Posted: Jun 18, 2010 12:32 am
by andyx1205
To add onto my previous post, in the article it noted:

Even the danger that a future Iranian bomb might set off some sort of regional arms race seems exaggerated, according to an unpublished dissertation by Philipp Bleek of Georgetown University. Bleek's thesis examines the history of nuclear acquisition since 1945 and finds little evidence for so-called "reactive proliferation." If he's right, it suggests that Iran's neighbors might not follow suit even if Iran did "go nuclear" at some point in the future).


I will post a letter by Philipp Bleek in the Wall-Street Journal that was a response to the following op-ed by John Bolton, the former US Ambassador to the UN under George Bush (so that we can evaluate both sides).

Get Ready for a Nuclear Iran
Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Turkey and others will surely follow suit.
John Bolton wrote:Negotiations grind on toward a fourth U.N. Security Council sanctions resolution against Iran's nuclear weapons program, even as President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad arrives in New York to address the Non-Proliferation Treaty review conference. Sanctions advocates acknowledge that the Security Council's ultimate product will do no more than marginally impede Iran's progress.

In Congress, sanctions legislation also creaks along, but that too is simply going through the motions. Russia and China have already rejected key proposals to restrict Iran's access to international financial markets and choke off its importation of refined petroleum products, which domestically are in short supply. Any new U.S. legislation will be ignored and evaded, thus rendering it largely symbolic. Even so, President Obama has opposed the legislation, arguing that unilateral U.S. action could derail his Security Council efforts.

The further pursuit of sanctions is tantamount to doing nothing. Advocating such policies only benefits Iran by providing it cover for continued progress toward its nuclear objective. It creates the comforting illusion of "doing something." Just as "diplomacy" previously afforded Iran the time and legitimacy it needed, sanctions talk now does the same.

Speculating about regime change stopping Iran's nuclear program in time is also a distraction. The Islamic Revolution's iron fist, and willingness to use it against dissenters (who are currently in disarray), means we cannot know whether or when the regime may fall. Long-term efforts at regime change, desirable as they are, will not soon enough prevent Iran from creating nuclear weapons with the ensuing risk of further regional proliferation.

We therefore face a stark, unattractive reality. There are only two options: Iran gets nuclear weapons, or someone uses pre-emptive military force to break Iran's nuclear fuel cycle and paralyze its program, at least temporarily.

There is no possibility the Obama administration will use force, despite its confused and ever-changing formulation about the military option always being "on the table." That leaves Israel, which the administration is implicitly threatening not to resupply with airplanes and weapons lost in attacking Iran—thereby rendering Israel vulnerable to potential retaliation from Hezbollah and Hamas.

It is hard to conclude anything except that the Obama administration is resigned to Iran possessing nuclear weapons. While U.S. policy makers will not welcome that outcome, they certainly hope as a corollary that Iran can be contained and deterred. Since they have ruled out the only immediate alternative, military force, they are doubtless now busy preparing to make lemonade out of this pile of lemons.

President Obama's likely containment/deterrence strategy will feature security assurances to neighboring countries and promises of American retaliation if Iran uses its nuclear weapons. Unfortunately for this seemingly muscular rhetoric, the simple fact of Iran possessing nuclear weapons would alone dramatically and irreparably alter the Middle East balance of power. Iran does not actually have to use its capabilities to enhance either its regional or global leverage.

Facile analogies to Cold War deterrence rest on the dubious, unproven belief that Iran's nuclear calculus will approximate the Soviet Union's. Iran's theocratic regime and the high value placed on life in the hereafter makes this an exceedingly dangerous assumption.

Even if containment and deterrence might be more successful against Iran than just suggested, nuclear proliferation doesn't stop with Tehran. Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Turkey and perhaps others will surely seek, and very swiftly, their own nuclear weapons in response. Thus, we would imminently face a multipolar nuclear Middle East waiting only for someone to launch first or transfer weapons to terrorists. Ironically, such an attack might well involve Israel only as an innocent bystander, at least initially.

We should recognize that an Israeli use of military force would be neither precipitate nor disproportionate, but only a last resort in anticipatory self-defense. Arab governments already understand that logic and largely share it themselves. Such a strike would advance both Israel's and America's security interests, and also those of the Arab states.

Nonetheless, the intellectual case for that strike must be better understood in advance by the American public and Congress in order to ensure a sympathetic reaction by Washington. Absent Israeli action, no one should base their future plans on anything except coping with a nuclear Iran.


Here is Professor Bleek's response:

Maybe Iran Isn't the Domino So Many Think It to Be
Philipp C. Bleek wrote:In "Get Ready for a Nuclear Iran" (op-ed, May 3), John Bolton repeats the conventional wisdom that Iran's pursuit of nuclear weapons, or at least a weapons option, will prompt Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Turkey and perhaps others to "surely seek, and very swiftly, their own nuclear weapons." These concerns are widely shared across the political spectrum, but they have little basis in either historical experience or analysis of the specific countries alleged to be on the cusp of launching their own nuclear weapons programs.

Similar arguments were made when Israel and Mao's China—both in highly antagonistic relationships with multiple other states—obtained nuclear weapons, but few if any nuclear dominoes toppled then. One could imagine Saudi Arabia desiring nuclear weapons if intense rival Iran obtained them, and the Saudis have the required financial resources, if not the nuclear infrastructure at present. But U.S. security guarantees will be a politically and economically far less costly alternative. Egypt and Turkey both have less overtly antagonistic relationships with Iran, and pursuing nuclear weapons would entail huge political costs. Both countries would risk undermining crucial relationships with Washington.

Mr. Bolton, alongside others including President Barack Obama, may be exaggerating the likelihood of a nuclear cascade to try to motivate action to prevent it, a worthwhile goal. But the fears of nuclear cascades should not blind us to the fact that we have significant levers to prevent proliferation, nor should they goad us to take precipitous actions, such as bombing Iran, that are likely to backfire.


It's only fair to present both sides of the case. Make your own judgement.