The 'Why there is no spoon' thread irks me greatly, but the latest outbreak of mockery and mindless thumbs-ups regarding the definition of existence has impelled me to start this thread. That is, somebody needs to put to bed the notion that if 'something' cannot be defined then it is ludicrous to suggest that it exists. Indeed, somebody needs to put to bed the notion that existence itself - lacking any coherent definition - is a concept not worthy of discourse, especially here within the philosophy forum.

There are major issues to consider... and as a starting point we need to consider what definitions refer to. So, let us consider some 'thing' which you might care to mention. For example, let's consider 'a horse' (animal version). Here's its definition from freedictionary:

horse (hôrs)
n.
1.
a. A large hoofed mammal (Equus caballus) having a short coat, a long mane, and a long tail, domesticated since ancient times and used for riding and for drawing or carrying loads.
b. An adult male horse; a stallion.
c. Any of various equine mammals, such as the wild Asian species Przewalski's horse or certain extinct forms related ancestrally to the modern horse.

Notice, I hope, that the definition of a horse hinges upon its properties/attributes. In philosophy-speak, this is called the intensional meaning of something. There is also a [philosophical] sense in which the meaning of many words is fixed by its extension (what it directly refers to, such as [over there is] a tree). This is a very simple way of defining things... merely by familiarity with observational/experiential form.

... The problems should now be apparent, since 'properties/attributes' are not what a thing is, but refer instead to what a thing does, or how a thing seems (is observed/experienced by another entity), or how a thing relates to other things in a comparative sense (for example, in a mathematical sense, as per the law of physics). Also, [extensional] definition via recognition doesn't tell you what something IS, it merely refers to how that thing consistently appears to observers/experiencers thereof.

... So, the bottom-line is that [our] definitions have got nothing to do with what a thing IS. That is, our definitions are devoid of ALL ontological/metaphysical significance. And there is good reason for this:

a) The observation/experience of something is ontologically distinct to any thing existing independently thereof, so our extensional ('pointed-finger': "there it is") meaning of existence is [therefore] worthless from the perspective of ontology/metaphysics.
b) The properties/attributes/characteristics of something (the intensional meaning of something) do not refer to what a thing IS, either, but how a thing is.

... In other words, [our] definitions are utterly devoid of any substance value.


Those who mock the definitional void one encounters with 'existence' are [then] being utterly naive, for existence cannot be defined... by logical default. So, you [now] know what you can do with your mockery and thumbs-ups, I hope.

jamest wrote:existence cannot be defined... by logical default.

If we need to talk about existence, then we need to be clear about what we mean by the term. But this is true of many terms, and the problems of producing a fully consistent and satisfactory definition exist, at least equally, for "truth" and "knowledge". Of course, we can say what we mean by those terms too, if our meaning needs to be made precise.
By the way, in my second sentence, "exist" means can be clearly stated and understood.

ughaibu wrote:

jamest wrote:existence cannot be defined... by logical default.

If we need to talk about existence, then we need to be clear about what we mean by the term. But this is true of many terms, and the problems of producing a fully consistent and satisfactory definition exist, at least equally, for "truth" and "knowledge". Of course, we can say what we mean by those terms too, if our meaning needs to be made precise.
By the way, in my second sentence, "exist" means can be clearly stated and understood.

You cannot define 'existence'. I've just explained why. The only reason that we comprehend the concept, is that
I am.

jamest wrote:

ughaibu wrote:in my second sentence, "exist" means can be clearly stated and understood.

You cannot define 'existence'. I've just explained why.

And I have just demonstrated, by counter example, that your contention is mistaken.

....and thus it was ever so.

ughaibu wrote:

jamest wrote:

ughaibu wrote:in my second sentence, "exist" means can be clearly stated and understood.

You cannot define 'existence'. I've just explained why.

And I have just demonstrated, by counter example, that your contention is mistaken.

No, you did not. You merely asserted that the same problem applies for the meaning of knowledge/truth, which it does not, for now you are discussing epistemology, as opposed to ontology. In other words, you're hinting at what/why we can know, as opposed to what we are who can know.

Discussions revolving around knowledge/truth are not wholly curtailed by considerations of ontology/metaphysics.

kennyc wrote:....and thus it was ever so.

Have you just won a lifetime's supply of popcorn?

jamest wrote:

ughaibu wrote:

jamest wrote:

ughaibu wrote:in my second sentence, "exist" means can be clearly stated and understood.

You cannot define 'existence'. I've just explained why.

And I have just demonstrated, by counter example, that your contention is mistaken.

No, you did not.

Of course I did!

ughaibu wrote:in my second sentence, "exist" means can be clearly stated and understood.

This is a definition, for fucks sake. So, as I have posted a definition of "exist", from which the construction of a definition of "existence" is a trivial exercise in grammar, I have demonstrated that it is not the case that "existence" cannot be defined.
Seriously, things don't get any simpler than this.

ughaibu wrote:This is a definition, for fucks sake. So, as I have posted a definition of "exist", from which the construction of a definition of "existence" is a trivial exercise in grammar, I have demonstrated that it is not the case that "existence" cannot be defined.

Then you're missing the point of this thread, since I'm obviously talking about a coherent definition acceptable to philosophers. I didn't mean to imply that wankstain definitions were impossible, as in [for example] "Existence is an orange tambourine". So spare me any more vitamin-C and put your instrument back in your pants.

I'm looking for high-brow discussion here. As if that weren't obvious.

"You're a wizard Harry".

jamest wrote:I'm obviously talking about a coherent definition acceptable to philosophers.

And as noted, this problem applies to plenty of terms. This is why we should clearly define the terms that we use in our arguments.

ughaibu wrote:

jamest wrote:I'm obviously talking about a coherent definition acceptable to philosophers.

And as noted, this problem applies to plenty of terms. This is why we should clearly define the terms that we use in our arguments.

Did you actually read the OP? Specifically, I'm discussing the meaning/definition of existence. NOT anything else. Especially not "plenty of terms" which have no direct fucking association with 'existence'.

I respect you, so I'll spare you the frozen-badger treatment, but you really don't appear to be on form tonight.

jamest wrote:Did you actually read the OP?

Yes.

jamest wrote:Specifically, I'm discussing the meaning/definition of existence. NOT anything else.

But you claim that there is no definition of "existence", a fortiori, unless you're mistaken, there can be no discussion of the definition of "existence". So, what you appear to want to discuss is the circumstance that there isn't

jamest wrote:a coherent definition acceptable to philosophers.

Assuming this is true, it is also the case for plenty of other terms, because there are plenty of terms whose definitions irreducibly involve logical difficulties.
Fortunately, as language users, we have a solution to this problem, that solution is to accept pluralism about usages but to exercise care and avoid ambiguity.

To those interested in existence here's a much more interesting read than jamest's juvenile ponderings.

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/existence/#Mei

ughaibu wrote:

jamest wrote:I'm obviously talking about a coherent definition acceptable to philosophers.

And as noted, this problem applies to plenty of terms. This is why we should clearly define the terms that we use in our arguments.

ughaibu, you are making the fatal error of assuming that there is a first principle, which you call "defining the terms". But when someone's argument is entirely circular, there is no first principle. Where is the beginning of a circle? James is embarking on the latest incarnation of his ontological fairground carousel. Round and round we go.

Give me a piece of charcoal and a sheet of A4 paper and I will define anything that exists.

Animavore wrote:Give me a piece of charcoal and a sheet of A4 paper and I will define anything that exists.

Draw me like one of your French girls, Ani.

I think existence should be used to mean 'in the world' (and reality defined differently).
So an apple we can point to exists not because we can point to it, rather it exists by being in the world and it is because it exists that we can point to it.
visible light or invisible Xrays exist by being in the world, although it is not possible to point at, showing that being able to point at something is not a requirement for it to exist.

When you say that you're trying to make something that's acceptable to philosophers, are you talking about something that you think philosophers already accept (either implicitly or explicitly) or something that will exert argumentative pressure on philosophers to agree with you? If the former, which philosophers accept this conclusion? If the latter, what pressure is any philosopher under to accept this?

jamest wrote:... So, the bottom-line is that [our] definitions have got nothing to do with what a thing IS. That is, our definitions are devoid of ALL ontological/metaphysical significance. And there is good reason for this:

a) The observation/experience of something is ontologically distinct to any thing existing independently thereof, so our extensional ('pointed-finger': "there it is") meaning of existence is [therefore] worthless from the perspective of ontology/metaphysics.
b) The properties/attributes/characteristics of something (the intensional meaning of something) do not refer to what a thing IS, either, but how a thing is.

... In other words, [our] definitions are utterly devoid of any substance value.

But James, you believe that the whole world is an orchestrated illusion like a game of Call of Duty. By insisting on such a radical separation between everything that could be said about a thing and what that thing "really is" you effectively debar yourself from meaningful communication with anyone else on this topic.

To put it another way, if all our concerns with pointing things out and speaking of what they do and how they seem are worthless to your metaphysics then it follows that your metaphysics is worthless to our concerns. Please note that this isn't a dismissal of philosophy, but a dismissal of your metaphysics from philosophy.