ughaibu wrote:

romansh wrote:The problem with free will, it is an incoherent concept when defined in terms of indeterminism, determinism or mixtures thereof.

The most that is meant, by philosophers, by "free will", is the ability of some agents, on some occasions, to make and consistently enact a conscious choice from amongst realisable alternative courses of action. Notice that free will is not defined "in terms of indeterminism, determinism or mixtures thereof", so you seem to be attempting to build a strawman.
Determinism is the stance that: 1. at all times the world has a definite state, that can, in principle, be exactly and globally described, 2. there are laws of nature that are same in all places and at all times, in the world, 3. given the state of the world at any time, the state of the world at all other times, is exactly and globally entailed by the given state and the laws of nature. By "indeterminism" I assume you mean the stance that a world is not determined.
So, you have the relevant definitions, please demonstrate that free will is an incoherent concept.

You have been peddling that definition for a long time now. probolems with it have been pointed many times (especially the presppositions in terms such as "agent", "enact" and "realisable alternative"). Why do you think that : "The most that is meant, by philosophers, by "free will", is the ability of some agents, on some occasions, to make and consistently enact a conscious choice from amongst realisable alternative courses of action."?

Do you have an authoritative source for it? Can you show that a majority of qualified philosophers agree with it?

It seems that at least one Stanford philosopher disagrees with you.

SEP wrote:“Free Will” is a philosophical term of art for a particular sort of capacity of rational agents to choose a course of action from among various alternatives. Which sort is the free will sort is what all the fuss is about. (And what a fuss it has been: philosophers have debated this question for over two millennia, and just about every major philosopher has had something to say about it.) Most philosophers suppose that the concept of free will is very closely connected to the concept of moral responsibility. Acting with free will, on such views, is just to satisfy the metaphysical requirement on being responsible for one's action.

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/freewill/

GrahamH wrote:

ughaibu wrote:

romansh wrote:The problem with free will, it is an incoherent concept when defined in terms of indeterminism, determinism or mixtures thereof.

The most that is meant, by philosophers, by "free will", is the ability of some agents, on some occasions, to make and consistently enact a conscious choice from amongst realisable alternative courses of action. Notice that free will is not defined "in terms of indeterminism, determinism or mixtures thereof", so you seem to be attempting to build a strawman.
Determinism is the stance that: 1. at all times the world has a definite state, that can, in principle, be exactly and globally described, 2. there are laws of nature that are same in all places and at all times, in the world, 3. given the state of the world at any time, the state of the world at all other times, is exactly and globally entailed by the given state and the laws of nature. By "indeterminism" I assume you mean the stance that a world is not determined.
So, you have the relevant definitions, please demonstrate that free will is an incoherent concept.

You have been peddling that definition for a long time now....

The same could be said of you, on the other side of the fence, based mainly on dubious (likely misinterpreted) experiments on neural timings.

DavidMcC wrote:

GrahamH wrote:

ughaibu wrote:The most that is meant, by philosophers, by "free will", is the ability of some agents, on some occasions, to make and consistently enact a conscious choice from amongst realisable alternative courses of action.

You have been peddling that definition for a long time now....

The same could be said of you, on the other side of the fence, based mainly on dubious (likely misinterpreted) experiments on neural timings.

The definition given is important in the epistemology/metaphysics debate because compatibilists need to give a convincing account of what it means, in a determined world, for there to be realisable alternative courses of action. The other standard, and weaker, definition of "free will", that an agent has free will when they act according to their desires and not under threat, coercion, undue influence, etc, is important in law. The free will debate of interest for ethics, concerns which of the above, if either, suffices for moral responsibility.
It is nowhere a question of philosophers disagreeing about what the definition of "free will" is. GrahamH has shown no sign of getting his head round these basics for such a long time that I have decided to take him seriously and conclude that he is incorrigibly outside the discussion.

ughaibu wrote:

DavidMcC wrote:

GrahamH wrote:

ughaibu wrote:The most that is meant, by philosophers, by "free will", is the ability of some agents, on some occasions, to make and consistently enact a conscious choice from amongst realisable alternative courses of action.

You have been peddling that definition for a long time now....

The same could be said of you, on the other side of the fence, based mainly on dubious (likely misinterpreted) experiments on neural timings.

The definition given is important in the epistemology/metaphysics debate because compatibilists need to give a convincing account of what it means, in a determined world, for there to be realisable alternative courses of action. The other standard, and weaker, definition of "free will", that an agent has free will when they act according to their desires and not under threat, coercion, undue influence, etc, is important in law. The free will debate of interest for ethics, concerns which of the above, if either, suffices for moral responsibility.
It is nowhere a question of philosophers disagreeing about what the definition of "free will" is. GrahamH has shown no sign of getting his head round these basics for such a long time that I have decided to take him seriously and conclude that he is incorrigibly outside the discussion.

You can't even attempt to answer the question? All you can manage is a flat denial?

DavidMcC wrote: The same could be said of you, on the other side of the fence, based mainly on dubious (likely misinterpreted) experiments on neural timings.

Actually David the whole concept of free will is incoherent if we believe in determinism. Libet's experiments by themselves are interesting but far from conclusive. But if we agree determinism is true then having an ability to do otherwise is on shaky ground. We can choose alternatives from realisable alternatives (consciously or otherwise) ... we do that all the time. The question is can we choose anything but the one we are going to choose?

Hence quotes like a quagmire of evasion, wretched subterfuge, word jugglery.

romansh wrote:

DavidMcC wrote: The same could be said of you, on the other side of the fence, based mainly on dubious (likely misinterpreted) experiments on neural timings.

Actually David the whole concept of free will is incoherent if we believe in determinism. Libet's experiments by themselves are interesting but far from conclusive. But if we agree determinism is true then having an ability to do otherwise is on shaky ground. We can choose alternatives from realisable alternatives (consciously or otherwise) ... we do that all the time. The question is can we choose anything but the one we are going to choose?

Hence quotes like a quagmire of evasion, wretched subterfuge, word jugglery.

Sure, IF we believe in complete determinism. Unfortunately, the world is not completely deteministic. We have known that since Schroedinger. You cannot predict what will happen from the big bang.

DavidMcC wrote:
Sure, IF we believe in complete determinism. Unfortunately, the world is not completely deteministic. We have known that since Schroedinger. You cannot predict what will happen from the big bang.

Depends on what you mean by complete determinism. I agree there need not be one outcome from a given set of events. But I would not argue in Deepak Chopra way that our consciousness influences quantum phenomena. I also agree we cannot predict from the big bang ... but so what? A lack of free will is not whether everything was predetermined from the big bang. But it is about whether our actions are determined by our macro and micro environments (in the now).

A couple of quotes from Hawking and Mlodinow to mull over (from The Grand Design).

... the molecular basis of biology shows that biological processes are governed by the laws of physics and chemistry and therefore are as determined as the orbits of the planets.

and

Quantum physics might seem to undermine the idea that nature is governed by laws, but that is not the case. Instead it leads us to accept a new form of determinism: Given the state of a system at some time, the laws of nature determine the probabilities of various futures and pasts rather than determining the future and past with certainty.

If your choice is based on some determined probability then that is not what free will is for me. It might be for others, but not me.

romansh wrote:

DavidMcC wrote: The same could be said of you, on the other side of the fence, based mainly on dubious (likely misinterpreted) experiments on neural timings.

Actually David the whole concept of free will is incoherent if we believe in determinism. Libet's experiments by themselves are interesting but far from conclusive. But if we agree determinism is true then having an ability to do otherwise is on shaky ground. We can choose alternatives from realisable alternatives (consciously or otherwise) ... we do that all the time. The question is can we choose anything but the one we are going to choose?

Hence quotes like a quagmire of evasion, wretched subterfuge, word jugglery.

Exactly.

An alternative is only "realisable" if you can actually choose it in the unique total circumstances of the decision. Ughaibu's definition is useless for philosophy and for subjective assessment of whether you have free will. We have an experience of choosing but no way to find the exact cause of that choice is made or whether or not we could have chosen differently.
Someone who was a complete puppet might apply the definition and conclude he had free will. The definition leaves out all the vital details.

GrahamH wrote:...
We have an experience of choosing but no way to find the exact cause of that choice is made or whether or not we could have chosen differently.
Someone who was a complete puppet might apply the definition and conclude he had free will. The definition leaves out all the vital details.

What exactly is a "complete puppet" who can't see the strings?
Do you really believe that mind-control technology already exists that makes your claim possible?
I don't think so.

Take the example of a student (no strings attached) who has been accepted by several good colleges/universities. He/she can only choose one, and it is not obvious which would be best. Are you trying to say that whatever was chosen, it could not have beeen otherwise? If not, why not?

David
We can put the boot on the other foot ... It is compatibilists who claim a free will (worth wanting?). Now I am not sure they are claiming they could have done otherwise, but as someone who can't see a mechanism for doing otherwise it is up to believers in free will to show me the mechanism we can do otherwise.

And here is the rub ... a mechanism for doing otherwise and free will seem a little incompatible; at least to me.

romansh wrote:David
We can put the boot on the other foot ... It is compatibilists who claim a free will (worth wanting?). Now I am not sure they are claiming they could have done otherwise, but as someone who can't see a mechanism for doing otherwise it is up to believers in free will to show me the mechanism we can do otherwise.

And here is the rub ... a mechanism for doing otherwise and free will seem a little incompatible; at least to me.

Indeed. There's supposedly a string connected to conscious free will that we can pull even though we don't know anything about pulling it. We have the fanciful notion that we pull all the strings, until we follow any of them and find out we don't. If you look for the free string you won't find it.

romansh wrote:David
We can put the boot on the other foot ... It is compatibilists who claim a free will (worth wanting?). Now I am not sure they are claiming they could have done otherwise, but as someone who can't see a mechanism for doing otherwise it is up to believers in free will to show me the mechanism we can do otherwise.

And here is the rub ... a mechanism for doing otherwise and free will seem a little incompatible; at least to me.

My point is what is to stop a decision being otherwise, unless it is the rather lame excuse of "time only happens oncce".
EDIT: You also seem to define "free will" such that it corresponds to lack of free will.

GrahamH wrote:

romansh wrote:David
We can put the boot on the other foot ... It is compatibilists who claim a free will (worth wanting?). Now I am not sure they are claiming they could have done otherwise, but as someone who can't see a mechanism for doing otherwise it is up to believers in free will to show me the mechanism we can do otherwise.

And here is the rub ... a mechanism for doing otherwise and free will seem a little incompatible; at least to me.

Indeed. There's supposedly a string connected to conscious free will that we can pull even though we don't know anything about pulling it. We have the fanciful notion that we pull all the strings, until we follow any of them and find out we don't. If you look for the free string you won't find it.

What strings?

DavidMcC wrote:
My point is what is to stop a decision being otherwise, unless it is the rather lame excuse of "time only happens oncce".
EDIT: You also seem to define "free will" such that it corresponds to lack of free will.

It is you claiming it can be otherwise ... I just can't see mechanism for it.

The aggregate of all the quantum phenomena is our what we observe ... do you agree? And if you agree how do we shape that aggregate in any meaningful way?

Just asking.

romansh wrote:

DavidMcC wrote:
My point is what is to stop a decision being otherwise, unless it is the rather lame excuse of "time only happens oncce".
EDIT: You also seem to define "free will" such that it corresponds to lack of free will.

It is you claiming it can be otherwise ... I just can't see mechanism for it.

The aggregate of all the quantum phenomena is our what we observe ... do you agree? And if you agree how do we shape that aggregate in any meaningful way?

Just asking.

I didn't say we can change our past, only that there is often nothing stopping it from having been otherwise than it was (ie, there is no law of physics or biology ruling it out), as long as there is more then one reasonable option, as in the example I gave above with choice of college enrolments (which are not normally based on knee-jerk reactions!).

... BTW, have you ever studied probability theory?

How do we change the aggregate of the quantum phenomena that is occurring now?

romansh wrote:How do we change the aggregate of the quantum phenomena that is occurring now?

The aggregate is indeterminate anyway. Rather, it's probabilistic.

You seem to be saying "Que sera, sera".

DavidMcC wrote:

romansh wrote:How do we change the aggregate of the quantum phenomena that is occurring now?

The aggregate is indeterminate anyway. Rather, it's probabilistic.

You did not answer my question ... I know the current theory it is probabilistic ... I even left a nice Hawking/Mlodinow quote for you.
So you don't change this probabilistic aggregate in this moment? Or if you do, how do you do it?

romansh wrote:Actually David the whole concept of free will is incoherent if we believe in determinism.

You haven't written anything that supports this contention, but in any case, it amounts to you stating that you're an incompatibilist, not that free will "is an incoherent concept when defined in terms of indeterminism, determinism or mixtures thereof".

romansh wrote:We can choose alternatives from realisable alternatives (consciously or otherwise) ... we do that all the time.

Then we satisfy the conditions for the strongest notion of free will.
So, as you are an incompatibilist and you hold that we do perform freely willed actions "all the time", you hold the libertarian position about free will

romansh wrote:

DavidMcC wrote:My point is what is to stop a decision being otherwise, unless it is the rather lame excuse of "time only happens oncce".

It is you claiming it can be otherwise ... I just can't see mechanism for it.
The aggregate of all the quantum phenomena is our what we observe ... do you agree?

The relevant scientists agree that there is nothing that allows us to predict whether or not a given atom of radioactive material will decay, so, the parsimonious position is that radioactive decay events are not determined.
We can set up an experiment such that given the amount of material and the extent of time, the probability of a decay event occurring will be one half. Now, if the behaviour of human beings is determined such that they "couldn't do otherwise", then at the start of the experiment there is only one action, that the researcher can perform, in the pair 1. write "decay occurred" or 2. write "decay didn't occur". But as the experimental setup is not determined such that the result "couldn't [be] otherwise", the probability of the researcher making the correct recording of the result is one half. If this is what is happening, then researchers are chronically deluded to the extent of being mistaken in at least half of their records and thus we have no empirical basis for science.
On the other hand, it's not just that we cannot accept that researchers are mostly mistaken about phenomena and thus their behaviour is not determined by some species of pseudo-determinism limited to the so called "macro world", we also require that researchers correctly record their observations on almost all occasions. But that means they must correctly record their observations with a probability of almost one, in short, their behaviour cannot be random or any matter of chance, it must be behaviour controlled by themselves.
In short, our present science commits us to the behaviour of researchers being neither determined nor a matter of chance, which is, of course, exactly how our behaviour has always appeared to be, how we assume it to be and how we apparently demonstrate it to be.

Your objection to all this, how we must assume the world to be, how we demonstrate it to be, including when we do science, is that you "just can't see mechanism for it". How is that meant to function as an objection?
My guess would be that the argument is something like this:
1) the only things that are real are things that Romansh can see a mechanism for
2) Romansh cannot see a mechanism for free will
3) therefore, free will is not one of the things that are real.

But premise 1 is, frankly, daft. Do you deny the reality of gravity? If not, what's the mechanism? Do you reject big bang cosmology? If not, what was the mechanism?
Besides which, this would only be an argument that tells your interlocutor why you are a free will denier (despite being a libertarian about free will!), it doesn't give that interlocutor any reason to agree with you. In short, it is a failure as an argument for the unreality of free will.