Posted: Dec 18, 2011 1:37 am
Thommo wrote:JLowder wrote:This simply confuses the distinction between intrinsic probability and what Draper calls "predictive power." No physical evidence is relevant to predictive power, NOT intrinsic probability.
I wonder if you could perhaps be a bit more precise about what you mean by the term "intrinsic probability" here?
BUMP on this question by Thommo. So far as I can see it was never answered. A good part of the discussion about plausibility of god hypotheses vs Russellian teapot hypotheses seems to use this notion, yet it has no apparent definition. Without a coherent definition, an assertion that a god hypothesis has a higher 'intrinsic probability' than a Russellian teapot is devoid of meaning.
The discussion about fine-tuning also appears to make some implicit assumptions about prior probability distributions for fundamental constants, when there is no basis for assuming any distributions.