ughaibu wrote:

VanYoungman wrote:This should shut up the likes of Searle and Nagels.

What do you think that Haynes/Libet type experimental results say that is relevant to the free will issue?

In those kinds of experiments, the reason it takes so long to ratify a decision is that you need to make it linguistic, rationalise, before you can be 'aware' of having 'done so'. That's why the scans show that relevant brain activity occurs long before you can say that you've decided to do something like that.

When somebody throws a rock at your head and you duck out of the way, we call it a 'reflex', and don't do experiments on people to see whether they have the free will to let the brick hit them in the head.

Easy enough to test that with objects thrown at your head at random intervals. Go to a batting cage.

ughaibu wrote:

VanYoungman wrote:This should shut up the likes of Searle and Nagels.

What do you think that Haynes/Libet type experimental results say that is relevant to the free will issue?

That it is an illusion. Albeit a magnificent illusion.

VanYoungman wrote:

ughaibu wrote:What do you think that Haynes/Libet type experimental results say that is relevant to the free will issue?

That it is an illusion.

1) what do you understand by the term "free will"?
2) what do you mean by "illusion"?
3) how do the results suggest that free will is an illusion?

ughaibu wrote:

VanYoungman wrote:

ughaibu wrote:What do you think that Haynes/Libet type experimental results say that is relevant to the free will issue?

That it is an illusion.

1) what do you understand by the term "free will"?
2) what do you mean by "illusion"?
3) how do the results suggest that free will is an illusion?

1. That there's a "you" inside you that is making your decisions and has the freedom to decide which decision the "you" will make.
2. What seems to be real isn't. (It just seems or feels that way.)
3. The brain is doing the deciding and only lets the "you" in on it after the fact. Read Dan Dennett's Consciousness Explained and then his update of the whole thing Sweet Dreams.

Finally, once and for all, the "Hard Problem" is solved. There is no problem hard or soft.

VanYoungman wrote:

ughaibu wrote:1) what do you understand by the term "free will"?
2) what do you mean by "illusion"?
3) how do the results suggest that free will is an illusion?

1. That there's a "you" inside you that is making your decisions and has the freedom to decide which decision the "you" will make.
2. What seems to be real isn't. (It just seems or feels that way.)
3. The brain is doing the deciding and only lets the "you" in on it after the fact.

1) the notion of a "you" inside you is called the Cartesian theatre, it is independent of the question of free will. So your definition is eccentric.
2) science deals with what seems to be real, how do you distinguish between observation and illusion?
3) presumably you hold that Libet/Haynes type results demonstrate that decisions are completed preconsciously, however, I see no reason to suppose that's true. How do you arrive at that interpretation of the results?

All three questions are more than adequately answered by a thorough reading of "Self Comes to Mind" by Antonio Damasio.

It seems to me that one of the problems with the Haynes/Libet experiments is this notion of there being a precise moment, that we can identify, at which a decision is made. It is very unclear what this is supposed to mean.

Are we talking about the moment when I say to myself "I'm going to "press button A"? Then there could be a gap between this moment and the moment that I actually start to move to press the button. What if in the meantime I say to myself, "No, on second thoughts I'll choose B this time". And couldn't I keep prevaricating like this for as long as I like? To be free is to be free to revise our decisions right up until the moment we actually act. I can commit myself to acting in a certain way but this commitment cannot guarantee that I will act in this way. For example I can decide to go on a diet but I can't know that I will keep choosing to stick to it in the future. My present will cannot constrain the freedom of my future will.

So there is no special significance to the moment at which we consciously choose or "make a decision". These declarations and promises we make to ourselves only get retrospectively labelled as "decisions" if they are not contradicted by future statements of intent. I can't claim to be causing some future act of mine to happen at the moment that I "make a decision" to act, because that would infringe my future free will just as surely as any other type of cause. The only place we can locate the moment of free choice is the moment of the act itself. None of the deliberation that precedes it is binding, I always have the option to choose differently. This way of seeing things has the advantage of allowing us to count non-deliberative or "spontaneous" choices as free, which is surely correct.

If we are shocked by the fact that our actions appear to be determined in advance of our conscious decisions we ought to be equally shocked if they appear to be determined by brain activity occurring just after our decisions because this still implies we don't have the freedom to revise these decisions any further. This shows the absurdity of these kind of experiments - all they can show, at the most, is that our actions are deterministic. But few people doubt this anyway. There is no evidence that those actions we regard as free actions involve any kind of quantum randomness so they must be assumed to be deterministic. And philosophers have been explaining how free will can be consistent with determinism for at least 300 years now. These experiments don't add anything to the debate.

Chrisw wrote:It seems to me that one of the problems with the Haynes/Libet experiments is this notion of there being a precise moment, that we can identify, at which a decision is made. It is very unclear what this is supposed to mean.

Are we talking about the moment when I say to myself "I'm going to "press button A"? Then there could be a gap between this moment and the moment that I actually start to move to press the button. What if in the meantime I say to myself, "No, on second thoughts I'll choose B this time". And couldn't I keep prevaricating like this for as long as I like? To be free is to be free to revise our decisions right up until the moment we actually act. I can commit myself to acting in a certain way but this commitment cannot guarantee that I will act in this way. For example I can decide to go on a diet but I can't know that I will keep choosing to stick to it in the future. My present will cannot constrain the freedom of my future will.

So there is no special significance to the moment at which we consciously choose or "make a decision". These declarations and promises we make to ourselves only get retrospectively labelled as "decisions" if they are not contradicted by future statements of intent. I can't claim to be causing some future act of mine to happen at the moment that I "make a decision" to act, because that would infringe my future free will just as surely as any other type of cause. The only place we can locate the moment of free choice is the moment of the act itself. None of the deliberation that precedes it is binding, I always have the option to choose differently. This way of seeing things has the advantage of allowing us to count non-deliberative or "spontaneous" choices as free, which is surely correct.

If we are shocked by the fact that our actions appear to be determined in advance of our conscious decisions we ought to be equally shocked if they appear to be determined by brain activity occurring just after our decisions because this still implies we don't have the freedom to revise these decisions any further. This shows the absurdity of these kind of experiments - all they can show, at the most, is that our actions are deterministic. But few people doubt this anyway. There is no evidence that those actions we regard as free actions involve any kind of quantum randomness so they must be assumed to be deterministic. And philosophers have been explaining how free will can be consistent with determinism for at least 300 years now. These experiments don't add anything to the debate.

I also think that the 0-second interval during which we "make a decision" can be added to the list of the fallacies around free will, along with the single cause fallacy and some others. I'd argue that the profusion of fallacies around free will indicates that we construe people by using an innate free will model, but Samsa would pound on me for that assertion.

Your emphasis on commitments and preference reversals would fit well together with Ainslie's framework for will, about which I started a thread some time ago in the Psychology section : http://www.rationalskepticism.org/psych ... 11969.html . Maybe you already know about it.

Without trying to define the concept of free will or even determine if it exists, I would like to throw my thoughts out there on the subject of evil.

Whilst objectively it is difficult or very nearly impossible to define it, I feel that it is because evil as a concept is a personal experience.

I would define it as "An act that is to the detriment of others" Whilst good I would define as "an act that which is to the emotional, fiscal or possesive gain of another"

Drudgelmir wrote:Without trying to define the concept of free will or even determine if it exists, I would like to throw my thoughts out there on the subject of evil.

Whilst objectively it is difficult or very nearly impossible to define it, I feel that it is because evil as a concept is a personal experience.

I would define it as "An act that is to the detriment of others" Whilst good I would define as "an act that which is to the emotional, fiscal or possesive gain of another"

Somebody has volunteered definitions of good and evil for us! Perhaps each of us can sleep soundly at night, knowing this has been taken care of once and for all.

Back to the free will discussion, in which the advocates of free will ask their skeptical opponents to define free will before being skeptical... It's rather like the theist who claims you must define their God with their God's properties (such as "existence") before you can be skeptical. However, I suggest that the onus ought to be on the advocates of a free will theory to outline the theory and its predictions, and then show us some evidence.

What is free will? An incoherent wibble, mostly.

If I'm free to will, why can't I choose..

... who to like and love?
... what to belief?
... how to feel?
... not to eat?
... et cetera

Free will is, if anything, the ability to consciously veto or postpone satisfying natural emerging urges.

Somebody has volunteered definitions of good and evil for us! Perhaps each of us can sleep soundly at night, knowing this has been taken care of once and for all.

Sarcastic git...
I was merely pointing out that the definition of what is evil is a subjective thing, and as such has very little to do with free will.
Free will itself is rather more tricky to examine, to do so relies on two main situations;
A)There is a god. Who has created us and given us free will, but has set rules to limit our actions thus making our will not so free anymore. or...
B)There is no god which means that whilst we are able to do as we please, we are still limited by social stigmas and rules.
So no to the greatest extent possible I would say that to say your will is completely free is a rare occurence and that it has less to do with good or evil, then say a Mercedes and a chocolate orange.

Drudgelmir wrote:

Somebody has volunteered definitions of good and evil for us! Perhaps each of us can sleep soundly at night, knowing this has been taken care of once and for all.

Sarcastic git...
I was merely pointing out that the definition of what is evil is a subjective thing, and as such has very little to do with free will.

You're right about the subjectivity. The definitions of free will also vary*. Free will can be important to some philosophers with a "good and evil" model; free will is supposed to show that people ultimately "deserve" the punishments or rewards handed out. This is particularly so with metaphysical formulations of free will.

Free will itself is rather more tricky to examine, to do so relies on two main situations;
A)There is a god. Who has created us and given us free will, but has set rules to limit our actions thus making our will not so free anymore. or...
B)There is no god which means that whilst we are able to do as we please, we are still limited by social stigmas and rules.
So no to the greatest extent possible I would say that to say your will is completely free is a rare occurence and that it has less to do with good or evil, then say a Mercedes and a chocolate orange.

It depends on how free will is formulated, but it usually amounts to some rationalisation, after the fact: "Bob was free, in some fundamental way, to decide course-of-action x, or to do the opposite." (Perhaps, if x was a "good" course to take, Bob fundamentally "deserves" a cookie. If x was an "evil" deed, Bob fundamentally "deserves" no supper. Etc. I'll concede I can't show that all free will supporters are concerned with morality, though.) It helps that we're very often uncertain about what we're going to "decide" next; free will can then become a label for mere uncertainty or unpredictability. I would rather call this uncertainty or unpredictability.

It's worth noting that, if any given free will model lacks specific empirical predictions, it can never be falsified with experiment. Watch any human going about her affairs: you can say she is going about her affairs with free will; or you can just say she is going about her affairs. Ockham's razor was made and sharpened for occasions like this.

* http://forum.richarddawkins.net/viewtop ... 18&t=78268
http://forum.richarddawkins.net/viewtop ... 8&t=105293

(I can't seem to find the links to any of the threads before Free Will V -but you get the point, I'm sure.)

To answer the question of free will, I would first have to know what humanity is. What makes humans sentient, knowledgeable, and extraordinary beings? Is there a life force and if so, what is it?

In my opinion there is no free will.
The definition of free will I am targeting is this one: "The ability to make choices as cause of the mythical "I" and not as cause of enviromental influences."

Idea 1:
Throughout my life, in every situation, my brain is processing the things it receives from my senses.
The result forms my "subjective view" on something. So what is, for example, my preference of a certain type of Ice Cream.
You might say it is my subjective view on Ice Cream.

Also, I am positive that I am legit to call:

4 the subjective view of f(x) = 2x on the number 2.
or
8 the subjective view of f(x) = 4x on the number 2.

Humans are just a little more complicated.

And my brain is just some sort of biological construct: If I wanted to influence my own personality and decisions, I would need some kind of "control" over the biochemical processes in my brain. But in what way does that "control" exist? It needs some kind of "observe" and "impact" structure.
But that free "impact" would have to origin from absolutely nothing, while being a very very certain something, or, so to say, a "plan": A certain result of nothing is not possible.

I will give an example to show what I mean:

Picture = Decision
Painting a small Spot = Chemical Process
Recognizing Patterns = Unfree "Will"

Let us say you want to paint a picture. (Planning a Decision)
You have a very clear image of what you are going to paint already. (Certainity)
But at the same time, If I would ask you, what colour you are going to paint a certain tiny spot in, you would have no idea how to answer me, because you only know the big picture and not the small one.
Saying you have free will, in this case, would be like stating that you could paint the picture without putting colour on any of the small tiny spots, which you have no idea of.

And if the origins of your decisions are unfree, then why would the latter clear picture be a result of free will?

If we compromise all of this, we can get two possible states.

A: Humans are biological "machines", they process certain information and return different kinds of responses.
B: Humans possess some kind of supernatural godly decision mind. Have fun with your idealism.


Idea 2:
Whenever we decide for something, we compare and combine certain preferences or stimuli.

Let us say I find myself in a state of Ice Cream lack, thus I might come to buy some. Let us assume I have the choice between strawberry (S) and chocolate (C). We furthermore describe myself as someone who prefers the taste of C.

Case C: I decide for Chocolate. I am doing so because of my preference for chocolate.
But - I never decided that chocolate is my preference.
So no free will involved here I guess.

Case S: I decide for Strawberry. Now there might be people who argue with this but I am certain that it is impossible to not chose your preferred ice cream without a good reason. And by good reason, I mean some inviromental influence. For example, that I would think about this whole argument and decide to show my disappreciation of it by deciding for S, only to find that I did not disprove anything at all, as I was influenced the whole time.
Or that I would want to try something new, which is a result of me eating chocolate to often for my type of brainy algorithm, which is just a sum of unfree choices and therefore unfree itself.

So what exactly creates decisions? Preferences of unfree "will" combined with other results of unfree "will" and enviromental influences.

RationalVegan wrote:In my opinion there is no free will.
The definition of free will I am targeting is this one: "The ability to make choices as cause of the mythical "I" and not as cause of enviromental influences."

Your proceeding discourse therefore assumes that there are external influences to whatever it is that we are. In other words, you assume the reality of the world in order to refute 'our' free will.

jamest wrote:

RationalVegan wrote:In my opinion there is no free will.
The definition of free will I am targeting is this one: "The ability to make choices as cause of the mythical "I" and not as cause of enviromental influences."

Your proceeding discourse therefore assumes that there are external influences to whatever it is that we are. In other words, you assume the reality of the world in order to refute 'our' free will.

Well, if the world is not real, then nothing makes sense anymore. We can abandon science then and embrace a world of anarchy. That does not sound really nice to me.

On the other hand, when you observe the problem from its fundamental state on, the elementary position is:
"Everything is as it looks like"

If you now assume a different position than the basic one, you would have to support it by certain arguments.
So I do not think that the idea that our world is real needs arguments in favor of it. I much rather think that you need arguments if you want to decline the basic state.
Such as in the case where you decide between god and no god: God is an addition to the existing world and therefore, he needs evidence in favor of him, contrary to the position that there is no god (decline of the new addition).

GrahamH wrote:What it doesn't show is whether the unconscious choice that initiates action is "free will".

Unconscious choice? Presumably, that means allowing habit or instinct to take control, because it is quicker and easier. It's something I do all too often, but I don't absolutely have to. If I have a mind to, I can break my mammalian-style learned habits, and instincts, and think/do what appeals to my emotions. Libet asked his subjects not to do that - to just press the button on a whim, without thinking, voluntarily overriding their "free won't", as Libet himself put it. In other words, if you don't look for a free will, you don't find it.

Of course, certain situations force us to act instinctively, such as in a life-threatening emergency, when we do not have time to exercise our free will. Even when there is time, learned habits are often allowed to take our free will away (as mentioned above), which is why we don't see it very often. Mammals had to acquire good learned habits if they were to survive, because free will is often too slow. However, the social mammals often do get a chance to think, for example in their politics.