Posted: Jun 20, 2011 11:40 pm
Matthew Shute wrote:As I've said before, I have no problem with you attacking metaphysical materialism/physicalism (which I don't support, anyway).
As I explained: The MWI is a metaphysical theory, in that it implicates a reality beyond that which we can see (this particular world).
If you have no problem with me attacking metaphysical materialism/physicalism in relation to this theory, then what exactly is your problem?
Your problem? There are many metaphysical models of reality. Suppose we isolate only those models which are both internally logically consistent and consistent with observation. You're not going to be left with 1; you're going to have a stack of them.
There are many metaphysical models of reality? Last I heard, there were essentially three... and one of them was a combination of the other two (dualism).
[/i] Other than mysticism or faith, the only way for you to eliminate further models, to close in on 1, is to judge them on some other grounds such as ethics or aesthetics.
How can you say that when I've already presented a synopsis of two logical problems which undermine a materialistic association with the MWI?
You're still stuck on the idea that you can home in on one metaphysical model, using only logic. How is this plausible?
There are reasons why idealism makes sense in relation to the MWI... and in relation to QM in general. I discussed the main one in the aforementioned synopsis, but you didn't actually address the content of that paragraph.
The MWI doesn't even need to be consistent with a particular metaphysical model, such as physicalism.
Of course it does, since the MWI is a metaphysical theory. If that theory does not fit with a particular model, then we cannot reconcile the theory with the model. In which case, either the theory is wrong or we can discard the model altogether.
It only has to be internally consistent and consistent with observation.
To be 'internally consistent' is to be able to reconcile the metaphysical theory with a particular metaphysical model, for how can there be an internally consistent metaphysical theory which cannot reconcile itself to any known metaphysical models? That would make no sense whatsoever.
Further, observation has got nothing to do with the MWI in that we cannot observe it to be true, nor can we observe it to be false.
The MWI is a metaphysical model, which is partly why you're going to have a big problem trying to "disprove" it.
As I've said, I'm not trying to disprove it. I'm merely trying to prove why it is not consistent with a physical reality... and show why it is consistent with a model of reality commensurate with idealism.
Metaphysics is accessible and questionable via reason alone. One problem metaphysicists have is in explaining to others that our minds do transcend the bounds of what this empirical reality can feed into them.
This seems little more than an article of faith, however.Certainly, the MWI is an instance of this transcendence at work.
We haven't actually falsified or authenticated the MWI, remember!
Whether we have falsified it or not, is not the point here. The point is that the theory is borne of a logic which transcends knowledge of the world that we can actually observe... and also speaks of a reality which we cannot.
We're no closer to knowing what reality is. In fact, we're further away, because we've merely added one more contender instead of eliminating any.
The MWI isn't 'another contender'. It merely adds or detracts to/from preestablished metaphysical models of reality.
From time to time I may ponder what is behind, or at the root of, experience. However, I know that all I'm doing is daydreaming about possibilities.
How do you know that?