Taken a snippet form another thread:

lobawad wrote:
2. If all observation is self-observation, anything which is observed, even if it appears to be external or external in nature, is part of the self, and wholly within the self.

We have a couple of things.

Appears to be
an implication of 'Is actually'

And a container idea of self and part of self and external and internal.

If I look at something and I can make the concept that this may only appear to be a something then I need a few bits of knowledge first.

I need to have a concept of the thing that appears to be what I see
I need to know that it is possible for there to be a mistake
I need a number of bits that represent a knowledge-base of seeing things. Information about blurry vision, focus, things that are hidden by other things etc.

When I say that the black thing sticking out from behind the trunk of a tree appears to be a crow I am working in a given model of space/time/object that I think we can all agree is sensible and invariant under any metaphysic.

In this model I place my 'self' as one of the objects. That is I have a vantage point. If I act to walk around the tree and see the whole object I may find it is a black squirrel and not a crow. The appearance was not the IS of the matter.

But in this model I am treating myself as another space-time object and I want to call that Self1. The black thing is Obj1.

Now if I want to instead talk about some deeper reality as what causes the model (STM-space-time-model) then I am considering that my Self is not actuality Self1 but my Mind. So this is Self2. The thing where I know the object and consider it.

What I am particularly concerned about is how we refer to these two selves with the same word. We make constant category errors in these discussions. We are talking about two entirely different mistakes concerning appearance and IS.

With Self1 I am inside the STM and referring to obscured things and a mistake in what I think I see and what is actually there if I walk around the tree.

With Self2 I am talking about metaphysics and ideas of the mind creating things. So this is another kind of self, another kind of IS, another kind of Appears.

It is notable that the two categories have a lot in common. There is analogy here. My claim is that the second type is a mistake of taking the first type and using the concept in an entirely new way (one-upping a concept) which I don't think makes any sense whatever.

At least not that I can conceive.

I'm not QUITE clear about what you think you are saying, but I will hazard a response/guess.

Setting aside the HUGE area of concern about the difference between perception and reality, and whether or not reality is in anyway CREATED by observation (I don't believe it is), I would suggest that the problem you are talking about isn't so much that ONE way of looking at it is a mistake, while the other way is not, as that there are correct and incorrect applications of a given way of thinking about each set of observations.

By the way, I think you are going down a false road, in your apparent thinking (or was it just lobawad's thinking?) that the act of observing something causes that something to somehow become a part of the observer. That is one of those tricky roads of what I think are OVER-THINKING that have caused a number of otherwise insightful philosophers to get caught up trying to prove a structure exists which is entirely made up of their own suppositions.

igorfrankensteen wrote:I'm not QUITE clear about what you think you are saying, but I will hazard a response/guess.

I'm simply trying to say that there are two different concepts here that being represented as one. Self1 and Self2, a model of reality, STM, and ideas about deeper metaphysical concerns over reality. If we can't keep our concepts straight then we can't talk intelligently.

igorfrankensteen wrote:
Setting aside the HUGE area of concern about the difference between perception and reality, and whether or not reality is in anyway CREATED by observation (I don't believe it is),

I don't see a huge problem. Can you tell me what the problem is?

I would suggest that the problem you are talking about isn't so much that ONE way of looking at it is a mistake, while the other way is not, as that there are correct and incorrect applications of a given way of thinking about each set of observations.

Yes. I think that is what I said.

By the way, I think you are going down a false road,

So you think my complaining about inaccuracies and category errors is a false road?

in your apparent thinking (or was it just lobawad's thinking?) that the act of observing something causes that something to somehow become a part of the observer. That is one of those tricky roads of what I think are OVER-THINKING that have caused a number of otherwise insightful philosophers to get caught up trying to prove a structure exists which is entirely made up of their own suppositions.

I didn't say a thing about whatever this is. If you want to discuss something being a part of the observer or observation at all then we have a hell of a lot of prep work to do first. We need to start with a clear understanding of which self you want to talk about.

Before everyone gets started jamming another supposed metaphysical claim up my ass let me clear some shit up. The claim I did make, at the very end, is that the arguments I have heard to data are nonsense to me. That isn't metaphysics. Either I do not understand the arguments or I have found something lacking in the arguments that is significant.

But that was just an aside and is not the topic of this thread.

What I would like is an acknowledged that mistaking a black squirrel for a crow is one thing and discussions about what really really is is another thing. On the heels of that would be an adoption of my notation for keeping the two straight.

SpeedOfSound wrote:With Self1 I am inside the STM and referring to obscured things and a mistake in what I think I see and what is actually there if I walk around the tree.

With Self2 I am talking about metaphysics and ideas of the mind creating things. So this is another kind of self, another kind of IS, another kind of Appears.

It is notable that the two categories have a lot in common. There is analogy here. My claim is that the second type is a mistake of taking the first type and using the concept in an entirely new way (one-upping a concept) which I don't think makes any sense whatever.

I think you’ve restated the Hard Problem of consciousness (we seem to be outside and inside our models at the same time), and (as per usual) I think Theory of Mind is responsible for landing us with common sense assumptions about the world which contradict each other, and I don’t see what to do about it.

We don’t just make our way around in the world of crows and trees, we spend much, or most of our time negotiating what other people are thinking about crows and trees, and also what they are thinking about us. In order to manage my reputation, I start by imagining how I appear in someone else’s world, I appear as Self1, inside the Space-Time-Model. So I don’t think Self1 is as basic as you do, I think it’s a sophisticated social construct; if anything, I would see Self2, the assumption that my mind encompasses everything (but without any strong sense of self, or of the thoughts/external world division), as the more basic category. But I’m not saying anything especially constructive, because I don’t see how to reorganize the categories to stop contradicting each other.

(Self1 is indeed the self in the scientific model and in the objective world of common sense, but I think that makes it the social model with particular selves taken out. )

SpeedOfSound wrote:

igorfrankensteen wrote:I'm not QUITE clear about what you think you are saying, but I will hazard a response/guess.

I'm simply trying to say that there are two different concepts here that being represented as one. Self1 and Self2, a model of reality, STM, and ideas about deeper metaphysical concerns over reality. If we can't keep our concepts straight then we can't talk intelligently.

There is a very important distinction that needs to be made here.

1. Phenomenal world
2. Fundamental reality

If we accept that all data derived from the phenomenal world is as accurate as is possible for humans to attain about reality - having passed the test of being constantly verified intersubjectively. Then we should accept, and act as though this knowledge is real, even though - due to our limitations - we cannot know it to be Absolutely so.

When humans then start to speculate about the fundamental nature of reality, they have no justification whatsoever to discount and discard any of the data that has already been intersubjectively verified; unless they have concrete empirical data which contradicts the aforementioned....So, it is one thing to speculate about a fundamental reality that does not correspond to the phenomenal world; but quite another to present these assumptions as fact.

If there is any fundamental reality that does not correspond to the phenomenal world, then it is beyond sense perception (since our senses can only detect phenomena), and would therefore have to be revealed to the brain. But, then, anyone claiming to have received such a revelation can very easily be deluded, insane, or just plain confused.

So, in summary: human beings have no justification whatsoever to reject legitimate findings in the phenomenal world; unless they have concrete, empirically verifiable data that contradicts the phenomenal world. And anyone who believes that they have such data, needs to present their evidence for scrutiny; if they are making such a claim, publicly.

Mere assumptions about the nature of fundamental reality, need to be presented as such.

Edit: change of word

Destroyer wrote:

Mere assumptions about the nature of fundamental reality, need to be presented as such.

Yes. We can't just discount this intersubjective model because we may mistake one critter for another. The argument from illusion is offered and then treated as if it's some fundamental fact about the nature of all knowledge.

Next an alternate model is hinted at but never clearly put forth. When Self2 is offered as the true creator of reality it is about some kind of supposed mind thing that imagines the squirrel behind the branch and makes it so.

I think when it is made clear what the categories are we can see what is being offered in the positive sense and then we can see how senseless it all is.

zoon wrote:

SpeedOfSound wrote:With Self1 I am inside the STM and referring to obscured things and a mistake in what I think I see and what is actually there if I walk around the tree.

With Self2 I am talking about metaphysics and ideas of the mind creating things. So this is another kind of self, another kind of IS, another kind of Appears.

It is notable that the two categories have a lot in common. There is analogy here. My claim is that the second type is a mistake of taking the first type and using the concept in an entirely new way (one-upping a concept) which I don't think makes any sense whatever.

I think you’ve restated the Hard Problem of consciousness (we seem to be outside and inside our models at the same time), and (as per usual) I think Theory of Mind is responsible for landing us with common sense assumptions about the world which contradict each other, and I don’t see what to do about it.

You point out the essence of the category errors about mind. What I am saying here is that we could be much better at labeling what we are talking about in these discussions.

lobawad wrote:SoS, I did already address the point (as I read it) in your original post here. Keep in mind that the arguments I used in the original presentation (of which this is one) are actually logical consequences of the arguments of solipsists. That is, I approached Jamest's claims using his own claims, to demonstrate incoherency. As I involved only the observed, without a single claim that the observed is in any way "real" beyond "observed", Jamest cannot argue against any claims of "reality" (I made none), nor can you bring "reality" into the picture (as far as my original argument goes).

I'll get back to this later, gotta work.

You were inspirational to me in that post. Just wanted to look into a small thing a little more carefully.

lobawad wrote:SoS, I did already address the point (as I read it) in your original post here. Keep in mind that the arguments I used in the original presentation (of which this is one) are actually logical consequences of the arguments of solipsists. That is, I approached Jamest's claims using his own claims, to demonstrate incoherency. As I involved only the observed, without a single claim that the observed is in any way "real" beyond "observed", Jamest cannot argue against any claims of "reality" (I made none), nor can you bring "reality" into the picture (as far as my original argument goes).

I'll get back to this later, gotta work.

The point about phenomena vs. noumena isn’t just to do with Physicalism vs. Idealism. It is really about the entire human condition...How things appear to be vs. the conviction that there is more to existence than meets the eye.

So, SoS does indeed have the right idea: distinguishing the propositions based upon these convictions, from actual knowledge based upon phenomena.

With Self1 I am inside the STM and referring to obscured things and a mistake in what I think I see and what is actually there if I walk around the tree.

With Self2 I am talking about metaphysics and ideas of the mind creating things. So this is another kind of self, another kind of IS, another kind of Appears.

It is notable that the two categories have a lot in common. There is analogy here. My claim is that the second type is a mistake of taking the first type and using the concept in an entirely new way (one-upping a concept) which I don't think makes any sense whatever.

I think some of the previous responses may be getting at the same point I'm about to make, but i'll throw this out anyway.

The way you have laid things out seems to divide the "self" into a self that perceives and a self that thinks. From your post, I gather that you take the structure of the perceptive self to be identical to the structure of the objects it perceives:

In this model I place my 'self' as one of the objects.

But in this model I am treating myself as another space-time object and I want to call that Self1.

The thinking self, or self 2, is identified with "mind". So far, all that seems to mean is that self 2 is somehow unlike the objects apprehended by self 1.

Now if I want to instead talk about some deeper reality as what causes the model (STM-space-time-model) then I am considering that my Self is not actuality Self1 but my Mind. So this is Self2.

Now here are my objections on first reading. You claim "self 1" is invariant under any metaphysic. But in analyzing the structure of "self 1" you say "I place my self..." and "I am treating myself as". Now, both of these statements express the structure of the perceptive self as basically divided and relational. In other words, before explicitly introducing "self 2" or "mind" you already claim a (subject-object) relation between "self" and "self" implicit in the statements "I place myself" and "I am treating myself". So it appears then that in analyzing the structure of self 1, you have already introduced cognition or "self 2". ("Self 2" would be the "I" that "places myself" and "treats myself" -- the self that holds the perceptive self 1 in theoretical relation.) So, if I have gotten the gist of your argument correct, the attempt to analyze the perceptive self independent of "mind" has failed.

So I would caution against what appears to me to be a leap from "invariant under" to "independent of".

Perhaps it is possible to analyze the perceptive self without making this move. I am doubtful, but I'll wait to read your response.

I would claim that an analysis of the structure of perception finds cognition as a necessary moment of perception. The glib way of putting this is, self 1 and self2 are both "self" --- so of course they are already present in and through the other. So I would ask, for example, how does self 1 get from the "sense data" to "sensible things" or "sensible objects"? Is the division and collection of the senses into "things" or "objects" immediate and thoughtless? Or has "mind" already played a necessary part in these most basic sensible categories?

The problem then is how can "self" be double, or constituted by a difference within itself, and be "self identical".

Destroyer,

The point about phenomena vs. noumena isn’t just to do with Physicalism vs. Idealism. It is really about the entire human condition...How things appear to be vs. the conviction that there is more to existence than meets the eye.

So, SoS does indeed have the right idea: distinguishing the propositions based upon these convictions, from actual knowledge based upon phenomena.

You make it sound like the only options are seeing the truth with your own two eyes and blind conviction. Are you claiming that "actual knowledge" is necessarily "based upon phenomena"?

Is self a container or not?

Please explain.

Thank you.

think wrote:

With Self1 I am inside the STM and referring to obscured things and a mistake in what I think I see and what is actually there if I walk around the tree.

With Self2 I am talking about metaphysics and ideas of the mind creating things. So this is another kind of self, another kind of IS, another kind of Appears.

It is notable that the two categories have a lot in common. There is analogy here. My claim is that the second type is a mistake of taking the first type and using the concept in an entirely new way (one-upping a concept) which I don't think makes any sense whatever.

I think some of the previous responses may be getting at the same point I'm about to make, but i'll throw this out anyway.

The way you have laid things out seems to divide the "self" into a self that perceives and a self that thinks. From your post, I gather that you take the structure of the perceptive self to be identical to the structure of the objects it perceives:

You are reading this too hard. I'm not talking about selves at all. Simply trying to find a way to communicate clearly with various kinds of idealists and physicalists. Trying to give a clear structure on which to model things.

In the end this is a suggestion thrown out with hope of someone coming along with a better idea. However, I need to make clearer maybe why I care about this.

You are reading this too hard. I'm not talking about selves at all.

self 1 + self 2 = selves?

See the edit

think wrote:Now here are my objections on first reading. You claim "self 1" is invariant under any metaphysic. But in analyzing the structure of "self 1" you say "I place my self..." and "I am treating myself as". Now, both of these statements express the structure of the perceptive self as basically divided and relational. In other words, before explicitly introducing "self 2" or "mind" you already claim a (subject-object) relation between "self" and "self" implicit in the statements "I place myself" and "I am treating myself". So it appears then that in analyzing the structure of self 1, you have already introduced cognition or "self 2". ("Self 2" would be the "I" that "places myself" and "treats myself" -- the self that holds the perceptive self 1 in theoretical relation.) So, if I have gotten the gist of your argument correct, the attempt to analyze the perceptive self independent of "mind" has failed.

So I would caution against what appears to me to be a leap from "invariant under" to "independent of".

We were unable to communicate before on this invariant idea. Try and leave behind the notion that I am saying anything at all about the nature of reality and consider that I am only talking about how we talk to each other.

Do you or do you nt know how to investigate a black thing in a tree and can you and would you come away to tell your wife that 'yes it was a black squirrel not a crow'?

Destroyer nailed it here:

Destroyer wrote:
So, SoS does indeed have the right idea: distinguishing the propositions based upon these convictions, from actual knowledge based upon phenomena.

The intent is to make a distinction in what we are talking about prior to talking.