hackenslash wrote:...
I'll give your post a fuller treatment later, but I've been away for 2 weeks, and more pressing matters than your failure to learn how logic actually works demand my attention.

Dude, kick back, relax, have some fun.

First I'll address this ...

jamest wrote:

Agrippina wrote:

This table is fucked up.

Er, no it isn't. What's truly fucked up is insisting that the entities and phenomena on the left hand side need a magic man.

jamest wrote:We haven't proved that the observed Sun/anything is natural (physical).

Bollocks. You have heard of spectroscopy, haven't you?

Oh wait, it was the application of spectrosopy to the light reaching us from the Sun, that allowed scientists to determine the existence of a chemical element, namely Helium, as being present on the Sun before it was found on earth. From here, we have:

Helium is named for the Greek god of the Sun, Helios. It was first detected as an unknown yellow spectral line signature in sunlight during a solar eclipse in 1868 by French astronomer Jules Janssen. Janssen is jointly credited with detecting the element along with Norman Lockyer. Jannsen observed during the solar eclipse of 1868 while Lockyer observed from Britain. Lockyer was the first to propose that the line was due to a new element, which he named. The formal discovery of the element was made in 1895 by two Swedish chemists, Per Teodor Cleve and Nils Abraham Langlet, who found helium emanating from the uranium ore cleveite. In 1903, large reserves of helium were found in natural gas fields in parts of the United States, which is by far the largest supplier of the gas today.

So a chemical element new to science was discovered as part of the chemical composition of the Sun back in 1868, but the element was only formally discovered here on Earth in 1895, some 27 years later. Indeed, spectroscopy has allowed us to determine the chemical composition of stars several billion light years distant from Earth.

Then, of course, when scientists were able to perform nuclear fusion in particle accelerators, they found that the energy release from Hydrogen fusion (which generates Helium), was entirely consistent with the output from the Sun. And also provided a reason for Helium being detected there.

Plus, scientists have launched spacecraft equipped with instruments aimed at detecting, for example, the nature of charged particles reaching us via the Solar Wind, the arrangement of magnetic fields around the Sun, etc.

Likewise, the application of back body radiation theory has allowed us to determine the surface temperature of the Sun. The same black body radiation theory that, incidentally, tells us something important about the Cosmic Microwave Background, which is one of the sources of data informing us of the age of the observable universe.

So we have several independent lines of inquiry telling us that the Sun is a material entity, generating its energy via nuclear fusion. Did you not learn even the elementary facts with respect to this in science classes?

jamest wrote: In fact, since I can prove that all observed entities have an immaterial essence grounded in quale and judgement

No, you merely assert this. An assertion that is laughable in the face of scientific fact. Because, wait for it, once again, our senses and brain processes would not exist, if there did not exist an underpinning of reliably repeatable phenomena, such as the chemical reactions that take place in the eye and the brain. Indeed, when the senses of some humans do not function accordingly, this is attributable to failure of those processes to operate in those individuals, for well-defined reasons, such as, for example, failure to inherit working opsin genes leading to colour blindness.

It's testable natural processes all the way down, James.

jamest wrote:you need to move all the things listed in the left-side of the table to the right-side of the table.

Bollocks. Oh wait, here's a simple experiment you can perform, James. Sit in a completely darkened room for about an hour. What do you see? You see nothing of the surroundings in such circumstances. Your eyes are useless in that environment, because they're not receiving any photons of visible light from outside. However, the moment someone switches on the light, this changes, because your eyes are now receiving photons. The reason you see things at that point, is because the light source is generating billions of photons, and some of these are reflected off various surfaces in the room, including the surfaces of your body, and the surfaces of whatever clothing you happen to be wearing. Your precious "quale" are nothing but the products of processes such as this. But please, do keep thinking that they're magic phenomena that have nothing to do with the physics of the requisite particles, whilst the rest of us point and laugh, and scientists continue making discoveries that owe nothing to your worthless assertions.

hackenslash wrote:

jamest wrote:Without any reasoning on my part,

That's almost the only self-evident thing you've presented. You have more than one premise. The one you've called your premise, I have no argument with, and if that were your only premise, you'd look pretty smart. However, you have other premises that are anything but self-evident. These are what make your argument unsound, your reasoning shoddy, and your conclusion 'not even' suspect.

It really is time you learned to construct an argument, James, because you've had enough lessons in the rudiments of logical argumentation. When is any of it actually going to sink in?

Incorrect. I only have one self-evident premise from which all other conclusions are derived. This means that my metaphysical argument is absolutely sound. Game over. Sandals and robe in the post.

I'll give your post a fuller treatment later, but I've been away for 2 weeks, and more pressing matters than your failure to learn how logic actually works demand my attention.

You'd rather do the ironing than be enlightened by me?

Still under the misguided assumption that blindly asserting you're correct makes it so, I see.

jamest wrote:

Chrisw wrote:Is anyone claiming that metaphysics has it's very own standards of evidence that are different from those that apply to other ways of investigating or questioning the world?

I'd say it doesn't and anyone whose metaphysical arguments rely on some special definition of 'evidence' is talking nonsense (I'm not aware of any serious philosophers who do this).

You think that professional philosophers should be looking for empirical evidence to back up their metaphysical claims?

I'm saying that metaphysics (actually let's not be pretentious, let's call it philosophy) doesn't exist in its own special world with its very own standards of proof or justification or evidence.

How do you feel about the statement "I see red"? That's empirical, do you have a problem with it?

Chrisw wrote:

jamest wrote:

Chrisw wrote:Is anyone claiming that metaphysics has it's very own standards of evidence that are different from those that apply to other ways of investigating or questioning the world?

I'd say it doesn't and anyone whose metaphysical arguments rely on some special definition of 'evidence' is talking nonsense (I'm not aware of any serious philosophers who do this).

You think that professional philosophers should be looking for empirical evidence to back up their metaphysical claims?

I'm saying that metaphysics (actually let's not be pretentious, let's call it philosophy) doesn't exist in its own special world with its very own standards of proof or justification or evidence.

How do you feel about the statement "I see red"? That's empirical, do you have a problem with it?

Unfortunately some people do.
If you've been privy to or involved in any of the consciousness 'discussions' you'll know what I mean.

Chrisw wrote:

jamest wrote:

Chrisw wrote:Is anyone claiming that metaphysics has it's very own standards of evidence that are different from those that apply to other ways of investigating or questioning the world?

I'd say it doesn't and anyone whose metaphysical arguments rely on some special definition of 'evidence' is talking nonsense (I'm not aware of any serious philosophers who do this).

You think that professional philosophers should be looking for empirical evidence to back up their metaphysical claims?

I'm saying that metaphysics (actually let's not be pretentious, let's call it philosophy) doesn't exist in its own special world with its very own standards of proof or justification or evidence.

How do you feel about the statement "I see red"? That's empirical, do you have a problem with it?

Then this from post 897 makes me an empiricist:

The premise of my sound argument is self-evident, requiring no proof. That an occurrence we call experience/thought/emotion is happening cannot be disputed.

I don't require logical proof that I'm having experiences. I don't even need to know what those experiences are, or what I am. All I need to know is that I am directly witnessing/observing events we call experience. Since observing is a verb, the inference of an experiencer - myself - is indisputable by reason. As stated, my existence is self-evident and indisputable by 'me'.

Without any reasoning on my part, I can report incidents of quale/sensations within my awareness. Incidents such as the awareness of something we call light, or sound, etc.. And with due consideration, I understand that all physical things within my awareness are the consequence of inferences on my part made from these quale. Thus, I cannot dispute the occurrence of quale/sensations, nor my own existence, but I can dispute the actual existence of these physical things beyond my own inferences of them.

jamest wrote:The premise of my sound argument is self-evident, requiring no proof. That an occurrence we call experience/thought/emotion is happening cannot be disputed.

True enough.

How do you get from there to Idealism? It seems that you are the only one here who can detect any connection between this premise and your conclusion.

jamest wrote:

Chrisw wrote:

jamest wrote:

Chrisw wrote:Is anyone claiming that metaphysics has it's very own standards of evidence that are different from those that apply to other ways of investigating or questioning the world?

I'd say it doesn't and anyone whose metaphysical arguments rely on some special definition of 'evidence' is talking nonsense (I'm not aware of any serious philosophers who do this).

You think that professional philosophers should be looking for empirical evidence to back up their metaphysical claims?

I'm saying that metaphysics (actually let's not be pretentious, let's call it philosophy) doesn't exist in its own special world with its very own standards of proof or justification or evidence.

How do you feel about the statement "I see red"? That's empirical, do you have a problem with it?

Then this from post 897 makes me an empiricist:

The premise of my sound argument is self-evident, requiring no proof. That an occurrence we call experience/thought/emotion is happening cannot be disputed.

I don't require logical proof that I'm having experiences. I don't even need to know what those experiences are, or what I am. All I need to know is that I am directly witnessing/observing events we call experience. Since observing is a verb, the inference of an experiencer - myself - is indisputable by reason. As stated, my existence is self-evident and indisputable by 'me'.

Without any reasoning on my part, I can report incidents of quale/sensations within my awareness. Incidents such as the awareness of something we call light, or sound, etc.. And with due consideration, I understand that all physical things within my awareness are the consequence of inferences on my part made from these quale. Thus, I cannot dispute the occurrence of quale/sensations, nor my own existence, but I can dispute the actual existence of these physical things beyond my own inferences of them.

A little healthy skepticism about whether you are living in the Matrix or that you are the only mind in the world is fine. Very good. Every twelve year old of a reasonable IQ has this experience. Dispute away. Proves nothing.

Nicko wrote:

jamest wrote:The premise of my sound argument is self-evident, requiring no proof. That an occurrence we call experience/thought/emotion is happening cannot be disputed.

True enough.

How do you get from there to Idealism? It seems that you are the only one here who can detect any connection between this premise and your conclusion.

There's quite a lot which goes in between the premise and the conclusion. For a nutshell overview, see:

http://www.rationalskepticism.org/gener ... l#p2029044

jamest wrote:Then this from post 897 makes me an empiricist

Why wouldn't you be an empiricist? Berkeley (subjective idealist) was. Mill (phenomenalist) was.

Right, now it's time to deal with this turgid shite ...

jamest wrote:

Calilasseia wrote:And of course, there's that little problem James tried to hand-wave away as purportedly "irrelevant", because it poses serious problems for his attempts to try and peddle unsupported assertions as fact, and fabrications of the television inside one's head as "knowledge". Namely, any metaphysical theory that claims to be in a position simply to describe the "things in themselves", let alone erect prescriptive statements of the sort that James clearly wants to, has to achieve a certain minimum level of completeness with respect to its framework, and that minimum level of completeness involves providing an account for the observational data he continues to sneer at. If a metaphyscial theory fails to provide an account for observational data, it is necessarily incomplete, and is therefore not in a position to support any assertions about the purported "irrelevance" of observational data, because without such an account, it cannot provide any exposition with respect to any hypothesised coupling between the two, and why said coupling renders said data purportedly "irrelevant". On the other hand, any metaphysical theory that does attain this level of completeness, by definition erects testable statements about observational data.

We have this experience we call the universe.

Which we wwouldn't have without the existence of the requisite observational data, provided by reliably repeatably physical phenomena.

jamest wrote:It comes about from the judgements we make of the order/patterns inherent within our quale/sensations.

And where does that order and those patterns come from? Oh, that's right, the reliably repeatable physical phenomena underpinning them.

The problem with your witless assertions about "quale", and your attempt to present these as some sort of fantastic magic phenomenon, one that moreover purportedly dictates the data we receive, is that said assertions amount to asserting that the past is editable, and that we can change it simply by wishing it to be changed. Once again, for those unfamiliar with this, I'll explain why, and to do so, I'll refer everyone to a not so little object known as SN1987A.

SN1987A is the name given to a supernova, which appeared in the night sky in the year 1987, hence the name. When it appeared, astronomers all around the world pointed their telescopes at it, and gathered relevant data. This included such instruments as the Hubble Space Telescope. Now the fun part is, that all of these disparate observers, and disparate instruments, gathered the same data, which on its own wouldn't be possible if the universe operated according to your hilarious presuppositions. But it gets better as follows. SN1987A is 169,000 light years distant from Earth, which means that the light emanating from that supernova was first emitted back when Mitochondrial Eve was searching for nuts in nearby trees. In order for your fantasies about "quale" being fantastic magic entities, that construct the universe and its contents, to operate, this requires that those astronomers were somehow able to reach into the past and conjure up the data with their minds. Except that, oh wait, this doesn't happen.

Those judgements we make about observations are shaped by the data, not the other way round. If the light reflected off a particular object is in the blue part of the spectrum, no amount of wishful thinking will make that object look red.

That external data, which has nothing to do with the products of the televisions inside our heads, is the inconvenient entity your "metaphysics" has to address in order to be complete. If your "metaphysics" doesn't do this, it's in no position to erect assertions about said data. But the moment it does address said data, then by definition, it will erect testable assertions about said data.

It's game fucking over for your fantasies, James. The data wins every time.

jamest wrote:That is, knowledge of things is a thought-construct (things are thoughts).

Nice bait and switch you pulled there in that sentence, James, moving from "knowledge of things is a thought construct", which is banally obvious, to "things are thoughts", which is a wholly unwarranted piece of conclusion jumping on your part, and yet another of your tiresome unsupported assertions. This latter assertion is falsified quite nicely by my baseball bat. Which, if I choose to deploy it to smash your head in, continues to exert its effects, as I continue beating your head to a bloody pulp, long after your consciousness and its "quale" have ceased to be. Indeed, the entire planet continued on its merry way, unaffected by "quale", for untold millions of years after the first vertebrates expired and left fossils.

I'll also remind you of my little exposition on Berkeley's Assassin.

jamest wrote:Clearly then, the way that we think/judge/reason is paramount in explaining the things that we see.

No, what's paramount is the data we receive. No amount of thinking that the Siberian Tiger bearing down upon you, about to turn you into its lunch, is going to make that Siberian Tiger vanish in a puff of smoke. Those of our past ancestors who might have entertained this delusion, discovered the hard way that it was a delusion, upon becoming said lunch.

jamest wrote:Equally important is the ordering of the quale/sensations which enable such a world-construct.

How can something be "equally important" to something else that's "paramount", James? Even your command of English is parlous.

Plus, you've just admitted above, though of course entirely unintentionally, that without reliable and repeatable underpinnings facilitating the requisite processing, your ""quale" and "judgments" are nowhere. At the moment, we only have one candidate for said underpinnings, namely testable natural processes, which have been alighted upon and elucidated in quantity.

jamest wrote:For instance, I'm only going to infer the presence of an elephant in a painting if the artist organises his paints just so.

Except that this doesn't happen with actual elephants. If an elephant turns up, it does so regardless of whatever you're thinking about.

jamest wrote:Likewise, the inference of an elephant within my actual experience of the world requires the just so ordering of my sensations/quale so that I arrive at the correct inference.

Which you wouldn't be able to do if, wait for it, you hadn't been previously presented with external data about elephants.

jamest wrote:The observed world does not exist

Bollocks. Want me to show you my baseball bat?

jamest wrote:being reducible instead to a combination of quale and judgement.

Bollocks. My baseball bat will reduce your head to a bloody pulp regardless of what "quale" you think you're cooking up in the television inside your head. Said cooking up of "quale" very quickly coming to an end as a result.

jamest wrote:However, it appears to exist

Oh no, it's the "observation is an illusion" delusion. Next time you're out and about, walk in front of a 40 ton truck, and see how "illusory" it is when it runs over you.

jamest wrote:and it appears to exist with a certain discernible order (laws of physics).

Funny how this order generates a lot of independently verifiable phenomena, regardless of our presuppositions on the matter. Which should be telling you something important.

jamest wrote: So, what are you asking me? I've explained how the world comes about in our minds.

No you haven't. You've erected a lot of witless assertions, peppered with the occasional appearance of the banally obvious.

jamest wrote:The order inherent within that world is something I leave for the physicists to unveil, though we now see that they've reached the inevitable impasse with QM.

Ha ha ha ha ha. I'll let the world's physicists point and laugh at this dribblingly encephalitic assertion of yours, not least because they don't think quantum physics is an "impasse". Rather, they think of it as a framework for understanding yet more classes of observational entities and phenomena.

jamest wrote:A physics which, incidentally, fits smoothly with idealism.

Bollocks. Pity Niels Bohr isn't around to smack you about the head with a heavy textbook. But then some of us have learned what the rigorous understanding of the Schrödinger Wave Equation actually is.

jamest wrote:However, for the metaphysicist the physics of our situation is irrelevant, even unimportant.

Only if said metaphsyicist is interested in assertionist navel gazing, instead of providing a genuine explanation for the world. Because any genuine explanation has to encompass that physics. If it doesn't, it's incomplete, and unfit for the purpose. If it does, it then becomes testable. Game over.

jamest wrote:The metaphysicist is not really concerned with perceived order, but with the being which expresses itself through that order.

Yawn. Try being a "being" without neutral atoms in place.

jamest wrote:The reality of ourselves is what concerns people like myself.

In short, you're concerned with the television inside your head, and trying to make this and its fabrications dictate to the universe. Ha ha ha ha ha.

Chrisw wrote:

jamest wrote:Then this from post 897 makes me an empiricist

Why wouldn't you be an empiricist? Berkeley (subjective idealist) was. Mill (phenomenalist) was.

Fair enough. My real beef is with those who demand scientific evidence of metaphysical claims. So I guess the distinction between two types of empirical evidence has to be made.

Anyway, I'm off to observe myself swimming in some observable pool. Mustn't forget to don my observable speedos. Observable ladies, be warned.

jamest wrote:Incorrect. I only have one self-evident premise from which all other conclusions are derived.

P1. I have experiences.
Conclusion: Those experiences aren't of anything real.

Is that how this works? This is even worse than I thought, and that's pretty special, because I knew it was complete bollocks.

This means that my metaphysical argument is absolutely sound. Game over. Sandals and robe in the post.

You clearly have no idea of what soundness actually is.

You'd rather do the ironing than be enlightened by me?

I'm far more likely to be enlightened by the iron, frankly.

jamest wrote:

Chrisw wrote:

jamest wrote:Then this from post 897 makes me an empiricist

Why wouldn't you be an empiricist? Berkeley (subjective idealist) was. Mill (phenomenalist) was.

Fair enough. My real beef is with those who demand scientific evidence of metaphysical claims. So I guess the distinction between two types of empirical evidence has to be made.

That problem is still there, waiting to be addressed. No amount of wishful thinking is going to make it go away.

jamest wrote:Fair enough. My real beef is with those who demand scientific evidence of metaphysical claims.

I'll settle for any evidence, as in 'that which makes evident', a challenge you haven't begun to rise to (speaking of your imaginary speedos and their imaginary contents).

So I guess the distinction between two types of empirical evidence has to be made.

Not really, no. Here's the bit you've been struggling with: Premises must be demonstrably true. One of your premises is, I freely admit, banally obvious. The other, which you seem to lack the wit to realise actually is a premise, doesn't even have the most diaphanous support, let alone anything substantive. Until you set the assertion that the subjects of your observations/experiences only exist inside your head on a rigorous footing, you still have a premise in need of support.

And that's when your work will actually begin. Not, of course, that you can actually get to the coal face by supporting said premise, because it's 'self-evidently' a load of fatuous cock.

James's position consists, in effect, of asserting that the six foot cockroach that appeared in a hallucination I experienced during a meningitis infection is every bit as real as Mount Everest, the Empire State Building or the Large Hadron Collider. Good luck with that.

jamest wrote:

Nicko wrote:

jamest wrote:The premise of my sound argument is self-evident, requiring no proof. That an occurrence we call experience/thought/emotion is happening cannot be disputed.

True enough.

How do you get from there to Idealism? It seems that you are the only one here who can detect any connection between this premise and your conclusion.

There's quite a lot which goes in between the premise and the conclusion. For a nutshell overview, see:

http://www.rationalskepticism.org/gener ... l#p2029044

Well, I agree with the last line of that post.

The body leaves me none the wiser as to how you get from "I have experiences" to Idealism.

hackenslash wrote:

jamest wrote:Incorrect. I only have one self-evident premise from which all other conclusions are derived.

P1. I have experiences.
Conclusion: Those experiences aren't of anything real.

Is that how this works? This is even worse than I thought, and that's pretty special, because I knew it was complete bollocks.

No, that's not how it works. The premise is that there are experiences/observations happening. I infer from this that there must be an experiencer/observer - 'me' - because [basically] observing is a verb. This isn't a starting premise because it emerges from the starting premise. Likewise, anything else I say is inferred from the starting premise or from inferences thereof. It's a progression of inferences, but there's really only one premise to my whole philosophy since anything else I say requires explaining from that (is questionable without that).

This means that my metaphysical argument is absolutely sound. Game over. Sandals and robe in the post.

You clearly have no idea of what soundness actually is.

Yes I do. The key part is that the premise(s) used to establish a conclusion must be true. Mine is.