On Idealism, repeated

on fundamental matters such as existence, knowledge, values, reason, mind and ethics.

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Re: On Idealism, repeated

#481  Postby hackenslash » Dec 02, 2021 10:14 pm

Frozenworld wrote:Apparently you don't have a grasp of it because you still don't have evidence for the claim that there is an external reality.


Except, of course, that I do. I may not have proof, but proof is mostly for alcoholics and mathematicians. To the extent that proof applies at all to science, it only applies in the form of modus tollens. In other words, in disproof, or falsification. Affirmative proof is not something that can be applied in science, because proof would require omniscience, which is impossible (even for deities). This is known in rigorous circles as the problem of induction. Popper thought he'd solved this problem, but he was wrong. What he actually did was to bring deduction into a primarily inductive area of reasoning, but he did so by redefining what constitutes knowledge.

What I do have is my empirical sense-data and yours, which is solid evidence that there's an external reality of some description. All else aside, solipsism itself requires an external reality, because it requires a stratum upon which your senses reside and function. They do not prove beyond all doubt that what we experience is, in an ontological sense, real, but they do stand in evidence.

Meanwhile, in your evidence bucket, we have fuck all but crickets.

Tell me again how I don't grasp it.

Skepticism is the default.


Correct. It's the rebuttable position. Except, of course, that you don't understand what scepticism really is. It is NOT the rejection of any claim under all circumstances. It's the rejection of unsubstantiated claims. My claims are substantiated not only by my sense-data but by yours as well.

And the foundation that you claim epistemology is founded on is false, and he been shown to be so several times. Cogito ergo sum is wrong.


Image

There is no evidence to back it because it all resorts back to what is doubted to be true. You really don't have a grasp on any of this stuff. Many have debunked there being an experiencer: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Similarit ... ite_ref-47


This citation is irrelevant to your assertion. Did you even read it? It doesn't debunk cogito, it simply compares two religious mindsets.

I don't get where you're going with knowing the word "empirical" because that is the very thing you guys claim shows external reality and other people when it is just circular. Using observation to justify observation.


This is the part of the show where you reveal to the class precisely what circular reasoning is, why it's a problem and, most important of all, when it's a problem.

Just as a critical example, ALL definitions are circular. They can't be otherwise, because definitions are of necessity tautologies, and tautologies are always circular.

Solipsism says one cannot know for sure if there is an external reality or other people, and you cannot verify it to be true or false. Harder versions say there isn't but that's a minority view and considered absurd even by other solipsists.


Even by other solipsists...

I'll leave that to stew for a bit.

Though considering you guys haven't addressed any of the points I posted or linked to that undermine your attempts to call solipsism nonsense I wonder if you fully grasp it and what it means. There is a difference between knowing what it is and understanding it.


You haven't posted anything worthy of address. To the extent that you have, it's been addressed, and more besides, giving the context for just how utterly fucking stupid this entire line is.

Solipsism was a worthy philosophical question back in the old days of Aristotle failing to do the accounting work of sexual dimorphism in hominid dentition, but it's Cliff Clavin level stupidity in the millennia since.
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Re: On Idealism, repeated

#482  Postby Spearthrower » Dec 03, 2021 3:40 am

Even by other solipsists...


I think that pretty much sums the entire thread up.
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Re: On Idealism, repeated

#483  Postby Cito di Pense » Dec 03, 2021 10:59 am

Frozenworld wrote:Skepticism is the default.


Paralyzing skepticism is likely caused by a cognitive or emotional disorder. Good thing that solipsism is around to assert that paralyzing skepticism cannot be proven to exist.

These days, paralyzing skepticism emerges in people who are utterly intimidated by the progress of scientific knowledge and who cannot even find a toehold to begin to understand how it is conducted. Every kind of evasion and denial from anti-vax to the kind of philosofloppy that Frozenworld is peddling is a secondary symptom of this fundamentally cognitive paralysis.
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Re: On Idealism, repeated

#484  Postby Spearthrower » Dec 03, 2021 9:16 pm

I think this is the most self-refutinglyist argument, I ever did see.



Edit: if you're going to make up a word, at least spell it right.
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Re: On Idealism, repeated

#485  Postby Greg the Grouper » Dec 03, 2021 9:34 pm

Spearthrower wrote:I think this is the most self-regutinglyist argument, I ever did see.


You see an argument?
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Re: On Idealism, repeated

#486  Postby Cito di Pense » Dec 04, 2021 3:45 am

It's what you get by "doing your own research". Relativism is self-reguting.

From the dim mists of 1997, we have

https://www.jstor.org/stable/4320935

from long before wokeness was in anyone's vocabulary. Do you see an argument?
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Re: On Idealism, repeated

#487  Postby zoon » Dec 04, 2021 10:44 am

Frozenworld wrote:Skepticism is the default.

I’m beginning to wonder whether the ancient philosophical problems around knowledge, justification and scepticism may not be social in origin? This would be by analogy with consciousness, which is a weird and slippery concept if I’m following Descartes’ introspection and wondering what exactly the “I” that I’m so much aware of might be, but which makes much more sense in the context of humans as social animals which have evolved to use the similarities between brains to guess what others are likely to do? Imagining the world as another sees it is a good first step to predicting, with a fair chance of accuracy, what they might be likely to do about it, and the internal model, the imagined world from the other person’s point of view, is easily reified as that other person’s consciousness. When I am living in a group of people who are likewise seeing me as a conscious being, it also makes sense to have a model of myself as others see me, the better to manage social life. This model of myself as a conscious being is then internalised and reified, and then sets up all sorts of philosophical problems when it fails to slot into the scientific model of the world.

Similarly, the need to justify a belief makes a lot of sense if I’m trying to persuade someone else to do something; they may be resistant, and start asking why they should do this, on what grounds is it sensible for them to accept the beliefs on which I’m suggesting they act. In social life, I need to be ready to defend my beliefs if I want other people to act on what I say, if I want to be a functioning member of society.

If we were not social animals with our unique form of sociality, we would be unlikely to feel the need to justify knowledge or belief? – we would just go ahead and act according to our thoughts. Our bodies are an extension of our thoughts, with muscles attached directly to the nervous system.

As with consciousness, the philosophical problems start to look intractable if the social model is internalised to oneself. I can see another person’s consciousness as a mere imagined model easily enough, but it’s not so easy to see my own in the same light (one of the reasons Descartes’ cogito feels compelling)? Similarly, I can understand without confusion that attempting to justify my beliefs to another person may or may not work, but if I feel that all my beliefs should be justified to myself before I can reasonably do anything, then I may start to spiral downwards into doubting everything (Descartes’ original problem)?

From the scientific point of view, seeing ourselves as social animals with ongoing cooperation, the ongoing need to be ready with justifications for our beliefs makes sense, as an aspect of that cooperation. Without the social context, justifying beliefs becomes unnecessary and irrelevant, in the same way that a non-social animal would be unlikely to think of itself as a conscious “I”?
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Re: On Idealism, repeated

#488  Postby felltoearth » Dec 04, 2021 6:32 pm

zoon wrote:
Frozenworld wrote:Skepticism is the default.

I’m beginning to wonder whether the ancient philosophical problems around knowledge, justification and scepticism may not be social in origin? This would be by analogy with consciousness, which is a weird and slippery concept if I’m following Descartes’ introspection and wondering what exactly the “I” that I’m so much aware of might be, but which makes much more sense in the context of humans as social animals which have evolved to use the similarities between brains to guess what others are likely to do?

… snip…


I wouldn’t say it’s by analogy at all. In fact the fragility of consciousness is at the heart of the tendency of some to be attracted to Idealism. I find narcissists are usually the ones defending it most virulently. Because when you look and see at the bottom of “I” that there is no justification for it and it is essentially an illusion we all carry in our heads, and your ego is therefore destroyed, then it follows that “it MUST be ALL an illusion, am I rite?” :teef:


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Re: On Idealism, repeated

#489  Postby Frozenworld » Dec 04, 2021 10:36 pm

zoon wrote:
Frozenworld wrote:Skepticism is the default.

I’m beginning to wonder whether the ancient philosophical problems around knowledge, justification and scepticism may not be social in origin? This would be by analogy with consciousness, which is a weird and slippery concept if I’m following Descartes’ introspection and wondering what exactly the “I” that I’m so much aware of might be, but which makes much more sense in the context of humans as social animals which have evolved to use the similarities between brains to guess what others are likely to do? Imagining the world as another sees it is a good first step to predicting, with a fair chance of accuracy, what they might be likely to do about it, and the internal model, the imagined world from the other person’s point of view, is easily reified as that other person’s consciousness. When I am living in a group of people who are likewise seeing me as a conscious being, it also makes sense to have a model of myself as others see me, the better to manage social life. This model of myself as a conscious being is then internalised and reified, and then sets up all sorts of philosophical problems when it fails to slot into the scientific model of the world.

Similarly, the need to justify a belief makes a lot of sense if I’m trying to persuade someone else to do something; they may be resistant, and start asking why they should do this, on what grounds is it sensible for them to accept the beliefs on which I’m suggesting they act. In social life, I need to be ready to defend my beliefs if I want other people to act on what I say, if I want to be a functioning member of society.

If we were not social animals with our unique form of sociality, we would be unlikely to feel the need to justify knowledge or belief? – we would just go ahead and act according to our thoughts. Our bodies are an extension of our thoughts, with muscles attached directly to the nervous system.

As with consciousness, the philosophical problems start to look intractable if the social model is internalised to oneself. I can see another person’s consciousness as a mere imagined model easily enough, but it’s not so easy to see my own in the same light (one of the reasons Descartes’ cogito feels compelling)? Similarly, I can understand without confusion that attempting to justify my beliefs to another person may or may not work, but if I feel that all my beliefs should be justified to myself before I can reasonably do anything, then I may start to spiral downwards into doubting everything (Descartes’ original problem)?

From the scientific point of view, seeing ourselves as social animals with ongoing cooperation, the ongoing need to be ready with justifications for our beliefs makes sense, as an aspect of that cooperation. Without the social context, justifying beliefs becomes unnecessary and irrelevant, in the same way that a non-social animal would be unlikely to think of itself as a conscious “I”?


we begin to see that existence doesn?t seem to include the qualities we usually assume. I think the three points I laid out help to appreciate this. 1) Things are constantly changing, 2) they have to be understood relative to some background, and 3) they are utterly dependent on other conditions for their ?existence.? When we normally say something exists, it implies some sort of autonomy and consistency for that thing- but the things that we imbue with existence actually have none. So we arrive at the idea of conventional truth- these things we acknowledge as existing exist only by convention rather than in actuality. Denoting ?things? is an act of the mind.

Now you might be saying,

?Yes, yes of course. We don?t directly perceive reality- the mental models we create of reality are not perfect. But our models do somehow correspond to the underlying objective reality though. Objective reality in some way is different here and there- it goes in and out, something here but not over there- this underlying reality is what our perceptions are somehow tied to.?

BUT, the implication of conventional existence is that it applies not just to these individual objects that we acknowledge, but also to the idea of reality itself, an object. Objective reality is just a convention as well.

The correspondence (or realist) theory of truth is deeply ingrained in most humans. It basically says that a belief is true if it corresponds with a fact. This idea is definitely part of our folk psychology and probably innately programmed in us. A drawback of this view is that there is no way to show that our beliefs do actually correspond with reality. Of course, just because there is no way to prove that a belief is consistent with reality does not mean that there is no objective reality. True. And so we could just go on and think that these theories that have stood the test of rational thought and empirical criticism, that we hold to be true, are at least ?moving toward? reality. OK. But still there is no way to reasonably argue for this reality (except for what appears below).

On the other hand, the pragmatic theory of truth basically says that what is true is what works and what is consistent with the wider system of beliefs. There is not necessarily a real reality behind things according to this view. Whereas a realist might say ?this theory is or is getting us closer to what is actually going on? the pragmatist would say ?this theory is useful as means to our goals and consistent with other experience.? Buddhism is a pragmatic view.

Guess how we validate correspondence theory or realism?! Not through correspondence theory. Pragmatism! How else could we? Realism does work- it helps us achieve our goals, it?s consistent with what just about everyone else believes, and it appears to be easily adopted by the human organism. We use it because it is pragmatic, not because it corresponds with reality. So the whole idea of an objective reality is simply a convention.


If you really think about it the foundation of knowledge is fragile indeed.
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Re: On Idealism, repeated

#490  Postby Greg the Grouper » Dec 04, 2021 11:34 pm

That feeling when accepting that knowledge as a concept is something you doubt is actual character growth.

Life is like a really poorly written young adult fiction novel.
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Re: On Idealism, repeated

#491  Postby Spearthrower » Dec 05, 2021 4:27 am

Frozenworld wrote:
zoon wrote:
Frozenworld wrote:Skepticism is the default.

I’m beginning to wonder whether the ancient philosophical problems around knowledge, justification and scepticism may not be social in origin? This would be by analogy with consciousness, which is a weird and slippery concept if I’m following Descartes’ introspection and wondering what exactly the “I” that I’m so much aware of might be, but which makes much more sense in the context of humans as social animals which have evolved to use the similarities between brains to guess what others are likely to do? Imagining the world as another sees it is a good first step to predicting, with a fair chance of accuracy, what they might be likely to do about it, and the internal model, the imagined world from the other person’s point of view, is easily reified as that other person’s consciousness. When I am living in a group of people who are likewise seeing me as a conscious being, it also makes sense to have a model of myself as others see me, the better to manage social life. This model of myself as a conscious being is then internalised and reified, and then sets up all sorts of philosophical problems when it fails to slot into the scientific model of the world.

Similarly, the need to justify a belief makes a lot of sense if I’m trying to persuade someone else to do something; they may be resistant, and start asking why they should do this, on what grounds is it sensible for them to accept the beliefs on which I’m suggesting they act. In social life, I need to be ready to defend my beliefs if I want other people to act on what I say, if I want to be a functioning member of society.

If we were not social animals with our unique form of sociality, we would be unlikely to feel the need to justify knowledge or belief? – we would just go ahead and act according to our thoughts. Our bodies are an extension of our thoughts, with muscles attached directly to the nervous system.

As with consciousness, the philosophical problems start to look intractable if the social model is internalised to oneself. I can see another person’s consciousness as a mere imagined model easily enough, but it’s not so easy to see my own in the same light (one of the reasons Descartes’ cogito feels compelling)? Similarly, I can understand without confusion that attempting to justify my beliefs to another person may or may not work, but if I feel that all my beliefs should be justified to myself before I can reasonably do anything, then I may start to spiral downwards into doubting everything (Descartes’ original problem)?

From the scientific point of view, seeing ourselves as social animals with ongoing cooperation, the ongoing need to be ready with justifications for our beliefs makes sense, as an aspect of that cooperation. Without the social context, justifying beliefs becomes unnecessary and irrelevant, in the same way that a non-social animal would be unlikely to think of itself as a conscious “I”?


we begin to see that existence doesn?t seem to include the qualities we usually assume. I think the three points I laid out help to appreciate this. 1) Things are constantly changing, 2) they have to be understood relative to some background, and 3) they are utterly dependent on other conditions for their ?existence.? When we normally say something exists, it implies some sort of autonomy and consistency for that thing- but the things that we imbue with existence actually have none. So we arrive at the idea of conventional truth- these things we acknowledge as existing exist only by convention rather than in actuality. Denoting ?things? is an act of the mind.

Now you might be saying,

?Yes, yes of course. We don?t directly perceive reality- the mental models we create of reality are not perfect. But our models do somehow correspond to the underlying objective reality though. Objective reality in some way is different here and there- it goes in and out, something here but not over there- this underlying reality is what our perceptions are somehow tied to.?

BUT, the implication of conventional existence is that it applies not just to these individual objects that we acknowledge, but also to the idea of reality itself, an object. Objective reality is just a convention as well.

The correspondence (or realist) theory of truth is deeply ingrained in most humans. It basically says that a belief is true if it corresponds with a fact. This idea is definitely part of our folk psychology and probably innately programmed in us. A drawback of this view is that there is no way to show that our beliefs do actually correspond with reality. Of course, just because there is no way to prove that a belief is consistent with reality does not mean that there is no objective reality. True. And so we could just go on and think that these theories that have stood the test of rational thought and empirical criticism, that we hold to be true, are at least ?moving toward? reality. OK. But still there is no way to reasonably argue for this reality (except for what appears below).

On the other hand, the pragmatic theory of truth basically says that what is true is what works and what is consistent with the wider system of beliefs. There is not necessarily a real reality behind things according to this view. Whereas a realist might say ?this theory is or is getting us closer to what is actually going on? the pragmatist would say ?this theory is useful as means to our goals and consistent with other experience.? Buddhism is a pragmatic view.

Guess how we validate correspondence theory or realism?! Not through correspondence theory. Pragmatism! How else could we? Realism does work- it helps us achieve our goals, it?s consistent with what just about everyone else believes, and it appears to be easily adopted by the human organism. We use it because it is pragmatic, not because it corresponds with reality. So the whole idea of an objective reality is simply a convention.


If you really think about it the foundation of knowledge is fragile indeed.



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Re: On Idealism, repeated

#492  Postby Spearthrower » Dec 05, 2021 4:28 am

I'm not an atheist; I just don't believe in gods :- that which I don't belong to isn't a group!
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Re: On Idealism, repeated

#493  Postby don't get me started » Dec 06, 2021 11:38 am

zoon wrote:
Frozenworld wrote:Skepticism is the default.

I’m beginning to wonder whether the ancient philosophical problems around knowledge, justification and scepticism may not be social in origin? This would be by analogy with consciousness, which is a weird and slippery concept if I’m following Descartes’ introspection and wondering what exactly the “I” that I’m so much aware of might be, but which makes much more sense in the context of humans as social animals which have evolved to use the similarities between brains to guess what others are likely to do? Imagining the world as another sees it is a good first step to predicting, with a fair chance of accuracy, what they might be likely to do about it, and the internal model, the imagined world from the other person’s point of view, is easily reified as that other person’s consciousness. When I am living in a group of people who are likewise seeing me as a conscious being, it also makes sense to have a model of myself as others see me, the better to manage social life. This model of myself as a conscious being is then internalised and reified, and then sets up all sorts of philosophical problems when it fails to slot into the scientific model of the world.

Similarly, the need to justify a belief makes a lot of sense if I’m trying to persuade someone else to do something; they may be resistant, and start asking why they should do this, on what grounds is it sensible for them to accept the beliefs on which I’m suggesting they act. In social life, I need to be ready to defend my beliefs if I want other people to act on what I say, if I want to be a functioning member of society.

If we were not social animals with our unique form of sociality, we would be unlikely to feel the need to justify knowledge or belief? – we would just go ahead and act according to our thoughts. Our bodies are an extension of our thoughts, with muscles attached directly to the nervous system.

As with consciousness, the philosophical problems start to look intractable if the social model is internalised to oneself. I can see another person’s consciousness as a mere imagined model easily enough, but it’s not so easy to see my own in the same light (one of the reasons Descartes’ cogito feels compelling)? Similarly, I can understand without confusion that attempting to justify my beliefs to another person may or may not work, but if I feel that all my beliefs should be justified to myself before I can reasonably do anything, then I may start to spiral downwards into doubting everything (Descartes’ original problem)?

From the scientific point of view, seeing ourselves as social animals with ongoing cooperation, the ongoing need to be ready with justifications for our beliefs makes sense, as an aspect of that cooperation. Without the social context, justifying beliefs becomes unnecessary and irrelevant, in the same way that a non-social animal would be unlikely to think of itself as a conscious “I”?


This is an excellent post Zoon and an interesting perspective on the ways that humans go about making sense of their world, each other and themselves- all three sense-making activities being deeply intertwined.

As Plato memorably stated in Theaeteus and the Sophist, thinking is ‘The soul’s dialogue with itself.’ Following from this I think you are right to make an explicit link between the head-internal dialogues that we engage in when we think (inasmuch as we perceive ourselves as being engaged in verbal thought), and the external, multi-participant verbal interactions we engage in (aka ‘conversation’) which are the ‘prime locus of human sociality’ (Schegloff, 1996).

Our need to demonstrate our epistemic status, and to come to an understanding of the epistemic status of others, is one of the driving forces of our interactive endeavors and has been referred to as the ‘Epistemic Engine’. (Heritage, 2012). It is not in any way surprising that the default setting of accounting for epistemic claims, and also negotiating epistemic rights and responsibilities with other participants in spoken interactions should find expression in our internal dialogue as well. As you note, this can spiral downwards towards questioning everything – failing to take account of the fact that a lot of what we ‘know’ is unavailable to introspection. (I once heard it described as the realm of ‘Mysteries for humans’...there is nothing magical here, it is just the limits of our evolved parameters, in the same way that humans can’t read bar codes or QR codes, or hear ultra-sound or make sense of the sound of a fax machine coming through the phone line. These are sensory limits and we probably also have parallel cognitive limits.)

The nature of ‘knowledge’ is often made clear to me as a person with a lot of experience teaching my language to speakers of other languages. It is quite clear to me that a lot of my ‘knowledge’ of language is deficient. I may know how to use a word exactly with a fine degree of nuance in my native language, but being asked to account for its meaning or function, or why it is different from a closely related word by a non-native speaker can leave me grasping at straws and fumbling for ad hoc definitions. I have knowledge that I can’t account for - even after prolonged cogitation.

I particularly like your linkage of epistemics to our unique form of sociality. It makes a lot of sense.


References

Heritage, J. (2012). Epistemics in action: Action formation and territories of knowledge. Research on language & social interaction, 45(1), 1-29.
Plato Theaetetus, 189e-190a & Sophist, 263e-264b. In J. Cooper & D. Hutchinson (1997). (Eds.), Plato: Complete works. Hackett Publishing Company.
Schegloff, Emanuel A. 1996d. Turn organization: One intersection of grammar and interaction. In E. Ochs, E. A. Schegloff, & S. A. Thompson, eds., Interaction and Grammar. Cambridge University Press, pp. 52–133.
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Re: On Idealism, repeated

#494  Postby Frozenworld » Dec 14, 2021 7:30 am

Spearthrower wrote:
Frozenworld wrote:
zoon wrote:
Frozenworld wrote:Skepticism is the default.

I’m beginning to wonder whether the ancient philosophical problems around knowledge, justification and scepticism may not be social in origin? This would be by analogy with consciousness, which is a weird and slippery concept if I’m following Descartes’ introspection and wondering what exactly the “I” that I’m so much aware of might be, but which makes much more sense in the context of humans as social animals which have evolved to use the similarities between brains to guess what others are likely to do? Imagining the world as another sees it is a good first step to predicting, with a fair chance of accuracy, what they might be likely to do about it, and the internal model, the imagined world from the other person’s point of view, is easily reified as that other person’s consciousness. When I am living in a group of people who are likewise seeing me as a conscious being, it also makes sense to have a model of myself as others see me, the better to manage social life. This model of myself as a conscious being is then internalised and reified, and then sets up all sorts of philosophical problems when it fails to slot into the scientific model of the world.

Similarly, the need to justify a belief makes a lot of sense if I’m trying to persuade someone else to do something; they may be resistant, and start asking why they should do this, on what grounds is it sensible for them to accept the beliefs on which I’m suggesting they act. In social life, I need to be ready to defend my beliefs if I want other people to act on what I say, if I want to be a functioning member of society.

If we were not social animals with our unique form of sociality, we would be unlikely to feel the need to justify knowledge or belief? – we would just go ahead and act according to our thoughts. Our bodies are an extension of our thoughts, with muscles attached directly to the nervous system.

As with consciousness, the philosophical problems start to look intractable if the social model is internalised to oneself. I can see another person’s consciousness as a mere imagined model easily enough, but it’s not so easy to see my own in the same light (one of the reasons Descartes’ cogito feels compelling)? Similarly, I can understand without confusion that attempting to justify my beliefs to another person may or may not work, but if I feel that all my beliefs should be justified to myself before I can reasonably do anything, then I may start to spiral downwards into doubting everything (Descartes’ original problem)?

From the scientific point of view, seeing ourselves as social animals with ongoing cooperation, the ongoing need to be ready with justifications for our beliefs makes sense, as an aspect of that cooperation. Without the social context, justifying beliefs becomes unnecessary and irrelevant, in the same way that a non-social animal would be unlikely to think of itself as a conscious “I”?


we begin to see that existence doesn?t seem to include the qualities we usually assume. I think the three points I laid out help to appreciate this. 1) Things are constantly changing, 2) they have to be understood relative to some background, and 3) they are utterly dependent on other conditions for their ?existence.? When we normally say something exists, it implies some sort of autonomy and consistency for that thing- but the things that we imbue with existence actually have none. So we arrive at the idea of conventional truth- these things we acknowledge as existing exist only by convention rather than in actuality. Denoting ?things? is an act of the mind.

Now you might be saying,

?Yes, yes of course. We don?t directly perceive reality- the mental models we create of reality are not perfect. But our models do somehow correspond to the underlying objective reality though. Objective reality in some way is different here and there- it goes in and out, something here but not over there- this underlying reality is what our perceptions are somehow tied to.?

BUT, the implication of conventional existence is that it applies not just to these individual objects that we acknowledge, but also to the idea of reality itself, an object. Objective reality is just a convention as well.

The correspondence (or realist) theory of truth is deeply ingrained in most humans. It basically says that a belief is true if it corresponds with a fact. This idea is definitely part of our folk psychology and probably innately programmed in us. A drawback of this view is that there is no way to show that our beliefs do actually correspond with reality. Of course, just because there is no way to prove that a belief is consistent with reality does not mean that there is no objective reality. True. And so we could just go on and think that these theories that have stood the test of rational thought and empirical criticism, that we hold to be true, are at least ?moving toward? reality. OK. But still there is no way to reasonably argue for this reality (except for what appears below).

On the other hand, the pragmatic theory of truth basically says that what is true is what works and what is consistent with the wider system of beliefs. There is not necessarily a real reality behind things according to this view. Whereas a realist might say ?this theory is or is getting us closer to what is actually going on? the pragmatist would say ?this theory is useful as means to our goals and consistent with other experience.? Buddhism is a pragmatic view.

Guess how we validate correspondence theory or realism?! Not through correspondence theory. Pragmatism! How else could we? Realism does work- it helps us achieve our goals, it?s consistent with what just about everyone else believes, and it appears to be easily adopted by the human organism. We use it because it is pragmatic, not because it corresponds with reality. So the whole idea of an objective reality is simply a convention.


If you really think about it the foundation of knowledge is fragile indeed.



Algorithms produce more informational content than you.


If you read any of that you'd see how one cannot prove that whether their beliefs match reality or not.
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Re: On Idealism, repeated

#495  Postby Frozenworld » Dec 14, 2021 7:36 am

don't get me started wrote:
zoon wrote:
Frozenworld wrote:Skepticism is the default.

I’m beginning to wonder whether the ancient philosophical problems around knowledge, justification and scepticism may not be social in origin? This would be by analogy with consciousness, which is a weird and slippery concept if I’m following Descartes’ introspection and wondering what exactly the “I” that I’m so much aware of might be, but which makes much more sense in the context of humans as social animals which have evolved to use the similarities between brains to guess what others are likely to do? Imagining the world as another sees it is a good first step to predicting, with a fair chance of accuracy, what they might be likely to do about it, and the internal model, the imagined world from the other person’s point of view, is easily reified as that other person’s consciousness. When I am living in a group of people who are likewise seeing me as a conscious being, it also makes sense to have a model of myself as others see me, the better to manage social life. This model of myself as a conscious being is then internalised and reified, and then sets up all sorts of philosophical problems when it fails to slot into the scientific model of the world.

Similarly, the need to justify a belief makes a lot of sense if I’m trying to persuade someone else to do something; they may be resistant, and start asking why they should do this, on what grounds is it sensible for them to accept the beliefs on which I’m suggesting they act. In social life, I need to be ready to defend my beliefs if I want other people to act on what I say, if I want to be a functioning member of society.

If we were not social animals with our unique form of sociality, we would be unlikely to feel the need to justify knowledge or belief? – we would just go ahead and act according to our thoughts. Our bodies are an extension of our thoughts, with muscles attached directly to the nervous system.

As with consciousness, the philosophical problems start to look intractable if the social model is internalised to oneself. I can see another person’s consciousness as a mere imagined model easily enough, but it’s not so easy to see my own in the same light (one of the reasons Descartes’ cogito feels compelling)? Similarly, I can understand without confusion that attempting to justify my beliefs to another person may or may not work, but if I feel that all my beliefs should be justified to myself before I can reasonably do anything, then I may start to spiral downwards into doubting everything (Descartes’ original problem)?

From the scientific point of view, seeing ourselves as social animals with ongoing cooperation, the ongoing need to be ready with justifications for our beliefs makes sense, as an aspect of that cooperation. Without the social context, justifying beliefs becomes unnecessary and irrelevant, in the same way that a non-social animal would be unlikely to think of itself as a conscious “I”?


This is an excellent post Zoon and an interesting perspective on the ways that humans go about making sense of their world, each other and themselves- all three sense-making activities being deeply intertwined.

As Plato memorably stated in Theaeteus and the Sophist, thinking is ‘The soul’s dialogue with itself.’ Following from this I think you are right to make an explicit link between the head-internal dialogues that we engage in when we think (inasmuch as we perceive ourselves as being engaged in verbal thought), and the external, multi-participant verbal interactions we engage in (aka ‘conversation’) which are the ‘prime locus of human sociality’ (Schegloff, 1996).

Our need to demonstrate our epistemic status, and to come to an understanding of the epistemic status of others, is one of the driving forces of our interactive endeavors and has been referred to as the ‘Epistemic Engine’. (Heritage, 2012). It is not in any way surprising that the default setting of accounting for epistemic claims, and also negotiating epistemic rights and responsibilities with other participants in spoken interactions should find expression in our internal dialogue as well. As you note, this can spiral downwards towards questioning everything – failing to take account of the fact that a lot of what we ‘know’ is unavailable to introspection. (I once heard it described as the realm of ‘Mysteries for humans’...there is nothing magical here, it is just the limits of our evolved parameters, in the same way that humans can’t read bar codes or QR codes, or hear ultra-sound or make sense of the sound of a fax machine coming through the phone line. These are sensory limits and we probably also have parallel cognitive limits.)

The nature of ‘knowledge’ is often made clear to me as a person with a lot of experience teaching my language to speakers of other languages. It is quite clear to me that a lot of my ‘knowledge’ of language is deficient. I may know how to use a word exactly with a fine degree of nuance in my native language, but being asked to account for its meaning or function, or why it is different from a closely related word by a non-native speaker can leave me grasping at straws and fumbling for ad hoc definitions. I have knowledge that I can’t account for - even after prolonged cogitation.

I particularly like your linkage of epistemics to our unique form of sociality. It makes a lot of sense.


References

Heritage, J. (2012). Epistemics in action: Action formation and territories of knowledge. Research on language & social interaction, 45(1), 1-29.
Plato Theaetetus, 189e-190a & Sophist, 263e-264b. In J. Cooper & D. Hutchinson (1997). (Eds.), Plato: Complete works. Hackett Publishing Company.
Schegloff, Emanuel A. 1996d. Turn organization: One intersection of grammar and interaction. In E. Ochs, E. A. Schegloff, & S. A. Thompson, eds., Interaction and Grammar. Cambridge University Press, pp. 52–133.


Not really, justifying doesn't become irrelevant in without the social context other the religion of Buddhism wouldn't have gotten off the ground. It really just starts when the thought of "why am I doing/believing this?" pops up and then the rest is history. We don't just justify to others but also to ourselves, to assure ourselves we know what we are doing and what we believe. Or in the case of first doubt the "why behind our lives".

Either way it's not really relevant to the thread, nor does it mean there is an external reality. As was mentioned in the link we have no way to prove if our beliefs correspond to reality.
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Re: On Idealism, repeated

#496  Postby Spearthrower » Dec 14, 2021 7:46 am

Frozenworld wrote:If you read any of that you'd see how one cannot prove that whether their beliefs match reality or not.


Not sure if you're convincing yourself that you have substantiated anything you've said, but I can tell you from my perspective that I'd expect a more involving conversation with a bot.
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Re: On Idealism, repeated

#497  Postby Spearthrower » Dec 14, 2021 7:46 am

Frozenworld wrote:
Either way it's not really relevant to the thread, nor does it mean there is an external reality. As was mentioned in the link we have no way to prove if our beliefs correspond to reality.


Run at a wall.
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Re: On Idealism, repeated

#498  Postby Spearthrower » Dec 14, 2021 7:47 am

Not really, justifying doesn't become irrelevant in without the social context other the religion of Buddhism wouldn't have gotten off the ground.


Want to try that again?

Bots also have a superior grasp of syntax.
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Re: On Idealism, repeated

#499  Postby Frozenworld » Dec 15, 2021 11:58 pm

Spearthrower wrote:
Frozenworld wrote:If you read any of that you'd see how one cannot prove that whether their beliefs match reality or not.


Not sure if you're convincing yourself that you have substantiated anything you've said, but I can tell you from my perspective that I'd expect a more involving conversation with a bot.


So instead of trying to show how we can prove things correspond with reality (which as the quote shows we can't) you're just gonna pretend I don't know anything when you haven't shown anything to support your point?

When you look at something red, where does red exist in the world? Red object is your brain looking at itself.


Color is one thing that does not exist in the world, it's just our brain's imagination, just like sound. Our brains even fill in bits of reality. Knowing all that it's laughable to think you can prove an external reality.
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Re: On Idealism, repeated

#500  Postby newolder » Dec 16, 2021 12:05 am

Frozenworld wrote:...

Not really, justifying doesn't become irrelevant in without the social context other the religion of Buddhism wouldn't have gotten off the ground.

...


Instead of failing with words, could you express yourself better through the medium of dance? I take it you do dance, right?
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