Regina wrote:PR(H | E & B ) = [Pr(E | H & B) x Pr(H | B)] / Pr(E | B),

where Pr(E | B ) = Pr(E | H & B) x Pr(H | B) + Pr(E | ~H & B) x Pr(~H | B)= 42

However, given a posterior distribution P(θ|y) for quantity z of fried chicken thought to have been consumed, there is a estimated 100% chance of KFC resulting in a number 2.

Mick wrote:

Regina wrote:So you can make a living trying to calculate the probability of one figment of the imagination over the other?

That's unchartiable. Philosophers philosophize for a living. One topic of philosophy from ancient times up until now is whether there is a god. Whether you like it or not, it remains a vibrant area of debate among professional philosophers. Perhaps the matter is settled for you, but who cares? You're not scholarly philosophy.

You are right. I'm not "scholarly philosophy". But I might be a scholarly philosopher. You have no way of knowing.
And here is Mr Lowder himself:

For a variety of reasons, I ended up never even applying to grad school. I've continued to study philosophy independently and would love to go to grad school at some point, but I have no plan to do so anytime soon.

Ultimately though what we believe in is based on the material that is in or brain i.e. the connections that make up our memories and which alter our thoughts. Add a suitable set of connections and we would believe in God (or anything), or take away these connections then we would stop believing in God (or anything).

Learning is what creates these connections and this can be due to experience or evidence. The absence of the connections through not learning is not the same as absence of the connection due to no evidence though the result is the same in that if such a set of connections means a belief in god then when there are no connections for whatever reason (born that way or have never learnt this) then there is no belief.

This is what I usually mean by not having a belief in god; nothing has stuck that makes me positively believe in god i.e. I do not have these memories. I have a very good filter; it is my belief that if you teach children to be sceptical and cautious and to verify what you trust before they get taught about woo then woo will not infest their mind. Equally if you can infest the children's mind with woo that turns off sceptical though then you can control that mind a lot more easier.

Now a person could also have the positive belief that there is no god and this would be a set of connections that they have learnt that make them believe this to be true. Very few atheists are like this.

Then there is those who have doubts about god and here the atheist would have to have a belief in god i.e. they would have had to have evidence and thus learnt about the positive existence of god and have such connections but then altered the weighting of that network of connections with new learning that in effectually swamped this belief. I believe that those that did believe but now have doubts are in this category. This is no different from any learning - you correct your mistakes.

Finally there is the often claimed that the atheist is in denial of God. For this to be valid the atheist would have to have a belief in god i.e. they would have had to have evidence and thus learnt about the positive existence of god and maintain this but then altered the weighting of that network of connections with new learning that in effect deliberately balanced out this belief. The result is the denial. I doubt many are like this. If most people believe in something they run with it. This is juggling two mutually exclusive beliefs at once for no particular reason and it's not like they are equal - the believer in the Christian God has to disbelieve the Hindu, Maori, Egyptian, Greek, Australian, Roman and so on gods.

Ultimately everything we believe in, everything we are, lies in the connections in our brain and the more we understand how beliefs are stored the smaller the gap that god can hide.

LucidFlight wrote:

Regina wrote:PR(H | E & B ) = [Pr(E | H & B) x Pr(H | B)] / Pr(E | B),

where Pr(E | B ) = Pr(E | H & B) x Pr(H | B) + Pr(E | ~H & B) x Pr(~H | B)= 42

However, given a posterior distribution P(θ|y) for quantity z of fried chicken thought to have been consumed, there is a estimated 100% chance of KFC resulting in a number 2.

Did you factor the strength of the posterior tensor into your flow calculations?

Made of Stars wrote:

LucidFlight wrote:

Regina wrote:PR(H | E & B ) = [Pr(E | H & B) x Pr(H | B)] / Pr(E | B),

where Pr(E | B ) = Pr(E | H & B) x Pr(H | B) + Pr(E | ~H & B) x Pr(~H | B)= 42

However, given a posterior distribution P(θ|y) for quantity z of fried chicken thought to have been consumed, there is a estimated 100% chance of KFC resulting in a number 2.

Did you factor the strength of the posterior tensor into your flow calculations?

I guess Lucid did not. The whole KFC angle looks fishy.

Regina wrote:I guess Lucid did not. The whole KFC angle looks fishy.

Yes, that would be the Poisson distribution in effect.

Regina wrote:

Made of Stars wrote:

LucidFlight wrote:
However, given a posterior distribution P(θ|y) for quantity z of fried chicken thought to have been consumed, there is a estimated 100% chance of KFC resulting in a number 2.

Did you factor the strength of the posterior tensor into your flow calculations?

I guess Lucid did not. The whole KFC angle looks fishy.

Fowl, more like!

Anyway, everyone knows it's a secret formula!

OK, ok. I have to think it through. In the most scholarly fashion, naturally.

LucidFlight wrote:

Regina wrote:I guess Lucid did not. The whole KFC angle looks fishy.

Yes, that would be the Poisson distribution in effect.

At least it's not neither fish nor fowl. Sorry in advance for the negative dialectic.

We do see that the origin of universes is not as much a problem of production as a problem of distribution.

Rumraket wrote:Jlowder, what do you think of the response to fine-tuning arguments, that it's fallacious to attempt a probability argument with a sample size of one?
In other words, we only have one example of a universe with a set of laws in it, and we don't even know if they can vary, never mind by how much. So the fine-tuning argument is basically an argument from blind assertion.

The strength of this objection depends upon the details of the specific version(s) of the FTA(s) we are considering. This objection is a strong objection against any version of the FTA which depends upon the frequency interpretation of probability, which defines probability as the number of times an outcome appears in a long series of similar events.

It is a weak, irrelevant objection against any version of the FTA which depends upon the logical or epistemic interpretations of probability, since epistemic and logical probabilities are not calculated by counting the number of relevant instances within a class. Rather, the epistemic probability of a statement is a measure of the probability that a statement is true, given some stock of knowledge. In other words, personal probability measures a person’s degree of belief in a statement. The logical theory of probability defines probability in terms of a logical relation between evidence and a hypothesis, i.e., the degree of rational belief in a statement.

The strongest versions of the FTA, in my opinion, rely upon the epistemic or logical interpretations of probability. For example, IIRC, Richard Swinburne's version uses the epstemic version of probability. In a similar way, the strongest version of the evidential argument from evil, which IMO is Paul Draper's argument from the biological role of pain and pleasure, also uses the epistemic interpretation.

jlowder wrote:

Rumraket wrote:Jlowder, what do you think of the response to fine-tuning arguments, that it's fallacious to attempt a probability argument with a sample size of one?
In other words, we only have one example of a universe with a set of laws in it, and we don't even know if they can vary, never mind by how much. So the fine-tuning argument is basically an argument from blind assertion.

The strength of this objection depends upon the details of the specific version(s) of the FTA(s) we are considering. This objection is a strong objection against any version of the FTA which depends upon the frequency interpretation of probability, which defines probability as the number of times an outcome appears in a long series of similar events.

Okay. So, would it be correct to say that it's a strong objection against a version of the FTA used by WLC, in which he asks one to consider the number of life-permitting universes out of the total amount of possible universes? If I remember correctly, he tries to explain it by having one put a dot on a piece of paper, and having the dot be blue for a life-prohibiting universe, and red for a life-permitting one. Then, he argues, as you go on putting down these dots you eventually end up with a vast sea of blue dots(life prohibiting universes) and scattered rarely and isolated among them will be very few red dots(life permitting universes). That strikes me as a frequency-interpretation of FTA?

jlowder wrote:It is a weak, irrelevant objection against any version of the FTA which depends upon the logical or epistemic interpretations of probability, since epistemic and logical probabilities are not calculated by counting the number of relevant instances within a class. Rather, the epistemic probability of a statement is a measure of the probability that a statement is true, given some stock of knowledge. In other words, personal probability measures a person’s degree of belief in a statement. The logical theory of probability defines probability in terms of a logical relation between evidence and a hypothesis, i.e., the degree of rational belief in a statement.

The strongest versions of the FTA, in my opinion, rely upon the epistemic or logical interpretations of probability. For example, IIRC, Richard Swinburne's version uses the epstemic version of probability. In a similar way, the strongest version of the evidential argument from evil, which IMO is Paul Draper's argument from the biological role of pain and pleasure, also uses the epistemic interpretation.

Interesting, thank you.

Paul G wrote:

jlowder wrote:

Paul G wrote:Yeah I hate this shit. Somehow God is more deserving of consideration because the idea deals with a more important subject? Has been around longer? Millions take it seriously? What? No physical evidence is no physical evidence, however much importance you attach to it.

http://secularoutpost.infidels.org/2006/12/sarcasm-how-to-be-atheist-apologist.html?showComment=1323998028603#c4453644275200653874

Hey, welcome to the forums. I feel partly honoured to be included in someone's blog for the second time now

That wasn't a specific comment directed at you, but to people who tend to make that argument.

I'll read your post in full first before I comment further.

Sorry for the delay in responding to you, Paul G, but thank you for the welcome.

Shrunk wrote:OK. I think our disagreement is over the connotation of the word "apologist". In secular circles (your intended audience) it usually denotes someone who will offer arguments to defend a religious position without regard to whether they are valid or sound, but just with regard to whether they can seem convincing. It's almost always used as a pejorative term, in my experience, and I was suprised to find the number of religious figures who openly used the term to describe their work. Until your post here, I had never heard of an atheist embracing the term.

Hi Shrunk -- I have a few points in reply.

1. My intended audience for that post is the audience of the Secular Outpost, which includes both theists and nontheists.

2. Regarding the nontheist portion of the audience, I'm well-aware that in secular circles the word "apologist" is almost always used pejoratively. I think that nontheists who rely upon the sort of the arguments or objections described in my piece deserve the sort of scorn they associate with the word "apologist." On the other hand, if they defined the word "apologist" according to ordinary usage of the term, they would not interpret the word pejoratively and would not take any offense. I guess part of my goal is to challenge the tendency among nontheists to define the word "apologist" pejoratively.

3. I think the best explanation for the fact that many religious figures self-identify as apologists includes the fact that they adopt the ordinary usage definition of the word "apologist" and hence don't take any offense. I also think there is a verse in the NT which in the original Greek contains the word "apologia." (Perhaps 1 Pet. 3:16? Maybe one of the Christians on this board can comment.)

I don't have a recommended term to replace the pejorative sense of "apologist," but I think the idea is that some apologists are so partisan in their approach that they lack credibility. Maybe "partisan hacks" or "spin doctors"?

Rumraket wrote:

jlowder wrote:

Rumraket wrote:Jlowder, what do you think of the response to fine-tuning arguments, that it's fallacious to attempt a probability argument with a sample size of one?
In other words, we only have one example of a universe with a set of laws in it, and we don't even know if they can vary, never mind by how much. So the fine-tuning argument is basically an argument from blind assertion.

The strength of this objection depends upon the details of the specific version(s) of the FTA(s) we are considering. This objection is a strong objection against any version of the FTA which depends upon the frequency interpretation of probability, which defines probability as the number of times an outcome appears in a long series of similar events.

Okay. So, would it be correct to say that it's a strong objection against a version of the FTA used by WLC, in which he asks one to consider the number of life-permitting universes out of the total amount of possible universes? If I remember correctly, he tries to explain it by having one put a dot on a piece of paper, and having the dot be blue for a life-prohibiting universe, and red for a life-permitting one. Then, he argues, as you go on putting down these dots you eventually end up with a vast sea of blue dots(life prohibiting universes) and scattered rarely and isolated among them will be very few red dots(life permitting universes). That strikes me as a frequency-interpretation of FTA?

I want to re-read what WLC has written before offering an answer; I'll have to get back to you.

Rumraket wrote:

jlowder wrote:It is a weak, irrelevant objection against any version of the FTA which depends upon the logical or epistemic interpretations of probability, since epistemic and logical probabilities are not calculated by counting the number of relevant instances within a class. Rather, the epistemic probability of a statement is a measure of the probability that a statement is true, given some stock of knowledge. In other words, personal probability measures a person’s degree of belief in a statement. The logical theory of probability defines probability in terms of a logical relation between evidence and a hypothesis, i.e., the degree of rational belief in a statement.

The strongest versions of the FTA, in my opinion, rely upon the epistemic or logical interpretations of probability. For example, IIRC, Richard Swinburne's version uses the epstemic version of probability. In a similar way, the strongest version of the evidential argument from evil, which IMO is Paul Draper's argument from the biological role of pain and pleasure, also uses the epistemic interpretation.

Interesting, thank you.

You're welcome. Thank you!

Mick wrote:http://secularoutpost.infidels.org/2006/12/sarcasm-how-to-be-atheist-apologist.html

Some of you should see yourselves here.

What the matter, Mick? Did you run out of Saint names to memorize or which one to pray to for intercession when you lose your car keys?

jlowder wrote:

Rumraket wrote:

jlowder wrote:

The strength of this objection depends upon the details of the specific version(s) of the FTA(s) we are considering. This objection is a strong objection against any version of the FTA which depends upon the frequency interpretation of probability, which defines probability as the number of times an outcome appears in a long series of similar events.

Okay. So, would it be correct to say that it's a strong objection against a version of the FTA used by WLC, in which he asks one to consider the number of life-permitting universes out of the total amount of possible universes? If I remember correctly, he tries to explain it by having one put a dot on a piece of paper, and having the dot be blue for a life-prohibiting universe, and red for a life-permitting one. Then, he argues, as you go on putting down these dots you eventually end up with a vast sea of blue dots(life prohibiting universes) and scattered rarely and isolated among them will be very few red dots(life permitting universes). That strikes me as a frequency-interpretation of FTA?

I want to re-read what WLC has written before offering an answer; I'll have to get back to you.

Here he is defending the analogy against the objection:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rGm4QGls_wQ#t=4m25s

AlohaChris wrote:

Mick wrote:http://secularoutpost.infidels.org/2006/12/sarcasm-how-to-be-atheist-apologist.html

Some of you should see yourselves here.

What the matter, Mick? Did you run out of Saint names to memorize or which one to pray to for intercession when you lose your car keys?

No, he's actually trying to elevate the discussion purportedly brought down by those strident atheists who cut through all the verbal diarrhoea by pointing out that it does indeed make no difference if supernaturalist BS is 3,000 years old, or just 3, that the many-armed Kali is no different from the tentacled Flying Spaghetti Monster.

Ihavenofingerprints wrote:Actually after reading everything again I probably just don't understand probability well enough. I think you might have a good case for theism being more likely than invisible unicorns.

Sorry for the delayed response.

This is a nitpick, but for what it is worth and to be precise, what I have defended is the claim that theism has a higher prior probability than rival supernatural hypotheses. I think that theism starts off with a higher probability than rival supernatural hypotheses before considering the evidence to be explained, on the basis of scope and simplicity. This is not the same thing as saying that theism has a higher final probability, i.e., that theism is more likely than invisible unicorns, conditional upon the evidence to be explained (e.g., the evidence cited by arguments for and against the existence of God, invisible unicorns, etc.).

Ihavenofingerprints wrote:But I can't personally see the difference in probability being anything but extremely insignificant. (that might be considered besides the point though)

That's understandable; I'm not prepared to defend an argument regarding how much greater theism's prior probability is compared to that of naturalism.

Regina wrote:

jlowder wrote:
2. Classical theism has a higher prior probability than other supernatural alternatives such as deism, Santa Claus, leprechauns, pastafarianism (flying spaghetti monster), invisible pink unicorns, etc., based on scope and simplicity.

Classical theism? What do you refer to here? The Greek, Roman, Egyptian, Celtic pantheon? Hinduism? Or just the Abrahamic religions?
Why has "classical" theism a higher probability than deism?
If you just refer to Abrahamic religions you should say so.

By classical theism, I am not necessarily referring to the God of Abraham, though the properties of the god posited by classical theism are no doubt identical to, or a subset of, the properties of the God of Abraham.

Rather, by classical theism (hereafter, "theism"), I mean the belief that there exists a disembodied mind who is omnipotent, omniscient, morally perfect, and the creator of all things. I shall call such a being "God."

The theistic hypothesis has a higher intrinsic probability than rival supernatural hypotheses based primarily on its simplicity, i.e., it attributes more objective uniformity to the world than its rivals. Let us define "deism" as the belief that there exists a disembodied mind who is omnipotent, omniscient, the creator of all things, but that mind is not morally perfect and does not intervene at all in its creation. It seems to me that the hypothesis that God created the universe and intervenes from time to time is simpler than the hypothesis that God created the universe and then never intervened in the world; the former attributes more objective uniformity to reality than the latter. To put the point another way, it seems to me that deism is more specific than theism, since the former specifies the number of times the creator of the world has intervened in the world, whereas the latter doesn't and is compatible with a wide range of number of interventions.

For similar reasons, I am inclined to believe that the hypothesis of a morally perfect being is simpler than an amoral, indifferent, or mostly good but slightly evil being.

Mick wrote:

Calilasseia wrote:

I disagree. I'm interested in a rigorous definition of atheism, not some dumbed-down strawman caricature thereof that simply makes life easy for duplicitous purveyors of supernaturalist apologetics. I propose as a corollary, that atheism, in its rigorous formulation, consists quite simply of a refusal to accept uncritically unsupported supernaturalist assertions.

Mr. Jeff Lowder,

I have criticized this poster's definition elsewhere, though he doesn't see the obvious complications of this definition. For one, as you may have already noted yourself, there's nothing about not believing or denying that claims such as 'A god exists' is true. Consequently, unless he wishes to add something else to this droll definition, it's logically consistent for theist to be an atheist too.

Not exactly. Theism is the belief that God exists. Assume, for the sake of discussion, that we define "atheism" as the lack of belief that God exists. There is no way that theism is logically compatible with atheism, even when atheism is defined as the lack of belief that God exists.