Posted: Feb 16, 2016 1:24 am
The 'Why there is no spoon' thread irks me greatly, but the latest outbreak of mockery and mindless thumbs-ups regarding the definition of existence has impelled me to start this thread. That is, somebody needs to put to bed the notion that if 'something' cannot be defined then it is ludicrous to suggest that it exists. Indeed, somebody needs to put to bed the notion that existence itself - lacking any coherent definition - is a concept not worthy of discourse, especially here within the philosophy forum.
There are major issues to consider... and as a starting point we need to consider what definitions refer to. So, let us consider some 'thing' which you might care to mention. For example, let's consider 'a horse' (animal version). Here's its definition from freedictionary:
horse (hôrs)
n.
1.
a. A large hoofed mammal (Equus caballus) having a short coat, a long mane, and a long tail, domesticated since ancient times and used for riding and for drawing or carrying loads.
b. An adult male horse; a stallion.
c. Any of various equine mammals, such as the wild Asian species Przewalski's horse or certain extinct forms related ancestrally to the modern horse.
Notice, I hope, that the definition of a horse hinges upon its properties/attributes. In philosophy-speak, this is called the intensional meaning of something. There is also a [philosophical] sense in which the meaning of many words is fixed by its extension (what it directly refers to, such as [over there is] a tree). This is a very simple way of defining things... merely by familiarity with observational/experiential form.
... The problems should now be apparent, since 'properties/attributes' are not what a thing is, but refer instead to what a thing does, or how a thing seems (is observed/experienced by another entity), or how a thing relates to other things in a comparative sense (for example, in a mathematical sense, as per the law of physics). Also, [extensional] definition via recognition doesn't tell you what something IS, it merely refers to how that thing consistently appears to observers/experiencers thereof.
... So, the bottom-line is that [our] definitions have got nothing to do with what a thing IS. That is, our definitions are devoid of ALL ontological/metaphysical significance. And there is good reason for this:
a) The observation/experience of something is ontologically distinct to any thing existing independently thereof, so our extensional ('pointed-finger': "there it is") meaning of existence is [therefore] worthless from the perspective of ontology/metaphysics.
b) The properties/attributes/characteristics of something (the intensional meaning of something) do not refer to what a thing IS, either, but how a thing is.
... In other words, [our] definitions are utterly devoid of any substance value.
Those who mock the definitional void one encounters with 'existence' are [then] being utterly naive, for existence cannot be defined... by logical default. So, you [now] know what you can do with your mockery and thumbs-ups, I hope.
There are major issues to consider... and as a starting point we need to consider what definitions refer to. So, let us consider some 'thing' which you might care to mention. For example, let's consider 'a horse' (animal version). Here's its definition from freedictionary:
horse (hôrs)
n.
1.
a. A large hoofed mammal (Equus caballus) having a short coat, a long mane, and a long tail, domesticated since ancient times and used for riding and for drawing or carrying loads.
b. An adult male horse; a stallion.
c. Any of various equine mammals, such as the wild Asian species Przewalski's horse or certain extinct forms related ancestrally to the modern horse.
Notice, I hope, that the definition of a horse hinges upon its properties/attributes. In philosophy-speak, this is called the intensional meaning of something. There is also a [philosophical] sense in which the meaning of many words is fixed by its extension (what it directly refers to, such as [over there is] a tree). This is a very simple way of defining things... merely by familiarity with observational/experiential form.
... The problems should now be apparent, since 'properties/attributes' are not what a thing is, but refer instead to what a thing does, or how a thing seems (is observed/experienced by another entity), or how a thing relates to other things in a comparative sense (for example, in a mathematical sense, as per the law of physics). Also, [extensional] definition via recognition doesn't tell you what something IS, it merely refers to how that thing consistently appears to observers/experiencers thereof.
... So, the bottom-line is that [our] definitions have got nothing to do with what a thing IS. That is, our definitions are devoid of ALL ontological/metaphysical significance. And there is good reason for this:
a) The observation/experience of something is ontologically distinct to any thing existing independently thereof, so our extensional ('pointed-finger': "there it is") meaning of existence is [therefore] worthless from the perspective of ontology/metaphysics.
b) The properties/attributes/characteristics of something (the intensional meaning of something) do not refer to what a thing IS, either, but how a thing is.
... In other words, [our] definitions are utterly devoid of any substance value.
Those who mock the definitional void one encounters with 'existence' are [then] being utterly naive, for existence cannot be defined... by logical default. So, you [now] know what you can do with your mockery and thumbs-ups, I hope.