Posted: Dec 16, 2011 8:44 pm
by Shrunk
Thommo wrote:
jlowder wrote:
Shrunk wrote:The problem I had with that example is that he misunderstands the nature of the multiverse counterargument.

I'm pretty sure I understand the nature of the "multiverse counterargument," as well as the Bayesian version of the fine-tuning argument (FTA). Here's one formulation:

Let F = the apparent 'fine-tuning' of the physical constants of our universe
Let T = classical theism
Let N = metaphysical naturalism

(1) F is known to be true.

I'm not familiar with this formulation, could you perhaps elaborate on this premise (1)?

Is this intended to be read as "Fine tuning is known to be a feature of the universe" or as "Fine tuning of free parameters in current physical models of the known universe is required for them to accurately describe the known universe"?

Because whilst the latter is a reasonable statement the former is indeed refuted by the mere possibility of "many worlds" - consequently where that is the argument being given the refutation is complete.

Of course if the latter of the two statements is intended then (3) is trivially false, as F becomes independent of both T and N, meaning that even the simplistic statement of "Many worlds is possible" is overkill as a refutation.

So I can only assume you perhaps intend it to mean something else?

Hmm. I"m not going to pretend I have even a passing knowledgle of Bayesian probability, so jlowder's last post went over my head. But it still didn't pass the smell test for me, and I think you touch on why here. I'm not sure why metaphysical naturalism even enters the discussion since, as you seem to suggest, methodological naturalism could be false and the statement "The apparent fine tuning of the universe is explained by many worlds" could still be true. But I could be missing the point entirely.