PensivePenny wrote:Looking for some clarification on why people believe morality is objective. I just don't get it. I am not a well read philosopher so when people talk about "moral objectivism" I have a hard time supplanting the meaning of those words with what the "ism" really means. To me, moral objectivism is the belief that morality is objective and that right and wrong are objective, meaning that it is observable, measurable, repeatable, etc. Maybe that's not what it means at all. So, when people poo-poo the idea of moral relativism, I interpret that that it is the opposite of moral objectivism, a belief that morality is "relative" to something. To me, the latter is obvious and self-evident and I can't understand how ANYONE could see otherwise. So, what am I missing?.. I mean, while I think the belief in God, is absurd, I can at least comprehend a number of reasons why a person might believe in a deity, mistaken as they might be. But morality? How can that be objective?
Even the Christians arguing that their morality is objective are basing it on God... therefore, even the morality they claim is objective, is relative to their God, which is a product of their culture, ingrained in them from birth. Clearly, other cultures, with other Gods, ingrained from birth with THEIR sense of morality feel just as intensely certain that their morality is objective... When pointing this out to Christians, the apologetics begin. Clearly, there is NO objective point from which right and wrong can be discerned.
What am I missing?
I strongly agree with you that there’s nothing out there, separate from the machinery of evolved human brains, to say that anything’s inherently right or wrong. I think the objectivity of morality (I'm using "morality" and "ethics" interchangeably) can make sense for people who believe there’s a god out there demanding it, since they take the line that their god is objectively there and all adherents of other religions or belief systems are simply mistaken. For atheists with a scientific background, there’s no such grounding for any kind of “ought”. I agree with you in rejecting Sam Harris’s claim that there is an objective morality of that kind.
At the same time, I think it is correct to say that morality, in the sense of a shared set of rules enforced by the group as a whole, is, objectively and scientifically speaking, a feature of every functioning human society. This is “descriptive morality”, in contrast with the claim that some actions are inherently right or wrong, which is referred to by philosophers as “normative morality”. The difference is explained, for example, in this quote from the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy here:
The SEP wrote:There does not seem to be much reason to think that a single definition of morality will be applicable to all moral discussions. One reason for this is that “morality” seems to be used in two distinct broad senses: a descriptive sense and a normative sense. More particularly, the term “morality” can be used either
1) descriptively to refer to certain codes of conduct put forward by a society or a group (such as a religion), or accepted by an individual for her own behavior, or
2) normatively to refer to a code of conduct that, given specified conditions, would be put forward by all rational persons.
Which of these two senses of “morality” a theorist is using plays a crucial, although sometimes unacknowledged, role in the development of an ethical theory. If one uses “morality” in its descriptive sense, and therefore uses it to refer to codes of conduct actually put forward by distinct groups or societies, one will almost certainly deny that there is a universal morality that applies to all human beings. The descriptive use of “morality” is the one used by anthropologists when they report on the morality of the societies that they study. Recently, some comparative and evolutionary psychologists (Haidt 2006; Hauser 2006; De Waal 1996) have taken morality, or a close anticipation of it, to be present among groups of non-human animals: primarily, but not exclusively, other primates.
While I’m strongly of the view that there’s no straightforwardly objective normative morality, I also think that there’s masses of evidence that humans have evolved as a social species to set up rules of conduct and to gang up on individuals who break those rules. Without this strong predisposition, I think human societies would fall apart (or become much more like e.g. chimp groups); this feature of our evolved psychology seems to me to be central to our functioning. Other animals have nothing approaching the human capacity for setting up detailed rules and then singling out those who break the rules for punishment, though as mentioned in the SEP quote above, there are many examples of precursor behaviours, especially in our closest primate relatives. Even human babies too young to speak will punish individuals who mistreat others, as described by Paul Bloom in an article here (which I’ve linked to before). The article opens with a representative anecdote:
Paul Bloom wrote:Not long ago, a team of researchers watched a 1-year-old boy take justice into his own hands. The boy had just seen a puppet show in which one puppet played with a ball while interacting with two other puppets. The center puppet would slide the ball to the puppet on the right, who would pass it back. And the center puppet would slide the ball to the puppet on the left . . . who would run away with it. Then the two puppets on the ends were brought down from the stage and set before the toddler. Each was placed next to a pile of treats. At this point, the toddler was asked to take a treat away from one puppet. Like most children in this situation, the boy took it from the pile of the “naughty” one. But this punishment wasn’t enough — he then leaned over and smacked the puppet in the head.
With this wired-in feature of our psychology being central to the way human societies work, it may become difficult to argue too heatedly that there’s no such thing as right or wrong? Certainly, different societies can have markedly different sets of rules, and the rules can change, usually with a good deal of heated argumentation, but every society has them, and I think a fair number of those rules are generally shared (such as not hitting people without good reason)? Some rules work better (in the sense of enabling a society to function as most participants would want, as romansh suggests) in particular circumstances, for example, avoidance of racial discrimination in mixed societies which are also democracies, and to that extent may be regarded as the “right” rules to have in those circumstances??