susskind says information means distinctions. But any further leads?

Susskind's description of information as "distinctions between entities" dovetails neatly with a statement I made in the past. Namely, that information is nothing more than the observational data extant with respect to the state of a system of interest, a statement I erected in order to deal with certain notorious canards about information that are peddled by certain well-known propagandists for mythology. This was motivated by the need to enforce a distinction between the data, and whatever meaning is ascribed thereto by the observer thereof, a distinction which lies at the heart of rigorous information theory.

As a corollary, one can also re-couch ascribed meaning in similar rigorous terms. Basically, any system of interactions that exhibits non-trivial behaviour, will exhibit different behaviours, and express different interactions, depending upon what data it encounters. That encounter can be either a direct physical interaction (e.g., a chemical reaction between different molecules), or it can be an interaction of the sort seen in the world of computer science, where a given piece of software exhibits a range of behaviours, dependent upon the input data. As an example I use frequently, the same stream of data bytes will be interpreted by different CPUs in an entirely different manner, and each CPU will regard that stream of data bytes as a completely different set of instructions. Therefore, on this basis, one can make ascribed meaning rigorous, by defining it as the set of interactions that will arise in a given system, upon receipt of the observational data about the state of another system. In order to have information, you have to have a system that can exist in a number of different states, and in order to have ascribed meaning, you have to have a system that can exhibit different interactions, upon encountering the information arising from the antecedent system.

I think this clears things up nicely.

could you provide some references, I think, the physical aspect of information to perhaps be more fundamental than anything else.

Calilasseia wrote:In order to have information, you have to have a system that can exist in a number of different states, and in order to have ascribed meaning, you have to have a system that can exhibit different interactions, upon encountering the information arising from the antecedent system.

So are you saying that DNA would not count as information under this definition because it is not subject to a variety of transcription methods?

John

z8000783 wrote:

Calilasseia wrote:In order to have information, you have to have a system that can exist in a number of different states, and in order to have ascribed meaning, you have to have a system that can exhibit different interactions, upon encountering the information arising from the antecedent system.

So are you saying that DNA would not count as information under this definition because it is not subject to a variety of transcription methods?

John

Actually, what I'm saying is that since a DNA molecule can exist in a variety of different states (each state described by its nucleotide sequence), then DNA contains information. The observational data with respect to the nucleotide sequence is the information in question, at least in an elementary treatment.

Moreover, since the molecules performing transcription produce different interactions, depending upon the nucleotide currently encountered, the possible nucleotides result in a particular 'ascribed meaning', as defined above, for those transcription molecules.

Semantic Conceptions of Information: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/information-semantic/

Biological Information: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/infor ... iological/

Computation in Physical Systems: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/compu ... alsystems/

z8000783 wrote:

Calilasseia wrote:In order to have information, you have to have a system that can exist in a number of different states, and in order to have ascribed meaning, you have to have a system that can exhibit different interactions, upon encountering the information arising from the antecedent system.

So are you saying that DNA would not count as information under this definition because it is not subject to a variety of transcription methods?

"In the precise sense in which one may speak of semantic information, genetic information can hardly count as an instance of it. It simply lacks all its typical features, including meaningfulness, intentionality, aboutness, and veridicality. DNA contains the genetic code, precisely in the sense that it physically contains the genes which code for the development of the phenotypes. So DNA does contain genetic information, like a CD may contain some software. But the genetic code or, better, the genes, are the information itself. Genes do not send information, in the sense in which a radio sends a signal. They work more or less successfully and, like a recipe for a cake, may only partly guarantee the end result, since the environment plays a crucial role. Genes do not contain information, like envelopes or emails do, nor do they describe it, like a blueprint; they are more like performatives: 'I promise to come at 8 pm' does not describe or contain a promise, it does something, namely it effects the promise itself through the uttered words. Genes do not carry information, as a pigeon may carry a message, no more than a key carries the information to open a door. They do not encode instructions, as a string of lines and dots may encode a message in Morse alphabet. True, genes are often said to be the bearers of information, or to carry instructions for the development and functioning organisms, and so forth, but this way of speaking says more about us than about genetics. We regularly talk about our current computers as if they were intelligent—when we know they are not—and we tend to attribute semantic features to genetic structures and processes, which of course are biochemical and not intentional at all. The 'code' vocabulary should not be taken too literally, as if genes were information in a semantic-descriptive sense, lest we run the risk of obfuscating our understanding of genetics. Rather, genes are instructions, and instructions are a type of predicative and effective/procedural information, like recipes, algorithms, and commands. So genes are dynamic procedural structures that, together with other indispensable environmental factors, contribute to control and guide the development of organisms. This is a perfectly respectable sense in which biological information is indeed a kind of information. Dynamic procedural structures are a special type of informational entities, those that are in themselves instructions, programs, or imperatives."

(Floridi, Luciano. Information: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010. pp. 79-80)

"[T]here are three main ways of talking about information:

(i) Information as reality, e.g. patterns, fingerprints, tree rings;

(ii) Information for reality, e.g. commands, algorithms, recipes;

(iii) Information about reality, i.e. with an epistemic value, e.g. train tables, maps, entries in an encyclopaedia.

Something may count as information in more than one sense, depending on the context. For example, a person's iris may be an instance of information as reality (the pattern of the membrane in the eye), which provides information for reality (e.g. as a biometric means to open a door by verifying the identity of the person), or about reality (e.g. the identity of the person). But it is crucial to be clear about what sense of information is being used in each case: (i) physical, (ii) instructional, (iii) semantic."

(Floridi, Luciano. Information: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010. pp. 74-5)

The broadest and most robust treatment of information is, I think, simply 'reduction in uncertainty'. This applies to all of the above treatments and brings them under one umbrella.