Posted: Apr 25, 2013 5:45 pm
by Teuton
Chrisw wrote:Teuton, without some further explanation this is just gibberish. Sounds like he's just playing fast and loose with the word "metaphysical".
And please don't post a link to his argument. If you can't explain it yourself then you don't understand it, so why are you posting it?

I could explain it myself, but why should I do so when good texts are available that explain it well. So here are links:

The Modal Force of the Supervenience Relation:

Supervenience and Mind:
Varities of Necessitation:
Ontological Failure:

"Since a mental-physical supervenience thesis tells us only how mental properties covary with physical properties, it is compatible not only with property dualism (as the non-reductive physicalist would hope) but also with substance dualism. Even if substance dualism were true, it might be that immaterial minds are causally connected or otherwise related to physical bodies in such a way that any variation in the properties of these immaterial minds occurs only with a variation in physical properties of the body. Physicalism certainly does not allow that substance dualism is true. So, since a supervenience thesis is compatible with substance dualism, it does not fully capture our physicalist intuitions."