Posted: Aug 15, 2017 7:12 am
Of course, a major part of the problem with the magic man assertion, apart from the nontrivial problem of absence of proper supporting evidence, centres upon two nasty holes in the entire edifice. The first is the existence of mutually contradictory mythological assertions (the whole tri-omni edifice requires logic itself to be thrown into the bin, which is a sure sign that said edifice is in serious need of revision), and the second is that a consilient framework of natural laws, far from providing support for the magic man assertion, renders it superfluous to requirements and irrelevant.
Elaborating on the first, if an entity is asserted to possess two capabilities, A and B, such that possession of capability A requires, of necessity, that entity to be able to perform actions violating the necessary conditions attached to possessing capability B, then those two capabilities cannot simultaneously be possessed by that entity. A situation arising in no small part from the failure to maintain rigorous control of one's definitions, and ensure that those definitions are consonant with both observational reality and elementary logic.
As for the second, one of the key points physicists have learned about the nature of universes is this: in order for any universe-type entity to possess any recognisable structure at all, even at the level of subatomic particles, then a consillient framework of natural laws needs to be in place underpinning that structure. There has to exist a consistent set of entities, and a consistent set of interactions between those entities, in order for recognisable structure to be present. This is true not only for universes in which organisms such as ourselves are physically permitted to exist (regardless of whether the requisite physically permitted interactions bringing those organisms into existence actually happen, which is a separate issue), but for universes in which organisms such as ourselves are physically impossible. In short, the existence of a set of natural laws places no guarantees on actual historical outcomes, especially if a large range of interactions are permitted, and the first interactions taking place in that history are sensitive to initial conditions.
Attempted escape from the second point and its ramifications fails. One of those ramifications being that that the usual self-regarding assertions presented as purported "conclusions", enjoy no support from frameworks of natural laws. If an exponentially increasing number of possible histories can appear within a system of interactions, the prior probability that any one of those histories will be realised, when viewed from the starting point, is vanishingly small. Even if one set of initial interactions places some constraints upon future sets, the existence of a vast range of choices of historical trajectory, even with those constraints in place, along with the possibility that the current trajectory will enable new interaction histories not previously possible, merely worsens the situation. For this reason, trying to escape the absence of support for the usual assertions, by asserting in turn that a particular choice was made to fulfil a particular destiny, is a stillborn dialectical ruse, one rendered even more so, the moment any indeterminism is present in the system of interactions in question.
Elaborating on the first, if an entity is asserted to possess two capabilities, A and B, such that possession of capability A requires, of necessity, that entity to be able to perform actions violating the necessary conditions attached to possessing capability B, then those two capabilities cannot simultaneously be possessed by that entity. A situation arising in no small part from the failure to maintain rigorous control of one's definitions, and ensure that those definitions are consonant with both observational reality and elementary logic.
As for the second, one of the key points physicists have learned about the nature of universes is this: in order for any universe-type entity to possess any recognisable structure at all, even at the level of subatomic particles, then a consillient framework of natural laws needs to be in place underpinning that structure. There has to exist a consistent set of entities, and a consistent set of interactions between those entities, in order for recognisable structure to be present. This is true not only for universes in which organisms such as ourselves are physically permitted to exist (regardless of whether the requisite physically permitted interactions bringing those organisms into existence actually happen, which is a separate issue), but for universes in which organisms such as ourselves are physically impossible. In short, the existence of a set of natural laws places no guarantees on actual historical outcomes, especially if a large range of interactions are permitted, and the first interactions taking place in that history are sensitive to initial conditions.
Attempted escape from the second point and its ramifications fails. One of those ramifications being that that the usual self-regarding assertions presented as purported "conclusions", enjoy no support from frameworks of natural laws. If an exponentially increasing number of possible histories can appear within a system of interactions, the prior probability that any one of those histories will be realised, when viewed from the starting point, is vanishingly small. Even if one set of initial interactions places some constraints upon future sets, the existence of a vast range of choices of historical trajectory, even with those constraints in place, along with the possibility that the current trajectory will enable new interaction histories not previously possible, merely worsens the situation. For this reason, trying to escape the absence of support for the usual assertions, by asserting in turn that a particular choice was made to fulfil a particular destiny, is a stillborn dialectical ruse, one rendered even more so, the moment any indeterminism is present in the system of interactions in question.