rationalskepticism.org

Mick wrote:The definition is not circular, or at least I don't see why it would be. In any case, my point stands: A diehard atheist can consistently uphold a divine command metaethic. He'd just need to ensure that he does not believe that there are moral truths.

I can understand assuming god exists so that we can have a conversation about the characteristics of god, and I can even understand assuming that the god we're discussing is the god of the Pentateuch, which is where these ideas about free will and divine command come from. But you see what a game that makes of trying to dress up one of these ideas as a "divine command metaethic". That goes for "moral truths" as well, in the 'objective' sense.

I don't think anyone who assumes that there are 'objective' "moral truths" should have any problem explaining where they come from. I don't think a 'personal sense of conviction about moral truths' qualifies as 'objective', and I don't think an 'argument' in which you assume your conclusion is anything but circular.

A diehard atheist cannot uphold any set of principles having the word 'divine' attached to it. All a person has to do to discourse in terms of moral truths is to believe that a principle of 'good' or of 'evil' applies to actions under the moral rubric. This thread is asking a specific question about the 'free will defence', and the question of objectivity depends circularly on the objectivity of free will. I don't know where you get this particular concept of ethics except from the Pentateuch, and so you have to be talking about the god of Abraham.

If you do not ask why the god of Abraham has created human beings simply to enact a morality play, you're just assuming your conclusion. As always, some or all of the god's ways are mysterious to us. Now that we have our assumptions straight:

JHendrix wrote:the Christian apologist needs to define "Good" or "Goodness" as literally "God's Nature".

Now as atheists, we’d reject that definition

The Christian apologist could certainly try this, but the Pentateuch alone will not do to suggest why we might do it, although we need the particular sort of free will found in the Pentateuch in order to begin the free will defence.

JHendrix wrote:To make sure I understand what you're saying, you're saying that there could be some objective standard for morality that exists apart from god, but that for it to actually exist, it requires that god exists? Kind of like how theists will argue that everything depends on god's existence.

I'm sure that could be argued, but it wouldn't really support the moral argument for god that's used by at least Craig. Further, it would undermine a lot of Christian theology, as well as contradict what the other apologists say about the basis of morality.

I think what you can glean from that is that one can start by assuming an objective standard for morality, but without an enforcement, it would be meaningless, especially in the presence of free will.

As things appear to stand, you have to be an optimist to say that on balance, more good is done than evil. Again you get the circularity, because you cannot do any accounting unless there is an objective means of doing so. I can say I prefer freedom to slavery, but that doesn't mean that a principle of free will is in operation.