Posted: Mar 07, 2010 8:40 pm
by Sween
dyet-b wrote:Well, it's not much of an argument...

ray wrote:

Yes, of course. God is not completely hidden. That would be very unfair. Anyone can see Him if they really loved to.

Are you saying that your god is hidden from anybody who doesn't "really love to" see him?
Why does the visibility of your asserted god depend on "really loving to see Him"? Can one find evidence for your god's existence through honest and critical inquiry (without any emotions clouding up judgement)?
You don't describe what it is that I should be looking for, and you blame me for not seeing it. That is completely unfair.

I don't speak for Ray, but I would argue (following Paul Moser and Kierkegaard) that God is "hidden" from disinterested observers. If we are talking about a perfect being, there is no reason to suspect that such a being would limit himself to or even take part in spectator evidence (which doesn't require any commitment or participation on the part of the observer). A perfect being (in virtue of his moral perfection) would will what is best for all moral agents. This would include our coming to know him freely (because moral perfection requires respect for freedom), and freely consenting to align our behavior in accordance with his will (because he wills only what is good). Spectator evidence would not accomplish these ends, and it would (as Kierkegaard suggests) establish an improper relationship between us, and create tension between God's moral perfection and our freedom. "There is enough light for those who want to believe and enough shadows to blind those who don't" (Pascal)

Yours is not an argument for god, it is rather a "No True Scotsman" logical fallacy mixed with blaming the victim, followed by a bad analogy.

As I've suggested before, I think one could understand it as more of a testable claim than an argument. It's the claim that through honest inquiry you will find evidence that God exists. When one asks whether X exists, one must ask what sort of evidence would we expect to find if X exists, and what sort of evidence would we not expect. In this case it will be volitional, morally authoritative evidence which requires an honest intention to participation on the part of the inquirer, as opposed to the reproducible, empirical sort which would afford belief alone, without requiring any meaningful commitment or investment in the question, and thus without any transformation of the will. The reason for this is explained above.