Posted: Nov 23, 2017 1:46 pm
GrahamH wrote:John Platko wrote:
The important point is:In this particular case, the content of the boxes is not set by what choice T will make (as is misleadingly assumed in statements of the ‘paradox’) but by the choice that the simulation T′ made before t0; this choice unpredictable, in the sense that the only way to predict it is to bring about a simulation of T′; and so on. Until T′ has made its choice, the content is not set; once it has made it, the choices of T are set, on the ground of the knowledge that was created in T′. What matters is precisely the fact that the requisite knowledge about what to do with the boxes, whatever that is, could not be predicted before an instance of the person T was brought about, via T′.
That depends entirely on the complexity of the algorithm and what rules. It may be easiest to run the algorithm on a physical computer. It may be enough to just read the rules, or look at a diagram.
No, in this case it depends entirely on what must be done to predict the - Oh heck, here's how Deutsch puts it:
In this particular case, the content of the boxes is not set by what choice T will make (as is misleadingly assumed in statements of the ‘paradox’) but by the choice that the simulation T′ made before t0; this choice unpredictable, in the sense that the only way to predict it is to bring about a simulation of T′; and so on. Until T′ has made its choice, the content is not set; once it has made it, the choices of T are set, on the ground of the knowledge that was created in T′. What matters is precisely the fact that the requisite knowledge about what to do with the boxes, whatever that is, could not be predicted before an instance of the person T was brought about, via T′.
The description is perfectly clear that it is the choice that T is perfectly predicted to make that sets the rules for P and therefor for T. P doesn't need a simulation of T. P only needs a way to perfectly predict T's action. It is no stretch of the imagination to just take a look at a description of the algorithm T executes, to read the rule, to observe that the levers are only connected to A... It could be simple or complex and it is all100% determined before the boxes are presented.
You changed the problem to eliminate free will, i.e the creation of knowledge - that's a different problem.
If you think the important point is that a simulation must be executed then you are simply wrong.
I think you made up your own scenario, and are not using Deutsch's.
It may be a useful thing to do, it may be a practical necessity in some complex cases, but there is no general principle that requires it.
In the general case, in must be done as Deutsch describes it. You can change the scenario to obfuscate the point Deutsch is making but what's the point of doing that?
Getting back to something interesting. Deutsch also points out why this is different than quantum unpredictability. Which is the direction I think the thread needs to get back on.
The second point is that this setting lends itself to explaining why the unpredictability of the creation of knowledge is fundamentally different from the unpredictability of measurement in quantum theory.
Consider a slightly altered version of the game, where the automaton T is supposed to make a choice based on the output of a measurement of the X-component of the spin on a superposition of two eigenstates of that observable. Then, there cannot be any perfect predictor for what choice T will make. This is because, if there were one, the laws of quantum mechanics would be violated. However, this has nothing to do with the unpredictability of knowledge we mentioned above. The knowledge created by T′ to make its choice is represented by a sharp information attribute of the variable ‘which box to open’; in the case of the quantum version, instead, the variable ‘which box to open’ is not sharp.