think wrote:I mean the project of ordering qualitatively different meanings of "real" onto a quantitative continuum. This is neither a "taxonomy of concepts" nor, to my knowledge, a scientific project.
Referring to this proposal:

That's why I've proposed a continuum from "assumed to be real" to "assumed to be non-real" with intermediate degrees of instrumentalist non-realist reliances.

I don't think it's a project, but a reasonable description of what scientists usually do. I think that scientists assume that some concepts refer to real things (e.g. "platypus", "brain"), others concepts don't refer to real things (e.g. "flogistus", "unicorn"), and other concepts are conceptual tools whose reference is uncertain.

seeker wrote:

think wrote:I mean the project of ordering qualitatively different meanings of "real" onto a quantitative continuum. This is neither a "taxonomy of concepts" nor, to my knowledge, a scientific project.
Referring to this proposal:

That's why I've proposed a continuum from "assumed to be real" to "assumed to be non-real" with intermediate degrees of instrumentalist non-realist reliances.

I don't think it's a project, but a reasonable description of what scientists usually do. I think that scientists assume that some concepts refer to real things (e.g. "platypus", "brain"), others concepts don't refer to real things (e.g. "flogistus", "unicorn"), and other concepts are conceptual tools whose reference is uncertain.

Ok...don't see why you think there can't be a descriptive project. This description of science is obviously not self-evident otherwise 1 you wouldn't have to say it 2 you couldn't say it and 3 even if you could and did, every other theory of science isn't in perfect agreement with you.

Positron wrote:Furthermore, I think that if we try to impose the concepts of realism and and ontology onto science we lumber it with useless baggage and take away from it's main strengths.

Science operates with a minimal set of assumptions and isn't that a good thing?

All you have to do is adopt the proper usage of the term real. It is always a judgement, not a property. There is absolutely no need for the property and the judgement is only made on cases.

To me there is no doubt that science studies reality. Reality is simply what is given and science studies that stuff. All this concern ver what reality really is or coming up with a definition of it that covers everything is verbal limbo.

SpeedOfSound wrote:To me there is no doubt that science studies reality. Reality is simply what is given and science studies that stuff. All this concern ver what reality really is or coming up with a definition of it that covers everything is verbal limbo.

Here we go again...is it a given that reality is simply what is given? How did you determine this?

think wrote:

SpeedOfSound wrote:To me there is no doubt that science studies reality. Reality is simply what is given and science studies that stuff. All this concern ver what reality really is or coming up with a definition of it that covers everything is verbal limbo.

Here we go again...is it a given that reality is simply what is given? How did you determine this?

Tautology. What else could reality be? I have not a clue.

I will bet you ten bucks you can't actually tell me what this extra real sauce is that you keep bringing up.

think wrote:

seeker wrote:

think wrote:I mean the project of ordering qualitatively different meanings of "real" onto a quantitative continuum. This is neither a "taxonomy of concepts" nor, to my knowledge, a scientific project.
Referring to this proposal:

That's why I've proposed a continuum from "assumed to be real" to "assumed to be non-real" with intermediate degrees of instrumentalist non-realist reliances.

I don't think it's a project, but a reasonable description of what scientists usually do. I think that scientists assume that some concepts refer to real things (e.g. "platypus", "brain"), others concepts don't refer to real things (e.g. "flogistus", "unicorn"), and other concepts are conceptual tools whose reference is uncertain.

Ok...don't see why you think there can't be a descriptive project. This description of science is obviously not self-evident otherwise 1 you wouldn't have to say it 2 you couldn't say it and 3 even if you could and did, every other theory of science isn't in perfect agreement with you.

If that's what you mean by "descriptive project", that's OK, but it sounds (to me) somewhat pretentious as a name. It merely means that this "deflationary realist" description will be kind of the description that I will probably use, because I have fallible reasons to think that it's more justified than other (non deflationary realist) proposals.

seeker wrote:

think wrote:

seeker wrote:

think wrote:I mean the project of ordering qualitatively different meanings of "real" onto a quantitative continuum. This is neither a "taxonomy of concepts" nor, to my knowledge, a scientific project.
Referring to this proposal:

I don't think it's a project, but a reasonable description of what scientists usually do. I think that scientists assume that some concepts refer to real things (e.g. "platypus", "brain"), others concepts don't refer to real things (e.g. "flogistus", "unicorn"), and other concepts are conceptual tools whose reference is uncertain.

Ok...don't see why you think there can't be a descriptive project. This description of science is obviously not self-evident otherwise 1 you wouldn't have to say it 2 you couldn't say it and 3 even if you could and did, every other theory of science isn't in perfect agreement with you.

If that's what you mean by "descriptive project", that's OK, but it sounds (to me) somewhat pretentious as a name. It merely means that this "deflationary realist" description will be kind of the description that I will probably use, because I have fallible reasons to think that it's more justified than other (non deflationary realist) proposals.

Those reasons are what I refer to when I asked you to make explicit the criteria, method, etc of what you have laid out here.

Altered to suit your tastes:

Why should such a description be attempted, is this descriptive activity knowledge producing, if so what kind of knowledge is produced, according to what method is it accomplished, what are the underlying presuppositions generating such a method, and how would this descriptive activity understand itself?

SpeedOfSound wrote:I will bet you ten bucks you can't actually tell me what this extra real sauce is that you keep bringing up.

1 you brought it up!
2 you claim "the real is the given" is a tautology. Strange then, that this "tautology" results in the positive conclusion that empirical science studies the real when the pure tautology "real is real" does not...

think wrote:

SpeedOfSound wrote:I will bet you ten bucks you can't actually tell me what this extra real sauce is that you keep bringing up.

1 you brought it up!
2 you claim "the real is the given" is a tautology. Strange then, that this "tautology" results in the positive conclusion that empirical science studies the real when the pure tautology "real is real" does not...

Real is what science studies. Science studies reality. Real is also what we find given in our lives. Science extends that with rigor.

There is no other meaning to real other than what is given us, what we find, and we use the word as a judgement of particulars. Any attempt to globalize the term results in 'but are concepts real?' and a lot of other never-ending discussions. But you can just refuse to participate in wibble.

Philosophers like to talk about Reality with a capital R as if it is some kind of universal backing to everything. This makes no sense to me. I have no clue what it means to do that.

SpeedOfSound wrote:

think wrote:

SpeedOfSound wrote:I will bet you ten bucks you can't actually tell me what this extra real sauce is that you keep bringing up.

1 you brought it up!
2 you claim "the real is the given" is a tautology. Strange then, that this "tautology" results in the positive conclusion that empirical science studies the real when the pure tautology "real is real" does not...

Real is what science studies. Science studies reality. Real is also what we find given in our lives. Science extends that with rigor.

You already made this claim, you're not addressing the argument. I'm asking for justification for the equation of the given or the datum with the real. Either the equation is a pure tautology, as you claim, in which case no positive claim about the relation of science to the real could be deduced from the equation, or, the equation isn't a tautology in which case you are determining the real in some fashion, excluding something or rather (for example concepts, as you point out below), etc. In this case, a reasoned justification is required.

There is no other meaning to real other than what is given us, what we find, and we use the word as a judgement of particulars. Any attempt to globalize the term results in 'but are concepts real?' and a lot of other never-ending discussions. But you can just refuse to participate in wibble.

Obviously there are other meanings. Real talk means speaking the truth. Keeping it real means authenticity. When I ask "what are the real motivations for doing such and such", I mean precisely the opposite of the given. In this case, I am asking what have you hidden, what is not given. So in so far as you refuse to give justification for your claim, you are the "wibbler" here. If you want to limit the term because you think it is productive to do so, then just say that. I would agree -- knowledge (scientific or otherwise) can only be produced when one sets certain limits to what is being investigated and how it is being investigated. But if one wishes to universalize those limits, then one has to give due reason. If you attempt to universalize such limits without proper justification, you start to look a lot like these naughty "metaphysicians" you keep talking about.

Philosophers like to talk about Reality with a capital R as if it is some kind of universal backing to everything. This makes no sense to me. I have no clue what it means to do that.

The reason for this is not too difficult to see -- if everything is to be comprehended under one mode of thought, then everything must have something in common, or some commonality must ground all diversity. Radical diversity means an impossibility of understanding two in terms of each other, or in terms of one. Hence, the grand metaphysical attempt: "all reality is water", "all reality is matter", "all reality is physical", "all reality is what is given"...

Now, the standard response to this is something like the following: "I don't insist that the real is the given, I only await you showing me otherwise." But this is bad thinking. In this case, one universalizes the criteria of knowledge, though the specific content may admit of novelty. Basically one demands the impossible: Give to me what is not given, and I will accept that the real is not simply the given.

deleted, accidental double post

think wrote:Why should such a description be attempted,

I'm not telling other people what they "should" do, they're free to do what they want. I'm just telling what I think about this issue, and I'm inviting other people to share their thoughts.

think wrote:is this descriptive activity knowledge producing, if so what kind of knowledge is produced

Yes, it produces my own knowledge.

think wrote:according to what method is it accomplished,

I'd say it's observation and hypothesis-testing.

think wrote:what are the underlying presuppositions generating such a method, and how would this descriptive activity understand itself?

I don't understand these questions.

seeker wrote:

think wrote:Why should such a description be attempted,

I'm not telling other people what they "should" do, they're free to do what they want. I'm just telling what I think about this issue, and I'm inviting other people to share their thoughts.

think wrote:is this descriptive activity knowledge producing, if so what kind of knowledge is produced

Yes, it produces my own knowledge.

think wrote:according to what method is it accomplished,

I'd say it's observation and hypothesis-testing.

think wrote:what are the underlying presuppositions generating such a method, and how would this descriptive activity understand itself?

I don't understand these questions.

Well the hypothesis to be tested seems to be: (1) That it is reasonable to adopt a "deflationary" stance about realism and ontology, and (2) that the adoption of this stance characterizes or is an essential part of scientific method generally. Correct?

So, what observations should one make to test this hypothesis?

think wrote:You already made this claim, you're not addressing the argument. I'm asking for justification for the equation of the given or the datum with the real. Either the equation is a pure tautology, as you claim, in which case no positive claim about the relation of science to the real could be deduced from the equation, or, the equation isn't a tautology in which case you are determining the real in some fashion, excluding something or rather (for example concepts, as you point out below), etc. In this case, a reasoned justification is required.

Consider that I am saying nothing universal about real I am talking about the word 'real'. That puts quite a different spin on it.

think wrote:Now, the standard response to this is something like the following: "I don't insist that the real is the given, I only await you showing me otherwise." But this is bad thinking. In this case, one universalizes the criteria of knowledge, though the specific content may admit of novelty. Basically one demands the impossible: Give to me what is not given, and I will accept that the real is not simply the given.

I don't insist that real is just a word of judgment on particular instances, I await you showing me some meaning beyond that.

The reason for this is not too difficult to see -- if everything is to be comprehended under one mode of thought, then everything must have something in common, or some commonality must ground all diversity. Radical diversity means an impossibility of understanding two in terms of each other, or in terms of one. Hence, the grand metaphysical attempt: "all reality is water", "all reality is matter", "all reality is physical", "all reality is what is given"...

I'm not asking you to give me the ultimate truth about reality I am asking you to justify using the word in ways like you listed above. "all reality is mind", "all reality is god", "all reality is illusion". No. Real is a judgement that I make about the squirrel in the tree and we can make it together or even argue about the squirrel but we can't argue about what Reality is until I know what you mean by 'what EVERYTHING IS'. I can't think of what thing we are trying to discover by this universal consideration of reality.

think wrote:Obviously there are other meanings. Real talk means speaking the truth. Keeping it real means authenticity. When I ask "what are the real motivations for doing such and such", I mean precisely the opposite of the given. In this case, I am asking what have you hidden, what is not given.

Nice! Science talk means speaking the truth. Keeping it scientific means authenticity. When I ask "what are the scientific reasons for such and such", I mean to challenge the given. So. science studies this kind of real.

But I noticed you are using given in a different sense then I am. You use it as the obvious surface way of looking at things and I use it, perhaps idiosyncratically, as what we always see right in front of us without thinking about it at all. There are squirrels in the trees. The fuckers are everywhere and everyone seems to know what I am talking about with them. There is probably a squirrel right this instant in the tail-pipe of your car. Science can look into those kinds of givens.

think wrote:Well the hypothesis to be tested seems to be: (1) That it is reasonable to adopt a "deflationary" stance about realism and ontology, and (2) that the adoption of this stance characterizes or is an essential part of scientific method generally. Correct?
So, what observations should one make to test this hypothesis?

First, observations of how scientists talk when they work. I can imagine a person talking in a strictly non-realist manner, e.g. "I don't know if there're platypuses, so I will only talk about my own patterns of sense-data". But scientists don't talk like this, and their work as scientists would become impossible if they adopt such kind of talk. I don't know how proponents of non-realism would answer this issue.
Second, if I try to use psychological theories in a description of how scientists work, those theories are also (deflationary) realist: they assume that there are external objects and events with which organisms interact. So a denial of deflationary realism will make our descriptions inconsistent with our psychological theories.
Third, observations about the utility of realist ontologies in informational science, and the inexistence of non-realist alternatives.

seeker wrote:

think wrote:Well the hypothesis to be tested seems to be: (1) That it is reasonable to adopt a "deflationary" stance about realism and ontology, and (2) that the adoption of this stance characterizes or is an essential part of scientific method generally. Correct?
So, what observations should one make to test this hypothesis?

First, observations of how scientists talk when they work. I can imagine a person talking in a strictly non-realist manner, e.g. "I don't know if there're platypuses, so I will only talk about my own patterns of sense-data". But scientists don't talk like this, and their work as scientists would become impossible if they adopt such kind of talk. I don't know how proponents of non-realism would answer this issue.

Aren't you describing an instrumental relation between the way scientists talk and the work they must do? Or what do you say is the relation here?

Second, if I try to use psychological theories in a description of how scientists work, those theories are also (deflationary) realist: they assume that there are external objects and events with which organisms interact. So a denial of deflationary realism will make our descriptions inconsistent with our psychological theories.

Not sure if you mean to argue that psychology and the "hard" sciences share the same methodological approach to their object...

Third, observations about the utility of realist ontologies in informational science, and the inexistence of non-realist alternatives.

Aren't all three of your points regarding the utility of realist ontology for certain types of science? If you mean to say that it is useful to think this way, and that many scientists adopt this stance because it is useful to their work and the effective dissemination of their findings, I find such a conclusion fairly uncontroversial. I in fact adopt a "deflationary realist ontology" every time I brush my teeth because it is useful to do so.

SpeedOfSound wrote:

Positron wrote:Furthermore, I think that if we try to impose the concepts of realism and and ontology onto science we lumber it with useless baggage and take away from it's main strengths.

Science operates with a minimal set of assumptions and isn't that a good thing?

All you have to do is adopt the proper usage of the term real.

Do our predictions about an empirically-defined platypus differ from our predictions about a "real platypus"? "Real" is just a word. Perhaps there's a point to be made about a taxonomic system that can distinguish between a platypus we can observe swimming in a stream in Tasmania, and a fictional platypus in a book. This is fine, but it's a pretty trivial matter. The word "real" also has some unfortunate baggage, drawing in the jamestians and muddying the waters. It provokes yet another tedious and pointless battle over "proper usage of 'real'". A term such as "non-fictional" might work just as well in the above taxonomic context.

Matthew Shute wrote:

SpeedOfSound wrote:

Positron wrote:Furthermore, I think that if we try to impose the concepts of realism and and ontology onto science we lumber it with useless baggage and take away from it's main strengths.

Science operates with a minimal set of assumptions and isn't that a good thing?

All you have to do is adopt the proper usage of the term real.

Do our predictions about an empirically-defined platypus differ from our predictions about a "real platypus"? "Real" is just a word. Perhaps there's a point to be made about a taxonomic system that can distinguish between a platypus we can observe swimming in a stream in Tasmania, and a fictional platypus in a book. This is fine, but it's a pretty trivial matter. The word "real" also has some unfortunate baggage, drawing in the jamestians and muddying the waters. It provokes yet another tedious and pointless battle over "proper usage of 'real'". A term such as "non-fictional" might work just as well in the above taxonomic context.

I have some scribblings about abstract structures on my paper and I can ask about if they are 'real' or not. Well, I can see them so they are real scribbles. I can think them and that is another real thing. I can talk or write about them and that is more real stuff. But all different things, we should note.

But then that is not what is usually begin talked about in philosophy. We want to know about some extra special real sauce. Do the abstract concepts have an extra special real saucy existence out THERE somewhere? This is the part that makes zero sense to me.

If I let go of that quest I do see many things, or think many things, that are analogous to these structures. I start to find them at Walmart. But then the things like trees that we accept as real, normal people anyway, are the same kinds of things. Analogs. But I can smack into those analogs if I am not careful. But I don't smack into the air.

There are tings and they are given. Some in the mind and some on paper and some out THERE. All real in the simple sense of the word and I think we should just accept that simplicity.