Posted: Apr 05, 2011 9:41 pm
Okay Mick, suppose I give you some mathematical problem, which I have just devised today and which has one of two answers - "Yes" or "No". You have to work out whether the answer is "Yes" or "No". You can't solve the problem, though you may intuitively have some suspicion that the anwer is a particualr value - "Yes" or "No". You take the problem to a university and see two mathematics professors, Professor A and Professor B. You don't know anything about these professors, apart from the fact that they are mathematics professors at this university: just assume that they are both randomly selected mathematics professors at the university. You show them both my problem.
Professor A says that he has an intuitive belief that the answer to the problem is "No".
Professor B says that he has an intuitive belief that it is modally possible that the answer to the problem is "Yes".
You ask each professor to justify his belief and he doesn't know on what he bases it. Also, neither professor makes any special impression in you in conversation: beyond the answers I have given above, you get no information from or about each professor, such as about his previous record on intuition, how reliable he is, his IQ, papers published, etc. All you know is what is in this scenario.
Here is my question: Has it now become more rational or less rational to think that the answer is "Yes", or has the visit told you nothing?
The similarity with what Plantinga's modal ontological argument is supposed to achieve should be obvious.
Professor A says that he has an intuitive belief that the answer to the problem is "No".
Professor B says that he has an intuitive belief that it is modally possible that the answer to the problem is "Yes".
You ask each professor to justify his belief and he doesn't know on what he bases it. Also, neither professor makes any special impression in you in conversation: beyond the answers I have given above, you get no information from or about each professor, such as about his previous record on intuition, how reliable he is, his IQ, papers published, etc. All you know is what is in this scenario.
Here is my question: Has it now become more rational or less rational to think that the answer is "Yes", or has the visit told you nothing?
The similarity with what Plantinga's modal ontological argument is supposed to achieve should be obvious.