Posted: Aug 15, 2017 12:28 pm
by Thomas Eshuis
Wortfish wrote:
Calilasseia wrote:Of course, a major part of the problem with the magic man assertion, apart from the nontrivial problem of absence of proper supporting evidence, centres upon two nasty holes in the entire edifice. The first is the existence of mutually contradictory mythological assertions (the whole tri-omni edifice requires logic itself to be thrown into the bin, which is a sure sign that said edifice is in serious need of revision), and the second is that a consilient framework of natural laws, far from providing support for the magic man assertion, renders it superfluous to requirements and irrelevant.

But what is the provenance of these natural laws? Why should Nature conform to a rationally intelligible framework?

You're question begging again.

Wortfish wrote:
As for the second, one of the key points physicists have learned about the nature of universes is this: in order for any universe-type entity to possess any recognisable structure at all, even at the level of subatomic particles, then a consillient framework of natural laws needs to be in place underpinning that structure. There has to exist a consistent set of entities, and a consistent set of interactions between those entities, in order for recognisable structure to be present. This is true not only for universes in which organisms such as ourselves are physically permitted to exist (regardless of whether the requisite physically permitted interactions bringing those organisms into existence actually happen, which is a separate issue), but for universes in which organisms such as ourselves are physically impossible. In short, the existence of a set of natural laws places no guarantees on actual historical outcomes, especially if a large range of interactions are permitted, and the first interactions taking place in that history are sensitive to initial conditions.

Again, what is the provenance of this consillient framework of natural laws that make things so ordered and structured?

Again, why ought there be a why?