I was thinking about atheism, theism and etc. earlier today when a weird argument for atheism or atleast being non-religious came to my mind.

There are Theists (My religions teacher at school for example) who claim that faith is not irrational, because you can neither prove god´s existence to be true, nor to be false.
Thus choosing one of them and fully disapproving of the other would have to be irrational.

But if we, for example, want to determine the probability of a particle being in a certain position, we say that (assuming that the %´cents are equally splitted between all the possible positions) this is P(x) = 1/Total number of possible positions.
But when we now just want to calculate the P(A) of it being in a certain region, the probability will go up, because our assumption integrates more positions. Complementary, the further we define the region, (reduce it´s size) where we assume it is positioned, the further P(A) will go down.

So now If I would put a box on a table and made an approach towards an audience, stating that God is inside my box (God being just any unprovable something), you could neither disprove nor prove me (by not looking into the box. This is basically the same as saying god is anywhere, but invisible, untouchable...etc.).

Now if God really just is any unprovable something, the probability of my claim being true should be 0.5 (or 50%), defining that there are no other variables determining the probability of god being there except that he either is, or is not.

P(E) = 0.5

But now, when someone would rise up from the audience and exclaim that he would further define God as being "Red", this must necessarily lower the probabilty, or must it not?
The probability of a specifically "Red" God being in there instead of anything else unprovable, should then be (assuming that the %´cents are equally splitted between all the possible colours):

P(R,E) = P(E)*(1/Total possible colours)

Then we would have the following distribution:

E = Existing
!E = Not Existing
R = Red
!R = Non-Red

P(!R,E) = P(E)*(Total possible colours-1/Total possible colours)

P(!E) = 0.5 > P(R,E)
P(!E) = 0.5 > P(!R,E)

So the further someone would define this God (unprovable something) the more rational it would become to disapprove of their belief. And further defining it is just what all (known to me) theistic religions do.
Thus, we could mathematically claim that Atheism is more rational than Theism.

Please inform me if this is totally wrong, because if it is not, I will definitely enjoy presenting this argument to my teacher.

This misunderstands the nature of the claims made by some religions, as well as the role of some religions. For a religion where the central thing is claims about the truth about God, sure, this might be a good approach, but many religions don't really play that game.

Can you give an example of a religion which does not play "that game"? (To satisfy my interest, not to prove yourself). As far as I know, every theistic religion should atleast be a little concerned about the existence of their god. Or is that a misconception?

I think your OP is more of an argument against religion, particularly those that preach some sort of divine doctrine. In this respect it is applicable.

Furthermore, if the probability of God existing to not existing is 50/50, then we can pretty much insert any other unevidenced entities into that same category. i.e. one would need to concede that dragons, fairies, leprechauns, flying spaghetti monsters etc. etc. all have a 50/50 possibility of being true also.

RationalVegan wrote:Can you give an example of a religion which does not play "that game"? (To satisfy my interest, not to prove yourself). As far as I know, every theistic religion should atleast be a little concerned about the existence of their god. Or is that a misconception?

Some varieties of Judaism have a God that is so abstract and featureless that what remains of God basically just is atheism + a strange way of talking about reality. Traces of this can be found among orthodox Jews that can say things like "God's existence is irrelevant, whether I obey these rules is relevant" or things like that. For many religions, the claims aren't what counts, it's the behaviours - in Judaism, the customs and the Torah. As God is rather vaguely defined, a kind of really really reduced God, e.g. the kind that Maimonides held

Buddhism in many of its forms likewise seems to make no or few claims about gods, and some modern varieties of Christianity likewise seem to be getting rid of the notion or weakening it significantly.

In such religions, the important thing tends to be community; a shared kind of frame of reference, where the entire community knows the same stories - but don't necessarily believe them, and use them as framing devices to talk about life and such; some kind of shared assumptions about how to interact with each other. Rituals then form a kind of practical, rather concrete way of illustrating and 'participating' in the stories. (Note: I am not using any standardized terminology from academic research right now.)

Some varieties of Judaism have a God that is so abstract and featureless that what remains of God basically just is atheism + a strange way of talking about reality. Traces of this can be found among orthodox Jews that can say things like "God's existence is irrelevant, whether I obey these rules is relevant" or things like that. For many religions, the claims aren't what counts, it's the behaviours - in Judaism, the customs and the Torah. As God is rather vaguely defined, a kind of really really reduced God, e.g. the kind that Maimonides held

Buddhism in many of its forms likewise seems to make no or few claims about gods, and some modern varieties of Christianity likewise seem to be getting rid of the notion or weakening it significantly.

Thanks for sharing.
If people believe in a religion only for the social benefits, then I do not think that there would be any need to prove their belief wrong of course. So you are of course correct with your original statement.

HughMcB wrote:Furthermore, if the probability of God existing to not existing is 50/50, then we can pretty much insert any other unevidenced entities into that same category. i.e. one would need to concede that dragons, fairies, leprechauns, flying spaghetti monsters etc. etc. all have a 50/50 possibility of being true also.

I think those are included in the definition I gave "God being just any unprovable something".
The spaggethi monster or a leprechaun are certain definitions of a "Unprovable something". For this, their probability of existence is lower than the one of any "Unprovable something" existing, which is perfectly reasonable, as no matter which of them would exist, "Unprovable Something" existing would always be true if we define it as the "Basis".

In this way, the probability of a Dragon instead of a Fairy or anything else existing in my box should be:

P(D) = P(E)*(1/Total amount of possible forms that can be taken)

HughMcB wrote:Furthermore, if the probability of God existing to not existing is 50/50, then we can pretty much insert any other unevidenced entities into that same category. i.e. one would need to concede that dragons, fairies, leprechauns, flying spaghetti monsters etc. etc. all have a 50/50 possibility of being true also.

With "unevidenced", do you mean empirical evidence? What is your view on the reasonableness of demanding empirical evidence for the supposedly metaphysical?

IgnorantiaNescia wrote:

HughMcB wrote:Furthermore, if the probability of God existing to not existing is 50/50, then we can pretty much insert any other unevidenced entities into that same category. i.e. one would need to concede that dragons, fairies, leprechauns, flying spaghetti monsters etc. etc. all have a 50/50 possibility of being true also.

With "unevidenced", do you mean empirical evidence? What is your view on the reasonableness of demanding empirical evidence for the supposedly metaphysical?

Are you talking about Aristotelian metaphysics or supernatural metaphysics?

Anything which has an effect on reality can be observed in reality (reality being that which can be observed). If you wish to speculate on forces which have no effect on reality then go for your life, but one must wonder how one can "know" such a force .....(I was going to use the word "exists", but it seems entirely inappropriate).

Fenrir wrote:Are you talking about Aristotelian metaphysics or supernatural metaphysics?

Anything which has an effect on reality can be observed in reality (reality being that which can be observed).

emp mine.