GrahamH wrote:

Little Idiot wrote:One doesnt need to believe in naive materialism to believe that physicalism means 'everything is physical'. SEP agrees, for example.
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/physicalism/

The question is 'what does physical mean' or what does 'everything is physical mean'.

I think most of us can agree physical means - to physicalists - objective, independent of observation.
I think most of us can agree physical means - to mentalists/idealists - subjective, observer dependent.

My case is that SOME theories of physics say there is no such thing as objective physical, objective time, objective space.
If these theories are correct, then physicalism is wrong, or has to ammend its position by changing the meaning of physical to include its subjective, observer dependent nature, and thus effectively be indidstinguishable from idealsim.

But you yourself have an observer independent reality WI.

Yes, but WI is not physical. In idealism physical is observer dependent, whereas in physicalism, physical is observer independent. Its about what does physical mean.

GrahamH wrote:

Little Idiot wrote:
If one were to agree that physics is showing the physical can not explain all things, and if one agrees that 'all things can be explained by the physical' is a key tennet of physicalism - then the case for intelligent free thinking people to seriously consider all forms of idealism, including mentalism, is made more strong by the argument herein. Therefore this is exactly on topic.

Whether something can be explained, or is impossible to explained is not knowable. All we can say is if we have what seems a good explanation, or that we can't currently imagine the form of a good explanation.

This is a problem with metaphysics.

You can't get away with -metaphics X can't explain Y therefore metaphysics Z, which explains none of what X explains, must be true.

But I didn't say because of this, mentalism is true. I said it would increase the case for considering mentalism, if physicalism were not true.

You propose that "it's all mental" but this seems to make absolutely no difference at all to how the world appears. Your one distinctive point is that you think it should be easier to jump from conceptual to experiential than from physical to experiential, because "it's all mental", but even that seems dubious. There seems to be negligible basis for the claim that such a jump is possible. Can you turn a concept into an experience?

Some forms of Idealism would have it that "its all experience", but you and Jamest acknowledge that this is insufficient to account for a inferred source of order behind the scenes. So you go for WM and James has a Sub Conscious as stand-ins for a real physical world. All these are outside consciousness.

It makes no differnce how a physicist does physics, or a NS-ist does NS. It makes no difference to how a physicalist experiences the world as a physicalist. But it makes a huge difference to the experience of the world, when the world is experienced as a mentalist.
Only when one delberatly applies the principles of mentalism to ones active life in the world can it make a huge difference to your active life in the world and experience of the world.

So i take it that Little Idiot doesn't want to answer any simple questions about his sensory processing claims.

GrahamH wrote:

Little Idiot wrote:

GrahamH wrote:

Little Idiot wrote:One doesnt need to believe in naive materialism to believe that physicalism means 'everything is physical'. SEP agrees, for example.
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/physicalism/

The question is 'what does physical mean' or what does 'everything is physical mean'.

I think most of us can agree physical means - to physicalists - objective, independent of observation.
I think most of us can agree physical means - to mentalists/idealists - subjective, observer dependent.

My case is that SOME theories of physics say there is no such thing as objective physical, objective time, objective space.
If these theories are correct, then physicalism is wrong, or has to ammend its position by changing the meaning of physical to include its subjective, observer dependent nature, and thus effectively be indidstinguishable from idealsim.

But you yourself have an observer independent reality WI.

Yes, but WI is not physical. In idealism physical is observer dependent, whereas in physicalism, physical is observer independent. Its about what does physical mean.

What are you calling physical here?
If "the physical world" = "the experienced world" and WI is observer independent, and experiences are bound by the laws of physics and WI, then "the physical world" depends on an observer independent reality (WI).

Also, of course, I don;t think you have any good evidence that reality is mind dependent, even if there is no objective fact to it.

Einstein rejected objective simultaneity, but that does not equate to mind dependent, merely to a physical frame of reference.

Again, I am not in this line of argument, arguing idealism is right, I am suggesting that some of physics cutting edge theories are contrary to the physicalists position. (Its only a secondary argument, to show the post is not off topic, that if a physicalist were to drop physicalism he may consider idealism)
Its about what does physicalism mean by 'everything is physical' (or what ever else one says physicalism claims, since its hard to get a straight answer to the question 'what does physicalism claim)

GrahamH wrote:
You don't remain intact. To some degree you disintegrate. Does an object remain that same object after disintegration?

After my biological death I will naturally begin to decay unless this gradual process will somehow be prevented from taking place (e.g. by placing me in a freezer). Alas, the question as to when exactly the organism I am will have ceased to exist is fraught with vagueness. (There is an analogous question as to when exactly the organism I am has begun to exist.) How much percent of a decaying organism, i.e. how many organs and how much organic tissue, must still be there (in a recognizable form) in order for it to still be there? Is a mere skeleton still an organism? Skeptics will say that there is no objective and precise fact of the matter as to when organisms or complex material objects in general begin or cease to exist, so that any answer will be more or less arbitrary.

Little Idiot wrote:One doesnt need to believe in naive materialism to believe that physicalism means 'everything is physical'. SEP agrees, for example.
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/physicalism/

The question is 'what does physical mean' or what does 'everything is physical mean'.

I think most of us can agree physical means - to physicalists - objective, independent of observation.
I think most of us can agree physical means - to mentalists/idealists - subjective, observer dependent.

My case is that SOME theories of physics say there is no such thing as objective physical, objective time, objective space.
If these theories are correct, then physicalism is wrong, or has to ammend its position by changing the meaning of physical to include its subjective, observer dependent nature, and thus effectively be indidstinguishable from idealsim.

Still wibbling about YOUR idea of naive physicalism as some ontic substance?

GrahamH wrote:

Little Idiot wrote:

GrahamH wrote:

Little Idiot wrote:
If one were to agree that physics is showing the physical can not explain all things, and if one agrees that 'all things can be explained by the physical' is a key tennet of physicalism - then the case for intelligent free thinking people to seriously consider all forms of idealism, including mentalism, is made more strong by the argument herein. Therefore this is exactly on topic.

Whether something can be explained, or is impossible to explained is not knowable. All we can say is if we have what seems a good explanation, or that we can't currently imagine the form of a good explanation.

This is a problem with metaphysics.

You can't get away with -metaphics X can't explain Y therefore metaphysics Z, which explains none of what X explains, must be true.

But I didn't say because of this, mentalism is true. I said it would increase the case for considering mentalism, if physicalism were not true.

But lacking an explanation for Y doesn't invalidate all of X. X is naturally incomplete, but not necessarily false.

If Z provided better explanations then Z would be preferred, but if Z merely borrows X's explanations, adding nothing to them, then X looks more sensible.

Its not just a small area unexplained by physics, infact physics does explain it (it we assume these theories are correct, space and time and physical are not fundamental) - its the fact that in this case physics has disproved physicalisms position that 'its all physical' by showing physical is something else.
Its not a gap in physicalism, physicalism is wrong if physics shows the physical is not fundamental.
Therefore 'its all mental' may or may not be the case, but 'its all physical' is scientifically demonstrated to be wrong (if these theories are correct).

Little Idiot wrote:

GrahamH wrote:
You propose that "it's all mental" but this seems to make absolutely no difference at all to how the world appears. Your one distinctive point is that you think it should be easier to jump from conceptual to experiential than from physical to experiential, because "it's all mental", but even that seems dubious. There seems to be negligible basis for the claim that such a jump is possible. Can you turn a concept into an experience?

Some forms of Idealism would have it that "its all experience", but you and Jamest acknowledge that this is insufficient to account for a inferred source of order behind the scenes. So you go for WM and James has a Sub Conscious as stand-ins for a real physical world. All these are outside consciousness.

It makes no difference how a physicist does physics, or a NS-ist does NS. It makes no difference to how a physicalist experiences the world as a physicalist. But it makes a huge difference to the experience of the world, when the world is experienced as a mentalist.
Only when one delberatly applies the principles of mentalism to ones active life in the world can it make a huge difference to your active life in the world and experience of the world.

OK, you say it makes a huge difference. What difference does it make?

I apply laws which you will not accept, possibly saying 'its chance', and observe the effect as predictable consequences in the environment. Its not magic, its a set of laws, understood, explained and based upon mentalism.

SpeedOfSound wrote:

Little Idiot wrote:One doesnt need to believe in naive materialism to believe that physicalism means 'everything is physical'. SEP agrees, for example.
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/physicalism/

The question is 'what does physical mean' or what does 'everything is physical mean'.

I think most of us can agree physical means - to physicalists - objective, independent of observation.
I think most of us can agree physical means - to mentalists/idealists - subjective, observer dependent.

My case is that SOME theories of physics say there is no such thing as objective physical, objective time, objective space.
If these theories are correct, then physicalism is wrong, or has to ammend its position by changing the meaning of physical to include its subjective, observer dependent nature, and thus effectively be indidstinguishable from idealsim.

Still wibbling about YOUR idea of naive physicalism as some ontic substance?

No.

Its simple. Nobody prepared to comit to what physicalism means, so use SEP definition.
state ones argument against said meaning.
explain and restate then clarify ones original point and argument.

Q1 what does physicalism actually mean?
Q2 how does ones meaning fare if the theories showing time, space and the physical cosmos are not fundamental are correct.

So, in what way am I wibbling, because it looks to me like your the one who's wibbling (defined as avoiding the actual argument and questions for use in this post) in this straight forward sequence of posts.

Little Idiot wrote:
Yes, individual mind is not conscious of all its own contnent. The mind can have access to information used unconsciously, without having access to the information consciously.

I fail to see how mentalism can consistently postulate the unconscious storage of mental contents, because the being of an immaterial mind is exhausted by its conscious being, i.e. by the occurrent mental/experiential contents of its consciousness.
The unconscious storage of subjectively accessible information presupposes the existence of some transconscious, objective, material structure or mechanism, i.e. of some nonmental hardware.

An obvious parallel here to the way QM is trotted about by believers as there observer theory supreme. Now SST. The Woo-Meisters just tingle at each new development, certain that soon! - the original woo-baby of it all will peer back at them from some accelerator or equation.

Little Idiot wrote:

GrahamH wrote:

Little Idiot wrote:It makes no difference how a physicist does physics, or a NS-ist does NS. It makes no difference to how a physicalist experiences the world as a physicalist. But it makes a huge difference to the experience of the world, when the world is experienced as a mentalist.
Only when one delberatly applies the principles of mentalism to ones active life in the world can it make a huge difference to your active life in the world and experience of the world.

OK, you say it makes a huge difference. What difference does it make?

I apply laws which you will not accept, possibly saying 'its chance', and observe the effect as predictable consequences in the environment. Its not magic, its a set of laws, understood, explained and based upon mentalism.

Could you give examples of these laws which physicalists will not accept, but which make a huge difference to experience?

GrahamH wrote:

Teuton wrote:

Little Idiot wrote:
Yes, individual mind is not conscious of all its own contnent. The mind can have access to information used unconsciously, without having access to the information consciously.

I fail to see how mentalism can consistently postulate the unconscious storage of mental contents, because the being of an immaterial mind is exhausted by its conscious being, i.e. by the occurrent mental/experiential contents of its consciousness.
The unconscious storage of subjectively accessible information presupposes the existence of some transconscious, objective, material structure or mechanism, i.e. of some nonmental hardware.

Clearly defining "mind" as conscious subject would make Idealism untenable. There must also be something outside consciousness.

If an immaterial persistent subject is possible why not an immaterial persistent subconscious with memory?

Correct. Idealism can make up anything it likes to solve any problem that comes up by just...making it up. It's all mental and if you have ever talked to someone in the advanced stages of bleeverism you know how quickly they can make something up that has zero evidential or logical support.

They are also very good at whining about the simplicity of simple models that threaten to shatter their shit with reason. If that fails to quiet reason they get oddly distracted by some little bird like string theory.

So why not immaterial unconscious and immaterial memory and on and on? Gap-Filler.

GrahamH wrote:
Clearly defining "mind" as conscious subject would make Idealism untenable. There must also be something outside consciousness.

Pure minds/souls/spirits are pure subjects lacking an outside or exterior.

GrahamH wrote:
So our Idealist correspondents here are not talking about "pure minds" by your definition, they are talking about minds that have conscious and unconscious parts. That formulation has other problems, but not the problem of memory.

There are three conceivable kinds of nonsubstantial mental entities:

1. occurrent conscious mental events/processes (experienced/felt sensations, emotions/feelings, cogitations/thoughts, conations/volitions)
2. occurrent unconscious mental events/processes (subexperiential, "computational" cognitive processes)
3. dispositional (unconscious) mental states (intellectual abilities, memories, beliefs, knowledge, preferences, interests, desires, etc.)

First of all, I'm asking myself what's genuinely mental about 2+3 when they are unconscious. For I think that nothing is genuinely mental unless it has subjective experiential/phenomenal content, and 2+3 lack such necessarily conscious content. I fail to see a relevant distinction between unconscious mental events and states and nonmental neural events and states. And that's why I deny that minds/souls/spirits, which don't have any nervous system or any other material structure, can be substrata of events and states of the types 2+3.

Anyway, the entire conscious/unconscious distinction makes no intelligible sense in the mentalistic worldview, mainly because both the substance-mentalistic and the pure-process-mentalistic conception of the mind or the mental is fundamentally flawed.

Pure-process mentalism is untenable simply because there cannot be any unexperienced experiences/experiencings, and experiences/experiencings or bundles/streams of experiences/experiencings cannot be (self-)experiencers.

Substance mentalism (and substance dualism) is untenable simply because mental substances cannot consist of any immaterial stuff and they cannot consist of nothing, of no stuff whatsoever either, which means that they cannot be anything at all but nonentities—which is to say that they are nothing in themselves.
The concept of a concrete object with causal powers which is extensionless, matterless, formless, structureless is an empty pseudoconcept.
Substance mentalism collapses either into substance materialism or pure-process mentalism.

Little Idiot wrote:I am suggesting that some of physics cutting edge theories are contrary to the physicalists position.

Which ones?