rationalskepticism.org

I understand your point, Thommo, and I don't have any problem with it - despite still maintaining the objection that I have given. In my objection, I don't explicitly say what a "possible world" is. In fact, I leave that to whoever is trying to use the modal ontological argument. My own view would be that the set of possible worlds should be the set of all worlds which we do not know to be inconsistent with our knowledge - and I would actually admit logically inconsistent worlds into this set. As far as I am concerned, there should not be any problem with saying that there are possible worlds in which the Goldbach conjecture is true and possible worlds in which it is false. All we are doing is defining what might be the case. Someone may say, however, that there must be a set of possible worlds that share things like mathematical and logica properties with our own. Specifically, for Plantinga's argument, we are talking about a set of worlds for which truths about the existence of God are all the same. Plantinga's intuition is claimed to be about the existence of a possible world in which God exists in that set - whether it is meaningful to talk about possible worlds outside that set does not concern me: Plantinga is clearly claiming that intuition can inform him about the set of possible worlds for which truths about God are the same as they are in ours, and can inform him more reliably that it could just inform him about our world alone. I dispute that - regardless of what other possible worlds are being considered beyond all this.