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jamest wrote:C & P from SoS's thread about percepts (highly relevant, here)...
SoS, it would be helpful if you were to think about the origin and construction of social languages. 'Red', for instance, is a word that had meaning long before science started talking about photons with specific wavelengths. Hence, if such words are not indicative of photons with particular wavelengths, what do you think that they refer to? Indeed, how could such words help to effect social communication if they referred to nothing and/or had no meaning?

jamest wrote:C & P from SoS's thread about percepts (highly relevant, here)...
SoS, it would be helpful if you were to think about the origin and construction of social languages. 'Red', for instance, is a word that had meaning long before science started talking about photons with specific wavelengths. Hence, if such words are not indicative of photons with particular wavelengths, what do you think that they refer to? Indeed, how could such words help to effect social communication if they referred to nothing and/or had no meaning?
think wrote:
I've noticed this is a very popular meme on this forum...do you care to substantiate this claim in any way? Perhaps a textual reference would be helpful. Everyone keeps talking about bent spoons, I'm not sure what it has to do with (idealist) philosophy.

SpeedOfSound wrote:think wrote:
I've noticed this is a very popular meme on this forum...do you care to substantiate this claim in any way? Perhaps a textual reference would be helpful. Everyone keeps talking about bent spoons, I'm not sure what it has to do with (idealist) philosophy.
It seems to be the implication of idealism by jamest and mentalism by Little Idiot that all is mental. This means all is mind. LI justifies this by pointing out that we can dream and imagine spoons. James by some pure bastardized conceptualization of observers and observed with a stolen favorite phrase of the thing in itself.
If all that is given is a dream then a spoon in front of me is a dream then I should have no trouble bending it. If there is something about dreams that make bending spoons harder then creating them in front of me then there should be some account of this difficulty.
Mostly what I rail against is naive idealism as I have just described it to you. Myself I am damned close to idealism with my phenomenal reality. I just doubt like hell that something that can be called a mind is responsible for 'sense data'. Another fine fucking reductive rape concept.
think wrote:SpeedOfSound wrote:think wrote:SpeedOfSound wrote:
Of course it does! The discerned reaching out and bending of the discerned spoon is all in the discerned mind. Your mind bends the discerned spoon. Thought you knew that?
I've noticed this is a very popular meme on this forum...do you care to substantiate this claim in any way? Perhaps a textual reference would be helpful. Everyone keeps talking about bent spoons, I'm not sure what it has to do with (idealist) philosophy.
It seems to be the implication of idealism by jamest and mentalism by Little Idiot that all is mental. This means all is mind. LI justifies this by pointing out that we can dream and imagine spoons. James by some pure bastardized conceptualization of observers and observed with a stolen favorite phrase of the thing in itself.
If all that is given is a dream then a spoon in front of me is a dream then I should have no trouble bending it. If there is something about dreams that make bending spoons harder then creating them in front of me then there should be some account of this difficulty.
Mostly what I rail against is naive idealism as I have just described it to you. Myself I am damned close to idealism with my phenomenal reality. I just doubt like hell that something that can be called a mind is responsible for 'sense data'. Another fine fucking reductive rape concept.
So, basically, if this is all a dream then why isn't it a lucid dream? How did this fine piece of reasoning become the ubiquitous refrain of this forum...
think wrote:
I've noticed this is a very popular meme on this forum...do you care to substantiate this claim in any way? Perhaps a textual reference would be helpful. Everyone keeps talking about bent spoons, I'm not sure what it has to do with (idealist) philosophy.
(I changed an “it” to “if” in your first line, hope that’s OK)GrahamH wrote:"I should have no trouble bending it [a spoon]" isn't right, but if you could bend it, merely by willing it to bend, it would be a powerful demonstration that the mind commands the physical world, and might actually create it. Failure to bend the spoon is neutral, since any arbitrary reason can be invented for why it is inappropriate for the spoon to bend.
GrahamH wrote:
"I should have no trouble bending it [a spoon]" isn't right, but it you could bend it, merely by willing it to bend, it would be a powerful demonstration that the mind commands the physical world, and might actually create it. Failure to bend the spoon is neutral, since any arbitrary reason can be invented for why it is inappropriate for the spoon to bend.

jamest wrote:GrahamH wrote:jamest wrote:For instance, the sensation of flickering yellowishness, combined with the sensations of heat/pain and an acrid smell, suffice to yield the discernment of 'a thing' which English-speakers have arbitrarily symbolised as 'fire'. Hence, both the 'thing' and the word gets its meaning from the aforementioned language of the senses. As such, words and their meanings (English or otherwise) are not created, but translated.
So the meaning of fire is defined by the relations of other "sense symbols" . And this context does not regress infinitely, of course. It comes to rest as some sensation that simply is what it is. So, what are the meanings of the symbols "yellowness" and "heat/pain"?
The meaning of any particular sensation rests solely in what it is like to be aware of it. This cannot be expressed in social language or through its physical expression. Even the loudest scream could not convey the actual meaning of pain. Similarly, a million words could not convey what it is like to experience 'red'. Regardless, most people know what 'redness' is like, and I should imagine that everyone has experienced pain. And so, sufficient are the names we arbitrarily assign to particular sensations, whilst constructing our social language, to convey what we mean when we talk about such experiences.
jamest wrote:Amongst the greatest proofs we have that the eliminativists are wrong, is that there exists words (symbols) amidst our language - themselves devoid of meaning - which nevertheless are meaningful.
jamest wrote:... Such is true not just of our symbols for the sensations, but for our emotions ('love', for instance). Indeed, it is true of every facet of experience that has ever been assigned a tag/symbol in our social languages.
jamest wrote:Ask yourself this: how can social language work (how can we communicate) if so many of its symbols are devoid of written meaning? The answer, of course, is because we have experienced their meaning.
jamest wrote:To narrate 'our reality' (the discernment of things - the world) using social language, absolutely demands that we utilise words such as 'pain' and 'red' and 'love' within such a discourse, because these words are the closest symbols we have indicative of that reality.
jamest wrote:Hence, the eliminativists/physicalists amongst us are being obtuse when thinking that the employment of social language can 'objectively' narrate our reality, only after we eradicate said language of every word indicative of that reality itself.
If the physicalists/eliminativists were right, our social languages would not be strewn with words of significance to each and everyone of us. Thus, they are wrong.
Count this as my third significant argument, since I regard it as a profound refutation of the eliminativist/physicalist perspective.
zoon wrote:(I changed an “it” to “if” in your first line, hope that’s OK)GrahamH wrote:"I should have no trouble bending it [a spoon]" isn't right, but if you could bend it, merely by willing it to bend, it would be a powerful demonstration that the mind commands the physical world, and might actually create it. Failure to bend the spoon is neutral, since any arbitrary reason can be invented for why it is inappropriate for the spoon to bend.
I’m not entirely happy with this attack on idealism, because it certainly feels as though we control our bodies with our minds, and bodies are as solidly material as spoons. As I think Mr Samsa’s sig points out, willing my hand to move is as weird as willing a spoon to bend, we’re just more used to it. Monkeys have been wired up to control cursors using transmitters from brain probes. Surely the materialist line is that the comparatively simple descriptive laws of physics appear to operate across all these phenomena? Thoughts are not the most parsimonious ultimate explanation.

GrahamH wrote:
Not being able to bend spoons with thought is metaphysically neutral, but being able to do it would refute physicalism.


jamest wrote:C & P from SoS's thread about percepts (highly relevant, here)...
SoS, it would be helpful if you were to think about the origin and construction of social languages. 'Red', for instance, is a word that had meaning long before science started talking about photons with specific wavelengths. Hence, if such words are not indicative of photons with particular wavelengths, what do you think that they refer to? Indeed, how could such words help to effect social communication if they referred to nothing and/or had no meaning?

SpeedOfSound wrote:jamest wrote:C & P from SoS's thread about percepts (highly relevant, here)...
SoS, it would be helpful if you were to think about the origin and construction of social languages. 'Red', for instance, is a word that had meaning long before science started talking about photons with specific wavelengths. Hence, if such words are not indicative of photons with particular wavelengths, what do you think that they refer to? Indeed, how could such words help to effect social communication if they referred to nothing and/or had no meaning?
I missed the post right before this. I will try and tackle this in the Percept thread. You mad some good points in that prior posts. None of them help your case but good still.
Request permission to use pieces from that post in the other thread.

GrahamH wrote:
"I should have no trouble bending it [a spoon]" isn't right, but if you could bend it, merely by willing it to bend, it would be a powerful demonstration that the mind commands the physical world, and might actually create it. Failure to bend the spoon is neutral, since any arbitrary reason can be invented for why it is inappropriate for the spoon to bend.

jamest wrote:My own position on this matter relates to something I said (in a recent thread, to you I think) regards my definition of 'The Mind'. There, I explained that there is a subconscious element to the mind - an aspect of it where 'sensations' are created, for example, as well as being the source of memory. It is the subconscious mind that creates [the sensations of] 'the world'. The point I was trying to make at the time was that the subconscious and conscious are ~one thing~, not two.
You have to note that a conscious effort to will a spoon to bend is actually an effort to oppose the will of the subconscious, in that the subconscious is creating a 'straight spoon' which remains straight due to an imposed order commensurate with the laws of physics.
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