Ihavenofingerprints wrote:I'm not trained in probability. But surely if the "fine tuning of the universe" gives theism more credibility or 'likely-ness'. The simple fact that life probably exists elsewhere in the universe (according to almost all experts), and it is also likely that if life does exist, there are many alien civilizations more advanced than us. Also given how we know long distance space travel certainly isn't impossible with the right technology. The case for the presence of UFO's in our galaxy - that can find their way into our solar system - and eventually Earth by tracking radio waves most certainly rises above that of "santa" or "unicorns", and would undoubtedly give theism a run for it's money when it comes to credibility.

But we know UFO's aren't flying around earth and all the masses of people putting up a case for their existence shouldn't be taken seriously until they get some better evidence.

My worry is that I'd be lowering my standards if I started taking people like this seriously. Let alone people claiming the supernatural phenomena exists (it would be inconsistent for me to treat one group seriously but not another).

For the record, I don't think the evidence of so-called "fine-tuning" does increase the probability of theism. My earlier posts should not be interpreted as an endorsement of fine-tuning arguments; they should not even be interpreted as an endorsement of the fine-tuning argument I formulated. My point was simply that there are good ways and bad ways to refute the fine-tuning argument. It seems to me that the multiverse hypothesis is one of the bad ways: it is a fundamentally misguided objection.

So what would be a good way to refute fine-tuning arguments (notice this is plural, since there are many different versions)? Focus on the claim that fine-tuning is more likely on theism than on naturalism: challenge the proponent of the argument to meet their burden of proof and provide reasons or evidence in support of that claim. Simply saying that fine-tuning is improbable on naturalism, by itself, is evidentially worthless since it's possible that fine-tuning is equally or even more improbable on theism. So why should we believe that the explanatory hypothesis of theism "predicts" the evidence of fine-tuning? If someone can't give a good answer to that question, then they've failed to support that argument.

Consider this analogy. Let E be evidence that I bought lunch today at McDonald's; G be the hypothesis that the earth is the center of the solar system; and H be the hypothesis that the sun is the center of the solar system. H obviously gives no reason at all to expect that I would buy lunch today at McDonald's. In other words, H does not predict E, i.e., Pr(E|H) < 0.5. But so what? It doesn't follow that G is true or even that G is more likely than H. Why? Because G also fails to predict E, i.e., Pr(E|G) < 0.5. So there's no reason at all to think my buying lunch today at McDonald's is evidence favoring geocentrism over heliocentrism, i.e., Pr(E|G) > Pr(E|H).

Let's go back to fine-tuning. It may be the case that fine-tuning is just as irrelevant to theism and naturalism, just as my buying lunch today at McDonald's is irrelevant to geocentrism and heliocentrism. Proponents of fine-tuning arguments assert that fine-tuning is relevant, but they need to do more than assert that. They need to provide an argument.

Another problem with fine-tuning arguments for God is that they typically commit the fallacy of understated evidence. In the words of Paul Draper, "proponents of a theistic argument are guilty of this fallacy if they "successfully identify some general fact F about a topic X that is antecedently more likely on theism than on naturalism, but ignore other more specific facts about X, facts that, given F, are more likely on naturalism than on theism."[1]

So even if it is (were?) the case that fine-tuning is some evidence for theism, there are other more specific facts about fine-tuning which appear to be more likely on naturalism than on theism:

1. Our universe is not teeming with life, including life much more impressive than human life.
2. The only intelligent life we know of is human and it exists in this universe.
3. Intelligent life is the result of evolution.

See http://secularoutpost.infidels.org/2011/11/paul-draper-fallacy-of-understated.html for further examples of this fallacy.

Paul G wrote:"higher prior probability"

This needs explaining.

Hi Paul -- Let me see if I can something on my hard drive about this which I can copy-and-paste. If not, I can write up a short overview. I'll get back to you.

Very interesting posts. Cheers.

(Also, I can see what I was misunderstanding before, and I see what you mean now)

Sorry for responding to things out of order. I wanted to respond to purplerat's post below.

purplerat wrote:There were a couple of other items from jlowder's blog that I had originally wanted to address but didn't. Now that he's here to address these points in person I thought I'd go ahead and bring up my objections. I'm only addressing 1 and 5 because the others, aside from 10 which I previously brought up, just seem like petty strawmen and not worth addressing.

jlowder wrote:1. Any reason for doubt, no matter how far-fetched or speculative, is sufficient for avoiding the conclusion that God exists. For example, even if we don't have the first clue about physics or cosmology, posit the mere possibility of the existence of multiple universes in order to avoid the theistic conclusion of the probabilistic fine-tuning argument for God's existence. This isn't like an American criminal trial where we expect the prosecution to prove the defendant's guilt "beyond a reasonable doubt." We expect theists to prove God exists beyond any doubt.

The problem I have with this claim is that I can't think of a single God claim for which there are only "far-fetched or speculative" reasons to doubt. Every one I've ever encountered all have massive holes and flaws that I can't get past before having to worry about the far-fetched or speculative doubts. Your claim puts the cart before the horse. Even if some atheist focus too much on the minor reasons to doubt God claims that doesn't erase the fact that there are still very major reasons to doubt them. To overlook those major reasons and complain about some people pointing out minor reasons is as I said above just a petty strawman.

Well, I'm not a physicist, but I'll give this example. If the ONLY reason a person has for introducing the mutiverse hypothesis is to avoid the theistic conclusion of a fine-tuning argument for God, then that would be a prime example of what I categorize as a "speculative" and "far-fetched" doubt. It would be an ad hoc, "just so" story. Biblical errantists criticize inerrantists for "just so" stories all the time in the context of debates over Bible contradictions; they rightly point out that many of the attempted "harmonizations" are completely ad hoc. Some proponents of the multi-verse hypothesis can come across just as ridiculous as inerrantists and for the same reason.

purplerat wrote:

jlowder wrote:
5. Require extrabiblical evidence for relatively modest empirical claims in the NT such as the historicity of Jesus, as if there were anything extraordinary about the New Testament Jesus being based upon a real historical individual.

My objection to this point is not about whether or not there is reason to think a historical Jesus could have existed. My objection is to the specail pleading for how the NT is treated in regards to empirical claims. The bible is a book of fiction, something even most Christians and theologians accept and acknowledge. There may be bits of historical truth in it, but for no other fiction do we expect empirical claims to be taken on face value without some other source to confirm their accuracy. Tom Sawyer contains many historically accurate empirical claims. Yet you would expect a non-fiction source to validate the historical accuracy of those claims. There very well may have been a historical Tom Sawyer but you wouldn't accept at face value even the most modest claims as being historically accurate without some other source. So why treat the Bible differently?

I disagree. My position can be summarized as follows:

1. So far as I can tell, the genre of the Bible is controversial. It is question-begging to assert that the Bible is a book of fiction, if by book of fiction you mean the author's intent was to invent stories about events that never happened.
2. The claim "even most Christians and theologians accept and acknowledge" that the Bible is a book of fiction is an empirical claim. I don't know of any empirical evidence to support that claim. I think it's false. The majority of Catholics, Orthodox, and Protestants believe that the Bible contains at least some historically accurate details.
3. Regarding the idea of taking the Bible at face value, I am not saying we should believe that Jesus existed because we should take the Bible at face value. In fact, I think the question, "Should we take the Bible at face value?", is the wrong question to ask. Instead, we should ask, should we believe this passage or this verse.

How to be an Atheist apologist?

Not as easy as it sounds, really. You obviously need to be an atheist, but in order to effectively study bees a degree in biology is almost necessary.

jlowder wrote:Consider this analogy. Let E be evidence that I bought lunch today at McDonald's; G be the hypothesis that the earth is the center of the solar system; and H be the hypothesis that the sun is the center of the solar system. H obviously gives no reason at all to expect that I would buy lunch today at McDonald's. In other words, H does not predict E, i.e., Pr(E|H) < 0.5. But so what? It doesn't follow that G is true or even that G is more likely than H. Why? Because G also fails to predict E, i.e., Pr(E|G) < 0.5. So there's no reason at all to think my buying lunch today at McDonald's is evidence favoring geocentrism over heliocentrism, i.e., Pr(E|G) > Pr(E|H).

I'm a little concerned here that you (appear to) suggest that prediction is equivalent to a probability of >0.5. Is that what you meant?

If you regularly buy lunch at McDonalds 6 days a week (for example), then Pr(E|H) can easily be > 0.5 regardless of any predictions of H.

Thommo wrote:

jlowder wrote:Consider this analogy. Let E be evidence that I bought lunch today at McDonald's; G be the hypothesis that the earth is the center of the solar system; and H be the hypothesis that the sun is the center of the solar system. H obviously gives no reason at all to expect that I would buy lunch today at McDonald's. In other words, H does not predict E, i.e., Pr(E|H) < 0.5. But so what? It doesn't follow that G is true or even that G is more likely than H. Why? Because G also fails to predict E, i.e., Pr(E|G) < 0.5. So there's no reason at all to think my buying lunch today at McDonald's is evidence favoring geocentrism over heliocentrism, i.e., Pr(E|G) > Pr(E|H).

I'm a little concerned here that you (appear to) suggest that prediction is equivalent to a probability of >0.5. Is that what you meant?

That is what I meant, but maybe I was wrong to write that. I'm sensing you think I was.

Thommo wrote:If you regularly buy lunch at McDonalds 6 days a week (for example), then Pr(E|H) can easily be > 0.5 regardless of any predictions of H.

Not necessarily. I'm using the epistemic interpretation of probability, not the frequency interpretation. If I regularly buy lunch at McDonald's 6 days a week, that could only be relevant IF:

1. We expand the expression Pr(E|H) to Pr(E|H&B), where B represents our background knowledge.
2. We include in B the fact that I regularly buy lunch at McDonald's 6 days a week.

If we do that, then Pr(E|H&B) > 0.5. Of course, H will be explanatorily irrelevant, since it will B, not H, that will make it possible for this value to be > 0.5. In fact, H will be irrelevant precisely because Pr(E|H&B) = Pr(E|B).

jlowder wrote:

Thommo wrote:If you regularly buy lunch at McDonalds 6 days a week (for example), then Pr(E|H) can easily be > 0.5 regardless of any predictions of H.

Not necessarily. I'm using the epistemic interpretation of probability, not the frequency interpretation. If I regularly buy lunch at McDonald's 6 days a week, that could only be relevant IF:

1. We expand the expression Pr(E|H) to Pr(E|H&B), where B represents our background knowledge.
2. We include in B the fact that I regularly buy lunch at McDonald's 6 days a week.

If we do that, then Pr(E|H&B) > 0.5. Of course, H will be explanatorily irrelevant, since it will B, not H, that will make it possible for this value to be > 0.5. In fact, H will be irrelevant precisely because Pr(E|H&B) = Pr(E|B).

Yes indeed, and it's also true if we replace the 0.5 with any 0 < x < 1, which is rather why I was wondering where the 0.5 comes into it!

Of course, if you don't like the frequentist example, feel free to consider any other method for estimating the probability of your eating lunch at McDonald's.

To put it another way, it seems rather odd to suggest it is a prediction of the theory of heliocentrism (say) that if I toss a coin twice in a row I won't get two heads, though it surely has P > 0.5 on the assumption that heliocentrism is true (again the theory is irrelevant as the probability is independent).

jlowder wrote:
2. Classical theism has a higher prior probability than other supernatural alternatives such as deism, Santa Claus, leprechauns, pastafarianism (flying spaghetti monster), invisible pink unicorns, etc., based on scope and simplicity.

Classical theism? What do you refer to here? The Greek, Roman, Egyptian, Celtic pantheon? Hinduism? Or just the Abrahamic religions?
Why has "classical" theism a higher probability than deism?
If you just refer to Abrahamic religions you should say so.

jlowder wrote:

Calilasseia wrote:So, now that you're here, Jay, care to tell me which, if any, mythological assertions are supported by any evidence?

I'm an atheist. Furthermore, as a metaphysical naturalist, I don't think any supernatural beings exist. I don't believe mythological assertions are supported by the evidence. I suspect you already knew that, however. What are you getting at?

Hi,

But wouldn't you say that classical theism or Christianity is supported by some evidence? This is an awfully weak claim.

Hey guys,

Here's a video debate involving Lowder. I think Lowder wins.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yl2lUIku-zo


Mr. Lowder,

The last I heard of you, you left IIDB in search of of a phd. If that's right, did you attain your goal?

jlowder wrote:
Well, I'm not a physicist, but I'll give this example. If the ONLY reason a person has for introducing the mutiverse hypothesis is to avoid the theistic conclusion of a fine-tuning argument for God, then that would be a prime example of what I categorize as a "speculative" and "far-fetched" doubt. It would be an ad hoc, "just so" story. Biblical errantists criticize inerrantists for "just so" stories all the time in the context of debates over Bible contradictions; they rightly point out that many of the attempted "harmonizations" are completely ad hoc. Some proponents of the multi-verse hypothesis can come across just as ridiculous as inerrantists and for the same reason.

Introducing a mutliverse hypothesis as a response to a fine-tuning argument for god is not about far-fetched or minor doubts. To the contrary it's done to illustrate the very large gaps, holes and doubts in both hypotheses. All current multiverse hypotheses contain very good reasons to doubt. Yet even as such they work just as well if not better than a fine-tuning argument for god in explanatory power. Fine-tuning arguments rely on the notion that no other solution exists, therefore it must be viable despite serious reason to doubt it. Introducing a mutliverse hypotheses merely contradicts the idea that there is no other possible solution.

jlowder wrote:
I disagree. My position can be summarized as follows:

1. So far as I can tell, the genre of the Bible is controversial. It is question-begging to assert that the Bible is a book of fiction, if by book of fiction you mean the author's intent was to invent stories about events that never happened.
2. The claim "even most Christians and theologians accept and acknowledge" that the Bible is a book of fiction is an empirical claim. I don't know of any empirical evidence to support that claim. I think it's false. The majority of Catholics, Orthodox, and Protestants believe that the Bible contains at least some historically accurate details.
3. Regarding the idea of taking the Bible at face value, I am not saying we should believe that Jesus existed because we should take the Bible at face value. In fact, I think the question, "Should we take the Bible at face value?", is the wrong question to ask. Instead, we should ask, should we believe this passage or this verse.

1. Fiction does not necessarily mean "stories about events that never happened". Much of fiction is based-on real events and/or real persons. IMO this is the most likely case for the new testament, that it's a "based-on" story. But with any other "based-on" story we would want additional non-fiction sources to confirm the accuracy of details in the "based-on" story. I'm sure you've watched movies that were "based-on" real people and events, but would you take any part of that movie as historical fact without finding some additional source of confirmation?
2. Containing "at least some historically accurate details" falls far short of what we would call non-fiction. Tom Sawyer contains "at least some historically accurate details"as does Greek mythology but obviously that doesn't make them non-fiction. For the sake of argument I'll withdraw any empirical claims about how many Christians believe the Bible and/or NT is literally true. Many, or more importantly many apologist who argue for a historically accurate Jesus being portrayed in the bible, do not actually view the NT as non-fiction.
3. If you don't take the Bible as a whole at face value then why would you accept any part of it at face value? How do you go about determining what to take at face value and what not to? The only why I can think of would be to use an extra-Biblical source.

Mick wrote:

Calilasseia wrote:So, now that you're here, Jay, care to tell me which, if any, mythological assertions are supported by any evidence?

You should frame your question better.

Really? Perhaps you can show us all how it's done, since you think the above needs improving. Care to rise to that challenge?

Mick wrote:Also: What is evidence? It's not as easy to say as you might think.

Here's a clue for you: made up shit isn't evidence. Such a shame many supernaturalists aren't aware of this, isn't it?

jlowder wrote:

Calilasseia wrote:So, now that you're here, Jay, care to tell me which, if any, mythological assertions are supported by any evidence?

I'm an atheist. Furthermore, as a metaphysical naturalist, I don't think any supernatural beings exist. I don't believe mythological assertions are supported by the evidence. I suspect you already knew that, however. What are you getting at?

Well Mick here claims that you take the purported "evidence" for the resurrection of Jesus seriously. He asserts this here. I'd like to know if this is true, and if so, on what grounds you purportedly take the wish-fulfilment of pre-scientific and superstitious humans "seriously".

Meanwhile, with respect to this:

jlowder wrote:Back when I was the moderator of the USENET newsgroup alt.atheism.moderated, I used to debate the definition of atheism and I used to defend the atheism as the lack of belief position. I'm persuaded, however, by Ted Drangethat by default we should define our terms in a way which matches ordinary usage. Ordinary usage of the word "atheism" is that it means the belief that God does not exist. I see no benefit whatsoever to the proposal that nontheists should spend their limited time on trying to convince people both that (a) atheism is rational and (b) that they should use the word atheism in a different way, as opposed to merely focusing on (a).

I disagree. I'm interested in a rigorous definition of atheism, not some dumbed-down strawman caricature thereof that simply makes life easy for duplicitous purveyors of supernaturalist apologetics. I propose as a corollary, that atheism, in its rigorous formulation, consists quite simply of a refusal to accept uncritically unsupported supernaturalist assertions. In short, it consists of "YOU assert that your magic man exists, YOU support your assertions". In the latter exposition thereof, the implicit requirement being that said support involves something other than the erection of yet more blind assertions and apologetic fabrications. Perhaps you might like to tell me why this is purportedly "wrong"?

jlowder wrote:Among professional philosophers, including self-identified atheist philosophers, the majority viewpoint is that atheism is the belief that there is no God and agnosticism is the lack of belief in God's existence and God's nonexistence. When professional philosophers want an umbrella term to group together people who believe God does not exist with the people who merely lack belief, they use the term "nontheist." So I'm not sure I agree with you that the majority of people who define atheism as the belief that there is no God are "religious people."

Actually, my understanding is that agnosticism consists of the position that the question of the existence of any god-type entity is unanswerable. Atheism, as a corollary of my proposed framing above, consists of the position "Perhaps this question is answerable, but we've yet to see a supernaturalist provide a proper answer".

Meanwhile, with respect to the "fine tuning" trope, my answer to that is essentially that arising from Douglas Adams' Puddle. Namely, we are here because the laws of physics permitted our existence, and the relevant, physically permitted, historical events took place. Plus, there's quite a bit of research emanating from the physics community with respect to the fact that, for example, manipulating a range of parameters produces a significant number of possible universes in which star formation can take place, and as a corollary, the nucleosynthesis of relevant chemical elements. Treating our existence as purportedly supporting the idea that the universe was somehow "made for us", consists of reading the relevant evidence backwards, not to mention reading it from a presuppositional basis.

Mick wrote:

Moonwatcher wrote:jlowder wrote:
Those are silly arguments. And probably the average theist on the street uses them. But not all theistic arguments can be dismissed as silly. Richard Swinburne's book, The Existence of God, would be exhibit A. I don't agree with him at all, but the man clearly knows what he is talking about and is not offering silly arguments.

I tried to find a quick summary of the book. Much of it consists of mathematical arguments. It also includes some rehashings of old philosophical arguments. I'll leave it to others more qualified to evaluate the math.

Moonwatcher wrote:
8. The people who primarily use atheism as other than a lack of belief in "God" are primarily people who are trying to put believing in something without evidence on the same level as not believing it without evidence.

JLowder wrote:
I don't understand what you mean.

I was saying that it is primarily religious people who try to define atheism as a belief rather than a lack of one from a desire to imply that not believing something minus evidence is somehow the same thing as believing things minus empirical evidence and hence imply that atheism is a religion.

Of course, there are "angry atheists" in the sense that we are all human beings with histories and issues, many of them with religion in our pasts and upbringings. But that is an aside from the core issue that, for most atheists here, it is a matter of not accepting things that have no supporting evidence. Any other issues stem from that.

That's silly. The motivation to understand atheism in this way is rooted in the conventions of English speakers. The distinction between denying and not believing is an esoteric one not commonly appreciated and understood by common speakers.

Atheism is understood in this way within most present day scholarship.

Then they need to understand empiricism and empirical thinking better than they do, whoever "they" are. The difference between not believing without evidence and denying is largely one of experience. If I, for example, have reached the point of "denial" at least regarding some things it is only because of years and decades of false arguments bereft of the slightest reason to accept something and, even then, genuine evidence would have an effect. That's the problem. So far, there isn't any.

jlowder wrote:

Moonwatcher wrote:Moonwatcher wrote:
8. The people who primarily use atheism as other than a lack of belief in "God" are primarily people who are trying to put believing in something without evidence on the same level as not believing it without evidence.

JLowder wrote:
I don't understand what you mean.

I was saying that it is primarily religious people who try to define atheism as a belief rather than a lack of one from a desire to imply that not believing something minus evidence is somehow the same thing as believing things minus empirical evidence and hence imply that atheism is a religion.

Of course, there are "angry atheists" in the sense that we are all human beings with histories and issues, many of them with religion in our pasts and upbringings. But that is an aside from the core issue that, for most atheists here, it is a matter of not accepting things that have no supporting evidence. Any other issues stem from that.

Back when I was the moderator of the USENET newsgroup alt.atheism.moderated, I used to debate the definition of atheism and I used to defend the atheism as the lack of belief position. I'm persuaded, however, by Ted Drangethat by default we should define our terms in a way which matches ordinary usage. Ordinary usage of the word "atheism" is that it means the belief that God does not exist. I see no benefit whatsoever to the proposal that nontheists should spend their limited time on trying to convince people both that (a) atheism is rational and (b) that they should use the word atheism in a different way, as opposed to merely focusing on (a).

Among professional philosophers, including self-identified atheist philosophers, the majority viewpoint is that atheism is the belief that there is no God and agnosticism is the lack of belief in God's existence and God's nonexistence. When professional philosophers want an umbrella term to group together people who believe God does not exist with the people who merely lack belief, they use the term "nontheist." So I'm not sure I agree with you that the majority of people who define atheism as the belief that there is no God are "religious people."

For the record, I am fully aware of how condescending it can come across when person A says, "I'm an X," and person B says, "No, you're not. You're a Y." In other words, who am I to tell people how they should self-identify? In response, I would point out the following: (1) I'm responding to Moonwatcher's comment; (2) I am not making a normative or ethical issue out of this, i.e., I'm not saying nontheists have an ethical requirement to use the word atheist consistently with ordinary usage; and (3) I am suggesting as a matter of strategy and "resource management" that there are much better uses of our time than an anal-retentive defense of etymological purism, i.e., the "but the greek roots of atheism, a + theism, mean literally without theism" defense. The meaning of words can and do change over time. If the meaning of "atheism" has changed from its Greek roots, then so be it.

(preparing to duck for the huge amount of flames I expect to get for this post, LOL)

I don't disagree with what you're saying except in the sense that when discussing the issue with a theist and that theist is allowed to define me as having a belief (because not believing something without evidence is a belief), he is setting the core of the discussion right there, his beliefs vs. my "beliefs". But it's not. I'm not asserting that "God" or even his specific god doesn't exist or that the events of his religion didn't happen. I'm saying there is no evidence for them unless he produces evidence I don't know about.

For instance, I grew up believing the Christian god was real and that the events in the Bible happened. Step by step, I started to believe less and less that these events really happened or that this deity even existed as evidence ever more indicated that they did not happen and that things happened in a completely different way.

Also, most of the current arguments, "So you believe in Science", that sort of thing, is just an intentional distraction. Most people would just say, "Oh, you don't believe in God." I don't mind them acceptig their belief as the norm and going from there. That's how I started.

Calilasseia wrote:Well Mick here claims that you take the purported "evidence" for the resurrection of Jesus seriously. He asserts this here. I'd like to know if this is true, and if so, on what grounds you purportedly take the wish-fulfilment of pre-scientific and superstitious humans "seriously".

Here's Lowder in 1995:

William Lane Craig, who in my opinion is the best Christian apologist today, is a top-notch scholar, and a highly competitive debater to boot (the same Craig who defeated Zindler). He has written several books on the Christian faith in general and the historicity of the resurrection in particular, at both the popular and scholarly levels, including Assessing the New Testament Evidence for the Historicity of the Resurrection of Jesus, Knowing the Truth About the Resurrection: Our Response to the Empty Tomb, Reasonable Faith: Christian Truth and Apologetics, and The Son Rises: The Historical Evidence for the Resurrection of Jesus. In my opinion, Craig makes a very strong case for the historicity of the resurrection, a case which I don't think the secular literature has given serious consideration.

http://www.infidels.org/library/modern/ ... chap1.html

It's a dated reference, no doubt. However, I do know that he have a favorable review of Risen Indeed even though he disagreed with the author on many points. If you examine Lowder's writing elsewhere you'll notice that he takes the case seriously. it receives fair treatment. http://www.amazon.com/review/R340227GKO ... &linkCode=

I disagree. I'm interested in a rigorous definition of atheism, not some dumbed-down strawman caricature thereof that simply makes life easy for duplicitous purveyors of supernaturalist apologetics. I propose as a corollary, that atheism, in its rigorous formulation, consists quite simply of a refusal to accept uncritically unsupported supernaturalist assertions.

Mr. Jeff Lowder,

I have criticized this poster's definition elsewhere, though he doesn't see the obvious complications of this definition. For one, as you may have already noted yourself, there's nothing about not believing or denying that claims such as 'A god exists' is true. Consequently, unless he wishes to add something else to this droll definition, it's logically consistent for theist to be an atheist too. If he wishes to claim a priori that 'a god exists' cannot be uncritically supported, and so no theist could consistently be an atheist on his definition, then he's built in question begging assumptions within this definition itself. Also: his definition broadens the scope of atheism to all supernatural claims rather than just to claims of deities. Such a scope is unfounded within the conventional and historical understanding of the word.

Since this user does not seem to wish to adhere to the historical or conventional understandings of the word, I'm unsure why he'd ask you if his definition is wrong (for by what measure could it be wrong?) It seems to be no more than Humpty Dumptyism on his part, and he is remarkably stubborn to change.

Mr Lowder wrote:
In my opinion, Craig makes a very strong case for the historicity of the resurrection, a case which I don't think the secular literature has given serious consideration.

I don't have the time to wade through tons of literature right now. (yeah, I know, skewed metaphor) Can anyone sum up the arguments for the "historicity of the resurrection"?

Regina wrote:

Mr Lowder wrote:
In my opinion, Craig makes a very strong case for the historicity of the resurrection, a case which I don't think the secular literature has given serious consideration.

I don't have the time to wade through tons of literature right now. (yeah, I know, skewed metaphor) Can anyone sum up the arguments for the "historicity of the resurrection"?

Whole books have been written on it. It cannot be summed up in some one essay.

I somehow expected that reply. Look, I'm not interested in logical waffle à la Craig, but some good old-fashioned historical facts: Who, when, why, and most of all how? Witnessed and recorded by whom? Shouldn't be that difficult.

Mick wrote:Mr. Jeff Lowder,

I have criticized this poster's definition elsewhere, though he doesn't see the obvious complications of this definition.

When did you present these, again?

Mick wrote:For one, as you may have already noted yourself, there's nothing about not believing or denying that claims such as 'A god exists' is true. Consequently, unless he wishes to add something else to this droll definition, it's logically consistent for theist to be an atheist too.

Bollocks. What part of "no supernaturalist has ever supported his assertions with anything other than apologetic fabrications" do you not understand once more?

Mick wrote:If he wishes to claim a priori that 'a god exists' cannot be uncritically supported

Actually, what I claim is that supernaturalists have never supported this assertion. In case you're wondering, apologetics doesn't equal "support".

Mick wrote:and so no theist could consistently be an atheist on his definition

Oh dear, it's made up shit time once more.

Do I have to lead you through the baby steps again?

[1] Supernaturalists assert that their pet magic entities exist.

[2] Supernaturalists have never provided anything other than more blind assertions and apologetic hot air, as purported "support" for the assertions in [1] above.

[3] Consequently, no one is obliged to treat the assertions in [1] as anything other than unsupported assertions, and treating said assertions as purportedly constituting "axioms" about the world is fatuous.

Now, if supernaturalists want their assertions about their pet magic entities to be treated as fact, the onus is on them to deliver the goods with respect to proper evidential support. And please, spare me the bullshit you've been peddling here about evidence, because it's just an excuse to leave the discoursive door open for made up shit.

As for how I regard the status of the question "does Magic Man exist?", I regard it as [1] answerable in principle, [2] not yet definitively answered, but [3] unlikely to be answered 'yes' given the preponderance of available evidence, unless supernaturalists can come up with something substantive in this regard. So please, spare me your pathetic apologetic attempts to try and misrepresent me as a "presupositionalist" of some sort, because it's a blatant caricature.

Mick wrote:then he's built in question begging assumptions within this definition itself.

Bollocks. See above.

Mick wrote:Also: his definition broadens the scope of atheism to all supernatural claims rather than just to claims of deities. Such a scope is unfounded within the conventional and historical understanding of the word.

So what? I don't care about "conventional and historical understanding", I care about ensuring that a precise, rigorous and evidentially supportable definition is in place. What part of this elementary concept do you not understand?

Mick wrote:Since this user does not seem to wish to adhere to the historical or conventional understandings of the word, I'm unsure why he'd ask you if his definition is wrong (for by what measure could it be wrong?) It seems to be no more than Humpty Dumptyism on his part

Oh look, it's ad hominem time again, laced with lots of the usual supernaturalist penchant for strawman Caricature. Yawn, yawn, fucking yawn.

Mick wrote:and he is remarkably stubborn to change.

No, I just refuse to treat made up shit as act. This isn't being stubborn, this is called "using one's grey cells". I suggest that some supernaturalists would do well to try this sometime.