GrahamH wrote:

mindhack wrote:Ants display creativity in their ability to respond to changes in their environment. If that's not an expression of consciousness, it certainly is awareness, is it not? I think the ability to come up with alternatives and be creative are more fundamental properties of conscious behaviour then whether or not ants contemplate individually battle strategies and societal structures.

Computers can come up with 'creative solutions' not anticipated by their programmers. Does that mean computers are subjective entities having experiences (= aware / conscious)?

I don't know. What do you think: is it possible for computers to be conscious, ever?

GrahamH wrote:

mindhack wrote:In many respects humans are ants. We both are social animals, build colonies, react to changes in our environment, don't make our minds up individually, a lot if not all of our behaviour has formed automatically as a respons to basic experiences such as pain, pleasure and yes...pheromones too .

In short, how can you be sure we're so different from ants in respect to consciousness?

We can't be sure, which is the problem. Does an ant that runs away from heat or writhes after contact with insecticide feel pain? Does a robot with heat sensors that runs away from heat feel pain?

We think human perception is conscious, right? Our perception consists of both observations and emotional judgements. Together they form our experience. Whatever we observe influences what we value and whatever we value influences what we observe. Do you think C requires an ability to make emotional judgements?

mindhack wrote:

DavidMcC wrote:

mindhack wrote:

chairman bill wrote:I think we need to distinguish between consciousness (an awareness of the external world, that potentially leads to changes in behaviour), and self-consciousness.

The thermostat has been programmed to behave, and to some extent, that is analogous to certain innate behaviours. What it doesn't do is learn. Is it conscious? It depends on how precious we are about the term & what it implies.

Yes, good point. But how to determine whether an animal is self-conscious. I know of a spider who reacts to its own image for example. See below, funny..

http://www.skoften.net/index/uploaded/spin_in_spiegelbeeld

Mindhack, the spider in the video is merely demonstrating that can sees its reflection, and that it does not realise that the reflection is only itself. It does not require C to react in such an instictive way, it only requires its senses and fixed pattern instincts.

You're probably right about the spider not realizing, but how do you tell? I think it's a stretch to fill in what the spider does and does not realize based on this video.

You'd need to do something like the mirror test (which has some problems associated with it, but still better than nothing). All we can say for sure is that it's highly unlikely that the spider's behavior there is a result of instincts or fixed-action patterns, as there doesn't appear to be any specific eliciting stimulus and certainly no stereotyped behavior. So we can see that there is some learning going on, some awareness of its environment and past experiences, and it's making choices about the best course of action, but we can't tell whether it thinks it's another spider or whether it understands that it is itself.

Most likely, it thinks it's another spider as even the animals which are the best at identifying themselves in mirrors (humans, apes, elephants) require years of training, and thousands upon thousands of trials, before they learn what a reflection is.

SpeedOfSound wrote:The comparative anatomy of mammals,birds, reptiles, even fishes and invertebrates, show some cortical development or precursors. This kind of thinking we do is very much continuous far into the past and in my opinion right to the single cell.

Fine, but that seems to imply that you think that reptiles must do a bit of lactation, otherwise it's "discontinuous evolution". You are ignoring the hundreds of millions of years of separate evolution between reptile and mammals, and in particular, eg, lactation and sulci in mammals, but not reptiles. The continuity of evolution does not imply continuity of EXTANT SPECIES. As I said before, the mammal-like reptiles are extinct, and that makes a discontinuity in extant species.

Mr.Samsa wrote:All we can say for sure is that it's highly unlikely that the spider's behavior there is a result of instincts or fixed-action patterns, as there doesn't appear to be any specific eliciting stimulus and certainly no stereotyped behavior.

So, you think it was improvising, or something? It appeared to be making threat gestures at the mirror, unless I'm mistaken. Are you saying threats aren't a FPA.
EDIT: The basic point is that those gestures weren't something the spider had to learn. And, even if it was, it would only be a habit instead of an instinct, so nothing that requires conscious thought.

SpeedOfSound wrote:

mindhack wrote:

DavidMcC wrote:

mindhack wrote:
Yes, good point. But how to determine whether an animal is self-conscious. I know of a spider who reacts to its own image for example. See below, funny..

http://www.skoften.net/index/uploaded/spin_in_spiegelbeeld

Mindhack, the spider in the video is merely demonstrating that can sees its reflection, and that it does not realise that the reflection is only itself. It does not require C to react in such an instictive way, it only requires its senses and fixed pattern instincts.

You're probably right about the spider not realizing, but how do you tell? I think it's a stretch to fill in what the spider does and does not realize based on this video.

Here you run into the same problem with the word 'realizing'. What is it?

I tried and failed.

Edit: A post hoc cognitive adjustment, and possibly the basis for new behaviour?

DavidMcC wrote:

Mr.Samsa wrote:All we can say for sure is that it's highly unlikely that the spider's behavior there is a result of instincts or fixed-action patterns, as there doesn't appear to be any specific eliciting stimulus and certainly no stereotyped behavior.

So, you think it was improvising, or something? It appeared to be making threat gestures at the mirror, unless I'm mistaken. Are you saying threats aren't a FPA.
EDIT: The basic point is that those gestures weren't something the spider had to learn. And, even if it was, it would only be a habit instead of an instinct, so nothing that requires conscious thought.

The threat gestures may be innate, but the general reaction wasn't (pressing against the mirror, trying to look around the back of it, etc). I assumed Mindhack was referring to that behavior, rather than the "waving" behavior.

Mr.Samsa, on the question of "learning", I supect that this takes a different form in spiders and insects than in mammals. It might be interesting to discover whether a spider or ant has to practice any learned behaviour, the way a mammal has to. If it does not, then it may be more like robotic learning than mammalian learning. I suspect the former, because, otherwise spiders might have to have lessons in things like "how to woo a potential mate", or "how to spin a web".

Mr.Samsa wrote:The threat gestures may be innate, but the general reaction wasn't (pressing against the mirror, trying to look around the back of it, etc).

Yes, but the situation the spider was confronted with was not like any its species would have encountered before, so I think it was simply using the instincts it had, in the only way it knew. I wonder whether a different, but genetically identical spider would do exactly the same thing.
Eg, the pressing against the mirror would have been the resuklt of not knwing the glass was there. Like a fly buzzing against a window pane.

Mr.Samsa wrote:

DavidMcC wrote:

Mr.Samsa wrote:All we can say for sure is that it's highly unlikely that the spider's behavior there is a result of instincts or fixed-action patterns, as there doesn't appear to be any specific eliciting stimulus and certainly no stereotyped behavior.

So, you think it was improvising, or something? It appeared to be making threat gestures at the mirror, unless I'm mistaken. Are you saying threats aren't a FPA.
EDIT: The basic point is that those gestures weren't something the spider had to learn. And, even if it was, it would only be a habit instead of an instinct, so nothing that requires conscious thought.

The threat gestures may be innate, but the general reaction wasn't (pressing against the mirror, trying to look around the back of it, etc). I assumed Mindhack was referring to that behavior, rather than the "waving" behavior.

He could of been learning to lift an arm to make an arm lift on the spider image. If that is the case then our ideas about how much circuitry is required for that kind of learning will be greatly reduced.

mindhack wrote:

SpeedOfSound wrote:

mindhack wrote:

DavidMcC wrote:

Mindhack, the spider in the video is merely demonstrating that can sees its reflection, and that it does not realise that the reflection is only itself. It does not require C to react in such an instictive way, it only requires its senses and fixed pattern instincts.

You're probably right about the spider not realizing, but how do you tell? I think it's a stretch to fill in what the spider does and does not realize based on this video.

Here you run into the same problem with the word 'realizing'. What is it?

I tried and failed.

Edit: A post hoc cognitive adjustment, and possibly the basis for new behaviour?

See below. Reductive theory.

SpeedOfSound wrote:He could of been learning to lift an arm to make an arm lift on the spider image.

But why would it care about that. A threat gesture, combined with not knowing the glass was there, is the simplest explanation, not experimentation. Spiders don't go to classes.

DavidMcC wrote:Mr.Samsa, on the question of "learning", I supect that this takes a different form in spiders and insects than in mammals. It might be interesting to discover whether a spider or ant has to practice any learned behaviour, the way a mammal has to. If it does not, then it may be more like robotic learning than mammalian learning. I suspect the former, because, otherwise spiders might have to have lessons in things like "how to woo a potential mate", or "how to spin a web".

The learning processes in insects and mammals are identical. Different species have different innate behaviors though, so some have FAPs for courting and others have to learn how to do it, but innate behaviors are obviously in the minority in terms of overall behavior (no organism could really survive if it had to rely purely on innate behaviors). So besides a few differences, like courting or web-spinning, there is no difference between how most insects learn how to find food, or escape predators, or find shelter etc, compared to mammals.

DavidMcC wrote:

Mr.Samsa wrote:The threat gestures may be innate, but the general reaction wasn't (pressing against the mirror, trying to look around the back of it, etc).

Yes, but the situation the spider was confronted with was not like any its species would have encountered before, so I think it was simply using the instincts it had, in the only way it knew. I wonder whether a different, but genetically identical spider would do exactly the same thing.

That's not how instincts work. An instinct by definition is always elicited by the same stimulus type, and always produces the exact same behavior. If you're saying that it has adapted its instinctual behavior to deal with, and react, to a novel situation - then I agree (to an extent), but importantly this is the same kind of learning that mammals, birds, and reptiles exhibit, and cannot be considered instinctual (even if it does contain an instinctual component). In the same way that a dog salivating when Pavlov rings the bell is a way of adapting to new situations using an instinct is not an instinctual behavior.

SpeedOfSound wrote:He could of been learning to lift an arm to make an arm lift on the spider image. If that is the case then our ideas about how much circuitry is required for that kind of learning will be greatly reduced.

Definitely. Whether it made the "conscious" appraisal of what was going on, it certainly would have learnt that relationship between raising an arm and the other spider raising an arm. It's basic conditioning, and we already know that spiders can do this.

DavidMcC wrote:

SpeedOfSound wrote:He could of been learning to lift an arm to make an arm lift on the spider image.

But why would it care about that. A threat gesture, combined with not knowing the glass was there, is the simplest explanation, not experimentation. Spiders don't go to classes.

It's not about "caring", it's about the fact that spiders necessarily have to interact with their environment and so they'd learn these associations in the same way they learn how to behave in response to other things. Being able to respond to your own impact on the world is a necessary component of something being alive (at least, staying alive).

DavidMcC wrote:

SpeedOfSound wrote:The comparative anatomy of mammals,birds, reptiles, even fishes and invertebrates, show some cortical development or precursors. This kind of thinking we do is very much continuous far into the past and in my opinion right to the single cell.

Fine, but that seems to imply that you think that reptiles must do a bit of lactation, otherwise it's "discontinuous evolution". You are ignoring the hundreds of millions of years of separate evolution between reptile and mammals, and in particular, eg, lactation and sulci in mammals, but not reptiles. The continuity of evolution does not imply continuity of EXTANT SPECIES. As I said before, the mammal-like reptiles are extinct, and that makes a discontinuity in extant species.

You could describe very succinctly what lactation is. Realization, self-awareness, and consciousness? I think not so easy. The last pages of this discussion have run aground on one thing. X is Y. Y is in the domain of science but X is not quite there yet.

Lactation IS Y. That we could sketch out. In this talk we have X in the folk psychology and intuition. This is a big problem. Paul Churchland has suggested that the science will move from Y to X and redefine these words with it's structure. Jaegwon Kim suggests that we clarify X by a functionalization prior to reduction.

With you and nearly every other poster in this thread and in other threads the problem remains that X is not properly specified. We all end up talking past each other because the set of such specifications is probably as extensive as the number of people we have here posting.

DavidMcC wrote:

SpeedOfSound wrote:He could of been learning to lift an arm to make an arm lift on the spider image.

But why would it care about that. A threat gesture, combined with not knowing the glass was there, is the simplest explanation, not experimentation. Spiders don't go to classes.

I care because it is interesting to map out the exact kind of circuitry needed to interact with the environment in this manner. If it turns out to be as simple as a spider than we can model that in a computer near to us in the future. I have suspicions about this kind of interaction being closely tied to our intuitions about what it means to be conscious.

DavidMcC wrote:

SpeedOfSound wrote:He could of been learning to lift an arm to make an arm lift on the spider image.

But why would it care about that. A threat gesture, combined with not knowing the glass was there, is the simplest explanation, not experimentation. Spiders don't go to classes.

You speak of 'care'. Am I right you think emotional judgement is an essential element of C? I'm not too sure about that.

mindhack wrote:Ants display creativity in their ability to respond to changes in their environment.

How do you know it is creativity?

You speak of 'care'. Am I right you think emotional judgement is an essential element of C? I'm not too sure about that.

That's exactly my point, I think it DOESN'T CARE. Not caring does not require C. Only caring requires C.

mindhack wrote:

GrahamH wrote:

mindhack wrote:Ants display creativity in their ability to respond to changes in their environment. If that's not an expression of consciousness, it certainly is awareness, is it not? I think the ability to come up with alternatives and be creative are more fundamental properties of conscious behaviour then whether or not ants contemplate individually battle strategies and societal structures.

Computers can come up with 'creative solutions' not anticipated by their programmers. Does that mean computers are subjective entities having experiences (= aware / conscious)?

I don't know. What do you think: is it possible for computers to be conscious, ever?

I think it could be possible, that consciousness is 'cognition' that structures information into control loops (c.f. your sensory response as 'awareness') such that data becomes contextualised and if that occurs with self-referencing information to form an incomplete model of a subjective point of view that could amount to what we call consciousness. Consciousness is 'cognitive in nature'.

mindhack wrote:

GrahamH wrote:

mindhack wrote:In many respects humans are ants. We both are social animals, build colonies, react to changes in our environment, don't make our minds up individually, a lot if not all of our behaviour has formed automatically as a response to basic experiences such as pain, pleasure and yes...pheromones too .

In short, how can you be sure we're so different from ants in respect to consciousness?

We can't be sure, which is the problem. Does an ant that runs away from heat or writhes after contact with insecticide feel pain? Does a robot with heat sensors that runs away from heat feel pain?

We think human perception is conscious, right? Our perception consists of both observations and emotional judgements. Together they form our experience. Whatever we observe influences what we value and whatever we value influences what we observe. Do you think C requires an ability to make emotional judgements?

What does 'emotional judgement' mean? this is a difficult question. I think it is related to what we call intuition and what underlies thinking and language in that they are the hidden processes inside the black box. If we had full access to our brains, if we had full information on our functioning, I don't think we could be conscious because consciousness is a sort of non-linguistic narrative of what happens to the organism.

If something constituting thought generation (& sensory simulation, imagining) can operate in a system, and it generates a context of a locus for perceptual and 'thought generation' processes / events linked to a behavioural model of other people/systems it could constitute consciousness musk as we have it.

I think emotional states are the legacy of simpler forms of self model and control, general patterns of threat, mating opportunity, fight or flight, feed or rest etc. They might be necessary steps to evolution of consciousness, which subsequently adds better resolution and hierarchical complexity to a better model that incorporates the emotional model, more advanced perceptual models and more predictive models of behaviour, in others and self.

DavidMcC wrote:

mindhack wrote:Ants display creativity in their ability to respond to changes in their environment.

How do you know it is creativity?

I think whenever ants manage to adjust, create new routes to food supplies for example, it's a display of creativity. Whether or not it really is creativity is open for debate.

Mr.Samsa wrote:The learning processes in insects and mammals are identical.

They're only identical if you ignore the differences, which are probably not brought out by the kind of experiments work you have referred to in the past. Have you tried distinstinguishing between learning in an industrial robot (with its learning subroutines routines) and an insect?