keyfeatures wrote:

DavidMcC wrote: if, while walking, we are thinking about something we want to do later,

This thinking about what you want to do later has been thought earlier than you are consciously aware of however. Like the optical display trails our conscious vision creates from fireworks, the conscious mind is always playing catchup with what is going on unconsciously. Just as the eye takes time to register photons that are no longer there, the conscious mind gives the illusion of a train of thought from unconscious signals that have since moved on. This is what brain scans show us.

But this does not necessary imply that our thinking always occurs unthingkingly, unbidden or without our knowledge or intent, as I think you infer. Your thoughts do not exist elsewhere or exist 'earlier than you are consciously aware' of - your conscious awareness of a thought is the thought, the perceptual and cognitive activity whcih happened before thought is part of the process of thought, but it is not the thought itself. Our perception of stimuli takes a little time, the photons have died by the time we consciously perceive them, but we do not say that the perception is false or that we did not see, or that what we see we saw unconsciously first and only later became consciously aware of it. Our thoughts, perceptions, and interpretations of stimuli are part of long chain of cause and effect and if we are to say that the thought existed before it was consciously thought then we might look to what initiated the thought (a perception or another thought) and say that the unthought-thought existed first in that state, or if the thought was a response to a perception we might say that the thought existed in the perception or in the thing perceived.

What we acknowledge in the term 'free will' is that we are presented with choices and we have the capacity to choose. Insight into the decision making process is interesting but how might it be useful in our everyday, choice-filled lives? Saying that the decision making process is a kind of sham which only results in the illusion of being able to freely choose this-over-that is not useful if it acts to undermine all the choices we make. If that were so, there would be no point in choosing to respond to this hasty missive.

THWOTH wrote: Your thoughts do not exist elsewhere or exist 'earlier than you are consciously aware' of - your conscious awareness of a thought is the thought, the perceptual and cognitive activity which happened before thought is part of the process of thought, but it is not the thought itself. Our perception of stimuli takes a little time, the photons have died by the time we consciously perceive them, but we do not say that the perception is false or that we did not see, or that what we see we saw unconsciously first and only later became consciously aware of it. Our thoughts, perceptions, and interpretations of stimuli are part of long chain of cause and effect and if we are to say that the thought existed before it was consciously thought then we might look to what initiated the thought (a perception or another thought) and say that the unthought-thought existed first in that state, or if the thought was a response to a perception we might say that the thought existed in the perception or in the thing perceived.

Conscious 'thought' is a qualia experience. Just as we can't say certain wavelengths of light, or the brain areas that respond to them, are the colour red, neither can we say that the external inputs, or unconscious brain areas that respond to them, are the thought in terms of qualia experience. Insofar as there is a difference between conscious qualia as an experience and the elements that create them, you are correct in stating that unconscious thinking is not a conscious thought. However, the conscious qualia experience that is fed back to the unconscious mind to be further developed is not a basis for 'free'will. Rather, it's just a continuation of a feedback loop.

There is no way to divorce our thinking from the physics that drives it. And all of this physics operates unconsciously. Indeed, much thinking can quite easily continue without us being aware of it - as is the case following brain stem damage, for example. The thinking processes continue but they cannot be channelled into what we perceive as a 'self'. Conscious awareness and the 'self' are simply a result of 'wiring'. With the right wiring you could just as easily experience the thoughts of another brain, and therefore be part of another 'self' - as is already the case for some siamese twins. Where does this reality of wiring leave free will? Dead in the water I'd say.

As for pointlessness or otherwise. Well, objectively it is pointless to respond one way or another. Yet subjectivity, or emotion if you prefer, compels meaning and purpose. This compulsion from a subjective point of view feels satisfying and we'd have little in the way of culture or art or feelings of connection without it.

I wonder if you could explain what qualia are keyfeatures and how they might amount to consciousness being 'a qualia experience'?

THWOTH wrote:I wonder if you could explain what qualia are keyfeatures and how they might amount to consciousness being 'a qualia experience'?

Qualia are what we experience (consciously) - the subjective feelings or sensations or 'ideas' we get that cannot be explained simply by reduction of the system to constituent parts or inputs. All conscious experiences are essentially qualia - preceded and transmitted by unconscious physics. They are not communicable solely in terms of descriptors of physical inputs or parts although they are caused by such.

Thanks keyfeatures , but if 'all conscious experiences are essentially qualia' why don't we just call them experiences?

THWOTH wrote:Thanks keyfeatures , but if 'all conscious experiences are essentially qualia' why don't we just call them experiences?

Why has language evolved words such as 'soul' or 'mind'? Subjective experience frequently creates words that science later shows are based on how we perceive the universe rather than how the universe is. Language (and this is certainly true for English) also has words with overlapping meanings. 'Quale' specifically relates to consciousness. We might say a planet 'experiences' gravity, or a particle 'experiences' a charge. This is not (entirely) the same 'experience' being discussed when we talk of feelings. Therefore, it's useful to have a word that specifically relates to subjective conscious experience.

Sorry, I might be being a little slow here, but if 'qualia' specifically relates to 'subjective conscious experiences' what part do qualia play in relation to those experiences? Could you give me some examples? What qualifies qualia?

DavidMcC wrote:Mr Samsa, thanks for your reply. I don't know if you have seen the long debates on the subject that have been held on richarddawkins.net in the last year or two, but it is apparent from them that there are differences of understanding as to whether "free will" is a matter of "all or nothing".

I haven't really been back to RD.net since the big switchover. I never liked the old front page, and I find the new style doesn't produce any interesting discussion..

DavidMcC wrote:I take the view that we have "a little bit" of it - and use it when it matters and there is time to think. In emergencies, our self-preservation instinct takes over, but when there is nothing much to worry about, habit tends to take over instead. However, this still leaves room for important decisions to be made "of our own free will", ie over-riding the other two, in accordance with whatever we want (not that we necessarily get to actually do whatever we want, but we at least get to think of it, as intelligent mammals).

I suppose the difficulty is in trying to distinguish how "instinctual" behavior is different from a conscious act of free will. With science, we know that complex conscious choices can be predicted in the same way habits and instincts are, so if there is a difference between the two then it must be a metaphysical difference, rather than an observable or measurable difference.

Do you think any scientific experiment could tease apart the difference you suggest?

DavidMcC wrote:As you can tell from my earlier posts I do not think that this kind of "free will" is uniquely human - to some extent, I think all mammals probably have it, especially primates. It probably plays a role in primate "politics", in which leaders try to manipulate the free will of the rest to suit their own ends, usually by trying to convince "the masses" that they have a common interest.

Oh sure, but my comment above was meant to point out that a lot of people's concept of free will presents difficulty in limiting it to humans - that is, not just animals display their concept of free will, but also inanimate objects and processes like the weather. For example, Dennett's compatibilist position leads us to accept that weather patterns have free will.

DavidMcC wrote:When we are taking a stroll, we no doubt perform a lot of muscular actions that would indicate that we have no free will, since we do not usually concern ourselves about each muscular movement. However, if, while walking, we are thinking about something we want to do later, then we are presumably exercising what free will we do have, on the basis of Libet's result, yes?

I think Libet argues that we don't have free will but "free won't" or "free don't" (I can't remember the phrase he uses), which seems somewhat in line with what you argue for. In other words, he seems to argue that we mostly operate on 'auto-pilot', but we can veto these choices and decisions using our free will.

I'd argue that I'm not sure what the difference is between habitual behaviors being the product of environmental factors, and 'conscious' behaviors being the product of environmental factors (keeping in mind that our thoughts and decisions don't just pop out of nowhere).

THWOTH wrote:What we acknowledge in the term 'free will' is that we are presented with choices and we have the capacity to choose. Insight into the decision making process is interesting but how might it be useful in our everyday, choice-filled lives? Saying that the decision making process is a kind of sham which only results in the illusion of being able to freely choose this-over-that is not useful if it acts to undermine all the choices we make. If that were so, there would be no point in choosing to respond to this hasty missive.

If free will is no more than "making a choice", then you run into the same redundancy you're discussing above with "qualia" and "experiences".

Mr.Samsa wrote:

I'd argue that I'm not sure what the difference is between habitual behaviors being the product of environmental factors, and 'conscious' behaviors being the product of environmental factors (keeping in mind that our thoughts and decisions don't just pop out of nowhere).

I agree. The only differences between kneejerk actions and more complex decision-making processes appear to be in the areas of the brain that are utilised and the resultant ratio of awareness to unawareness we have in the process. For a 'choice' to be genuine there has to be a mechanism for it to operate. The fact that I could conceivably choose to eat an orange, rather than a bag of crisps say, fails to provide a mechanism for how the counterfactual outcome might genuinely arise. Possibility is not probability. The 'choice' is rather illusory without such a mechanism.

Mr.Samsa wrote:I suppose the difficulty is in trying to distinguish how "instinctual" behavior is different from a conscious act of free will. With science, we know that complex conscious choices can be predicted in the same way habits and instincts are, so if there is a difference between the two then it must be a metaphysical difference, rather than an observable or measurable difference.

Do you think any scientific experiment could tease apart the difference you suggest?

The obvious difference is that you have to think about free will decisions, so free will is slower than instinct, and you know when you're thinking, presumably. Therefore, we can easily tell the difference when it comes to our own behaviour. The problem only occurs when dealing with others, especially other species, where there may be little or no communication of detailed thoughts, only inferences from behaviour.
Also, conscious decisions of free will rely on the "emotional value" of the decision, whereas instinct per se is unemotional. IMO, it's only when the two coincide, because of the physiological effects of hormones (eg, when you fear for your life), that it seems as if instinct itself involves emotion. When you're trying to decide what is in your (or others') best interests, you can be sure it is free will.
It is also easy to distinguish between free will and learned habit, because the latter is what you do "without thinking".

Does that make sense?

I think Libet argues that we don't have free will but "free won't" or "free don't" (I can't remember the phrase he uses), which seems somewhat in line with what you argue for. In other words, he seems to argue that we mostly operate on 'auto-pilot', but we can veto these choices and decisions using our free will.

But a "free won't" more-or-less amounts to a free will, because it can be applied to ideas that occur to you as much as to instincts.

The only problem I see is distinguishing between instinct and habit, but that can usually be deduced from the details - we know we can't have an instinct to do most of the things we do from habit, because they're too specific. Instincts are vague (which is probably why learned habits were such an advantage to the early mammals (and mammal-like reptiles preceding them) because a change of habit comes more quickly than change of instinct, which mainly requires genetic change, except for minor adjustments.

Mr.Samsa wrote:

THWOTH wrote:What we acknowledge in the term 'free will' is that we are presented with choices and we have the capacity to choose. Insight into the decision making process is interesting but how might it be useful in our everyday, choice-filled lives? Saying that the decision making process is a kind of sham which only results in the illusion of being able to freely choose this-over-that is not useful if it acts to undermine all the choices we make. If that were so, there would be no point in choosing to respond to this hasty missive.

If free will is no more than "making a choice", then you run into the same redundancy you're discussing above with "qualia" and "experiences".

Perhaps. But even if 'free will' is generally misconceived from a neurological point of view it is still an 'illusion' we have to navigate in our everyday lives.

DavidMcC wrote:

Mr.Samsa wrote:I suppose the difficulty is in trying to distinguish how "instinctual" behavior is different from a conscious act of free will. With science, we know that complex conscious choices can be predicted in the same way habits and instincts are, so if there is a difference between the two then it must be a metaphysical difference, rather than an observable or measurable difference.

Do you think any scientific experiment could tease apart the difference you suggest?

The obvious difference is that you have to think about free will decisions, so free will is slower than instinct, and you know when you're thinking, presumably. Therefore, we can easily tell the difference when it comes to our own behaviour. The problem only occurs when dealing with others, especially other species, where there may be little or no communication of detailed thoughts, only inferences from behaviour.
Also, conscious decisions of free will rely on the "emotional value" of the decision, whereas instinct per se is unemotional. IMO, it's only when the two coincide, because of the physiological effects of hormones (eg, when you fear for your life), that it seems as if instinct itself involves emotion. When you're trying to decide what is in your (or others') best interests, you can be sure it is free will.
It is also easy to distinguish between free will and learned habit, because the latter is what you do "without thinking".

Does that make sense?

I get that we can find ways of distinguishing the two in that sense, but I was more getting at the fact that habitual behaviors and free willed conscious behaviors are generated by the same forces and variables. As such, what reason is there to claim that one is "free will" and the other is not, when there is no fundamental difference between the two?

DavidMcC wrote:

I think Libet argues that we don't have free will but "free won't" or "free don't" (I can't remember the phrase he uses), which seems somewhat in line with what you argue for. In other words, he seems to argue that we mostly operate on 'auto-pilot', but we can veto these choices and decisions using our free will.

But a "free won't" more-or-less amounts to a free will, because it can be applied to ideas that occur to you as much as to instincts.

The only problem I see is distinguishing between instinct and habit, but that can usually be deduced from the details - we know we can't have an instinct to do most of the things we do from habit, because they're too specific. Instincts are vague (which is probably why learned habits were such an advantage to the early mammals (and mammal-like reptiles preceding them) because a change of habit comes more quickly than change of instinct, which mainly requires genetic change, except for minor adjustments.

Well, when it comes to humans, distinguishing instinct from habit is easy as humans don't have any instincts past the age of 6 months.

THWOTH wrote:Perhaps. But even if 'free will' is generally misconceived from a neurological point of view it is still an 'illusion' we have to navigate in our everyday lives.

Is it? I don't assume even the illusion of free will and I think I navigate my life just fine.

"This thinking about what you want to do later has been thought earlier than you are consciously aware of however. Like the optical display trails our conscious vision creates from fireworks, the conscious mind is always playing catchup with what is going on unconsciously."

It's the "always" bit that I doubt, key. The implication is that we reason with our subconscious, and that can't be true, IMO - we must be reasoning using only what is in our working memory (our conscious memory - much less than what is in our subconscious memory), otherwise we would all be geniuses, who could draw amazing conclusions without even knowing how we came to them. I suggest that what really happens is that memories pop into our working memory from time to time, and only when the right ones do so can we do any reasoning with them, because that is a conscious process, unlike the pre-processing that the retina and visual cortex do with visual data.

Mr.Samsa wrote:I was more getting at the fact that habitual behaviors and free willed conscious behaviors are generated by the same forces and variables.

True, but we do seem to be able to break habits from time to time, if we concentrate enough, such as we might after the habit got us into difficulties the last time we let it just happen, without thinking. Thinking takes time, so it's sensible not to use it unless you have to. Thus, when it comes to our own behaviour, it is usually easy to tell when we were going with a habit and when not. It's only with others' behaviour that there's a problem distinguishing, because we can't see what's going on inside their head (at least, not normally!).

Well, when it comes to humans, distinguishing instinct from habit is easy as humans don't have any instincts past the age of 6 months.

Although I would agree that we have fewer instincts than most species, I think there must still be some basic ones, such as self-preservation, and (at puberty) the sex drive. I'm sure we suppress the sexual instinct quite often, using our "free won't" to avoid getting into trouble as a consequence.

Okay but the free won't was not free in the Libet study. The participants were told to enact it. As such, it's the social / environmental factors that cause as 'won't' to feed back to unconscious signals. Given competing sets of environmental / social factors it's not the will that freely decides between them but the competition of their actions on our genes and between each other.

DavidMcC wrote:

Mr.Samsa wrote:I was more getting at the fact that habitual behaviors and free willed conscious behaviors are generated by the same forces and variables.

True, but we do seem to be able to break habits from time to time, if we concentrate enough, such as we might after the habit got us into difficulties the last time we let it just happen, without thinking. Thinking takes time, so it's sensible not to use it unless you have to. Thus, when it comes to our own behaviour, it is usually easy to tell when we were going with a habit and when not. It's only with others' behaviour that there's a problem distinguishing, because we can't see what's going on inside their head (at least, not normally!).

True, we can break habits by thinking about it. But the problem is that the choice to think about it, and to change our habits, are formed by the same processes that generate our habits.

DavidMcC wrote:

Well, when it comes to humans, distinguishing instinct from habit is easy as humans don't have any instincts past the age of 6 months.

Although I would agree that we have fewer instincts than most species, I think there must still be some basic ones, such as self-preservation, and (at puberty) the sex drive. I'm sure we suppress the sexual instinct quite often, using our "free won't" to avoid getting into trouble as a consequence.

"Instinct" is actually an old word that is largely rejected by modern science. It's been replaced by the more rigorous processes of "reflexes" and "fixed-action patterns", and these have strict definitions. When applied to humans, we find that no 'instincts' in humans extend beyond around 6 months of age.

There is currently no evidence for any kind of innate or biological self-preservation instinct or sex drive. This doesn't mean that we don't value life or that we don't have urges to have sex, just that these don't meet the criteria for being instincts. As direct disproof of the claim, keep in mind that instincts need to be universal across all individuals within a species: people who commit suicide, and asexuals, automatically disqualify them from being instincts.

Mr.Samsa wrote:True, we can break habits by thinking about it. But the problem is that the choice to think about it, and to change our habits, are formed by the same processes that generate our habits.

Sometimes, quantity becomes quality, as they say. The threshold for this to occur is clearly lower when we are young. Your argument could be used to claim that there is no difference between a star like the sun and a black hole, because they were formed by the same process of gravitational collapse of gas.

"Instinct" is actually an old word that is largely rejected by modern science. It's been replaced by the more rigorous processes of "reflexes" and "fixed-action patterns", and these have strict definitions.

Makes no odds to me. There is certainly some justification in distinguishing between the brain-bypassing "reflexes" and the others - but they still involve a significant genetic component, because the "rules" by which the neuronal wiring is developed are influenced by genetic interactions, as well as by developmental hormones outside the brain.

... people who commit suicide, and asexuals, automatically disqualify them from being instincts.

I disagree that they are disproof of instinct. They merely show that (a) instincts are vague, and (b) these examples are more complex than just instinct, because they are profoundly influenced by hormones acting within the brain.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Instinct

keyfeatures wrote:Okay but the free won't was not free in the Libet study.

That's exactly what I was arguing, but for different reasons. I argue that the first Libet experiment, subjects were, in effect, asked to suspend their free will, by pressing the button "on impulse" rather than deliberately. (By deliberately, I mean as a result of conscious thought, as any good decision should be.)

DavidMcC wrote:

keyfeatures wrote:Okay but the free won't was not free in the Libet study.

That's exactly what I was arguing, but for different reasons. I argue that the first Libet experiment, subjects were, in effect, asked to suspend their free will, by pressing the button "on impulse" rather than deliberately. (By deliberately, I mean as a result of conscious thought, as any good decision should be.)

This now becomes a moral argument. You imply that decisions are either good or bad and that conscious involvement makes decisions better. What's the rationale behind this?

This now becomes a moral argument. You imply that decisions are either good or bad and that conscious involvement makes decisions better.

Not at all. Morality doesn't come into it. It's only about the distinction between habits, "instincts" and "free will" conscious decisions (which cCAN have a moral dimension, but certainly don't necessarily).