pl0bs wrote:The matter in our brains requires consciousness to operate. Now it is a fact that our brains consists of the same ordinary matter as in the rest of the universe, and it operates by the universal laws of physics. If matter in the brain requires C, then so does all the rest.

pl0bs wrote:
This is an example of a conscious activity (reading a manual), that is used to support the idea that conscious activities are epiphenomenal. It is therefor not a valid example since it is begging the question ("conscious activities are epiphenomenal, because this conscious activity is epiphenomenal").

pl0bs wrote:

Rumraket wrote:Hydrogen and Oxygen combine to make water by sharing valence electrons. When the electrons aren't shared, it's not water to ANY extend. It's not "almost" water or "slightly" water. It's just not water.
Water is an emergent property of valence electron sharing between one oxygen atom and two hydrogen atoms.

The electrons werent created in the water, the atoms werent created in the water. They just moved around a little, got near eachother, and silly humans as we are, we gave it a label (water) as if something entirely new was created.

pl0bs wrote:And we dont even know what "concrete things" are. If for example particles are loops of spacetime, then the panpsychist view might have all of spacetime as a single experiencing entity, as opposed to each individual particle.

katja z wrote:
You call that an answer? How can bacteria have experiences that require having a nervous system??
Or do you say that seing, thinking, feeling pain and the rest (referring to your definition) not require having a nervous system?

pl0bs wrote:

katja z wrote:I don't need to, I can just bop you on the head to inflict brain damage and you'll go unconscious (meaning, you won't be having any of those experiences of yours).

Ill be watching from out of my body.

If this "etc." is relevant here, you should elaborate on it and tell us just what it refers to. It shouldn't be too hard since you're claiming that you're talking of experiences we all know about.

If you don't do that, your "etc." is just a handy retreat for you for when people point out flaws in your arguments.

Perhaps you could address this in the topic about my definition.

pl0bs wrote:I didnt say C is nonmaterial. Im saying the statement that C came from a previous C(which is what you said), is a nonmaterialist statement.

Rumraket wrote:
Water is an emergent property of valence electron sharing between one oxygen atom and two hydrogen atoms.

pl0bs wrote:The electrons werent created in the water, the atoms werent created in the water. They just moved around a little, got near eachother, and silly humans as we are, we gave it a label (water) as if something entirely new was created.

pl0bs wrote:

Madmaili wrote:Yes but you need to be alive in order to categorize things into living or non living <snip>

There you go.
You agree with me.

pl0bs wrote:The electrons werent created in the water, the atoms werent created in the water. They just moved around a little, got near eachother, and silly humans as we are, we gave it a label (water) as if something entirely new was created.

Teuton wrote:No. There are purely physical, "physiophysical", processes and psychophysical processes, the latter of which are as causally potent as the former. Experiences are psychophysical organismic processes, which have both a subjective and an objective aspect. They are causes, but not in virtue of their mental properties but in virtue of their physical properties. Qualia do not equip experiences with additional nonphysical powers.

pl0bs wrote:So C has causal power. Now what causal power would that be? The laws of physics are universal. C either has causal power over one of them, or is one of them. Either option is a deathblow to materialism.

Rumraket wrote:Something entirely new WAS created. It manifests itself by having entirely different behavior from that of oxygen or hydrogen alone. This is an emergent property.
Nothing silly or arbitrary about it. It is manifesly demonstrable in observational reality.

Teuton wrote:Well, Spinoza might be right in holding that there is only one concrete substance, and everything else is but a local attribute of that one substance. In this picture, elementary particles are reducible to local energetic states of a substantial spacetime. Now a cosmic panpsychist may hold that the one cosmic substance is a unity that is conscious as a whole. How plausible the belief in a "world soul" or "world spirit" is is a question I'll leave open here…

Teuton wrote:FYI: There is such a thing as panpsychistic materialism/materialistic panpsychism.

The third of Strawson’s leading theses is a good deal more tendentious than the first two; namely, that emergence isn’t possible. ‘For any feature Y of anything that is correctly considered to be emergent from X, there must be something about X and X alone in virtue of which Y emerges, and which is sufficient for Y.’ But Strawson holds that there isn’t anything about matter in virtue of which conscious experience could arise from it; or that if there is, we have literally no idea what it could be. In particular, we can’t imagine any way of arranging small bits of unconscious stuff that would result in the consciousness of the larger bits of stuff of which they are the constituents. It’s not like liquids (Strawson’s favourite example of bona fide emergence) where we can see, more or less, how constituent molecules that aren’t liquid might be assembled to make larger things that are. How on earth, Strawson wonders, could anything of that sort explain the emergence of consciousness from matter? If it does, that’s a miracle; and Strawson doesn’t hold with those.
http://www.lrb.co.uk/v29/n10/jerry-fodo ... themselves

Teuton wrote:New atomic arrangements generate new collective properties.
It is not the case that all properties of an integral whole are nothing but sums of the properties of its basic parts.

Teuton wrote:<snip>
(McGinn, Colin. The Mysterious Flame: Conscious Minds in a Material World. New York: Basic Books, 1999. p. 100)

pl0bs wrote:

Teuton wrote:Qualia do not equip experiences with additional nonphysical powers.

Either way, C is required, and this is true especially when you equate it with any physical causal power.

pl0bs wrote:Heres a description of Strawsons view on emergence:

The third of Strawson’s leading theses is a good deal more tendentious than the first two; namely, that emergence isn’t possible. ‘For any feature Y of anything that is correctly considered to be emergent from X, there must be something about X and X alone in virtue of which Y emerges, and which is sufficient for Y.’ But Strawson holds that there isn’t anything about matter in virtue of which conscious experience could arise from it; or that if there is, we have literally no idea what it could be. In particular, we can’t imagine any way of arranging small bits of unconscious stuff that would result in the consciousness of the larger bits of stuff of which they are the constituents. It’s not like liquids (Strawson’s favourite example of bona fide emergence) where we can see, more or less, how constituent molecules that aren’t liquid might be assembled to make larger things that are. How on earth, Strawson wonders, could anything of that sort explain the emergence of consciousness from matter? If it does, that’s a miracle; and Strawson doesn’t hold with those.
http://www.lrb.co.uk/v29/n10/jerry-fodo ... themselves

Madmaili wrote:Btw Materialism is non material