Posted: Jun 11, 2011 1:30 am
Inspired by a recent conversation in the 'free will' thread, I felt compelled to have a go at refuting the MWI...
From the SEF ( http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qm-manyworlds/ ):
The Many-Worlds Interpretation (MWI) is an approach to quantum mechanics according to which, in addition to the world we are aware of directly, there are many other similar worlds which exist in parallel at the same space and time. The existence of the other worlds makes it possible to remove randomness and action at a distance from quantum theory and thus from all physics.
... every time a quantum experiment with different outcomes with non-zero probability is performed, all outcomes are obtained, each in a different world, even if we are aware only of the world with the outcome we have seen.
... Firstly, assuming that there are many worlds like this that exist at the same space & time, it should be acknowledged that these worlds cannot be comprised of the same matter, for if one (the same) set of matter exists at one (the same) set of space & time, then we only have one world, not many. That is, the MWI requires that different matter/bodies exist at the same space & time. But, how can more than one body exist at the same space & time? That is illogical. (Problem 1)
Secondly, ignoring the first problem, let us focus upon the claim that "The existence of the other worlds makes it possible to remove randomness and action at a distance from quantum theory and thus from all physics.". No it does not, is my retort. Why? Because if what distinguishes one world from another is the distinct/separate bodies that already exist in each of these worlds, then whichever 'experiment with different outcomes with non-zero probability is performed' the outcome in each of these worlds is still indeterminable. Why? Because one body cannot jump into another world where a pre-existing body of an exact likeness already exists. How do I know this? Because I am yet to see more than one of anything... and if it were the case that mirroring-bodies could jump from one universe to the next, then we would expect to see numerous variants of some bodies such as, say, Stonehenge, all co-existing together. In other words, almost everything would be an observed blur - the consequence of it existing simultaneously with variances of its potential.
... Bodies a; b; c; d; e, etc, already exist in this world. The MWI would have it that different like-bodies of a; b; c, etc, exist in another world. So, whatever happens to those bodies will happen to them in their world. It won't happen to them in this world. Therefore, the MWI does not eradicate randomness from quantum theory. Further, it cannot explain nor eradicate the problem of 'action at a distance', for the same problem arises: even if there are many Stonehenges - what happens to 'it' will happen to it in its own world... since it cannot transcend that world into another. (2nd problem)
Lastly, for now, the MWI is physically dependent. That is, the likelihood of an outcome is assessed from physical potential. However, we all know that the likelihood of events isn't contingent upon physical potentials. I know, for instance, given the evolution of my own life/mind, that the likelihood of me becoming a materialist tomorrow, is zero. I have no doubt about that, given that I've already been there and seen the flaws thereof (not to mention everything else I've 'seen'). Likewise, you all may be sure of some thing or other. Further, for example, though the physical potential exists, the likelihood of tomorrow's papers headlining The Pope as a murderous gay atheist, seems bleak, to say the least. Therefore, are these many worlds constrained by what is physically possible, or by what is sensibly possible? That is, do mental/emotive concerns dictate what worlds are possible, or simply physical potentials? On the face of it, it would seem that the MWI doesn't have any recourse towards mental potential/agency. (3rd problem).
I started this thread because two people informed me that the MWI is not irrational and that any assault upon it was bound to be a consequence of incredulity, on my part. In other words, I started this thread to try and prove why reason can undermine the MWI. I expect to think of further problems with it as the discussion evolves.
... Any serious input is welcome. Btw, I'm supposed to be extremely busy with something else until next Tuesday evening, so pardon me if my responses seem a bit light up until that point. However, my mind has become focused upon this issue and I felt compelled to put it out there. Thankyou.
From the SEF ( http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qm-manyworlds/ ):
The Many-Worlds Interpretation (MWI) is an approach to quantum mechanics according to which, in addition to the world we are aware of directly, there are many other similar worlds which exist in parallel at the same space and time. The existence of the other worlds makes it possible to remove randomness and action at a distance from quantum theory and thus from all physics.
... every time a quantum experiment with different outcomes with non-zero probability is performed, all outcomes are obtained, each in a different world, even if we are aware only of the world with the outcome we have seen.
... Firstly, assuming that there are many worlds like this that exist at the same space & time, it should be acknowledged that these worlds cannot be comprised of the same matter, for if one (the same) set of matter exists at one (the same) set of space & time, then we only have one world, not many. That is, the MWI requires that different matter/bodies exist at the same space & time. But, how can more than one body exist at the same space & time? That is illogical. (Problem 1)
Secondly, ignoring the first problem, let us focus upon the claim that "The existence of the other worlds makes it possible to remove randomness and action at a distance from quantum theory and thus from all physics.". No it does not, is my retort. Why? Because if what distinguishes one world from another is the distinct/separate bodies that already exist in each of these worlds, then whichever 'experiment with different outcomes with non-zero probability is performed' the outcome in each of these worlds is still indeterminable. Why? Because one body cannot jump into another world where a pre-existing body of an exact likeness already exists. How do I know this? Because I am yet to see more than one of anything... and if it were the case that mirroring-bodies could jump from one universe to the next, then we would expect to see numerous variants of some bodies such as, say, Stonehenge, all co-existing together. In other words, almost everything would be an observed blur - the consequence of it existing simultaneously with variances of its potential.
... Bodies a; b; c; d; e, etc, already exist in this world. The MWI would have it that different like-bodies of a; b; c, etc, exist in another world. So, whatever happens to those bodies will happen to them in their world. It won't happen to them in this world. Therefore, the MWI does not eradicate randomness from quantum theory. Further, it cannot explain nor eradicate the problem of 'action at a distance', for the same problem arises: even if there are many Stonehenges - what happens to 'it' will happen to it in its own world... since it cannot transcend that world into another. (2nd problem)
Lastly, for now, the MWI is physically dependent. That is, the likelihood of an outcome is assessed from physical potential. However, we all know that the likelihood of events isn't contingent upon physical potentials. I know, for instance, given the evolution of my own life/mind, that the likelihood of me becoming a materialist tomorrow, is zero. I have no doubt about that, given that I've already been there and seen the flaws thereof (not to mention everything else I've 'seen'). Likewise, you all may be sure of some thing or other. Further, for example, though the physical potential exists, the likelihood of tomorrow's papers headlining The Pope as a murderous gay atheist, seems bleak, to say the least. Therefore, are these many worlds constrained by what is physically possible, or by what is sensibly possible? That is, do mental/emotive concerns dictate what worlds are possible, or simply physical potentials? On the face of it, it would seem that the MWI doesn't have any recourse towards mental potential/agency. (3rd problem).
I started this thread because two people informed me that the MWI is not irrational and that any assault upon it was bound to be a consequence of incredulity, on my part. In other words, I started this thread to try and prove why reason can undermine the MWI. I expect to think of further problems with it as the discussion evolves.
... Any serious input is welcome. Btw, I'm supposed to be extremely busy with something else until next Tuesday evening, so pardon me if my responses seem a bit light up until that point. However, my mind has become focused upon this issue and I felt compelled to put it out there. Thankyou.