Posted: Apr 29, 2012 7:58 pm
JHendrix wrote:By define I mean what Craig and Plantinga call their moral ontology, ie. what it's based on. This means that things are "good" because they part of god's nature.
You should use a different word than define for this, it invites confusion.
Doubtful. Swinburne doens't think that objective morality depends upon God, although our knowledge of it is more likely if God exists than not.I've not read Swinburne or Feser, but based on the paper I linked, it appears at least Swinburne makes the same move.
If you read Craig, you'll see that he makes it very clear that his commands make up our moral epistemology (ie. how we know what is good and bad). Reference.
No, Craig's point is one of ontology, not epistemology. He's made that distinction clear. Moral obligations are constituted by His commands, although how we know of them is a different issue.
I'm sorry, but huh? Atheists would reject the morality's ontology being rooted in god's nature, because we don't believe in a god. We can very much believe that goodness exists, we just don't believe that "goodness" is derived from god's nature.
Definitions are not existential statements; and hence a definition of goodness as God's nature itself need not have any existential commitment. Likewise, when we define God or Harry Potter or whatever singular term, we are not commited its existence unless that which we define them as exists. Thus, when we say something such as God is goodness itself, we need not believe that God exists unless we believe that goodness exists. If we don't believe that goodness exists, say, we atheists and moral skeptics, then there's no problem at all.
Ironically, I'm not sure I'm following you here.
To make sure I understand what you're saying, you're saying that there could be some objective standard for morality that exists apart from god, but that for it to actually exist, it requires that god exists? Kind of like how theists will argue that everything depends on god's existence.
I'm sure that could be argued, but it wouldn't really support the moral argument for god that's used by at least Craig. Further, it would undermine a lot of Christian theology, as well as contradict what the other apologists say about the basis of morality.
The paper I linked earlier by Morrison did go into this in detail. I rally would like to see if there was a reply to that.
Don't worry about it.