Just a note: if Byron wants to address ortholodox Christianity, God is not looked at as a person. God is personal, but not person. Instead, there are 3 persons in one being or substance, I suppose. Cerberus can be looked at as a good analogue. Three different heads corresponding to three different persons, but one being.

Mick wrote:Just a note: if Byron wants to address ortholodox Christianity, God is not looked at as a person. God is personal, but not person. Instead, there are 3 persons in one being or substance, I suppose. Cerberus can be looked at as a good analogue. Three different heads corresponding to three different persons, but one being.

I think Byron has been adequately describing orthodox Christianity, although you're right, he does seem to have accidentally confused "substance" with "persons" in his description of the Trinity. There are said to be three persons in the Trinity, all of whom share the same substance. I'm sure this was an unintentional slip, though, as Byron's impressive posting history does not betray an impoverished understanding of Christian theology. In any case, even the Church has had to come up against the inevitable wall of irrationality in saying "3=1," and in the end concedes that it just has to be flatly accepted as a theological mystery, the likes of which human comprehension cannot grasp. (Naturally).

Filioqué!

Mick wrote:Just a note: if Byron wants to address ortholodox Christianity, God is not looked at as a person. God is personal, but not person. Instead, there are 3 persons in one being or substance, I suppose. Cerberus can be looked at as a good analogue. Three different heads corresponding to three different persons, but one being.

So what it all boils down to is: God suffers from multiple personality disorder.
That explains quite a lot actually.

Assuming the bible is the sole basis of Christianity does the trinity even count as Christianity?

Haven't read any of the debate thread or any of the peanut gallery, but I'm guessing the protagonist position will revolve around debating the meaning of "rationally", essentially try to define arguments for Christianity into being rational.

Problem with religion versus non-religion is there simply isnt a shared language. Politics generally is about priorities. You can disagree what the priorities are but even people who differ in political views speak the same language

Someone who tries to justify god or chrisitanity might as well be speaking in Chinese

Mick wrote:Just a note: if Byron wants to address ortholodox Christianity, God is not looked at as a person. God is personal, but not person. Instead, there are 3 persons in one being or substance, I suppose. Cerberus can be looked at as a good analogue. Three different heads corresponding to three different persons, but one being.

What a bunch of crap.

Oh, finally!

Byron's latest post just added.

Byron,

You did a better job here. In contrast, you earlier response and opener were awful. Just a few notes.

God loathes sin, but, omnipotent and omniscient, chooses to create it: this is not consistent or logical behavior

I am not too sure what "logical behaviour" is, but there is no formal inconsistency between the propositions:

1. God loathes sin.
2. God is omniscient and omnipotent.
3. God chooses to create sin.

If you have an unsaid premise, you can't afford to hide it, for 1-3 are clearly not inconsistent on their own.

That said, I am unsure what you mean by "creating" sin. God allows for sin, but he is not its productive cause or creator. Sin, on the Christian view is the production of men.


Secondly: Good job showing some interaction with Euthyphro. However, it is a Socratic dialogue, not a Platonic dialogue. Moreover, Socrates did not address any "inherent flaw" in god given morality. Euthyphro did not choose the option that that which is good is good because gods will it; and so Socrates does not address it. You are imposing later thought into Euthyphro.

Thirdly: you mischaracterize WLC's position. His position doesn't "comes down to the "good is whatever God says it is,"". The position you prescribe to him is called theological voluntarism-Craig rejects it. Craig says that our moral obligations are constituted by His commands, and that God is goodness itself. His commands are expressions of His nature, goodness itself. Thus, His commands are anchored in the very being of goodness, and they cannot be arbitrarily prescribed.

Fourthly: you replied to me here: "Even if humanity had a consistent ethic, it would do nothing to prove a conscious and omnipotent god of three persons (in this theological context I use "person" interchangeably with "personal": an entity that is conscious and self-aware)." But you can't use a noun interchangeably with an adjective.

Ill say more later.

Mick wrote:Byron,

You did a better job here. In contrast, you earlier response and opener were awful. Just a few notes.

God loathes sin, but, omnipotent and omniscient, chooses to create it: this is not consistent or logical behavior

I am not too sure what "logical behaviour" is, but there is no formal inconsistency between the propositions:

1. God loathes sin.
2. God is omniscient and omnipotent.
3. God chooses to create sin.

If you have an unsaid premise, you can't afford to hide it, for 1-3 are clearly not inconsistent on their own.

That said, I am unsure what you mean by "creating" sin. God allows for sin, but he is not its productive cause or creator. Sin, on the Christian view is the production of men.


Secondly: Good job showing some interaction with Euthyphro. However, it is a Socratic dialogue, not a Platonic dialogue. Moreover, Socrates did not address any "inherent flaw" in god given morality. Euthyphro did not choose the option that that which is good is good because gods will it; and so Socrates does not address it. You are imposing later thought into Euthyphro.

Thirdly: you mischaracterize WLC's position. His position doesn't "comes down to the "good is whatever God says it is,"". The position you prescribe to him is called theological voluntarism-Craig rejects it. Craig says that our moral obligations are constituted by His commands, and that God is goodness itself. His commands are expressions of His nature, goodness itself. Thus, His commands are anchored in the very being of goodness, and they cannot be arbitrarily prescribed.

Fourthly: you replied to me here: "Even if humanity had a consistent ethic, it would do nothing to prove a conscious and omnipotent god of three persons (in this theological context I use "person" interchangeably with "personal": an entity that is conscious and self-aware)." But you can't use a noun interchangeably with an adjective.

Ill say more later.

Had a rational conversation with any more dead nuns lately, Mick?

Mick wrote:Byron,

You did a better job here. In contrast, you earlier response and opener were awful. Just a few notes.

God loathes sin, but, omnipotent and omniscient, chooses to create it: this is not consistent or logical behavior

I am not too sure what "logical behaviour" is, but there is no formal inconsistency between the propositions:

1. God loathes sin.
2. God is omniscient and omnipotent.
3. God chooses to create sin.

If you have an unsaid premise, you can't afford to hide it, for 1-3 are clearly not inconsistent on their own.

I figure Byron means by "logical behaviour" something like "consistent with practical reason" (practical to be contrasted with theoretical, not to be taken as prudential), but I agree that this needs spelling out. An obvious rejoinder on behalf of the theist: God loathes sin but creates it for the sake of a greater good.

Mick wrote:Thirdly: you mischaracterize WLC's position. His position doesn't "comes down to the "good is whatever God says it is,"". The position you prescribe to him is called theological voluntarism-Craig rejects it. Craig says that our moral obligations are constituted by His commands, and that God is goodness itself. His commands are expressions of His nature, goodness itself. Thus, His commands are anchored in the very being of goodness, and they cannot be arbitrarily prescribed.

Yeah, it's confusing the right with the good. That said, "the right is whatever God says it is" is not far off, I think.

Spinozasgalt wrote:

Mick wrote:Byron,

You did a better job here. In contrast, you earlier response and opener were awful. Just a few notes.

God loathes sin, but, omnipotent and omniscient, chooses to create it: this is not consistent or logical behavior

I am not too sure what "logical behaviour" is, but there is no formal inconsistency between the propositions:

1. God loathes sin.
2. God is omniscient and omnipotent.
3. God chooses to create sin.

If you have an unsaid premise, you can't afford to hide it, for 1-3 are clearly not inconsistent on their own.

I figure Byron means by "logical behaviour" something like "consistent with practical reason" (practical to be contrasted with theoretical, not to be taken as prudential), but I agree that this needs spelling out. An obvious rejoinder on behalf of the theist: God loathes sin but creates it for the sake of a greater good.

Mick wrote:Thirdly: you mischaracterize WLC's position. His position doesn't "comes down to the "good is whatever God says it is,"". The position you prescribe to him is called theological voluntarism-Craig rejects it. Craig says that our moral obligations are constituted by His commands, and that God is goodness itself. His commands are expressions of His nature, goodness itself. Thus, His commands are anchored in the very being of goodness, and they cannot be arbitrarily prescribed.

Yeah, it's confusing the right with the good. That said, "the right is whatever God says it is" is not far off, I think.

That's fine, so long as we don't identify the right with God's command or make them semantically equivalent.

Ya, constitution. Not identity.

All types of 'oh dear' in Will's latest post.

Mick wrote: Craig says that our moral obligations are constituted by His commands, and that God is goodness itself. His commands are expressions of His nature, goodness itself. Thus, His commands are anchored in the very being of goodness, and they cannot be arbitrarily prescribed.

At the age of five or six, many children reckon that they can convince their mother that they have eaten their peas by scattering the peas about the plate.

Avoiding the dilemma by lumping the two horns together into one is the slickest approach, but a good hard look at the thing will reveal that this is an evasion. Why is God good?

To an attempt to continue evasion by responding with "God is Goodness itself", I will ask "Why is God Goodness itself?".

How do we determine that god is goodness itself? How do we know that god is good and the devil is bad and not the other way around?

The bible of course proclaims this, but how do human beings determine that the claim is true?

Faith, pumpkin, duh.

Mick wrote:Thirdly: you mischaracterize WLC's position. His position doesn't "comes down to the "good is whatever God says it is,"". The position you prescribe to him is called theological voluntarism-Craig rejects it. Craig says that our moral obligations are constituted by His commands, and that God is goodness itself. His commands are expressions of His nature, goodness itself. Thus, His commands are anchored in the very being of goodness, and they cannot be arbitrarily prescribed.

Is the right not good? Is the good not right? Can the right be bad and still be good? Can the good be wrong and still be right? Does God not prescribe the right and the good, and proscribe the wrong and the bad(?)

In Craig's command-theology the right and the good are constituted, that is; the are defined, by prescription. Therefore, for the commanded Christian, any and all god-prescriptions and proscriptions (for god-proscriptions are simply prescriptions to not do something-or-other) are always and only ever right, even if they are morally objectionable (for example, the commanded slaughter of innocents). Obeying the injunctions of God in this manner is the epitome of goodness, according to command-theology.

It is the apologetic distinction between the right and the good which is arbitrary here, for it is in the application of that arbitrary distinction that the bad is so often deemed right - which is to say, that the application of this distinction muddies the issues so that the morally objectionable can be, and is, passed off as axiomatic goodly righteousness according to God's (presumed) will.

Of course, the real question is who can know the will of God, and how, such that the right thing, and therefore the good thing, can be morally assured? Addressing that without asserting a 'just because' plea is where the moral reasoning of the monotheist often fails, and when it does fail it fails hard.