Posted: Aug 14, 2017 6:31 pm
GrahamH wrote:zoon wrote: But then he says that it follows we ought not to blame people for what they do, and at this point I think he’s fallen into the trap Hume identified (* see below). Where does that “ought” suddenly come from?
I see differences between moral accountability to a god and a realisation that things would be better for us collectively if we did X.
Granted people can't be held accountable to God if they act according to how they were made and they were made by that god. Clearly responsibility can be attributed to the maker in that case. God must hold himself to blame. Just as Tesla will be to blame if their autopilot leads to loss of life for easily foreseeable reasons the designers failed to make provision for.
I agree that moral thinking is often in terms of a god, or at least some moral order to the universe, and that this is to be resisted.
GrahamH wrote:In terms of evolved behaviour of humans, and abilities to imagine futures different to the present the 'ought' is surely no more than a 'it might be better if...' that is just a discovery about the world on par with which substances are nourishing or how to make fire. These are aspects of the unfolding of the world that apply just as much if we view it as all set on a path at the Big Bang or jiggling about as it flows like a river carving a channel. Is free will necessary to discover strawberries taste good and nourish? I would say not.
We can see societal rules could prevent various unpleasant situations in the future and establish coercive rules to encourage that to happen.
I think our evolved moral “ought” is not entirely captured by “I think it would be better if…..” It’s more about organizing collective punishment or rewards for the individuals concerned, not just “I think it would be better…..” but “All right-thinking people will agree with me that it would be better if………”. Prof Robin Dunbar, in a recent book, argues that gossip is a very ancient function of language, it’s certainly universal in human societies. Gossip is not just describing someone’s behaviour, but describing it in moral terms. If someone has annoyed me, then I may do well to talk about the incident to others before tackling the offender. If the others agree with me, then I’m on safer ground when I bring the matter up, I can expect support. If, however, I learn that everyone thinks I’m complaining unnecessarily, then I need to back off. Discussing what has been going on in moral terms, what behaviour should be punished or rewarded, enables a consensus to emerge, it helps the group to function effectively as a unit, for example if it’s attacked by another group. We see these moralising discussions going on here on RatSkep, for example, the thread on whether a teacher of literature should be sanctioned for not including books by women. It’s noticeable, even among atheists who deny objective morality, that these discussions tend to be couched in straightforwardly moral terms, rather than in terms of enabling survival or anything else. Moral thinking evolved because it helped groups to survive, but it doesn’t feel quite that way - like the taste of strawberries feeling good in itself rather than an evolved aid to survival.
GrahamH wrote:I think I agree with you that Sapolsky is mistaken to say we ought not blame anyone because it lacks pragmatism and he can't appeal to 'moral authority'.
Yes, Sapolsky does seem to have missed the mark there. He does not say that moral thinking, blaming or praising people, is evolved behaviour which is often helpful but sometimes goes awry (as with choosing food by taste). Instead, he says that we are wholly determined and therefore ought not to praise or blame people, which is merely incoherent. As you say, he is assuming the existence of some moral authority while simultaneously, explicitly, denying it. But it’s all too easy for us determinists to do that.