I used to think that the answer is "no", mainly because of Ryle´s and Skinner´s arguments that "belief" was just a dispositional term (not an overt or covert behavior, but a "summary label" of very different behaviors, so its huge heterogeneity would prevent a fruitful theory). Even the so-called "Theory of Mind" (which, ironicaly, is not a "theory" and is not about "mind") doesn´t qualify as a theory of belief (because it explores an heterogeneous set of interpersonal skills).
But now, the following studies by Harris et al have made me think that perhaps it was a premature conclusion, and that there might be enough regularities to warrant further exploration.
http://www.samharris.org/images/uploads/Harris_Sheth_Cohen.pdf
http://www.samharris.org/site/full_text/the-neural-correlates-of-religious-and-nonreligious-belief/
What do you think? Do you know other studies about this issue?

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You might check out this thread: Psychology of Belief.

I'm about to start The God Gene: How faith is hardwired into our genes by geneticist Dean Hamer. Title sounds a bit sensationalist, but we'll see.

Maybe this thread should be merged with Murshid's.

I thought we already did. Sociology and anthropology of religion, Dennett, Marlene Winnell soon to formally propose religious trauma syndrome, Persinger.

Now I read again my OP, and I see that I was somewhat ambiguous. In one sense of the term, "belief" is wider than just "religious belief". We can have beliefs about anything, not just religious issues. Religious belief is also an interesting and important topic, of course, and we could continue talking about it in this thread, but it´s just a chapter in the "belief" topic.
So now I´d like to ask you: do we have a scientific theory about "belief" in a general sense? Can we have a scientific theory about it? Do we know the neural correlates of different kinds of belief? Are there similar correlates for different belief, or do we have different kinds of neural correlates for different kinds of belief? Do we know the bio-psycho-social mechanisms responsible of the emergence, acceptance, change, and rejection of beliefs in this general sense?

I'll jump in with all my candor about behaviorism, because I think it is the best way to get corrected about my probable misconceptions.

seeker wrote:I used to think that the answer is "no", mainly because of Ryle´s and Skinner´s arguments that "belief" was just a dispositional term (not an overt or covert behavior, but a "summary label" of very different behaviors, so its huge heterogeneity would prevent a fruitful theory).

I would need a little more detail here, otherwise it sounds a bit like the classic "My great mind can't do it, so it must be impossible". Behaviorists have the liberty of making their own definitions and of splitting "belief" into a small list of concepts, each of them related to one aspect of what folk psychology means by belief.

What about expectation and surprise ? Those sound behaviorist enough. By reinforcing correct predictions one can know what someone expects (they say that one can even know it about babies by monitoring their reaction time). Belief sounds to me as a very strong level of expectation of a class of related real-world events bound to occur in certain circumstances. Is the problem in quantifying the expectation ?

Even the so-called "Theory of Mind" (which, ironicaly, is not a "theory" and is not about "mind") doesn´t qualify as a theory of belief (because it explores an heterogeneous set of interpersonal skills).

It wouldn't have though of invoking the "theory of mind" here. Theory of mind seems concerned with a very special kind of belief (as is a religious belief).

But now, the following studies by Harris et al have made me think that perhaps it was a premature conclusion, and that there might be enough regularities to warrant further exploration.
http://www.samharris.org/images/uploads/Harris_Sheth_Cohen.pdf
http://www.samharris.org/site/full_text/the-neural-correlates-of-religious-and-nonreligious-belief/
What do you think? Do you know other studies about this issue?

I didn't follow the links yet, not that I am not interested, but because I am yet to be convinced that we need neuroscience at all in order to get one (or several) rigorous definitions of belief.

seeker wrote:I used to think that the answer is "no", mainly because of Ryle´s and Skinner´s arguments that "belief" was just a dispositional term (not an overt or covert behavior, but a "summary label" of very different behaviors, so its huge heterogeneity would prevent a fruitful theory).

I just want to jump in on this point here. I think a construct made up of a number of different behaviours does not prevent fruitful study provided that a clear structure can be identified. Take for instance self-esteem. In around 1976 a very useful hierarchical structure of self-esteem was theorised by Shavelson, Hubner, and Stanton. Not only has this provided a number of useful advances in our knowledge of the processes that underlie self-esteem (think the Big-Fish-Little-Pond effect and the Internal/External frame of reference model for example) but it has given the overarching construct of self-esteem substance. I don't see why belief is can not be studied in a similar manner. Once its structure is identified and can be shown to be empiracised, useful study of the concept seems perfectly reasonable. There are of course ways of studying religious belief for example that date back to Allport (internal and external orientations toward belief) that provide interesting structures that make research on the processes involved in religious belief perfectly sensible.

Hello palindnilap & Lazar. I´m not defending any strong claim here (e.g. “you cannot/shouldn´t study belief” or “you need neuroscience in order to study belief”). Of course, anyone can define and redefine and split and approach the concept as he/she wants. My question is how can we obtain some lawlike regularities, because I don´t see much of that yet, but perhaps there´s some evidence that I still don´t know. (Remember that I´m referring to general belief, not just religious belief).

Ah well there is the rub. I think you would be hard pressed to find any psychology construct which displays law like regularities (pre-empting Samsa jumping in with the matching rule here ).

Lazar wrote:Ah well there is the rub. I think you would be hard pressed to find any psychology construct which displays law like regularities (pre-empting Samsa jumping in with the matching rule here ).

I wouldn´t agree with your claim, but I guess we´re using different conceptions of "lawlike regularities". I´d say that there´re lots of lawlike regularities described by the theories of behavior analysis and cognitive psychology. Don´t you agree?

seeker wrote:

Lazar wrote:Ah well there is the rub. I think you would be hard pressed to find any psychology construct which displays law like regularities (pre-empting Samsa jumping in with the matching rule here ).

I wouldn´t agree with your claim, but I guess we´re using different conceptions of "lawlike regularities". I´d say that there´re lots of lawlike regularities described by the theories of behavior analysis and cognitive psychology. Don´t you agree?

Lazar will obviously have a more professional take on the subject, but I'd say that the use of "law" in anything as complex as human behavior is problematic, given the multiple variables involved in wholistic brain function, not to mention the multitude of social variables as the mind operates out in the real world. Statistical regularities or tendencies (rather than hard and fast laws) would seem to be sufficient in characterizing and explaining behaviors.

ChasM wrote:

seeker wrote:

Lazar wrote:Ah well there is the rub. I think you would be hard pressed to find any psychology construct which displays law like regularities (pre-empting Samsa jumping in with the matching rule here ).

I wouldn´t agree with your claim, but I guess we´re using different conceptions of "lawlike regularities". I´d say that there´re lots of lawlike regularities described by the theories of behavior analysis and cognitive psychology. Don´t you agree?

Lazar will obviously have a more professional take on the subject, but I'd say that the use of "law" in anything as complex as human behavior is problematic, given the multiple variables involved in wholistic brain function, not to mention the multitude of social variables as the mind operates out in the real world. Statistical regularities or tendencies (rather than hard and fast laws) would seem to be sufficient in characterizing and explaining behaviors.

I agree with your premises, but your conclusion doesn´t follow. Yes, human behavior is complex, there´re multiple variables, and regularities are mostly statistical. But that doesn´t imply that the use of the concept of "law" in human behavior is problematic. I´d argue that a "statistical regularity" is still a "lawlike regularity". For example, many regularities in physics are statistical instead of deterministic, and yet we don´t deny that they´re still "lawlike regularities". Are we changing our standards just because we´re talking about humans? Is that a solid argumentation?

seeker wrote:I agree with your premises, but your conclusion doesn´t follow. Yes, human behavior is complex, there´re multiple variables, and regularities are mostly statistical. But that doesn´t imply that the use of the concept of "law" in human behavior is problematic. I´d argue that a "statistical regularity" is still a "lawlike regularity". For example, many regularities in physics are statistical instead of deterministic, and yet we don´t deny that they´re still "lawlike regularities". Are we changing our standards just because we´re talking about humans? Is that a solid argumentation?

Yes, even in a mathematically quantifiable field such as physics we get the strange statistical probabilities/regularities of QM. I'd have to ask a physicist whether we should consider these "laws" or "law-like," however. Your usage of the term "law-like" strikes me a bit too broad.

Yes, we're changing our standards because the object of inquiry, the human mind, is exponentially more complex than the predictable behavior of atoms, the regularities of objects in motion, etc. With increasing complexity, predictions based on law-like properties can get a bit dodgy.

In addition, the problem is that we must use as a tool the very thing we're examining; thus we have the ensuing problems associated with recursion.

ChasM wrote:

seeker wrote:I agree with your premises, but your conclusion doesn´t follow. Yes, human behavior is complex, there´re multiple variables, and regularities are mostly statistical. But that doesn´t imply that the use of the concept of "law" in human behavior is problematic. I´d argue that a "statistical regularity" is still a "lawlike regularity". For example, many regularities in physics are statistical instead of deterministic, and yet we don´t deny that they´re still "lawlike regularities". Are we changing our standards just because we´re talking about humans? Is that a solid argumentation?

Yes, even in a mathematically quantifiable field such as physics we get the strange statistical probabilities/regularities of QM. I'd have to ask a physicist whether we should consider these "laws" or "law-like," however. Your usage of the term "law-like" strikes me a bit too broad.

I´m using the standard meaning of the term, no more and no less.

ChasM wrote:Yes, we're changing our standards because the object of inquiry, the human mind, is exponentially more complex than the predictable behavior of atoms, the regularities of objects in motion, etc. With increasing complexity, predictions based on law-like properties can get a bit dodgy.

I reject the change of standards. We have law-like regularities in both cases, but we have different degrees of precision. According to Howard (1993), particle physicists can account for 90 percent or more of the variation in their samples (but particular events, like the spontaneous desintegration of a nucleus, cannot be predicted at all), while social scientists typically account for 25-35 percent of the variations in their samples. I guess that the different theories of biology fall in different points between those averages. The statistical laws in social sciences allow less precise predictions, but they´re still “laws” in the standard sense of the term.

ChasM wrote:In addition, the problem is that we must use as a tool the very thing we're examining; thus we have the ensuing problems associated with recursion.

We´re not using as a tool “the very thing we're examining” (neuroscientists don´t study their own brains, and psychologists don´t study their own behavior). At best, we´re using as a tool “a thing of the same kind” than the one we´re examining, but that´s also the situation of physicists (they´re using mechanical devices that are made of particles).

Daniel Dennett's book Breaking the Spell: Religion As a natutal Phenomenon argues that science should study religion as a natural phenomenon. I think it's a good idea. The viewpoint appearing most reasonable to me is that religious belief started out as an attempt to explain the natural world. Why is there thunder, what happens after death, how did the world come into being, and so on.

ChasM wrote:I'm about to start The God Gene: How faith is hardwired into our genes by geneticist Dean Hamer. Title sounds a bit sensationalist, but we'll see.

I think that hypothesis is deeply flawed. Would the "faith gene" be much more present in Americans than in Europeans? Has the "faith gene" somehow greatly decreased in number during the last century in Europe?

Hugin wrote:I think that hypothesis is deeply flawed. Would the "faith gene" be much more present in Americans than in Europeans? Has the "faith gene" somehow greatly decreased in number during the last century in Europe?

I'd tend to think it's flawed as well, at least if it's simplistic, but it doesn't necessarily require that there's a "faith gene" in the sense of having genes for hair colour.
It could be a somewhat weaker idea - that there are inbuilt things that predispose people to be receptive (or vulnerable) to certain kinds of ideas, but that social changes can hugely influence the extent to which people might end up believing, or the extent to which they'd be prepared to admit that they didn't actually believe much, if at all..

As far as I can see, the area is likely to be made complex by the wide variations in what might underpin the faith of various people.
It wouldn't be hard to propose the idea that for a certain class of deep 'spiritual believers, their faith was connected with a capacity to extend their capacity for irrational love onto things other than physical people, maybe allied with a particular kind of imagination.
For other people, maybe there would be an innate desire for order and stability, which in some situations they see the political/social side of a religion meshing well with (or which they see a rejection of a common religion as being contrary to), and they make a more rational decision to support religion, and to adopt faith, or at least to seem to adopt it.
Other people might have a natural attraction to the happy-clappy kinds of religion, or to the kinds which claim to have answered all the questions, 'liberating' believers who don't like unanswered questions, while people with a more natural attraction towards the mystical might be drawn by faiths offering more mystery than answers, and so on.

Given that people *are* different, it'd be understandable that religions, as relatively successful/enduring entities would tend to have found ways of making themselves attractive to different kinds of people, as well as developing ways of moulding people to fit the religion.

For a scientific theory of belief, it'd seem we'd need to start off with a definition of what belief actually was.

seeker wrote:Hello palindnilap & Lazar. I´m not defending any strong claim here (e.g. “you cannot/shouldn´t study belief” or “you need neuroscience in order to study belief”). Of course, anyone can define and redefine and split and approach the concept as he/she wants. My question is how can we obtain some lawlike regularities, because I don´t see much of that yet, but perhaps there´s some evidence that I still don´t know. (Remember that I´m referring to general belief, not just religious belief).

I won't pick on semantic technicalities (neither would I be able to). I don't know whether you would count the following as a lawlike regularities, but I was thinking along the lines that Martin Seligman followed in his studies of optimism.

1) Define optimism in a (rather) precise way, by looking at the way people explain their setbacks. The less the explanatory style is permanent and pervasive, the more optimistic someone is. This obviously doesn't capture everything that various people might mean by optimism, but it doesn't matter much. It is always possible to define a different "optimism" and work with that one.

2) Find correlations between optimism thus defined and future events. For example, the grades of optimistic students are more likely to improve, optimistic salespersons are less likely to resign, etc.

Would something like that about belief count as scientific enough for you ?

seeker wrote:

Lazar wrote:Ah well there is the rub. I think you would be hard pressed to find any psychology construct which displays law like regularities (pre-empting Samsa jumping in with the matching rule here ).

I wouldn´t agree with your claim, but I guess we´re using different conceptions of "lawlike regularities". I´d say that there´re lots of lawlike regularities described by the theories of behavior analysis and cognitive psychology. Don´t you agree?

I think this is a difference in terms. I would claim that psychology makes a number of well-specified models (some more well specified than others, none a true model). If that is what you mean yes there are some well-specified models.

Lazar wrote:

seeker wrote:

Lazar wrote:Ah well there is the rub. I think you would be hard pressed to find any psychology construct which displays law like regularities (pre-empting Samsa jumping in with the matching rule here ).

I wouldn´t agree with your claim, but I guess we´re using different conceptions of "lawlike regularities". I´d say that there´re lots of lawlike regularities described by the theories of behavior analysis and cognitive psychology. Don´t you agree?

I think this is a difference in terms. I would claim that psychology makes a number of well-specified models (some more well specified than others, none a true model). If that is what you mean yes there are some well-specified models.

Then, I´ll ask you: (1) what´s your definition of a "true" model? As I´ve shown in my previous example, even our best scientific models (e.g. particle physics) are not completely precise and have areas of non-predictability. (2) What degree of precision would a model require to pass from "well-specified" to "true"? As I´ve showed, different theories can predict different data-sets with different degrees of precision, from 25-35% in the social sciences to more than 90% in particle physics. Where do you trace the threshold?
I´m skeptic of your distinction between "well-specified" and "true" models. We only have models that are more or less precise in their predictions and descriptions of our data sets, and the degrees of precision fall in a continuum, so any clear-cut threshold is just an arbitrary decision that must be argued on pragmatic grounds.

palindnilap wrote:I won't pick on semantic technicalities (neither would I be able to). I don't know whether you would count the following as a lawlike regularities, but I was thinking along the lines that Martin Seligman followed in his studies of optimism.
1) Define optimism in a (rather) precise way, by looking at the way people explain their setbacks. The less the explanatory style is permanent and pervasive, the more optimistic someone is. This obviously doesn't capture everything that various people might mean by optimism, but it doesn't matter much. It is always possible to define a different "optimism" and work with that one.
2) Find correlations between optimism thus defined and future events. For example, the grades of optimistic students are more likely to improve, optimistic salespersons are less likely to resign, etc.
Would something like that about belief count as scientific enough for you ?

Yes, it would count (at least as a fist step). Do you know somethink like that about (general) belief? I don´t.