Posted: Nov 19, 2011 6:41 am
by andrewk
I've been thinking a little more about this topic, hence the following:

Is it possible for there to be anything that we validly call supernatural?

Consider a thought experiment about ghosts. Say that, whenever an organism dies it creates a field of some type, whose strength depends on the intensity of the emotions at the time of death. The field dissipates exponentially over time and distance. When observed it can cause sound waves and electromagnetic waves that approximate the look and sound of the dead organism. We call these ‘apparitions’.

The sound and EM waves violate the principle of conservation of energy as we currently understand it. But they can be incorporated into a new principle that enables the amount of energy in the universe to be described by a new, clear mathematical formulae.

If we made experimental observations, developed a theory that included this formula and made predictions using the theory that were subsequently confirmed by experiment, so that now this phenomenon fitted into our understanding of the laws under which the universe operates, would we still describe the apparitions as supernatural?

My answer would be No. Once we understand a little of how and when they happen, they are no more supernatural than lightning and other electrical effects were once we came to understand electricity.

This leads me to propose that when we refer to ‘supernatural’ phenomena, we just mean phenomena for which we currently have no explanation - let’s call that Gap-supernatural. This definition is fundamentally different from the usual definition in current use, which is that ‘supernatural’ refers to anything that is not comprised of, or explicable in terms of, matter and energy - let’s call that concept ME-supernatural.

It so happens that, given our present state of knowledge, Gap-supernatural is the same as ME-supernatural. But that didn’t used to be the case. Before energy was discovered, Gap-supernatural included anything that was not composed solely of matter, such as lightning. So Gap-supernatural is a constantly diminishing set, as our knowledge grows.

I suggest that, when people say that ‘supernatural’ means anything not composed of matter and energy - or the equivalent statement that the natural world comprises only those things made solely of matter and/or energy - they are only saying that because matter and energy comprise all the things about the universe that we currently understand. What they really mean is
Gap-supernatural.

If next year we were to discover some field that is not inexplicable in terms of matter and energy, but causes changes to matter and energy according to laws describable by mathematical equations, I am confident that it would be rapidly assimilated into what we call the natural world. Say we call the field zumquatch. Then within a few years philosophers and theologians will be saying that the natural world consists of those things that can be explained solely in terms of matter and/or energy and/or zumquatch.

If we take this approach then anything that is true and capable of being known but is not yet known by humans, is currently supernatural, but will not necessarily remain so. It is only supernatural until we learn how it works. We could then define a new term - Irreducibly Supernatural - to mean something that is incapable of ever being known or described.

Now, as many theologians take the view that God is supernatural, and presumably will always be so, it seems that they must believe he is Irreducibly Supernatural, otherwise he is capable of being described by mathematical laws and accordingly just part of the universe, part of nature. But can anything be Irreducibly Supernatural? How could this be?

Perhaps if an object is so complex that it cannot be described by any finite set of laws, we could say that it is Irreducibly Supernatural. God could be such an object. However, there are some problems with this:

1. If god is omnipotent he should be capable of making himself fully known and understood to a human. But if that is the case then the god is not Irreducibly Supernatural. This suggests that god can only be Irreducibly Supernatural if he is not omnipotent.

2. If the universe is infinite, as is entirely possible under some solutions of the Friedman Lemaitre Robertson Walker cosmological equations, then it may itself be Irreducibly Supernatural. Whether it is so depends on whether the patterns in the universe repeat themselves in a regular manner over time and/or space. If they do, then it may be possible to formulate a finite description of the
infinite universe, just as we can give a finite description of the infinite decimal expansion of one seventh in base ten. If not, then the universe is Irreducibly Supernatural, which is awkward for the theologians because they can’t define a coherent category of supernatural objects that contains only god.

3. I also think I recall that some apologists like to think of God as a very simple being, as that is more pure, and also avoids the problem of how such a complex object came to be. This simplicity would conflict with His being Irreducibly Supernatural. But I may be misremembering my apologists on this one.