THWOTH wrote:If you make a claim for at least one god the burden of support is on you. Considering whatever support you bring to the claim the atheist is the one who does not believe you.

I see. So let's suppose a theist who claims that some god exists, Shiva, for example, and let's suppose a christian who does not believe the claim that Shiva exists. According to you, we have here a theist who is an atheist.
Of course no theist is an atheist. So, see if you can figure out where your thinking fucked up.

We have other active topics on this atheism thing, don't we?

Thomas Eshuis wrote:

Boyle wrote:

ScholasticSpastic wrote:

ughaibu wrote:
As an aside, what about science's most embarrassing fuck ups? Was it how-questions that were behind them?

Science doesn't fuck up. Scientists fuck up. I suppose the same could be said of philosophy, so I am happy to retroactively apply that qualification as well.

I'd say the school of natural science, and science, that came from philosophy is due entirely to "Why" questions.

While philosophy is certainly the birthplace of science and the scientific method that does not mean or demonstrate that 'why' questions were the pivotal connection.
Especially not since 'why' questions beg a teleological question as Animavore pointed out above.

I don't think they do. You might reply to a "why" question with a teleological answer, but that's not to say that any such "why" begs that question. It looks like overreaching to me. I don't know how a defense of something like that would go. If we're having the sort of conversation where we trade the burden of proof around, I think this point earns the weight of it.

Thomas Eshuis wrote:

Boyle wrote:That isn't to say that science isn't, like, the best tool we have to investigate the natural world. It is, definitely, but it got there due to the "why" questions asked by philosophers. Why do we need to showat is more reliable and demonstrable, very specific correlations rather than broad ones? Why have good experimental designHow do you demonstrate that a hypothesis is correct ? Why verify Is common sense a reliable source of knowledge? Whyich produces more reliable results is evidence even important when making a claim or assertions? Those are philosophical questions, not and scientific ones.

FIFY.

I'm not sure what you were trying to do here, Thomas. But I don't think you've rephrased Boyle's original questions as ones more friendly to science and thereby showed that science can handle all the good questions, if that was the job you were trying to accomplish. I think, rather, you've smuggled in several additional points and tried to answer some of those questions for your own view, instead. You may have had other ambitions though.

On your first point, I'm saying that just stating that any 'why' question that isn't begging a teleological answer can be rephrased as a 'what' or 'how' question has a burden of proof that hasn't been met here. But there's another point here, too. If all of these non-teleological 'why' questions can be rephrased as 'how' or 'what' questions and these are then amenable to science, then the distinction between the former one and the latter two doesn't do any work. If science can answer these 'why' questions, whether you rephrase them or not, then the blanket ban on 'why' questions that plenty of people talk up for science doesn't do anything. It's a catchphrase that doesn't catch anything.

On your second point, sure. I'm happy to tell you where I'm coming from. In Boyle's first question, he asked why we need to show very specific correlations rather than broad ones. But your rephrasing asks which of the two is more reliable and demonstrable. So, you've not so much just rephrased the question as smuggled in your answer (the reliable and demonstrable ones are to be preferred) and then asked which satisfies that preference. In his second, he asked why we should have good experimental design. You rephrased this as a question about how to demonstrate that a hypothesis is correct. Those are clearly two different questions. In his third, he asked why we should verify common sense. In yours, you changed that to ask if common sense is a reliable source of knowledge. That is, you changed the question to one about reliability again (that's leaving aside whether a shading of reliability is sometimes sketched into common sense). In the last, again, you change his question about the importance of evidence to your own about the reliability of evidence over assertions.

Spinozasgalt wrote:On your first point, I'm saying that just stating that any 'why' question that isn't begging a teleological answer can be rephrased as a 'what' or 'how' question has a burden of proof that hasn't been met here.

I'm unsure what you mean, can you elaborate?

Spinozasgalt wrote: But there's another point here, too. If all of these non-teleological 'why' questions can be rephrased as 'how' or 'what' questions and these are then amenable to science, then the distinction between the former one and the latter two doesn't do any work.

It's not that teleological question can be rephrased, it's that why questions can be rephrased as what or how questions and thereby avoid the appearance of being questions about purpose, goal and intent.

Spinozasgalt wrote: If science can answer these 'why' questions, whether you rephrase them or not, then the blanket ban on 'why' questions that plenty of people talk up for science doesn't do anything. It's a catchphrase that doesn't catch anything.

It does, see above.

Spinozasgalt wrote:On your second point, sure. I'm happy to tell you where I'm coming from. In Boyle's first question, he asked why we need to show very specific correlations rather than broad ones. But your rephrasing asks which of the two is more reliable and demonstrable. So, you've not so much just rephrased the question as smuggled in your answer (the reliable and demonstrable ones are to be preferred) and then asked which satisfies that preference.

Except that's the point. Why reliable and demonstrable are preferable are philosophical questions, but science doesn't bother with that. It operates from that position as a basis.
What are things and how do they work is what gave birth to science.
Not why should we look for reliable results and demonstrable evidence.

Spinozasgalt wrote: In his second, he asked why we should have good experimental design. You rephrased this as a question about how to demonstrate that a hypothesis is correct. Those are clearly two different questions.

And pointing out the difference between science and philosophy.
As above. Science already starts with the points of falsification and demonstration.
Why that's important is a philosophical question, but not what gave rise to science.

Spinozasgalt wrote: In his third, he asked why we should verify common sense. In yours, you changed that to ask if common sense is a reliable source of knowledge. That is, you changed the question to one about reliability again (that's leaving aside whether a shading of reliability is sometimes sketched into common sense). In the last, again, you change his question about the importance of evidence to your own about the reliability of evidence over assertions.

I did indeed, you're right about that, but again for the reasons already given above.

Thomas Eshuis wrote:

Spinozasgalt wrote:On your first point, I'm saying that just stating that any 'why' question that isn't begging a teleological answer can be rephrased as a 'what' or 'how' question has a burden of proof that hasn't been met here.

I'm unsure what you mean, can you elaborate?

Sure. You were talking about a burden of proof with others previously and here you're suggesting that any 'why' question that isn't a teleological one can be rephrased as a 'what' or a 'how' question without loss. But if this is a conversation where people trade the burden of proof around, then a statement as broad as that one will have to carry a heavy burden of proof. Ughaibu, for instance, doesn't agree that any decent 'why' question can be rephrased as a 'how' or a 'what' without loss. What do you say to show he's wrong?

Thomas Eshuis wrote:

Spinozasgalt wrote: But there's another point here, too. If all of these non-teleological 'why' questions can be rephrased as 'how' or 'what' questions and these are then amenable to science, then the distinction between the former one and the latter two doesn't do any work.

It's not that teleological question can be rephrased, it's that why questions can be rephrased as what or how questions and thereby avoid the appearance of being questions about purpose, goal and intent.

Sure, I got that. But as I said, 'why' questions are not really problematic then. Teleological answers are (I wouldn't go so far as to agree there, btw). Why throw out all 'why' questions because teleological commitments might be lurking in some of them? The scope of the catchphrase about science answering the 'how' rather than the 'why', as it leads on to the following...

Thomas Eshuis wrote:

Spinozasgalt wrote: If science can answer these 'why' questions, whether you rephrase them or not, then the blanket ban on 'why' questions that plenty of people talk up for science doesn't do anything. It's a catchphrase that doesn't catch anything.

It does, see above.

Misses its mark. It's pithy. But it doesn't distinguish between problematic and non-problematic forms of questioning. You may as well say that science answers the 'what' but not the 'for what'. If teleology is the problem, it at least gets closer to it.

Thomas Eshuis wrote:

Spinozasgalt wrote:On your second point, sure. I'm happy to tell you where I'm coming from. In Boyle's first question, he asked why we need to show very specific correlations rather than broad ones. But your rephrasing asks which of the two is more reliable and demonstrable. So, you've not so much just rephrased the question as smuggled in your answer (the reliable and demonstrable ones are to be preferred) and then asked which satisfies that preference.

Except that's the point. Why reliable and demonstrable are preferable are philosophical questions, but science doesn't bother with that. It operates from that position as a basis.
What are things and how do they work is what gave birth to science.
Not why should we look for reliable results and demonstrable evidence.

Spinozasgalt wrote: In his second, he asked why we should have good experimental design. You rephrased this as a question about how to demonstrate that a hypothesis is correct. Those are clearly two different questions.

And pointing out the difference between science and philosophy.
As above. Science already starts with the points of falsification and demonstration.
Why that's important is a philosophical question, but not what gave rise to science.

Spinozasgalt wrote: In his third, he asked why we should verify common sense. In yours, you changed that to ask if common sense is a reliable source of knowledge. That is, you changed the question to one about reliability again (that's leaving aside whether a shading of reliability is sometimes sketched into common sense). In the last, again, you change his question about the importance of evidence to your own about the reliability of evidence over assertions.

I did indeed, you're right about that, but again for the reasons already given above.

I think we're losing the thread of what we were saying here. My initial point on these was that if you were trying to rephrase Boyle's questions to make them into 'how' or 'what' ones and thereby amenable to science, that you had lost bits and brought in others. If, as I also suggested might be the case, you weren't trying to rephrase them with that sort of thing in mind, then that's fine.

Spinozasgalt wrote:

Thomas Eshuis wrote:

Spinozasgalt wrote:On your first point, I'm saying that just stating that any 'why' question that isn't begging a teleological answer can be rephrased as a 'what' or 'how' question has a burden of proof that hasn't been met here.

I'm unsure what you mean, can you elaborate?

Sure. You were talking about a burden of proof with others previously and here you're suggesting that any 'why' question that isn't a teleological one can be rephrased as a 'what' or a 'how' question without loss. But if this is a conversation where people trade the burden of proof around, then a statement as broad as that one will have to carry a heavy burden of proof. Ughaibu, for instance, doesn't agree that any decent 'why' question can be rephrased as a 'how' or a 'what' without loss. What do you say to show he's wrong?

That, with regards to science specifically, it's all about the what and how questions, not why. Science isn't concerned with why reliable and falsifiable are important, it operates from the premise that they are.
It's a curiosity about how things work, not why, as in a reason or purpose, that gave rise to science.

Spinozasgalt wrote:

Thomas Eshuis wrote:

Spinozasgalt wrote: But there's another point here, too. If all of these non-teleological 'why' questions can be rephrased as 'how' or 'what' questions and these are then amenable to science, then the distinction between the former one and the latter two doesn't do any work.

It's not that teleological question can be rephrased, it's that why questions can be rephrased as what or how questions and thereby avoid the appearance of being questions about purpose, goal and intent.

Sure, I got that. But as I said, 'why' questions are not really problematic then. Teleological answers are (I wouldn't go so far as to agree there, btw). Why throw out all 'why' questions because teleological commitments might be lurking in some of them? The scope of the catchphrase about science answering the 'how' rather than the 'why', as it leads on to the following...

Because I did not say throw out all the 'why' questions, my point is that they are not inherently/exclusively 'why' questions.
ughaibu and Boyle are claiming science is based on 'why' questions specifically, when most of the 'why' questions they offered with regards to science can be rephrased as 'how' and 'what', thereby avoiding the impression that there's a reason or guided process behind it.

Spinozasgalt wrote:

Thomas Eshuis wrote:

Spinozasgalt wrote: If science can answer these 'why' questions, whether you rephrase them or not, then the blanket ban on 'why' questions that plenty of people talk up for science doesn't do anything. It's a catchphrase that doesn't catch anything.

It does, see above.

Misses its mark.

How?

Spinozasgalt wrote:It's pithy. But it doesn't distinguish between problematic and non-problematic forms of questioning. You may as well say that science answers the 'what' but not the 'for what'. If teleology is the problem, it at least gets closer to it.

Your suggestion, like the 'why' questions, begs the question that there must be a 'for what'.

Spinozasgalt wrote:

Thomas Eshuis wrote:

Spinozasgalt wrote:On your second point, sure. I'm happy to tell you where I'm coming from. In Boyle's first question, he asked why we need to show very specific correlations rather than broad ones. But your rephrasing asks which of the two is more reliable and demonstrable. So, you've not so much just rephrased the question as smuggled in your answer (the reliable and demonstrable ones are to be preferred) and then asked which satisfies that preference.

Except that's the point. Why reliable and demonstrable are preferable are philosophical questions, but science doesn't bother with that. It operates from that position as a basis.
What are things and how do they work is what gave birth to science.
Not why should we look for reliable results and demonstrable evidence.

Spinozasgalt wrote: In his second, he asked why we should have good experimental design. You rephrased this as a question about how to demonstrate that a hypothesis is correct. Those are clearly two different questions.

And pointing out the difference between science and philosophy.
As above. Science already starts with the points of falsification and demonstration.
Why that's important is a philosophical question, but not what gave rise to science.

Spinozasgalt wrote: In his third, he asked why we should verify common sense. In yours, you changed that to ask if common sense is a reliable source of knowledge. That is, you changed the question to one about reliability again (that's leaving aside whether a shading of reliability is sometimes sketched into common sense). In the last, again, you change his question about the importance of evidence to your own about the reliability of evidence over assertions.

I did indeed, you're right about that, but again for the reasons already given above.

I think we're losing the thread of what we were saying here. My initial point on these was that if you were trying to rephrase Boyle's questions to make them into 'how' or 'what' ones and thereby amenable to science, that you had lost bits and brought in others. If, as I also suggested might be the case, you weren't trying to rephrase them with that sort of thing in mind, then that's fine.

Although I think science technically deals with what and how questions, the discussion section of any given paper does allow for an element about why. Why is a paper relevant in light of other research for example. Or why was a certain method for calculation chosen, et cetera. Why-questions also emerge when hard science is translated into narratives to help educate a broader public.

Thomas Eshuis wrote:

Spinozasgalt wrote:

Thomas Eshuis wrote:

Spinozasgalt wrote:On your first point, I'm saying that just stating that any 'why' question that isn't begging a teleological answer can be rephrased as a 'what' or 'how' question has a burden of proof that hasn't been met here.

I'm unsure what you mean, can you elaborate?

Sure. You were talking about a burden of proof with others previously and here you're suggesting that any 'why' question that isn't a teleological one can be rephrased as a 'what' or a 'how' question without loss. But if this is a conversation where people trade the burden of proof around, then a statement as broad as that one will have to carry a heavy burden of proof. Ughaibu, for instance, doesn't agree that any decent 'why' question can be rephrased as a 'how' or a 'what' without loss. What do you say to show he's wrong?

That, with regards to science specifically, it's all about the what and how questions, not why. Science isn't concerned with why reliable and falsifiable are important, it operates from the premise that they are.
It's a curiosity about how things work, not why, as in a reason or purpose, that gave rise to science.

But, and ughaibu put up an example, not all 'why' questions are about these deeper issues. Some of them are mundane questions that look an awful lot like what science usually tackles. What can you say to this? It's your contention, I think, that any such question is either disqualified from science or easily rephrased as a 'how' or a 'what' question and thus made amenable to science. I don't think ughaibu even has to provide a counterexample here, does he? He can just take the stance that the atheist does - say that he doesn't believe it and ask for evidence.

Thomas Eshuis wrote:

Spinozasgalt wrote:

Thomas Eshuis wrote:

Spinozasgalt wrote: But there's another point here, too. If all of these non-teleological 'why' questions can be rephrased as 'how' or 'what' questions and these are then amenable to science, then the distinction between the former one and the latter two doesn't do any work.

It's not that teleological question can be rephrased, it's that why questions can be rephrased as what or how questions and thereby avoid the appearance of being questions about purpose, goal and intent.

Sure, I got that. But as I said, 'why' questions are not really problematic then. Teleological answers are (I wouldn't go so far as to agree there, btw). Why throw out all 'why' questions because teleological commitments might be lurking in some of them? The scope of the catchphrase about science answering the 'how' rather than the 'why', as it leads on to the following...

Because I did not say throw out all the 'why' questions, my point is that they are not inherently/exclusively 'why' questions.
ughaibu and Boyle are claiming science is based on 'why' questions specifically, when most of the 'why' questions they offered with regards to science can be rephrased as 'how' and 'what', thereby avoiding the impression that there's a reason or guided process behind it.

Spinozasgalt wrote:

Thomas Eshuis wrote:

Spinozasgalt wrote: If science can answer these 'why' questions, whether you rephrase them or not, then the blanket ban on 'why' questions that plenty of people talk up for science doesn't do anything. It's a catchphrase that doesn't catch anything.

It does, see above.

Misses its mark.

How?

It "catches" too much: simple 'why' questions are made to look suspicious because of a background commitment that only some of them have. So much so that they have to be rephrased or rephrase-able in other terms.

Thomas Eshuis wrote:

Spinozasgalt wrote:It's pithy. But it doesn't distinguish between problematic and non-problematic forms of questioning. You may as well say that science answers the 'what' but not the 'for what'. If teleology is the problem, it at least gets closer to it.

Your suggestion, like the 'why' questions, begs the question that there must be a 'for what'.

Inasmuch as statements along the lines of, "Science tells us How. Religion tells us Why." beg the question, yes. I'm all right with that. People like to make statements like these for laypeople. While mine might need some polish, I think it's less misleading and doesn't have people torturing language to bring it in line with some sort of scientific norm.

ScholasticSpastic wrote:

Cito di Pense wrote:

ScholasticSpastic wrote:
The more pressing question, for me, remains: What does any of this have to do with the question of why science works?

It works because, as I already pointed out, there's a risk somebody might discover that you've faked your data.

This can apply to any collective endeavor, not just science. Its non-specificity is intensely problematic, in my opinion, to making an attempt to utilize it as an answer to the question of why science works.

It's glib, I admit. What other kinds of 'data' do you want to pull in, here, in order to dash my hopes that glibness will put a little sparkle on what is otherwise a kind of a dumb, rhetorical question, at least the way it was asked in the OP, so long ago.

I'll elaborate, you know, because what the word 'data' denotes in the sciences is not so problematic that it becomes necessary to put science in the same bin with 'any other collective endeavour'. Going beyond that will take us back to the definition of science itself: Circularly, the enterprise where it's predictably risky to fake your data. When you get to the place where it becomes irrelevant whether or not the data are faked, you've probably arrived at what some guru would call the 'science' of human happiness. Saying that something works purely because it produces expressions of happiness isn't absurd, but it isn't science.

Cito di Pense wrote:
It's glib, I admit. What other kinds of 'data' do you want to pull in, here, in order to dash my hopes that glibness will put a little sparkle on what is otherwise a kind of a dumb, rhetorical question, at least the way it was asked in the OP, so long ago.

I've agreed, as of a number of pages back, that the question was problematic.

In my opinion, pointing up that the question is shit should relieve one of feeling the need to answer it. I cannot tell you why science works, but I can tell you how it works, and I can tell you when it works best. Even though Spinozasgault does a good job pointing out that "why" is not always problematically teleological, and even though science is a human product and thus should not be shielded from teleological considerations (as humans are capable of teleology), I feel that the question as originally asked opens the door too wide to super- or extra-human teleological considerations all while missing out on the really interesting things about science.

ScholasticSpastic wrote:

Cito di Pense wrote:
It's glib, I admit. What other kinds of 'data' do you want to pull in, here, in order to dash my hopes that glibness will put a little sparkle on what is otherwise a kind of a dumb, rhetorical question, at least the way it was asked in the OP, so long ago.

I've agreed, as of a number of pages back, that the question was problematic.

In my opinion, pointing up that the question is shit should relieve one of feeling the need to answer it. I cannot tell you why science works, but I can tell you how it works, and I can tell you when it works best. Even though Spinozasgault does a good job pointing out that "why" is not always problematically teleological, and even though science is a human product and thus should not be shielded from teleological considerations (as humans are capable of teleology), I feel that the question as originally asked opens the door too wide to super- or extra-human teleological considerations all while missing out on the really interesting things about science.

That's right, but when somebody asks you, "Why does science work?" it's nice to have a snappy comeback. Having a snappy comeback is far more difficult when somebody says something might be 'problematic teleologically' or 'problematically teleological' (as if there was any amount of teleology that wasn't problematic). But I think I've somehow managed.

This goes back to assessing the ignorance of the sort of ignoramuses who invented teleology. Nuff said.

ughaibu wrote:

THWOTH wrote:

ughaibu wrote:Atheism is the stance that there are no gods, so of course it's a positive claim.

Nope. Atheism is a response to the claims and assertions of others.

What do you mean "nope"? As a response to the claim that there is at least one god, it is a denial of that claim. In short, it is the claim that there are at most zero gods.
If you're accused of shoplifting and you deny your guilt, you make a positive claim of innocence, don't you?

Where did this bullshit of pretending that atheism is a vacuous term that makes no statement originate and why in the living fuck does any atheist think it worth perpetuating?

You know how sometimes you find a coin in the street? That's because invisible magical creatures called threeps put them there.

Do you believe that? Yes or no?

a better question is...

why does anyone think science works?

King-Baal wrote:a better question is...

why does anyone think science works?

Because we're having this conversation through the technologies of electronics, computing, via the medium of the internet which uses principles from electromagnetic theory or optical theory depending on your cabling and is probably sitting on a desk which was made involving some metallurgy, in a case which is made from plastics and other high grade parts in turn dependent on literally millenia of scientific discoveries?

I mean, I take it you'd agree that the computer you're using "works"?

Thommo wrote:

King-Baal wrote:a better question is...

why does anyone think science works?

Because we're having this conversation through the technologies of electronics, computing, via the medium of the internet which uses principles from electromagnetic theory or optical theory depending on your cabling and is probably sitting on a desk which was made involving some metallurgy, in a case which is made from plastics and other high grade parts in turn dependent on literally millenia of scientific discoveries?

I mean, I take it you'd agree that the computer you're using "works"?

as having studied aerospace engineering for 4 years, i can assure you that no scientific theory has ever been directly applied to any invention or product.

all technology/machines are made thought a trial and error process using mountains of case specific data.

the relationship from the data, patterns of the data have NEVER matched any scientific theory.

computers and internet specifically had their systems built on cybernetics.

if you think "science" has lead to all of man's "products" youd be delusional.

science hasnt built or made anything outside of its ludicrous theories.

trial and error masked under the term 'engineering' is what produces the inventions you see.

the scientific theories do not take into account their errors when being applies into the real world, because they have never been applied to the real world, and the gap is too great.

the purpose of engineering is to "get it to work, no matter what"

King-Baal wrote:as having studied aerospace engineering for 4 years, i can assure you...

How far didja get? Adding and subtracting integers with less than three decimal digits? Because, to master 'aerospace engineering', that's one of the things you have to be able to do.

You can assure me of fuck-all, pal, because someone else is having to ask you to mention some feature of aerospace engineering, like boundary layer theory or converging-diverging nozzles, which would at least suggest you know some terminology besides the name of a field of study called 'aerospace engineering'. Naturally, I'm skeptical of your anonymous claim in an internet forum.