There were a couple of other items from jlowder's blog that I had originally wanted to address but didn't. Now that he's here to address these points in person I thought I'd go ahead and bring up my objections. I'm only addressing 1 and 5 because the others, aside from 10 which I previously brought up, just seem like petty strawmen and not worth addressing.

jlowder wrote:1. Any reason for doubt, no matter how far-fetched or speculative, is sufficient for avoiding the conclusion that God exists. For example, even if we don't have the first clue about physics or cosmology, posit the mere possibility of the existence of multiple universes in order to avoid the theistic conclusion of the probabilistic fine-tuning argument for God's existence. This isn't like an American criminal trial where we expect the prosecution to prove the defendant's guilt "beyond a reasonable doubt." We expect theists to prove God exists beyond any doubt.

The problem I have with this claim is that I can't think of a single God claim for which there are only "far-fetched or speculative" reasons to doubt. Every one I've ever encountered all have massive holes and flaws that I can't get past before having to worry about the far-fetched or speculative doubts. Your claim puts the cart before the horse. Even if some atheist focus too much on the minor reasons to doubt God claims that doesn't erase the fact that there are still very major reasons to doubt them. To overlook those major reasons and complain about some people pointing out minor reasons is as I said above just a petty strawman.

jlowder wrote:
5. Require extrabiblical evidence for relatively modest empirical claims in the NT such as the historicity of Jesus, as if there were anything extraordinary about the New Testament Jesus being based upon a real historical individual.

My objection to this point is not about whether or not there is reason to think a historical Jesus could have existed. My objection is to the specail pleading for how the NT is treated in regards to empirical claims. The bible is a book of fiction, something even most Christians and theologians accept and acknowledge. There may be bits of historical truth in it, but for no other fiction do we expect empirical claims to be taken on face value without some other source to confirm their accuracy. Tom Sawyer contains many historically accurate empirical claims. Yet you would expect a non-fiction source to validate the historical accuracy of those claims. There very well may have been a historical Tom Sawyer but you wouldn't accept at face value even the most modest claims as being historically accurate without some other source. So why treat the Bible differently?

purplerat wrote:

jlowder wrote:1. Any reason for doubt, no matter how far-fetched or speculative, is sufficient for avoiding the conclusion that God exists. For example, even if we don't have the first clue about physics or cosmology, posit the mere possibility of the existence of multiple universes in order to avoid the theistic conclusion of the probabilistic fine-tuning argument for God's existence. This isn't like an American criminal trial where we expect the prosecution to prove the defendant's guilt "beyond a reasonable doubt." We expect theists to prove God exists beyond any doubt.

The problem I have with this claim is that I can't think of a single God claim for which there are only "far-fetched or speculative" reasons to doubt. Every one I've ever encountered all have massive holes and flaws that I can't get past before having to worry about the far-fetched or speculative doubts. Your claim puts the cart before the horse. Even if some atheist focus too much on the minor reasons to doubt God claims that doesn't erase the fact that there are still very major reasons to doubt them. To overlook those major reasons and complain about some people pointing out minor reasons is as I said above just a petty strawman.

The problem I had with that example is that he misunderstands the nature of the multiverse counterargument. It's not just a matter of saying "Well, it doesn't have to be the fine tuning. It could be the multiverse." and then determining which of the two is more probable. The multiverse directly challenges the fine tuning argument, by demomnstrating that the proabability calculations upon which it is based involve a number of assumptions which themselves cannot be but asserted or assumed. If you allow just for the "mere possibility" of the multiverse, all of those calculations become meaningless, since they are based on the assumption that the multiverse is false.

Or, looked at another way, the fine tuning argument is evidence for the multiverse just as much as it is for the existence of God. If the premises of the FTA are accepted as true, the multiverse solves the apparent problem as easily as positing the existence of God. AFAIK, there is no means from the FTA alone to determine which solution is the more probabe. Ockham's razor favours the multiverse, however.

Anyway, if jlowder is going to actually participate in this discussion, maybe he can point out the sarcasm in the article that none of us seem to be able to find.

purplerat wrote:Welcome to the forum jlowder.

Thanks! It's good to be here.

purplerat wrote:My objection to your claim that

10. Compare belief in God to belief in Santa Claus, leprechauns, invisible pink unicorns, the flying spaghetti monster, and so forth, as if all supernatural explanatory hypotheses are equally plausible, despite the fact that considerations from inductive logic like scope, simplicity, etc. show that these hypotheses do not have equal intrinsic probability.

is the supernatural part. I would agree that for otherwise [natural] untestable or unproven hypotheses all are not equally plausible. The problem is that once you define a hypothesis as being supernatural there is no way to determine it's plausibility since plausibility is a natural quality. If it's at all plausible then it's not supernatural.

Unless you are building "implausible" into your definition of "supernatural," I don't see how one could possibly justify the last sentence. Also, I'm not sure if you claim this or not, but I disagree with the claim that the supernatural is inherently untestable. I think theism is testable; I also think it fails several empirical tests. As I argued in my debate with Phil Fernandes, there is a good, cumulative case against theism and for metaphysical naturalism.

In your defense of this position you even avoid discussing the supernatural, i.e.

(snipped quotations)

In neither of the quotes which you use to defend your claim does the word supernatural even appear. In fact both quotes are discussing entirely natural things. Dogs, doors, scarves, emeralds and colors are all natural things. The hypothesis made in the above quotes are natural hypothesis so yes we can evaluate plausibility. What I would challenge you to do is to provide actual examples of supernatural hypotheses and show how their plausibilites can be evaluated.[/quote]

You are correct that the word supernatural does not even appear in those quotations. If you read the original source of the quotations, you'd discover they come from an essay in which Draper goes on to apply the concepts of scope and simplicity to supernaturalism (specifically, theism) and metaphysical naturalism. Draper then proceeds to present an argument against theism based on evolution and the problem of evil. And again, in my debate with Fernandes I presented several evidential arguments against theism which demonstrate how theism can be tested and shown wanting. See also my outline or taxonomy of arguments for atheism.

To summarize, my position is:

1. Not all supernatural hypotheses have equal intrinsic or prior probability.
2. Classical theism has a higher prior probability than other supernatural alternatives such as deism, Santa Claus, leprechauns, pastafarianism (flying spaghetti monster), invisible pink unicorns, etc., based on scope and simplicity.
3. Metaphysical naturalism, which entails a denial of supernaturalism, has an even higher prior probability than theism.
4. There are several interpretations of probability. I am a pluralist about those, but unless otherwise specified, assume that I am using the epistemic interpretation of probability.

For my definitions of "theism" and "metaphysical naturalism," see http://naturalisticatheism.blogspot.com/2006/01/biological-evolution-as-evidence.html

Regards,

Jeffery Jay Lowder

sennekuyl wrote:No. Even the OP had trouble.

I was surprised to read several comments along these lines. Here is a non-sarcastic explanation:

* There are good ways and bad ways to promote atheism.
* I consider every single argument described in my list "How to be an Atheist Apologist" to be an example of a bad way to promote atheism.

Moonwatcher wrote:Well, lt's see.

1. Actually, I'd like any argument that isn't the equivalent of, "Oh, look at the flowers, therefore God" or, even better, "Oh, look at the flowers. Therefore specifically my religion's god but not the god of anybody else's religion". The latter is the one I find annoying.

Those are silly arguments. And probably the average theist on the street uses them. But not all theistic arguments can be dismissed as silly. Richard Swinburne's book, The Existence of God, would be exhibit A. I don't agree with him at all, but the man clearly knows what he is talking about and is not offering silly arguments.

Moonwatcher wrote:2. Education may be a factor but intelligence has little to do with it. People believe in religions because those religions meet their needs. That's not getting into why most people end up in a specific religion which is mostly cultural and theists for some reason want so to avoid that reality.

http://www.infidels.org/library/modern/features/2000/lowder1.html

Moonwatcher wrote:3. Theists are not inherently stupid and it takes tremendous intelligence to work out some of these philosophies and they are necessary often to explain why the world isn't logically consistent with an omnipotent god.

4. The problem is that argument has to start with the assumption that moral values are objective and then use it to "prove" God so, in that case, objective moral values are the blind assertion and the existence of God the blind assertion within a blind assertion.

Well, I agree that most defenders of that argument typically do nothing more than appeal to intuitions to defend objective moral values. That doesn't contradict what I wrote, however. The assertion that objective moral values exist is a claim about moral ontology, not moral epistemology. Therefore, a correct response to that argument would be either (1) objective moral values do not exist, or (2) objective moral values do not require God. My preferred response is (2).

Moonwatcher wrote:5. Ahem. I'm not entirely arguing on that one.

6. I whistle innocently and look at the next one.

Moonwatcher wrote:7. I think few claim science is the only means to truth. But theists love to claim something exists as a fact and not a philosophical one, and then cry foul when they are asked for empirical evidence for an empirical claim.

I've only skimmed it, but Alex Rosenberg's new book explicitly defends scientism.

Moonwatcher wrote:8. The people who primarily use atheism as other than a lack of belief in "God" are primarily people who are trying to put believing in something without evidence on the same level as not believing it without evidence.

I don't understand what you mean.

Moonwatcher wrote:9. Many religious claims are testable. Many are not. Religious people tend to evade the ones that are testable and then ignore it when every testable claim fails the tests.

Your last sentence may very well be true.

Moonwatcher wrote:10. I primarily compare mythical entities that traffic in flaming swords, magic trees that give knowledge and have angels and demons running around equal probability to Santa and invisible unicorns. Gods like that are the gods most people believe in or are just derivative updates and modern facelifts of such gods. For most people, no matter how much they try to play that game, they are really talking about some ancient, tribal god. Aside from that, I've seen arguments that are based from a core concept of "God" and theists pretty much do the inductive routine as you said, just as they always do.

(snip)

Since I just wrote a separate post on #10 (responding to another person), I'm going to skip this one.

Regards,

Jeffery Jay Lowder

jlowder wrote:

sennekuyl wrote:No. Even the OP had trouble.

I was surprised to read several comments along these lines. Here is a non-sarcastic explanation:

* There are good ways and bad ways to promote atheism.
* I consider every single argument described in my list "How to be an Atheist Apologist" to be an example of a bad way to promote atheism.

Yes, I think we all understand that. The problem is, your suppposedly "sarcastic" piece is not actually sarcastic. Your point is that anyone using those arguments actually would be an "atheist apologist." So, again, how is that sarcastic?

This would be an example of sarcasm:

"Here's a bunch of really, really effective atheist arguments. I promise you, you use these arguments and even the Pope himself will convinced to become an atheist."

It's minor point, perhaps, except that a major point of your piece is that the proper meaning of terms should be respected. So it doesn't do you any favours to fail to observe that in your own writing.

Shrunk wrote:The problem I had with that example is that he misunderstands the nature of the multiverse counterargument.

I'm pretty sure I understand the nature of the "multiverse counterargument," as well as the Bayesian version of the fine-tuning argument (FTA). Here's one formulation:

Let F = the apparent 'fine-tuning' of the physical constants of our universe
Let T = classical theism
Let N = metaphysical naturalism

(1) F is known to be true.
(2) T is not very much more less probable intrinsically than N.
(3) Pr(F/T) >!! Pr(F/N).
(4) Other evidence held equal, N is probably false.

Note: regarding (2), I do think T has a lower prior probability than N. But it's not zero.

Let M = the multiverse hypothesis. M is supposed to be an objection to 3. But how?

I don't deny the potential relevance of M to the issue of whether the FTA argument is sound. It could raise Pr(F/N) or lower Pr(F/T). In order to assess the evidential significance of M to the FTA, we would need to apply a principle that Draper calls the "weighted average principle" (WAP). Then WAP can be represented as follows.

Pr(F/N) = Pr(M/N) x Pr(F/N&M) + Pr(~M/N) x Pr(F/N&~M)

This formula is an average because Pr(M/N) + Pr(~M/N) = 1. It is not a simple straight average, however, since those two values may not equal 1/2.

In order to be a successful objection to the FTA above, therefore, M would need to raise Pr(M/N) so that it is greater than or equal to Pr(F/T) by using the above formula. Does M do that? I don't see how. Let's look at the right-hand side of equation for WAP:

Take the first half: Pr(M/N) x Pr(F/N&M). N gives us very little reason to expect M to be true. So Pr(M/N) is going to be low. And therefore the first half of the right-hand side of the equation for WAP is going to be low.

Take the second half: Pr(~M/N) x Pr(F/N&~M). Naturalism without M doesn't give us a good reason to expect F. So Pr(F/N&~M) is going to be low. (That was the whole point of appealing to M as an objection to the FTA.) So the entire second half is going to be low.

Since the values of both the first half and the second half of the right-hand side are low, their sum is low. So M fails miserably to raise Pr(F/N).

Shrunk wrote:It's not just a matter of saying "Well, it doesn't have to be the fine tuning. It could be the multiverse." and then determining which of the two is more probable. The multiverse directly challenges the fine tuning argument, by demomnstrating that the proabability calculations upon which it is based involve a number of assumptions which themselves cannot be but asserted or assumed. If you allow just for the "mere possibility" of the multiverse, all of those calculations become meaningless, since they are based on the assumption that the multiverse is false.

For the reasons I explained above, I don't think that's accurate.

Shrunk wrote:Or, looked at another way, the fine tuning argument is evidence for the multiverse just as much as it is for the existence of God. If the premises of the FTA are accepted as true, the multiverse solves the apparent problem as easily as positing the existence of God. AFAIK, there is no means from the FTA alone to determine which solution is the more probabe. Ockham's razor favours the multiverse, however.

For the reasons I explained above, I don't think this is accurate. Regarding the fourth sentence, Ockham's razor favors the atheistic single-universe hypothesis over FTA. The atheistic multiverse hypothesis is unnecessary.

Shrunk wrote:Anyway, if jlowder is going to actually participate in this discussion, maybe he can point out the sarcasm in the article that none of us seem to be able to find.

See my earlier post regarding the sarcasm.

Regards,

Jeffery Jay Lowder

Shrunk wrote:

jlowder wrote:

sennekuyl wrote:No. Even the OP had trouble.

I was surprised to read several comments along these lines. Here is a non-sarcastic explanation:

* There are good ways and bad ways to promote atheism.
* I consider every single argument described in my list "How to be an Atheist Apologist" to be an example of a bad way to promote atheism.

Yes, I think we all understand that. The problem is, your suppposedly "sarcastic" piece is not actually sarcastic. Your point is that anyone using those arguments actually would be an "atheist apologist."

No, my point is NOT "that anyone using those arguments actually would be an 'atheist apologist.'" My attempt to make a sarcastic point was this: if you were going to be an atheist apologist, here are a bunch of really effective atheistic arguments. A person's status as an "atheist apologist" was a hypothetical assumption of the piece, NOT its conclusion.

Shrunk wrote:So, again, how is that sarcastic?

This would be an example of sarcasm:

"Here's a bunch of really, really effective atheist arguments. I promise you, you use these arguments and even the Pope himself will convinced to become an atheist."

It's minor point, perhaps, except that a major point of your piece is that the proper meaning of terms should be respected. So it doesn't do you any favours to fail to observe that in your own writing.

How have I failed to observe that in my own writing?

jlowder wrote: No, my point is NOT "that anyone using those arguments actually would be an 'atheist apologist.'" My attempt to make a sarcastic point was this: if you were going to be an atheist apologist, here are a bunch of really effective atheistic arguments. A person's status as an "atheist apologist" was a hypothetical assumption of the piece, NOT its conclusion.

Yeah, I get that, too. So, again, how is that sarcastic?

If people actually wanted to be "atheist apologists" or thought that was a good thing to be, then your article would be sarcastic. But that's not the case.

If I wrote something like this:

How to be a racist:

1) Judge people by the colour of their skin or their ethnic origin, not their indiviual traits or qualities.

Etc.

Would that be sarcasm? I don't think so.

Shrunk wrote:So, again, how is that sarcastic?

This would be an example of sarcasm:

"Here's a bunch of really, really effective atheist arguments. I promise you, you use these arguments and even the Pope himself will convinced to become an atheist."

It's minor point, perhaps, except that a major point of your piece is that the proper meaning of terms should be respected. So it doesn't do you any favours to fail to observe that in your own writing.

How have I failed to observe that in my own writing?

By using the term "sarcasm" to refer to something that isn't sarcasm.

jlowder wrote:

Paul G wrote:Yeah I hate this shit. Somehow God is more deserving of consideration because the idea deals with a more important subject? Has been around longer? Millions take it seriously? What? No physical evidence is no physical evidence, however much importance you attach to it.

http://secularoutpost.infidels.org/2006/12/sarcasm-how-to-be-atheist-apologist.html?showComment=1323998028603#c4453644275200653874

Hey, welcome to the forums. I feel partly honoured to be included in someone's blog for the second time now

That wasn't a specific comment directed at you, but to people who tend to make that argument.

I'll read your post in full first before I comment further.

Oh, well everyone else already has, so I may aswell just sit and watch these conversations rather than butting in late.

jlowder wrote:Richard Swinburne's book, The Existence of God, would be exhibit A. I don't agree with him at all, but the man clearly knows what he is talking about and is not offering silly arguments.

Interesting. Can you recommend it? Also, any other books worthwhile reading written from the theological perspective?

Shrunk wrote:

jlowder wrote: No, my point is NOT "that anyone using those arguments actually would be an 'atheist apologist.'" My attempt to make a sarcastic point was this: if you were going to be an atheist apologist, here are a bunch of really effective atheistic arguments. A person's status as an "atheist apologist" was a hypothetical assumption of the piece, NOT its conclusion.

Yeah, I get that, too. So, again, how is that sarcastic?

(snip)

The sarcasm is that the arguments are not effective.

Shrunk wrote:If people actually wanted to be "atheist apologists" or thought that was a good thing to be, then your article would be sarcastic. But that's not the case.

What is not the case? That people do not want to be "atheist apologists"? Perhaps we using that expression differently. According to Merriam-Webster, an "apologist" is:

one who speaks or writes in defense of someone or something

Surely you agree that there are atheists who speak or write in defense of atheism? If so, those atheists are apologists according to the Merriam-Webster definition. In fact, Francois Tremblay explicitly identifies himself as an atheist apologist and has even written a book on the subject. See also his website, where he has a page with a list of apologetic arguments for atheism, materialism, etc.

LIFE wrote:

jlowder wrote:Richard Swinburne's book, The Existence of God, would be exhibit A. I don't agree with him at all, but the man clearly knows what he is talking about and is not offering silly arguments.

Interesting. Can you recommend it? Also, any other books worthwhile reading written from the theological perspective?

Yes, I can absolutely recommend it. Again, I don't agree with it at all, but he really does present the best case for theism I've ever seen. His book Is There a God? is a more accessible book.

Check out the Great Debate on the Secular Web:

http://www.infidels.org/library/modern/debates/great-debate.html

jlowder wrote:

Shrunk wrote:

jlowder wrote: No, my point is NOT "that anyone using those arguments actually would be an 'atheist apologist.'" My attempt to make a sarcastic point was this: if you were going to be an atheist apologist, here are a bunch of really effective atheistic arguments. A person's status as an "atheist apologist" was a hypothetical assumption of the piece, NOT its conclusion.

Yeah, I get that, too. So, again, how is that sarcastic?

(snip)

The sarcasm is that the arguments are not effective.

Shrunk wrote:If people actually wanted to be "atheist apologists" or thought that was a good thing to be, then your article would be sarcastic. But that's not the case.

What is not the case? That people do not want to be "atheist apologists"? Perhaps we using that expression differently. According to Merriam-Webster, an "apologist" is:

one who speaks or writes in defense of someone or something

Surely you agree that there are atheists who speak or write in defense of atheism? If so, those atheists are apologists according to the Merriam-Webster definition. In fact, Francois Tremblay explicitly identifies himself as an atheist apologist and has even written a book on the subject. See also his website, where he has a page with a list of apologetic arguments for atheism, materialism, etc.

OK. I think our disagreement is over the connotation of the word "apologist". In secular circles (your intended audience) it usually denotes someone who will offer arguments to defend a religious position without regard to whether they are valid or sound, but just with regard to whether they can seem convincing. It's almost always used as a pejorative term, in my experience, and I was suprised to find the number of religious figures who openly used the term to describe their work. Until your post here, I had never heard of an atheist embracing the term.

jlowder wrote:
To summarize, my position is:

1. Not all supernatural hypotheses have equal intrinsic or prior probability.
2. Classical theism has a higher prior probability than other supernatural alternatives such as deism, Santa Claus, leprechauns, pastafarianism (flying spaghetti monster), invisible pink unicorns, etc., based on scope and simplicity.
3. Metaphysical naturalism, which entails a denial of supernaturalism, has an even higher prior probability than theism.
4. There are several interpretations of probability. I am a pluralist about those, but unless otherwise specified, assume that I am using the epistemic interpretation of probability.

I'm just going to simplify this a whole lot and request that you please explain #2. How is a supernatural FSM less plausible than supernatural "classical theism"?

"higher prior probability"

This needs explaining.

Shrunk wrote:

jlowder wrote:

Shrunk wrote:

Yeah, I get that, too. So, again, how is that sarcastic?

(snip)

The sarcasm is that the arguments are not effective.

Shrunk wrote:If people actually wanted to be "atheist apologists" or thought that was a good thing to be, then your article would be sarcastic. But that's not the case.

What is not the case? That people do not want to be "atheist apologists"? Perhaps we using that expression differently. According to Merriam-Webster, an "apologist" is:

one who speaks or writes in defense of someone or something

Surely you agree that there are atheists who speak or write in defense of atheism? If so, those atheists are apologists according to the Merriam-Webster definition. In fact, Francois Tremblay explicitly identifies himself as an atheist apologist and has even written a book on the subject. See also his website, where he has a page with a list of apologetic arguments for atheism, materialism, etc.

OK. I think our disagreement is over the connotation of the word "apologist". In secular circles (your intended audience) it usually denotes someone who will offer arguments to defend a religious position without regard to whether they are valid or sound, but just with regard to whether they can seem convincing. It's almost always used as a pejorative term, in my experience, and I was suprised to find the number of religious figures who openly used the term to describe their work. Until your post here, I had never heard of an atheist embracing the term.

It's rather sad that you thought 'apologist' only had this sort of meaning. It suggests a lack of familiarity with Christian apologetics. This wouldn't be so bad if you didn't go out of your way to criticize their thought.

jlowder wrote:

LIFE wrote:

jlowder wrote:Richard Swinburne's book, The Existence of God, would be exhibit A. I don't agree with him at all, but the man clearly knows what he is talking about and is not offering silly arguments.

Interesting. Can you recommend it? Also, any other books worthwhile reading written from the theological perspective?

Yes, I can absolutely recommend it. Again, I don't agree with it at all, but he really does present the best case for theism I've ever seen. His book Is There a God? is a more accessible book.

Check out the Great Debate on the Secular Web:

http://www.infidels.org/library/modern/debates/great-debate.html

For a good bashing of common criticisms of the ontological argument, I'd suggest Oppy's book entitled Ontological Arguments and Belief in God. He's an agnostic thinker who later gives his own 'refutation' of the argument, though still lays waste to many other criticisms. Despite what is commonly thought, OAs are resilient beasts.

jlowder wrote:

Shrunk wrote:The problem I had with that example is that he misunderstands the nature of the multiverse counterargument.

I'm pretty sure I understand the nature of the "multiverse counterargument," as well as the Bayesian version of the fine-tuning argument (FTA). Here's one formulation:

Let F = the apparent 'fine-tuning' of the physical constants of our universe
Let T = classical theism
Let N = metaphysical naturalism

(1) F is known to be true.
...

I'm not familiar with this formulation, could you perhaps elaborate on this premise (1)?

Is this intended to be read as "Fine tuning is known to be a feature of the universe" or as "Fine tuning of free parameters in current physical models of the known universe is required for them to accurately describe the known universe"?

Because whilst the latter is a reasonable statement the former is indeed refuted by the mere possibility of "many worlds" - consequently where that is the argument being given the refutation is complete.

Of course if the latter of the two statements is intended then (3) is trivially false, as F becomes independent of both T and N, meaning that even the simplistic statement of "Many worlds is possible" is overkill as a refutation.

So I can only assume you perhaps intend it to mean something else?