The Impossibility of Dualism + Chalmers Hard Problem = Monistic Idealism
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jfraatz wrote: Mentality can not reduce to non-mentality.
jfraatz wrote:burden of proof required by the positive assertion of materialism
Cito di Pense wrote:jfraatz wrote: Mentality can not reduce to non-mentality.
No trace of mentality anywhere in this. Words, maybe. But not 'mentality'.jfraatz wrote:burden of proof required by the positive assertion of materialism
So, the words appear before us in no medium, by virtue of pure mentality. That's'a good one, eh, boss! In the beginning was the word, then?
Thomas Eshuis wrote:Cito di Pense wrote:jfraatz wrote: Mentality can not reduce to non-mentality.
No trace of mentality anywhere in this. Words, maybe. But not 'mentality'.jfraatz wrote:burden of proof required by the positive assertion of materialism
So, the words appear before us in no medium, by virtue of pure mentality. That's'a good one, eh, boss! In the beginning was the word, then?
Still unable to see how this is not sollipsism.
Rumraket wrote:Your premises are question-begging arguments from ignorance.
jfraatz wrote:I am curious to see if anyone can refute this. To date, no one has.
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Premise 1.) Substance dualism is impossible. (due to the internal contradictions posed by interactionism -and I think most everyone here can agree)
Premise 2.) Mentality can not reduce to non-mentality. (due to Chalmers Hard Problem, and Levine's Explanatory Gap)
Conclusion: Mind is the only substance that can possibly exist, and thus monistic idealism entails.
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Most everyone I know, with few exceptions, attacks Premise 2.) so I will set up two defenses of it here.
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Firstly, thought experiments with modal logic and solipsism:
P1.) Minds COULD exist in purely solipsistic universes.
P2.) Solipsistic universes are purely mental and immaterial. (as everything material* is an illusion of the mind)
C1.) Minds can exist in immaterial universes. (from C1 and C2)
P3.) Nothing material can exist in an immaterial universe.
C2.) Minds can not be material in any possible world. (from C1 and P3)
Thus premise 2.) stands.
*This includes any and all proposed material explanations of consciousness from neuroscience COMBINED with materialism.
To rule out this one has to disprove the possibility of solipsism. In principle of course, I am not ACTUALLY arguing for solipsism, just pointing out that it's POSSIBLE existence tells us something about the nature of mentality.
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Secondly, I will point out that any attempts to argue that the mind is material because it is based on a material brain, begs the question as to whether or not the brain is actually material. Since Idealism is what is being argued for, the contingency of the mind on the brain is entirely compatible with the argument, as in an idealist universe our minds would be dependent on a larger mind, of which the brain is a projection. Thus it is not at all surprising that the mind would be dependent on the brain.
Thus to argue that the mind is material because it is based on a material brain, one must first demonstrate that the brain is actually material, and that there is evidence for said material substance behind our empirical evidence of such.
So to refute Premise 2.) one will need to first shoulder the burden of proof required by the positive assertion of materialism, that matter does in fact exist.
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Tell me if you can refute this, either by providing evidence that matter exists behind our perceptions, or by showing how substance dualism is a logically viable alternative.
Just A Theory wrote:jfraatz wrote:I am curious to see if anyone can refute this. To date, no one has.
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Premise 1.) Substance dualism is impossible. (due to the internal contradictions posed by interactionism -and I think most everyone here can agree)
Premise 2.) Mentality can not reduce to non-mentality. (due to Chalmers Hard Problem, and Levine's Explanatory Gap)
Conclusion: Mind is the only substance that can possibly exist, and thus monistic idealism entails.
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Neither Chalmers nor Levine have demonstrated that their problems or gaps actually require an explanation. At best, they point to the subjective nature of interpretation of qualia. At worst, they merely hide their own ignorance in the scientific gaps in the understanding of emotion and emotional responses.
In short, Premise 2 has not been demonstrated to be correct for the trivial reason that no full model of the brain has yet been constructed. It is unknown precisely what emergent properties could arise from a neural network that contains over 100 billion agents that can each form hundreds or thousands of connections.Most everyone I know, with few exceptions, attacks Premise 2.) so I will set up two defenses of it here.
You're quite correct. Premise 2 is laughable.---------------
Firstly, thought experiments with modal logic and solipsism:
P1.) Minds COULD exist in purely solipsistic universes.
P2.) Solipsistic universes are purely mental and immaterial. (as everything material* is an illusion of the mind)
C1.) Minds can exist in immaterial universes. (from C1 and C2)
P3.) Nothing material can exist in an immaterial universe.
C2.) Minds can not be material in any possible world. (from C1 and P3)
Thus premise 2.) stands.
No.
The error in the above formulation lies because you're generalising from a solipsistic universe in C1 to any possible universe in C2. By definition, the set of "any possible universe" must include "non-solipsistic universes".
C2 thus does not follow from P3 and C1.*This includes any and all proposed material explanations of consciousness from neuroscience COMBINED with materialism.
To rule out this one has to disprove the possibility of solipsism. In principle of course, I am not ACTUALLY arguing for solipsism, just pointing out that it's POSSIBLE existence tells us something about the nature of mentality.
No sorry, this is not correct. The syllogism above contains a basic logical flaw.-------------
Secondly, I will point out that any attempts to argue that the mind is material because it is based on a material brain, begs the question as to whether or not the brain is actually material. Since Idealism is what is being argued for, the contingency of the mind on the brain is entirely compatible with the argument, as in an idealist universe our minds would be dependent on a larger mind, of which the brain is a projection. Thus it is not at all surprising that the mind would be dependent on the brain.
Under this type of logical formulation, it is entirely possible that nothing is material. Solipsism can't be disproven but it's also functionally useless as an argument for (or against) anything.
The brain is material, I can cut someone open and touch their brain. If I cut away parts of their brain, their mental functions are impaired; they may even describe an alteration in their subjective experiences. Unless solipsism is the only world (and remember that your logical formation wants to discuss all possible universes) then this is quite conclusive evidence that the brain is in fact material and that it does have an effect on the mind.Thus to argue that the mind is material because it is based on a material brain, one must first demonstrate that the brain is actually material, and that there is evidence for said material substance behind our empirical evidence of such.
So to refute Premise 2.) one will need to first shoulder the burden of proof required by the positive assertion of materialism, that matter does in fact exist.
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Matter exists because not all universes are solipsistic.Tell me if you can refute this, either by providing evidence that matter exists behind our perceptions, or by showing how substance dualism is a logically viable alternative.
Done.
Thomas Eshuis wrote:Also have you published a paper yet, on your 'universe is a mind' claim?
jfraatz wrote:Please empirically verify the verification principle for me. Go and give me some peer-reviewed papers as to where the verification principle was located, and what means they used to empirically verify it's existence.
Until then, you have no evidence for positivism.
Sovereign wrote:Thomas Eshuis wrote:Also have you published a paper yet, on your 'universe is a mind' claim?
No he hasn't. He's on thejfraatz wrote:Please empirically verify the verification principle for me. Go and give me some peer-reviewed papers as to where the verification principle was located, and what means they used to empirically verify it's existence.
Until then, you have no evidence for positivism.
argumentation style.
Thomas Eshuis wrote:Do you have any evidence that there exists no matter beyond our perceptions?
jfraatz wrote:Mind is the only substance that can possibly exist
jfraatz wrote:Hence I do not have the burden of proof.
Thomas Eshuis wrote:Just A Theory wrote:jfraatz wrote:I am curious to see if anyone can refute this. To date, no one has.Neither Chalmers nor Levine have demonstrated that their problems or gaps actually require an explanation. At best, they point to the subjective nature of interpretation of qualia. At worst, they merely hide their own ignorance in the scientific gaps in the understanding of emotion and emotional responses.
Actually they have. In Chalmers case the gap has been demonstrated by the possibility of p-zombies. In Levine's case he's pointed out that all the properties of the mind are subjective, while all of the properties of the (supposedly) material brain are objective. Thus there is no way to explain one with the other, as they use descriptions which are fundamentally irreducible to one another. (To deny this is to commit a category error)
And it appears that you are demonstrating your ignorance that the gap is non-empirical and therefore beyond the scope of science altogether. Unless you are going to say that science can make non-empirical metaphysical claims?In short, Premise 2 has not been demonstrated to be correct for the trivial reason that no full model of the brain has yet been constructed.
My "modal solipsism" argument does demonstrate that to be correct though. Any "future full model of the brain" would fall under the category of "solipsistic illusion" in a solipsistic universe and the mind would still be immaterial and non-reducible to non-mind in such a universe.
And since the mind could exist in such a universe, this demonstrates that it is immaterial in all other universes as well -even ones where "future full models of the brain" exist.It is unknown precisely what emergent properties could arise from a neural network that contains over 100 billion agents that can each form hundreds or thousands of connections.
It is however known, what CAN NOT arise from them (assuming they are only material) -and that is anything that is also not reducible back into them. The color red for instance can not be cut in half continually until it produces neural correlates. If this neural network is purely materially objective, it can not give rise to anything subjective -as that would imply that science is delving into metaphysics.The error in the above formulation lies because you're generalising from a solipsistic universe in C1 to any possible universe in C2. By definition, the set of "any possible universe" must include "non-solipsistic universes".
I don't think you're getting the point of modal argumentation here. Let me explain:
The mind is the mind regardless of what universe it is in -solipsist or otherwise. However because it CAN exist in a solipsist universe, and all things in solipsist universes are immaterial, then the mind is immaterial. However since the mind is the mind, then the mind is what it is in any other universe as well -including the non-solipsist ones. So C2 does follow from P3 and C1.
That's the whole point of the argument, to use a particular hypothetical to draw a general conclusion about something in the hypothetical. I'm sure you are familiar with this. It's a thought experiment. Philosophers and theoretical physicists do it all of the time.Under this type of logical formulation, it is entirely possible that nothing is material.
Exactly.Solipsism can't be disproven but it's also functionally useless as an argument for (or against) anything.
Well it's useful as a hypothetical. Since minds CAN exist in solipsist universes, and everything in a solipsist universe is immaterial, this proves that the mind is immaterial as well. (or else it couldn't exist in a hypothetical solipsist universe)The brain is material, I can cut someone open and touch their brain. If I cut away parts of their brain, their mental functions are impaired; they may even describe an alteration in their subjective experiences. Unless solipsism is the only world (and remember that your logical formation wants to discuss all possible universes) then this is quite conclusive evidence that the brain is in fact material and that it does have an effect on the mind.
That would also happen in an idealist universe -which is what is being argued for here. So I don't see how that is particularly relevant.Matter exists because not all universes are solipsistic.
jfraatz wrote:That doesn't follow. Remember, it's not a choice between solipsism and materialism only. Afterall Berkeleyanism, not solipsism, is what is being argued for.
jfraatz wrote:Matter doesn't exist in monistic idealist universes either.
jfraatz wrote:And the point of the argument is that all universes are mental universes. So if that follows
Thomas Eshuis wrote:jfraatz wrote:Thomas Eshuis wrote:Yes you are
No, no, I'm not the one asserting the existence of matter. What you are asking of me is akin to someone asking an atheist if "he has any evidence that God does not exist."
The burden of proof lies on the claimant, not on the person lacking belief in the claim. I simply lack a belief that matter exists. You are asserting it does. Therefore you have the burden of proof.Edit, more-over, as a defender of a particular claim/argument, in this case the 'Introspective argument', you very much do carry the burden of proof to defend any and all statements that are part of that argument.
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