pl0bs wrote:

cateye wrote:Ah. Now we're getting somewhere. I agree, it is impossible to infer presence of consciousness. But I go one step further: I say that consciousness is an unneeded concept. See campermons question in the other thread, about the difference between "simulated" and "real" consciousness. I'm satisfied by explaining the behaviour of a person, and that can be done without the requirement of unphyiscal entities.

This definition of consciousness im using doesnt say its material or immaterial. When you talk about simulated consciousness, would you say that rocks have it? A materialist would still have to explain what is special about brains that allows that to have (simulated or real) consciousness, whereas a rock does not.

Yes, a materialist would have to say what is special about brains that make it to have "simulated consciousness", but that is quite easy: it is a neuronal network (in the mathematical sense), whereas a rock is not.

cateye wrote:Yes, a materialist would have to say what is special about brains that make it to have "simulated consciousness", but that is quite easy: it is a neuronal network (in the mathematical sense), whereas a rock is not.

I think we should continue our discussion in this topic. That topic is about why i dont think complexity can create consciousness. Ill reply to your post there.

pl0bs wrote:That little burden thingy is upon you. You claim C is an emergent property of the brain. Prove it.

I can alter my own level of consciousness by interference with the chemical composition of my brain, but without changing its structure. I can do the same, (although I admit to not having tried this myself, there are case studies. See for example that of Phineas P Gage.), by changing the structure of my brain, through surgery or accident. If, as you seem to claim, consciousness is a property of all matter, irregardless of structure and composition, then this should not be possible; any accumulation of matter should be conscious to a degree which is relative to its mass, and I should not be able to alter or diminish my own degree of consciousness by altering its physicality.

Secondly, brain structure and composition are necessary to explain the separation of my consciousness from other objects. If all matter was conscious per se, then there would be no explanation for why I do not have a sense of being a rock, nor my having, by necessity to assume the people around me are conscious. If all matter had consciousness as an inherent property then one would expect to observe, at all times, a greater interconnectedness with all of the objects that exist.

Jef wrote:I can alter my own level of consciousness by interference with the chemical composition of my brain, but without changing its structure. I can do the same, (although I admit to not having tried this myself, there are case studies. See for example that of Phineas P Gage.), by changing the structure of my brain, through surgery or accident. If, as you seem to claim, consciousness is a property of all matter, irregardless of structure and composition, then this should not be possible; any accumulation of matter should be conscious to a degree which is relative to its mass, and I should not be able to alter or diminish my own degree of consciousness by altering its physicality.

Secondly, brain structure and composition are necessary to explain the separation of my consciousness from other objects. If all matter was conscious per se, then there would be no explanation for why I do not have a sense of being a rock, nor my having, by necessity to assume the people around me are conscious. If all matter had consciousness as an inherent property then one would expect to observe, at all times, a greater interconnectedness with all of the objects that exist.

I didnt say consciousness doesnt change when the physical ingredients do change. So yes there is interaction between C and the physical. That can also include C being split up, as might be interpreted from split brain surgery.

pl0bs wrote:I didnt say consciousness doesnt change when the physical ingredients do change.

But why should it, if consciousness is inherent? All matter seems to be made of the same fundamental 'parts', in differing compositions. I don't see anything within your philosophy which can account for changes in the quality of consciousness without invoking the very same emergence of properties you're seeking to rebutt.

So yes there is interaction between C and the physical.

In that case I call Occam's Razor. If the interaction of the physical is necessary to the subjective experience of consciousness, then granting consciousness independent existence without evidence is a superfluous multiplication of entities. Furthermore, as consciousness has never been observed independently of the physical interactions which you admit are necessary you have no grounds to reject the claim that the physical is both necessary and sufficient.

Jef wrote:But why should it, if consciousness is inherent? All matter seems to be made of the same basic stuff, in differing compositions.

There is change so changed can be experienced.

In that case I call Occam's Razor. If the interaction of the physical is necessary for the experience of consciousness, then granting consciousness independent existence without evidence is a superfluous multiplication of entities. Furthermore, as consciousness has never been observed independently of the physical interactions which you admit are necessary you have no grounds to reject the claim that the physical is both necessary and sufficient.

Interaction only implies monism, but not materialist monism in particular.

pl0bs wrote:

Jef wrote:But why should it, if consciousness is inherent? All matter seems to be made of the same basic stuff, in differing compositions.

There is change so changed can be experienced.

And what grounds do you have for claiming this teleological perspective? Who decides the purpose of change?

In that case I call Occam's Razor. If the interaction of the physical is necessary for the experience of consciousness, then granting consciousness independent existence without evidence is a superfluous multiplication of entities. Furthermore, as consciousness has never been observed independently of the physical interactions which you admit are necessary you have no grounds to reject the claim that the physical is both necessary and sufficient.

Interaction only implies monism, but not materialist monism in particular.

I think you'll find that my rebuttals thus far apply equally as well to any monism other than physicalism. The only difference between neutral monism and dualism is that one needlessly multiplies entities while the other needlessly multiplies the properties of a known entity. It's still an unjustified multiplication.

Jef wrote:What grounds do you have for claiming this teleological perspective?

The fact that brains change when we experience stuff.

I think you'll find that my rebuttals thus far apply equally as well to any monism other than physicalism. The only difference between neutral monism and dualism is that one needlessly multiplies entities while the other needlessly multiplies the properties of a known entity. It's still an unjustified multiplication.

Well not quite. An idealist could reject materialism for the same reason of unjustified multiplication. After all, mind is known to interact with the physical, and the physical has never been observed without a mind...

On a side note, I don't think it should be too much to ask that you support your claims with some argument as you make them. This is a thread you have made to forward your position in a philosophy forum. It becomes tiresome if, for every single claim you make, the others who are reading it are forced to request the missing arguments.

I ask this, not in order to rebuke you, but to aid the flow of the conversation. I hope you understand.

pl0bs wrote:Well not quite. An idealist could reject materialism for the same reason of unjustified multiplication. After all, mind is known to interact with the physical, and the physical has never been observed without a mind...

For the purposes of this thread I'll happily accept that critique without argument since, as you're not arguing, as far as I can tell, from an idealist standpoint, it is neither here nor there and would only distract from the real issues.

pl0bs wrote:

Jef wrote:What grounds do you have for claiming this teleological perspective?

The fact that brains change when we experience stuff.

I think you may have misunderstood the question. You certainly didn't answer it.

Jef wrote:I think you may have misunderstood the question. You certainly didn't answer it.

Feel free to clarify and ask again then.

Your previous answer, 'there is change so that change can be experienced' implies that change was 'created' for a purpose; the purpose of being experienced. What arguments or evidence do you have for a purposive creation of change?

Jef wrote:Your previous answer, 'there is change so that change can be experienced' implies that change was 'created' for a purpose; the purpose of being experienced. What arguments or evidence do you have for a purposive creation of change?

I didnt imply any such thing. Im simply saying that physical change can be accompanied by a change of experiences. Watching a movie will cause lots of activity in your brain.

pl0bs wrote: You claim C is an emergent property of the brain. Prove it. Show me the experiment that demonstrates the creation of consciousness.

Ok pl0bs but I will have to impregnate you.

Wezentrommel wrote:

pl0bs wrote: You claim C is an emergent property of the brain. Prove it. Show me the experiment that demonstrates the creation of consciousness.

Ok pl0bs but I will have to impregnate you.

Ill get a sex operation first. And then lets both be unconscious and create C from that.

YanShen wrote:How about the first premise, which makes no sense in relation to the issue at hand? The only things reductionism reduces are our misconceptions? You seem to confuse the epistemological with the ontological here. Definitions and ideas and concepts are just what people use to help conceptualize reality. Whether or not "consciousness" is purely the result of physical processes is an empirical issue. Defining life or consciousness is what humans do in order to help them conceptualize reality. The underlying processes that drive the universe occur independently of our thoughts.

So you disagree with premise 1. Do you think that when we reduced a water molecule to a collection of atoms, that we actually physically changed the makeup of all water? Or did we just improve our understanding of water, as premise 1 states:

P1: The only things reductionism reduces, are our own misconceptions.

Clearly you change the physical makeup, since it is no longer water. Hydrogen atoms and oxygen atoms don't have properties of water, like universal solvency. Your confusion seems to be that you want to adopt a Platonic realist conception to "water' here. There isn't such a thing as "water" that transcends all of reality. Water is just a name we give to two hydrogen atoms plus one oxygen atom.

YanShen wrote:Clearly you change the physical makeup. As it is no longer water. Hydrogen atoms and oxygen atoms don't have properties of water, like universal solvency.

So when we discovered that watermolecules consist of H2O molecules, we actually physically changed the makeup of all water in the universe?

Read the rest of my post earlier. You changed the makeup of that particular water molecule. Your confusion lies in that you want to give a Platonic realist existence to things. So for you, water is an ideal form, a la Plato's theory of forms, which transcends the particular instances of water. Clearly this kind of Platonic realism is hopelessly naive. You can call two hydrogen atoms and one oxygen atom combined in some particular manner whatever name you want. You can call it water in one instance and a dog in the next. Those are just utterances. Regardless of what you think or decide to call it, two hydrogen atoms combined with an oxygen atom in a particular fashion will exhibit properties such as universal solvency. This is the underlying ontology of objective reality. I hope that this clears up part of your confusion.