "rules"(?) logically flow forth from that communal nature. As you intimate in your first paragraph, ALL behaviours and traits are ultimately genetically based, but there comes a point where that description becomes useless. I'd imagine considering morality as genetic would be passed that point.

It seems to me that morality, for example the sense of fairness, and the readiness to exert group sanctions on individual members of the group, is central to our communal nature. Are these so straightforwardly logical as not to be worth investigating as, at least possibly, evolved through natural selection?

Mr.Samsa wrote: It's actually a situation that is almost perfectly comparable to the supposed finding that there is an innate predisposition towards sniffing out cheaters in a population, known as the "cheater detection module". It was supposed to be innate because all people (even across cultures) made the same cognitive mistake in the Wason selection task, but when presented with content relevant to detecting cheaters, the success rate increased dramatically.

For years evo psychologists believed that it must have been an adaptation because it was culturally universal, however, it was eventually shown that this is unlikely - instead the evidence strongly suggests that it's a product of more general cognitive processes.

It’s been suggested (by Joshua Greene and others) that the trolley problem may be the result of two different parts of the brain being activated in the two different scenarios. In the first, it’s all about calculation, 5 against 1, choose 5. In the second scenario, pushing the man off the bridge, the calculation is overwhelmed by a more emotional response, in another part of the brain, prohibiting the causing of direct harm to another person. If that is the case, it could be argued that this is a collision of two more general cognitive processes, rather than a specifically evolved response, but I don’t think it could be argued successfully that the two processes did not evolve, or that the second is not social. (The trolley problem is unlike the Wason selection task in that it’s not obviously adaptive, it’s an interesting observed quirk of moral thinking rather than part of an ideologically driven programme.)