Rumraket wrote:

jlowder wrote:I want to re-read what WLC has written before offering an answer; I'll have to get back to you.

Here he is defending the analogy against the objection:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rGm4QGls_wQ#t=4m25s

I haven't listened to the audio or watched the video at that link, but I did a search to find something by WLC in writing on his interpretation of probability for his version of the FTA. I found this:

http://commonsenseatheism.com/wp-conten ... iverse.pdf

(The relevant portion starts at the bottom of page 12 of the PDF file and continues through to the bottom of page 13.)

He doesn't explicitly identify his theory of probability by name, but it appears he has in mind the classical interpretation of probability. If I am interpreting him correctly, he seems to think that each of the physical constants could have had any value, so he compares the ratio of life-permitting combinations of constants to all combinations of constants.

If I'm right about this, then, no, I don't think the "but our universe is the only one we know of" objection is a good objection to Craig's argument. That objection would only be relevant to a version of the FTA which appealed to the frequency interpretation. Off the top of my head, I can't think of a single proponent of the FTA who employs a frequency interpretation of probability.

ETA: I just noticed that at the top of page 15 Craig seems to conditionally refer to epistemic probability. Still don't see any references to relative frequencies, though.

jlowder wrote:If I am interpreting him correctly, he seems to think that each of the physical constants could have had any value, so he compares the ratio of life-permitting combinations of constants to all combinations of constants.

Constants cannot have any value. Don't get 'constant' mixed up with 'variable'. If constants are variables, then yes, god exists. But in that case, natural language is nonsense, and cannot be used to construct arguments for god.

Proposing a multiverse theory just to make an equivalence of constants and variables may also be a lot of nonsense. At the very least, it is a kind of question-begging. To make a plausible multiverse theory, one needs to establish its constants without getting into an infinite regress. A multiverse where anything is variable is a magical multiverse.

Perhaps I don't understand what is meant by the term "frequency interpretation". It seems to me when you make up a hypothetical scenario with life-permitting universes being extremely rare out of the total number of "possible" universes, you're saying life-permitting universes have a low frequency. Which leads us to my objection.

In any case I can't help thinking that any version of the FTA asks us to accept a hidden premise that the fundamental constants can change, regardless of the actual values they are further assumed to be able to take up.

jlowder wrote:If I am interpreting him [Craig] correctly, he seems to think that each of the physical constants could have had any value, so he compares the ratio of life-permitting combinations of constants to all combinations of constants.

If that's the comparison Craig is making then, as the range of possible values for the constants is infinite ( [0,+infinity) for the ones that cannot be -ve and (-infinity,+infinity) for those that can ), the probability of the universe being life-permitting is zero regardless of the width of the life-permitting ranges, as x/infinity = 0 when x is finite. But why then does he put so much effort into arguing that the life-permitting ranges are very narrow? The argument would work just as well if they were mind-bogglingy wide.

Craig has two problems to overcome before he even begins to talk about probabilities:

1) He says that there is the appearance that the universe is designed for intelligent life, but there is no reason to think that it was.
Ponds seem to be designed for fish, frogs, aquatic insects...but there is no reason to think that they are. It is the other way around. These organisms were "designed" by their environment. No different from any other organism on earth. Was the arctic designed for polar bears? Was the ocean designed for Dolphins?

It's the weak anthropic principle in action. Here we are. Where else would you expect us to be?

2) Before Craig starts going off about variable constants (something that has been pointed out to be a contradiction in terms) he needs to show that any of the six constants that he cites could have values that are different than they are. Saying that if any of these constants were different the universe would be different is a far cry from showing that they could be different.

As far as I know no one has ever shown that any of the constants could be different than what they are, or any other law such as the 1st law of thermodynamics; in this universe or any other universe.

All we have are "what if" questions about what a universe with different constants and laws would be like. No evidence that they could be different, and no reason to think that they could.

I have no fondness for multiple universe hypotheses except that they seem to keep dropping out of the math in different areas of physics as possibilities. That's it, they seem to be possible. The same thing happened with black holes. Guess what!

Black holes exist and they all follow the same rules.

jlowder wrote:

Mick wrote:

Calilasseia wrote:


Mr. Jeff Lowder,

I have criticized this poster's definition elsewhere, though he doesn't see the obvious complications of this definition. For one, as you may have already noted yourself, there's nothing about not believing or denying that claims such as 'A god exists' is true. Consequently, unless he wishes to add something else to this droll definition, it's logically consistent for theist to be an atheist too.

Not exactly. Theism is the belief that God exists. Assume, for the sake of discussion, that we define "atheism" as the lack of belief that God exists. There is no way that theism is logically compatible with atheism, even when atheism is defined as the lack of belief that God exists.

But that wasn't his definition. Consider what he wrote.

Oldskeptic wrote:Craig has two problems to overcome before he even begins to talk about probabilities:

1) He says that there is the appearance that the universe is designed for intelligent life, but there is no reason to think that it was.
Ponds seem to be designed for fish, frogs, aquatic insects...but there is no reason to think that they are. It is the other way around. These organisms were "designed" by their environment. No different from any other organism on earth. Was the arctic designed for polar bears? Was the ocean designed for Dolphins?

It's the weak anthropic principle in action. Here we are. Where else would you expect us to be?

2) Before Craig starts going off about variable constants (something that has been pointed out to be a contradiction in terms) he needs to show that any of the six constants that he cites could have values that are different than they are. Saying that if any of these constants were different the universe would be different is a far cry from showing that they could be different.

As far as I know no one has ever shown that any of the constants could be different than what they are, or any other law such as the 1st law of thermodynamics; in this universe or any other universe.

All we have are "what if" questions about what a universe with different constants and laws would be like. No evidence that they could be different, and no reason to think that they could.

I have no fondness for multiple universe hypotheses except that they seem to keep dropping out of the math in different areas of physics as possibilities. That's it, they seem to be possible. The same thing happened with black holes. Guess what!

Black holes exist and they all follow the same rules.

Yeah I agree, and I'm tired of hearing the argument made by theists that various multiverse hypotheses were "invented" by conspirating atheistic scientists as a way of getting around of the FTA. That's bullshit to the highest degree. The fact is that certain attempts to reconcile quantum mechanics with gravity, like certain string theories, either outright predict or are compatible with multiverses.
In fact, there's a multiverse interpretation of quantum mechanics itself, and that has nothing to do with any "constants" of nature trying to be avoided.

jlowder wrote:

Regina wrote:

jlowder wrote:
2. Classical theism has a higher prior probability than other supernatural alternatives such as deism, Santa Claus, leprechauns, pastafarianism (flying spaghetti monster), invisible pink unicorns, etc., based on scope and simplicity.

Classical theism? What do you refer to here? The Greek, Roman, Egyptian, Celtic pantheon? Hinduism? Or just the Abrahamic religions?
Why has "classical" theism a higher probability than deism?
If you just refer to Abrahamic religions you should say so.

By classical theism, I am not necessarily referring to the God of Abraham, though the properties of the god posited by classical theism are no doubt identical to, or a subset of, the properties of the God of Abraham.

Rather, by classical theism (hereafter, "theism"), I mean the belief that there exists a disembodied mind who is omnipotent, omniscient, morally perfect, and the creator of all things. I shall call such a being "God."

The theistic hypothesis has a higher intrinsic probability than rival supernatural hypotheses based primarily on its simplicity, i.e., it attributes more objective uniformity to the world than its rivals. Let us define "deism" as the belief that there exists a disembodied mind who is omnipotent, omniscient, the creator of all things, but that mind is not morally perfect and does not intervene at all in its creation. It seems to me that the hypothesis that God created the universe and intervenes from time to time is simpler than the hypothesis that God created the universe and then never intervened in the world; the former attributes more objective uniformity to reality than the latter. To put the point another way, it seems to me that deism is more specific than theism, since the former specifies the number of times the creator of the world has intervened in the world, whereas the latter doesn't and is compatible with a wide range of number of interventions.

For similar reasons, I am inclined to believe that the hypothesis of a morally perfect being is simpler than an amoral, indifferent, or mostly good but slightly evil being.

@jlowder
Welcome to the forum from me, too. It's good to have you here.

Could you explain your reasoning for the highlighted sentence?

I think you could argue, that the hypothesis that God is insufficiently moral from time to time is simpler than the hypothesis, that God is never insufficiently moral. To me the latter is more specific, for the same reasons, that you gave in your above quotation with regard to the number of God's interventions in the world.

Somewhere earlier in this long thread somebody had alleged that multiverse theories were just invented by atheists to counter the fine-tuning argument.
Rumraket pointed out that multiverse theories arise naturally from attempts to answer certain physical questions, totally unrelated to any metaphysical issues.
I agree with Rumraket and would like to add the observation that multiverses, or 'parallel worlds' as we oldies used to call them, are a venerable tradition in fiction and speculation about the nature of reality, dating back to centuries before the so-called 'fine tuning argument' was ever conceived.
Wikipedia has a list of works of fiction involving parallel worlds. There is alsothis Wikipedia article that discusses the history of ideas of parallel universes as they appear in fiction.

Most of the fictional works listed pre-date the fine-tuning argument. Notable amongst them is the Chronicles of Narnia, written by that well-known Christian apologist CS Lewis.

So, multiverse theory invented by atheists to counter the FTA? - I think not.

andrewk wrote:Somewhere earlier in this long thread somebody had alleged that multiverse theories were just invented by atheists to counter the fine-tuning argument.
Rumraket pointed out that multiverse theories arise naturally from attempts to answer certain physical questions, totally unrelated to any metaphysical issues.
I agree with Rumraket and would like to add the observation that multiverses, or 'parallel worlds' as we oldies used to call them, are a venerable tradition in fiction and speculation about the nature of reality, dating back to centuries before the so-called 'fine tuning argument' was ever conceived.
Wikipedia has a list of works of fiction involving parallel worlds. There is alsothis Wikipedia article that discusses the history of ideas of parallel universes as they appear in fiction.

Most of the fictional works listed pre-date the fine-tuning argument. Notable amongst them is the Chronicles of Narnia, written by that well-known Christian apologist CS Lewis.

So, multiverse theory invented by atheists to counter the FTA? - I think not.

Maybe your recalling (just not very well) what I said about multiverse theories being used to counter fine-tuning arguments.

purplerat wrote:
Introducing a mutliverse hypothesis as a response to a fine-tuning argument for god is not about far-fetched or minor doubts. To the contrary it's done to illustrate the very large gaps, holes and doubts in both hypotheses. All current multiverse hypotheses contain very good reasons to doubt. Yet even as such they work just as well if not better than a fine-tuning argument for god in explanatory power. Fine-tuning arguments rely on the notion that no other solution exists, therefore it must be viable despite serious reason to doubt it. Introducing a mutliverse hypotheses merely contradicts the idea that there is no other possible solution.

I wasn't by any means suggesting that mutliverse hypotheses were invented to counter the FTA. They exist independently but also serve as a counter to the FTA. Mr. Lowder in his "How to be an Atheist apologist" blog post does seem to be pointing to multiverse hypotheses being invented as a "far fetched and speculative" counter to the FTA.

jlowder wrote:
The strongest formulations of the fine-tuning argument do NOT claim that a naturalistic explanation for "fine-tuning" are impossible; rather, they argue that such explanations are very improbable. So the mere possibility that the multiverse hypothesis could be true is irrelevant to such versions of the FTA.

You seem to be misunderstanding completely why somebody would introduce a mutliverse hypothesis. It's not to offer some other highly improbably, yet possible, explanation for our universe being the way it is (accepting for the sake of argument that our universe actually is "fine-tuned"). A mutliverse hypothesis addresses the the improbability itself. If a mutliverse contains an infinite number of possible universes then any possible universe would exist an infinite number of times and thus isn't really improbable. So if a FTA accepts that a naturalistic explanation is at all possible then probability is irrelevant if we consider such a mutliverse as I just suggested. The fact that we happen to exist in one of these infinite number of "fine-tuned" universes should strike nobody as anything extraordinary because we can only exist in such a universe. The last point being one that I would expect anybody who has spent any effort considering such things to quite easily be able to wrap their heads around.

jlowder wrote:
You're correct; fiction can be "based-on" real people and events. What definition of "fiction" do you propose?

I still think the genre of the Bible is controversial; I don't see how to construct a non-question-begging argument based on an assumption about the genre of the Bible.

I'm not sure how you see the genre of the bible being controversial as an argument for taking parts of it on face value. Even within the clearly non-fiction genre, if there is controversy about the source that's usually sufficient enough to require additional substantiation for claims made.

purplerat wrote:

andrewk wrote:Somewhere earlier in this long thread somebody had alleged that multiverse theories were just invented by atheists to counter the fine-tuning argument. (snip)

Maybe your recalling (just not very well) what I said about multiverse theories being used to counter fine-tuning arguments.

No it wasn't you ratty (if I may be so bold as to call you that). I remember now (thanks to what you said lower down in your reply) that the allegation was actually made in the blog post that was linked in the original post.

Hi, Jeffery

jlowder wrote:
For similar reasons, I am inclined to believe that the hypothesis of a morally perfect being is simpler than an amoral, indifferent, or mostly good but slightly evil being.

I beg to differ on that one (I have other differences on the issue of probability, how to assess simplicity, etc., but that would take a bit long to discuss).
The issue is that moral perfection - or moral goodness, etc. - is a very complex claim about how the entity would behave in specific situations (perhaps, you would prefer to call that great scope instead of complexity; it depends on your terminology, but the point is that it's a huge conjunction of claims).
Someone might as well posit a being G that is omnipotent and "consequentialistically perfect" - in the sense that, say, G maximizes satisfaction of desires of all other beings, in some way (I posted a somewhat more detailed account here).
That claim would not seem to have greater scope or complexity than "omniscient, omnipotent, morally perfect, and creator of all other beings".
In fact, the alternative does not contain the claim that the entity is the creator of all other things, or omniscient (and if omniscience follows from omnipotence, then still the alternative is no less complex). And consequentialistically perfect does not seem to be a claim that has greater scope or complexity than morally perfect (if you think desire consequentialism is true, then let's pick another variant - one that does not match moral perfection).
So, it seems to me the alternative in question has no lower prior than theism. But that is just one alternative.
The claim that there is a being that is omnipotent and not morally perfect is the union (i.e., disjunction) of all other alternative beings, and thus a lot more probable than theism (assuming that the probability of an omnipotent being is not zero).
In fact, even a n-consequentialist deity would seem to have no lower probability than theism, yielding the prior of theism either zero or an infinitesimal(unless you count the information in the description of the alternatives as reducing probability, which would be probably right but would also make the probability of any omniscient being zero, or at least an infinitesimal).

All this talk of constants. Think small, not big. It's all defined at our location by atomic radii. They are a property of matter. Add anything you like to that, photons etc.

I never mind preachers, they are for simple folk. Who believe. But this Craig drives me nuts. Brain hurts.

Angra Mainyu wrote:Hi, Jeffery. The issue is that moral perfection - or moral goodness, etc. - is a very complex claim about how the entity would behave in specific situations (perhaps, you would prefer to call that great scope instead of complexity; it depends on your terminology, but the point is that it's a huge conjunction of claims).

That's one way to look at God's moral perfection, though that's not the classical way. God's goodness is not measured in how he behaves but instead it is understood and measured by what he is. For the Thomist, it is that he is pure actuality or being itself which makes him morally perfect--goodness itself. I'm unsure what Jeffery had in mind, though as far as I can remember neither Craig nor Swinburne are Thomists.

Mick wrote:

Angra Mainyu wrote:Hi, Jeffery. The issue is that moral perfection - or moral goodness, etc. - is a very complex claim about how the entity would behave in specific situations (perhaps, you would prefer to call that great scope instead of complexity; it depends on your terminology, but the point is that it's a huge conjunction of claims).

That's one way to look at God's moral perfection, though that's not the classical way. God's goodness is not measured in how he behaves but instead it is understood and measured by what he is. For the Thomist, it is that he is pure actuality or being itself which makes him morally perfect--goodness itself. I'm unsure what Jeffery had in mind, though as far as I can remember neither Craig nor Swinburne are Thomists.

I've argued that what I proposed is the correct way to look at moral perfection, since saying that a being is morally perfect gives you more or less detailed information about how that being would behave under specific situations.

More precisely, the moral perfection condition entails that God would never do anything immoral under any circumstances, and would do what's morally good over what's neutral.

One could posit alternative conditions about how an omnipotent, omniscient creator would behave.

I'm not sure how exactly the Thomistic objection would go, but let me clarify my position and ask you about it:

Jeffery defined "God" as an omnipotent, omniscient, morally perfect being, creator of all other beings.
That's a pretty standard definition in present-day philosophy.

Swinburne adds also some other properties, including what he calls "perfect freedom" (due to a mistaken view of freedom), to the definition of "God", but that only adds more conditions, and also fails to entail moral perfection - which is what I argued in the links I posted in my previous post.

In brief, my claim is that moral perfection does not follow from omnipotence, omniscience, and the property (relation or relational property, if you like) of being the creator of all other beings.

Neither does it follow from the so-called "perfect freedom", which only means, by Swinburne's definition, that God's actions are not caused by any previous states of the world - including God's previous states.

That moral perfection does not follow from omniscience and what Swinburne calls "perfect freedom" is what I argued in the links I posted - hence, it does not follow from omniscience alone, either.

Also, omniscience adds nothing in terms of morality.

So, as I mentioned, one might posit alternative conditions about how an omnipotent, omniscient creator would behave - alternative to moral perfection, that is -, thus coming up with alternative beings with no lower probability by the standards based on simplicity and scope.

Would the Thomist objection you have in mind claim that moral perfection follows from the other properties included in the definition of "God" in Jeffery's (or even in Swinburne's) definition?

If so, I would argue that the objection fails, and the same reasons I've given in the links I provided earlier are enough to show that. The Thomist might object to those reasons, but they'd have to make their case - which I would argue against, of course.

If not, then the objection fails: the Thomist might be working under a different definition of "God", but that's not the entity I'm talking about.

By the way, you're correct that neither Craig nor Swinburne are Thomists.
In fact, their conceptions of God are incompatible with Thomism:
According to Craig, God (for instance) learns tensed facts as time goes by, so God changes.
That contradicts Thomism.
Swinburne is less clear sometimes, but he rejects including timelessness or being outside of time as a property of God - he has serious doubts about the coherence of that conception.

One could argue that moral perfection is about the will rather than behavior. Kant might argue that way.

So if 'God' is morally perfect, we can discount the bible as offering any insights into God's nature, 'cos clearly that deity is anything but morally perfect

Mick wrote:One could argue that moral perfection is about the will rather than behavior. Kant might argue that way.

I'd have to see your argument to address it in more detail, but my point is that if entity A is morally perfect, then in situation X, entity A will not behave immorally.

And if there are two possible courses of action, one morally neutral and the other one morally praiseworthy, A will follow the latter, etc.

Someone might as well posit omnipotent beings who would behave in different manners, in some situations - that's what my examples actually do -, and then consider that the hypotheses are mutually disjoint to make a probabilistic case.