rationalskepticism.org

MS2 wrote:It seems we love to have stories and good historians tell us stories that are consonant with as many of the 'facts' as possible. Some of the 'facts' will turn out not to be facts, either because some new evidence turns up or reexamination of the old 'fact' shows it to be something else. In that case a new story has to be told. And the process is always going to be more tentative than (hard) science (a) because there is a higher level of subjectivity, and (b) because some (most!) facts are simply irrecoverable. Beyond that is the problem that some subjects become politicised for whatever reason, and on these the subjective desire to tell a story supporting a particular viewpoint becomes paramount.

I'd say that's a pretty fair analysis.

I might not be an illustrious historian, but my undergraduate degree was Anthropology & Ancient History at one of the UK's top 3 universities for History (and for Anthropology), so I did go through a rather arduous and prickly process to gather what I have learned! (All the arduousness and prickliness was on the History side of the curriculum divide! )

Again, one minor pedanticism, if I may? Facts never turn out not to be facts - facts are intrinsically irrefutable: they just are. It's our interpretation or modelling of the meaning of that fact which might be turned on its head. When Phlogiston was falsified, it wasn't because the direct observations of combustion and rusting were false or turned out to be something else - they were the facts! It was the description accounting for those facts which was in error. Of course, far too many people in this life thrive on certainty, so those people might consider some explanations to themselves be facts. Ultimately, those people are most likely to be disappointed as the universe is fundamentally far queerer than pretty much any of us can imagine.

One critical thing that needs to be addressed in the distinction between History and the 'hard' sciences. Many people erroneously perceive hallmarks of hard science to be methodological rigour, objective measurements, and certainty - that which can be unequivocally established as true.

But the real distinction is much simpler.

Chemicals, atoms, cells and the like do not think - they have no inner existence which can be in contrast to their observable outer existence. Knowing what an atom is equates to knowing why it does what it does.

This is obviously the opposite with the 'soft' sciences. Knowing what a human is or was does not tell you anything of certainty as to why he/she did something, or why he/she thought she did something.

Studies in this field are addressing a series of events which are all caused by human agency, yet the study has no methodological process of actually plumbing the human actors' minds about their motivations. Even a signed, sealed, and preserved written confession might have had an ulterior motive: how could we ever know? We can't even know with certainty why another person alive today does something, even if we ask them - how sure can we really be that it's accurate or even true? Humans are masters of social, and even self, deception.

So, a very important point that's perhaps been lost here is that an agenda of seeking truth in a soft science is actually a vastly more difficult proposition than in the hard sciences, which is itself an incredibly gigantic enterprise. I very much doubt any physicist, chemist, or biologist would tell you they're anywhere near to achieving complete truth in any of those fields!

Now, imagine if each of the causes in the universe's physical systems also had unique, undisclosed motivations, rich psychological experiences and a consequent inner life! The hard sciences just wouldn't exist: everything would be too chaotic to describe.

So the historian's job is nearly an impossible one, but they can at least suggest a way of navigating the chaos and telling a good yarn while they're about it.