SpeedOfSound wrote:

GrahamH wrote:

SpeedOfSound wrote:

GrahamH wrote:

Agreed.



Possibly irrelevant. Subjective identity does not necessarily require physical identity.
...

What is subjective identity?

Now. What is it in physical terms?

It's irrelevant because there is no such thing as subjective identity. My point all along.

Subjective identity is seeming identity, any extreme likeness of experience, obviously. I gave you an example - the taste of coffee. If two cups seem to taste the same then they are subjectively identical.

To say they are not the same you are appealing to some objective criteria that cannot apply.

So every sip of coffee you have ever had is identical? The physical world has no effect on what your mind experiences?

You believe apparently that what you experience is only what you think about your experience. But Graham, thinking about your experience is not the same as experiencing it.

It's you who are thinking about your experience. I'm simply referring to how it seems. If it seems the same what basis is there to say it is not the same? You are denying the obvious - that we all experience likeness in our experiences. Familiarity, and degree of similarity are integral to many experiences.

SpeedOfSound wrote:Hence:

Subjective identity is seeming identity, any extreme likeness of experience, obviously.

Is false. Think! You are claiming to be able to observe experience. You aren't saying it out loud but rather it is deeply embedded in your precepts.

What does 'observe experience' mean? The usual phrase is 'have experience' or 'know what it's like'. Jamest has used 'observe orchestrated qualia' to mean the same thing. 'Observe experience' sounds like it comes straight from playbill at the Cartesian Theatre. You keep sliding into that mindset.

SpeedOfSound wrote:Try this on again. You CANNOT know or re-experience what you experienced just a moment ago. You can't re-experience by remembering what you experienced. You can only have a new experience of remembering.

What has this to do with remembering? If you taste your favourite bran of coffee you simply know it is that familiar taste. The sameness is integral in the experience and requires no conscious thought, introspection or recall of past experiences. It simply seems the same.

SpeedOfSound wrote:Every moment of your experience is possibly a unique never before felt moment and there is NO WAY to know one way or the other.

What do you mean by 'moment'? Are you, or are you not, packaging up experienced qualities into a unit, some sort of snapshot objective fact of subjective experience? Can you square your thinking on this with Dennett's rejection of any definite unified fact of experience?

It seems that you are arguing that the taste of the coffee is not the experience of coffee because the conscious moment must include any other experiential element. So you might have coffee taste + wind sound + itch + sunset +... as one unitary moment of experience. Then you might think that the coffee that seem the same as you are familiar with is not the same experience because your leg in not itching. Is that it?

SpeedOfSound wrote:You in fact cannot be certain that you weren't actually tasting shit a moment before you tasted coffee. Could be a false memory.

Perhaps so, but this is not about memory, it's about experience NOW. It it seems the same how can you say it is not?

SpeedOfSound wrote:In any event, even by just subjective means and memory it is ridiculous to claim that every sip of coffee in your life or even in this cup of coffee is the same experience. First taste different than the second isn't it?

I claimed nothing of the sort. To say that we can have identical experience is not to say that all experience must be identical.
If the second sip seems different then obviously it is subjectively different. If it seem the same then it is subjectively the same.

GrahamH wrote:

SpeedOfSound wrote:

GrahamH wrote:

SpeedOfSound wrote:
What is subjective identity?

Now. What is it in physical terms?

It's irrelevant because there is no such thing as subjective identity. My point all along.

Subjective identity is seeming identity, any extreme likeness of experience, obviously. I gave you an example - the taste of coffee. If two cups seem to taste the same then they are subjectively identical.

To say they are not the same you are appealing to some objective criteria that cannot apply.

So every sip of coffee you have ever had is identical? The physical world has no effect on what your mind experiences?

You believe apparently that what you experience is only what you think about your experience. But Graham, thinking about your experience is not the same as experiencing it.

It's you who are thinking about your experience. I'm simply referring to how it seems. If it seems the same what basis is there to say it is not the same? You are denying the obvious - that we all experience likeness in our experiences. Familiarity, and degree of similarity are integral to many experiences.
....

Nope. Am not denying anything we do with our minds. We all experience likeness. But experiencing likeness is just another thing we experience. You are denying the obvious. That experience is rich and ineffable.

SpeedOfSound wrote:

GrahamH wrote:

SpeedOfSound wrote:

GrahamH wrote:


Subjective identity is seeming identity, any extreme likeness of experience, obviously. I gave you an example - the taste of coffee. If two cups seem to taste the same then they are subjectively identical.

To say they are not the same you are appealing to some objective criteria that cannot apply.

So every sip of coffee you have ever had is identical? The physical world has no effect on what your mind experiences?

You believe apparently that what you experience is only what you think about your experience. But Graham, thinking about your experience is not the same as experiencing it.

It's you who are thinking about your experience. I'm simply referring to how it seems. If it seems the same what basis is there to say it is not the same? You are denying the obvious - that we all experience likeness in our experiences. Familiarity, and degree of similarity are integral to many experiences.
....

Nope. Am not denying anything we do with our minds. We all experience likeness. But experiencing likeness is just another thing we experience. You are denying the obvious. That experience is rich and ineffable.

What sort of reply is that? Experience seems rich, and is ineffable??

It is flat out ridiculous to cite ineffability as part of your argument against the 'effable' bit - the 'seeming'. It is the case that we experience sameness. Sayig subjectivity is 'ineffable' it precisely to say that you can't dig into it beyond the seeming. You can't dig down a an actual fact of the matter about experience beyond how it seems. How it seems is the experience.

Baby steps again. Do you know what your experience was yesterday at 3:07:34 for that one second? If not then why not?
Now move closer until you get to the last one second period. Do you know what the entire content of that experience was?

I have no idea how you would answer that. So please answer.

BTW. What Nagel says that Strawson said is irrelevant.

SpeedOfSound wrote:Baby steps again. Do you know what your experience was yesterday at 3:07:34 for that one second? If not then why not?
Now move closer until you get to the last one second period. Do you know what the entire content of that experience was?

I have no idea how you would answer that. So please answer.

I have no idea, but that's an issue of memory, not whether an experience seems identical (subjective), or is identical (objective-subjective=nonsense).

Do you understand my point that the identity of subjective events is implicit in the experience, not some objective fact?
Can you answer the charge that there is no objective fact of the matter to subjective experience - subjective content? The objective fact of the matter stuff is not subjective by definition, so useless for deciding the issue at hand.

Suppose you drink some juice and it tastes to you just like the apple juice you used to drink at grandma's when you were 6.

There is no basis to claim that this is wrong, and that this juice tastes unlike grandma's juice. Even if the juice turned out to be orange juice, if it it tastes to you like grandma's apple juice then that's how it tastes. That is your experience. What can the fact of the matter of your experience be?

I also took issue with the idea of 'entire content' of experience. I'm more inclined to Dennett's view, that there is no privileged all-as-one fact of the matter to experience.

SpeedOfSound wrote:BTW. What Nagel says that Strawson said is irrelevant.

No, it might be inaccurate re Strawson's views, or it may represent them well. You have the book. If Nagel is wrong you can quote Strawson and set us straight. In any case Nagel's views are also relevant to the topic, and no less so than Strawson's.

Can we get back on topic - conscious / unconsious?

GrahamH wrote:

SpeedOfSound wrote:Baby steps again. Do you know what your experience was yesterday at 3:07:34 for that one second? If not then why not?
Now move closer until you get to the last one second period. Do you know what the entire content of that experience was?

I have no idea how you would answer that. So please answer.

I have no idea, but that's an issue of memory, not whether an experience seems identical (subjective), or is identical (objective-subjective=nonsense).

Do you understand my point that the identity of subjective events is implicit in the experience, not some objective fact?
Can you answer the charge that there is no objective fact of the matter to subjective experience - subjective content? The objective fact of the matter stuff is not subjective by definition, so useless for deciding the issue at hand.

Suppose you drink some juice and it tastes to you just like the apple juice you used to drink at grandma's when you were 6.

There is no basis to claim that this is wrong, and that this juice tastes unlike grandma's juice. Even if the juice turned out to be orange juice, if it it tastes to you like grandma's apple juice then that's how it tastes. That is your experience. What can the fact of the matter of your experience be?

I also took issue with the idea of 'entire content' of experience. I'm more inclined to Dennett's view, that there is no privileged all-as-one fact of the matter to experience.

I disagree that there is no objective fact. It's all objective fact. The subjective is emergent on the facts of the physical systems.

If you think you are accessing your subjective world and that you can apprehend it you are believing in spooks. Trying to think 'this is what it is like' is much like deciding to walk up the steps. It takes some time and some other things happen in the process.

Even the thing that seems to be deciding to check out what it is like is just more process. So when you think about your 'consciousness' you are doing what you are trained to do and you will get the results you are trained to get. In my case I have this multi-sense full visual scene thing coming back and for you it's this seeming recognition and knowing. The more each of us attempt to figure it out from the inside by our own cookbook the more we will differ. The more trained we will become in finding what we believe to be there.

It's not just a memory problem it's a problem like trying to square the circle. It's simply not possible to get the knowledge you claim you have to form the opinion you do have.

The best we can do is the objective facts and the facts are that we are embedded in the world and their is a complex adaptive system in the local world that can only be analyzed as a system.

GrahamH wrote:

SpeedOfSound wrote:BTW. What Nagel says that Strawson said is irrelevant.

No, it might be inaccurate re Strawson's views, or it may represent them well. You have the book. If Nagel is wrong you can quote Strawson and set us straight. In any case Nagel's views are also relevant to the topic, and no less so than Strawson's.

Can we get back on topic - conscious / unconsious?

Right. Now I gotta fix this? No. If you want to reflect Strawson's opinion on something then use a Strawson quote. Nagel very likely is one of the guys Strawson mentions as having massively misunderstood what he is saying. I'm having a similar problem in this thread with you. If people quote what you say about me as my opinion then they may as well just make up their own shit or draw a card from a hat.
When I get the time to tackle the book, if I get the time, I will let you know what I find.

Now I hope you notice this subtly upsetting of the apple cart here. I am NOT saying that it is hopeless for science to figure out C. I am saying it is the only way. What is hopeless is trying to lay your hands on the thing to be figured out subjectively. You do not know and never will know, from the 'inside' what it is like to be you. You will never find a referent for the word consciousness as used in the philosophical what-it-is-like sense. All you will ever get for a referent, from this introspection angle is as many opinions as there are philosophers.

Not that introspection has no use. Once you learn to do timelines and keep physical systems mapped separately you can find a hell of a lot by introspecting by formula.

Science First. Bullshit later.

SpeedOfSound wrote:

GrahamH wrote:

SpeedOfSound wrote:Baby steps again. Do you know what your experience was yesterday at 3:07:34 for that one second? If not then why not?
Now move closer until you get to the last one second period. Do you know what the entire content of that experience was?

I have no idea how you would answer that. So please answer.

I have no idea, but that's an issue of memory, not whether an experience seems identical (subjective), or is identical (objective-subjective=nonsense).

Do you understand my point that the identity of subjective events is implicit in the experience, not some objective fact?
Can you answer the charge that there is no objective fact of the matter to subjective experience - subjective content? The objective fact of the matter stuff is not subjective by definition, so useless for deciding the issue at hand.

Suppose you drink some juice and it tastes to you just like the apple juice you used to drink at grandma's when you were 6.

There is no basis to claim that this is wrong, and that this juice tastes unlike grandma's juice. Even if the juice turned out to be orange juice, if it it tastes to you like grandma's apple juice then that's how it tastes. That is your experience. What can the fact of the matter of your experience be?

I also took issue with the idea of 'entire content' of experience. I'm more inclined to Dennett's view, that there is no privileged all-as-one fact of the matter to experience.

I disagree that there is no objective fact. It's all objective fact. The subjective is emergent on the facts of the physical systems.

Facts of the physical system can only give you facts of the emergent subjective experience if you have the precise 'decompilation' of the physical system that accounts for all aspects of the subjective experience. We do not have anything like that, so it makes no sense to appeal to differences in the physical system as if that could tell you objective facts of the matter of the subjective view.

SpeedOfSound wrote:If you think you are accessing your subjective world and that you can apprehend it you are believing in spooks. Trying to think 'this is what it is like' is much like deciding to walk up the steps. It takes some time and some other things happen in the process.

That paragraph is an absolute mess. You obviously haven't understood one word I've posted on consciousness in all this time. In the very post you are responding to I stated there is no all as one fact of the matter to experience. You think there is, and that you apprehend it all as a piece. I'm with Dennett that there is no such thing, no apprehender. Your projection is tiresome.

And then you fall back to 'Trying to think 'this is what it is like'. FFS, some time ago you stated, and I agreed, that introspection, thinking about experience, is not fit for getting to fact of the matter of experience. That's the ineffability issue.

SpeedOfSound wrote:Even the thing that seems to be deciding to check out what it is like is just more process. So when you think about your 'consciousness' you are doing what you are trained to do and you will get the results you are trained to get. In my case I have this multi-sense full visual scene thing coming back and for you it's this seeming recognition and knowing. The more each of us attempt to figure it out from the inside by our own cookbook the more we will differ. The more trained we will become in finding what we believe to be there.

Maybe there is some small hope. As you say, when you attempt to check out what you are experiencing you do not get to some fact of the matter, you get more experience. We both most likely have similarly 'multi-sense full visual scene thing coming back'. If you really want to render your experience meaningless by insisting there is not 'knowing what it is like' about it that will be a strange move indeed.

You insist that encompasses every bit of detail in some unitary all-in-one EXPERIENCE. As if the CT stage is set and the homunculus takes it all in all at once in any given instant. As if he could take a photo of it as it actually is. That's a 'finishing line', and 'arrival point' or 'privileged view'.

SpeedOfSound wrote:It's not just a memory problem it's a problem like trying to square the circle. It's simply not possible to get the knowledge you claim you have to form the opinion you do have.

I have the subjective view, and make no claims about any more than that. It's you who are claiming to know what you admit to not knowing. That is attempting to square the circle.

SpeedOfSound wrote:The best we can do is the objective facts and the facts are that we are embedded in the world and their is a complex adaptive system in the local world that can only be analyzed as a system.

No, the best we can do with the subjective content is the subjective content. The objective facts are not in 1:1 intelligible correspondence with the subjective facts. Any claim that the subjective must reflect all the objective facts is an empty claim.

What we know is that how it seems (subjective_ is not simply how it is physically (objective)

Analysing cannot get us far at all subjectively, as we agree. Analyse the system by any means, but is severely limited in what it can tell you about the specifics of the subjective.

As I said earlier, if orange juice tastes like apple juice to you then it tastes like apple juice to you. There is no denying that. Any appeal to the objective fact that the juice is orange, or that it tastes like orange to other people, cannot negate the fact that it tastes like apple to you. The objective analysis can perhaps reveal clues as to why you are tasting apple.

GrahamH wrote:Any comments on Mary's room?
...

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Knowledge_argument#Qualia

The thought experiment was originally proposed by Frank Jackson as follows:

Mary is a brilliant scientist who is, for whatever reason, forced to investigate the world from a black and white room via a black and white television monitor. She specializes in the neurophysiology of vision and acquires, let us suppose, all the physical information there is to obtain about what goes on when we see ripe tomatoes, or the sky, and use terms like ‘red’, ‘blue’, and so on. She discovers, for example, just which wavelength combinations from the sky stimulate the retina, and exactly how this produces via the central nervous system the contraction of the vocal cords and expulsion of air from the lungs that results in the uttering of the sentence ‘The sky is blue’. [...] What will happen when Mary is released from her black and white room or is given a color television monitor? Will she learn anything or not? [4]

In other words, Jackson's Mary is a scientist who knows everything there is to know about the science of color, but has never experienced color. The question that Jackson raises is: once she experiences color, does she learn anything new?

Daniel Dennett
Objection: Daniel Dennett argues that Mary would not, in fact, learn something new if she stepped out of her black and white room to see the color red.[11] Dennett asserts that if she already truly knew "everything about color", that knowledge would necessarily include a deep understanding of why and how human neurology causes us to sense the "qualia" of color. Moreover, that knowledge would include the ability to functionally differentiate between red and other colors. Mary would therefore already know exactly what to expect of seeing red, before ever leaving the room. Dennett argues that functional knowledge is identical to the experience, with no ineffable 'qualia' left over. As a consequence, Dennett concludes that this is not a sound argument for the existence of qualia.

On this, Dennett seems to have been talking out of the wrong orifice. Mary's "book learning" about colour vision would NOT affect her colour vision, before or after stepping out of the bw room. If she is not a monochromat, she will experience the colour when she leaves the room. Simple as that.

... The visual cortex develops adaptively to the kinds of cone cells (and rod cells) in the eyes that are sending signals to it, not to the experience of seeing, except in so far as a signal has to be produced by the phototransducers.

DavidMcC wrote:

GrahamH wrote:Any comments on Mary's room?
...

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Knowledge_argument#Qualia

The thought experiment was originally proposed by Frank Jackson as follows:

Mary is a brilliant scientist who is, for whatever reason, forced to investigate the world from a black and white room via a black and white television monitor. She specializes in the neurophysiology of vision and acquires, let us suppose, all the physical information there is to obtain about what goes on when we see ripe tomatoes, or the sky, and use terms like ‘red’, ‘blue’, and so on. She discovers, for example, just which wavelength combinations from the sky stimulate the retina, and exactly how this produces via the central nervous system the contraction of the vocal cords and expulsion of air from the lungs that results in the uttering of the sentence ‘The sky is blue’. [...] What will happen when Mary is released from her black and white room or is given a color television monitor? Will she learn anything or not? [4]

In other words, Jackson's Mary is a scientist who knows everything there is to know about the science of color, but has never experienced color. The question that Jackson raises is: once she experiences color, does she learn anything new?

Daniel Dennett
Objection: Daniel Dennett argues that Mary would not, in fact, learn something new if she stepped out of her black and white room to see the color red.[11] Dennett asserts that if she already truly knew "everything about color", that knowledge would necessarily include a deep understanding of why and how human neurology causes us to sense the "qualia" of color. Moreover, that knowledge would include the ability to functionally differentiate between red and other colors. Mary would therefore already know exactly what to expect of seeing red, before ever leaving the room. Dennett argues that functional knowledge is identical to the experience, with no ineffable 'qualia' left over. As a consequence, Dennett concludes that this is not a sound argument for the existence of qualia.

On this, Dennett seems to have been talking out of the wrong orifice. Mary's "book learning" about colour vision would NOT affect her colour vision, before or after stepping out of the bw room. If she is not a monochromat, she will experience the colour when she leaves the room. Simple as that.

I really doubt Dennett holds this view. Here again we have the problem of people talking out of their asses about what a philosopher said and making it look like the philosophers problem.

BTW. If Dennett said that then he is indeed talking out his ass.

Dennett defending his views on Mary's Room.

http://ase.tufts.edu/cogstud/dennett/pa ... yfinal.htm

Not read it yet. On very limited knowledge I think I disagree with him, but I do like his closing observation.

Dennett wrote:A closing observation: I find that some philosophers think that my whole approach to qualia is not playing fair. I don’t respect the standard rules of philosophical thought experiments. “But Dan, your view is so counterintuitive!” No kidding. That’s the whole point. Of course it is counterintuitive. Nowhere is it written that the true materialist theory of consciousness should be blandly intuitive. I have all along insisted that it may be very counterintuitive. That’s the trouble with “pure” philosophical method here. It has no resources for developing, or even taking seriously, counterintuitive theories, but since it is a very good bet that the true materialist theory of consciousness will be highly counterintuitive (like the Copernican theory--at least at first), this means that “pure” philosophy must just concede impotence and retreat into conservative conceptual anthropology until the advance of science puts it out of its misery. Philosophers have a choice: they can play games with folk concepts (ordinary language philosophy lives on, as a kind of aprioristic social anthropology) or they can take seriously the claim that some of these folk concepts are illusion-generators. The way to take that prospect seriously is to consider theories that propose revisions to those concepts.

GrahamH wrote:

SpeedOfSound wrote:

GrahamH wrote:

SpeedOfSound wrote:Baby steps again. Do you know what your experience was yesterday at 3:07:34 for that one second? If not then why not?
Now move closer until you get to the last one second period. Do you know what the entire content of that experience was?

I have no idea how you would answer that. So please answer.

I have no idea, but that's an issue of memory, not whether an experience seems identical (subjective), or is identical (objective-subjective=nonsense).

Do you understand my point that the identity of subjective events is implicit in the experience, not some objective fact?
Can you answer the charge that there is no objective fact of the matter to subjective experience - subjective content? The objective fact of the matter stuff is not subjective by definition, so useless for deciding the issue at hand.

Suppose you drink some juice and it tastes to you just like the apple juice you used to drink at grandma's when you were 6.

There is no basis to claim that this is wrong, and that this juice tastes unlike grandma's juice. Even if the juice turned out to be orange juice, if it it tastes to you like grandma's apple juice then that's how it tastes. That is your experience. What can the fact of the matter of your experience be?

I also took issue with the idea of 'entire content' of experience. I'm more inclined to Dennett's view, that there is no privileged all-as-one fact of the matter to experience.

I disagree that there is no objective fact. It's all objective fact. The subjective is emergent on the facts of the physical systems.

Facts of the physical system can only give you facts of the emergent subjective experience if you have the precise 'decompilation' of the physical system that accounts for all aspects of the subjective experience. We do not have anything like that, so it makes no sense to appeal to differences in the physical system as if that could tell you objective facts of the matter of the subjective view.
...

Wrong! A fact is that you or I am looking at an apple. We would expect that we experience seeing an apple. You do not need the exact translation. All we need is correlation.

You seem to be searching for some Holy Codex to give you an exact bridge.

This does mean, however, that we can't learn finer details. If I have a fact or two about the cycles and states of the hippocampus and it's cortical connections I may be able to be more precise about what is happening in dreams.

GrahamH wrote:...

SpeedOfSound wrote:If you think you are accessing your subjective world and that you can apprehend it you are believing in spooks. Trying to think 'this is what it is like' is much like deciding to walk up the steps. It takes some time and some other things happen in the process.

That paragraph is an absolute mess. You obviously haven't understood one word I've posted on consciousness in all this time. In the very post you are responding to I stated there is no all as one fact of the matter to experience. You think there is, and that you apprehend it all as a piece. I'm with Dennett that there is no such thing, no apprehender. Your projection is tiresome.

And then you fall back to 'Trying to think 'this is what it is like'. FFS, some time ago you stated, and I agreed, that introspection, thinking about experience, is not fit for getting to fact of the matter of experience. That's the ineffability issue.
...

There you are dancing between worlds again even as you read what I wrote.

YOU said

Do you understand my point that the identity of subjective events is implicit in the experience, not some objective fact?

I said that you have no way of knowing what the identity relationship of two consecutive moments of experience is. You seem to think you have access enough to make the claim you make. That the seeming is enough for you to know what it is you experienced a moment or a grandmother ago.

And then you fall back to 'Trying to think 'this is what it is like'. FFS, some time ago you stated, and I agreed, that introspection, thinking about experience, is not fit for getting to fact of the matter of experience. That's the ineffability issue.

Where did I 'fall back' on WIIL? I'm complaining about your claim that you knwo what it is like. That it's implicit in your experience. I'm saying exactly the opposite and completely agreeing with you here that you cannot 'eff it'.

You are the one making the claim that you somehow know the content of your experience implicitly. Then you try and stuff the same fucking claim back up my ass? What The Fuck?

Back to basics. You have two moments of experience E1 and E2, and you do not know form one to the next what is the total content of that experience. You have no means of apprehending the set and extensionally conveying it. Therefore you cannot even say two consecutive moments are alike let alone that grandmas juice tastes the same.

SpeedOfSound wrote:Wrong! A fact is that you or I am looking at an apple. We would expect that we experience seeing an apple. You do not need the exact translation. All we need is correlation.

Yes, the propositional fact that we each are seeing an apple is trivial and needs no neuroscience or philosophy.

Just knowing that someone is seeing an apple is not equivalent to seeing an apple. You may determine the propositional fact from a brain scan, but you can't get the subjective quality of it from a brain scan.

GrahamH wrote:...

SpeedOfSound wrote:Even the thing that seems to be deciding to check out what it is like is just more process. So when you think about your 'consciousness' you are doing what you are trained to do and you will get the results you are trained to get. In my case I have this multi-sense full visual scene thing coming back and for you it's this seeming recognition and knowing. The more each of us attempt to figure it out from the inside by our own cookbook the more we will differ. The more trained we will become in finding what we believe to be there.

Maybe there is some small hope. As you say, when you attempt to check out what you are experiencing you do not get to some fact of the matter, you get more experience. We both most likely have similarly 'multi-sense full visual scene thing coming back'. If you really want to render your experience meaningless by insisting there is not 'knowing what it is like' about it that will be a strange move indeed.

It's one of those strange non-intuitive moves indeed. Never said it would be easy to change how you think. See your Dennett quote that you liked so much for more info.

You insist that encompasses every bit of detail in some unitary all-in-one EXPERIENCE. As if the CT stage is set and the homunculus takes it all in all at once in any given instant. As if he could take a photo of it as it actually is. That's a 'finishing line', and 'arrival point' or 'privileged view'.
...

Never said that. I said you have no way of ruling any bit of the world out as part of what you actually experience. There is no way to say what is conscious and what is not. Again you try and turn this shit around back on me. I'm complaining about what you think you know that you have no way of knowing.

This thread is a challenge for YOU, user of the the words like unconscious, to provide the exact details of how you arrived at this dodgy fact. How is that you know that some little book binding in a scan of my library is 'in my unconscious'?