Posted: Apr 13, 2011 1:02 pm
Teuton wrote:
My contention is that God's existence is neither narrowly nor broadly logically necessary, and not ontologically/metaphysically necessary either.
Given the theistic concept of God, it is a conceptually and also metaphysically necessary truth that if God exists, spirits exist:
[](<God exists> –> <Spirits exist>)
The following is an axiom of modal logic:
[](p –> q) –> ([]p –> []q)
An instance of this is the following:
[](<God exists> –> <Spirits exist>) –> ([]<God exists> –> []<Spirits exist>)
This means that if God exists in all metaphysically possible worlds, then spirits exist in all metaphysically possible worlds.
But the claim that the nonexistence of spirits (souls) is inconceivable, unimaginable, or unthinkable is ridiculous.
And by modus tollens it follows that if the existence of spirits isn't metaphysically necessary, the existence of the divine spirit called God isn't metaphysically necessary either.