Dan Dennett was right 20 years ago. Sam Harris is right this year. But there will still be the same old nay-sayers. They'll be philosophers like Nagels and Searle. Not Neuroscientists.

http://www.nature.com/news/2011/110831/ ... 7023a.html

Does that make the Hameroff-Penrose theory of quantum consciousness (supposedly linked to the quantization of space) correct as well, because Hameroff is a biologist?

I think not. The Sam Harris theory of "no free will" plays on the combination of three factors:
1. an ancient Eastern philosophy;

2. a dubious experiment by Libet (in which the subjects are asked not to think before they act);

3. the association of the concept of "free will" with a bible story, instead of with mammalian evolution (mammals have to learn how to survive, rather than having it mainly pre-programmed in their genes)!

Hi David

This is not a dubious experiment by Libet though, is it? What mechanism are you saying shows free will does exist?

Philosophers aren't convinced that brain scans can demolish free will so easily. Some have questioned the neuroscientists' results and interpretations, arguing that the researchers have not quite grasped the concept that they say they are debunking.

I'm with them! On RD's site, I spent three long threads trying to explain why, but this article on RD's site shows the lengths that some people will go to to support their mistaken ideas:

http://richarddawkins.net/articles/644694-parent-child-conflict-it-s-in-the-genes

The clash of wills between parents and children is now suddenly due to our genes! A simpler explanation is that it is a clash of free wills, just like in politics.

PS, I notice that you registered here on the same day as I did. I guess you saw the same post about it as I did!

No I've been locked out by the RD Mods David. Too much wordplay and out of box thinking. It's the stuff I'm made of so hard to change but clearly not welcome there.

It occurs to me that it would make sense to look for clashes of will between identical twins, as these could not be of genetic origin. I'm pretty sure they happen, though!

As an aside, I'm sorry to hear that you're banned from RD. However, I did notice that you were tending to join with a couple of other posters on some fairly "impenetrable" discussions, that could be construed as "off topic".

Why couldn't a clash of wills between identical twins be genetic (at least in part)? If you are of an argumentative nature you're going to clash with another genehost with an argumentative nature - even if you are genetically identical.

The impenetrability is in the comprehension or otherwise of the reader. Language evolves - how many others must understand before it's deemed acceptable? Some would find Adorno, or even Russell, impenetrable.

keyfeatures wrote:Why couldn't a clash of wills between identical twins be genetic (at least in part)? If you are of an argumentative nature you're going to clash with another genehost with an argumentative nature - even if you are genetically identical.

A good point, but I was thinking more of the kind of arguments that are about specific issues and tend to occur at particular ages (teeens), that anyone might get into, such as when the child wants to drive the parent's car when under-aged. This doesn't seem to require any particular pre-disposition to argue, given most teen's hormonal situation!

DavidMcC wrote:
A good point, but I was thinking more of the kind of arguments that are about specific issues and tend to occur at particular ages (teeens), that anyone might get into, such as when the child wants to drive the parent's car when under-aged.

Pinker puts it down to a combination of genetics and peer group. For those more genetically susceptible to peer group pressure, the car issue would most likely arise if others in the group had similar aims. Personally, I don't remember ever wanting to drive my parents' car either under or at age so the example you give doesn't resonate as an argument "anyone might get into". The hormones can work both ways. Teenage surges often coincide with menopausal mothers. Perhaps the rise in later motherhood with alter this? At any rate, I don't understand what this has to do with free will -or the proof thereof.

I don't understand what this has to do with free will -or the proof thereof.

My thinking was that those who assert that we have no free will have to replace it with instinct, as there has to be some cause to replace the free will. But instinct, being of genetic origin, tends to produce cooperation between genetically identical individuals, as in theocial insects. Having said that, it is possible to manipulate at least one species of ant so that it attacks its own kin in preference to others. Unfortunately, I don't have a reference to that work, and don't remember how it was done.

My browser wouldn't let me correct for a typo in the above post. For "theocial" read "the eusocial"". Sometimes my computer keyboard gets it keyboard codes mixed up!

I'm waiting for Mr Samsa to tell me what I should think about this.

THWOTH wrote:I'm waiting for Mr Samsa to tell me what I should think about this.

Don't hold your breath, then!

Oh! Hang on, he's resigned from the mods team, but that doesn't in itself stop him from posting. Maybe he'll "tell you what to think" after all!

DavidMcC wrote:

I don't understand what this has to do with free will -or the proof thereof.

My thinking was that those who assert that we have no free will have to replace it with instinct, as there has to be some cause to replace the free will. But instinct, being of genetic origin, tends to produce cooperation between genetically identical individuals, as in theocial insects. Having said that, it is possible to manipulate at least one species of ant so that it attacks its own kin in preference to others. Unfortunately, I don't have a reference to that work, and don't remember how it was done.

Genes don't care if they survive or not. Plus, once you get to the level of gene host you have a lot of genetic factors all combining and competing. Since there's so much internal conflict going on there's no reason why this shouldn't manifest as conflict between genetically identical individuals. Not least ones of the same sex. Male-male fights are a lot more common than female-male or even female-female so there's clearly a lot more going on than just an assessment of how many genes you have in common. You only have to look at the history of warfare to see that.

THWOTH wrote:I'm waiting for Mr Samsa to tell me what I should think about this.

Well, as an expert on the matter....



If you want my opinion, then scientific experiments can't really touch on issues on free will as it's a metaphysical claim, not a scientific one. It can weigh in on issues like libertarian free will, which claims absolutely no input from environmental issues and argues that basic facts of causality don't apply to the immaterial nature of the "soul" or "mind". Scientific findings that demonstrate that altering environmental variables can result in predictable behavioral results obviously disprove such an hypothesis (in its most basic form, at least).

The difficulty with free will, however, is that the modern (and most accepted form) is the compatibilist position, where free will cannot be disproven by even pointing out that the universe (and thus the brain and behaviors) are entirely deterministic. The processes that occur within the brain are said to be part of the "self", and so the finding that brain areas light up seconds before we are consciously aware of a choice doesn't change the fact that the "self" (which includes unconscious processes) still made the choice. As such, if we were to reverse time, and present the exact same choice to the participant, we are no longer faced with a form of "free will" which suggests that the person can or would choose differently, because the self is influenced by genetic and environmental variables.

This doesn't mean we have to accept the existence of free will though, or that scientific facts can't help shape our opinions, but rather it just points out that free will is a philosophical issue that can only really be determined by arguments and logical reasoning. And this is what the Nature article actually says, if you read it all the way through:

Philosophers question the assumptions underlying such interpretations. "Part of what's driving some of these conclusions is the thought that free will has to be spiritual or involve souls or something," says Al Mele, a philosopher at Florida State University in Tallahassee. If neuroscientists find unconscious neural activity that drives decision-making, the troublesome concept of mind as separate from body disappears, as does free will. This 'dualist' conception of free will is an easy target for neuroscientists to knock down, says Glannon. "Neatly dividing mind and brain makes it easier for neuroscientists to drive a wedge between them," he adds.

The trouble is, most current philosophers don't think about free will like that, says Mele. Many are materialists — believing that everything has a physical basis, and decisions and actions come from brain activity. So scientists are weighing in on a notion that philosophers consider irrelevant.

The article is more about the idea that neuroscience can help us narrow down the definition of "free will", and reach an agreement between scientists and philosophers as to what such a thing would constitute.

Mr Samsa, the opponents of "free will" make specific claims that effectively define what they are denying the existence of. That is, they claim that Libet's experiment shows that we only find out about what we decided some time after we actually decided. I have argued that this result (and the aforementioned conclusion) is based on a serious procedural error. That is, Libet specifically asked his subjects to press a button effectively "on a whim", rather than after any conscious thinking. This allowed them to act on impulse, so emulating a learned habit. Although much of any mammal's behaviour is inevitably habitual (or instinctive), some mammals (including humans), clearly have the ability to "think before they act" - to exercise their "free won't" as philosophers have described it.
When Libet re-ran the experiment so as to supposedly answer the above criticism, he made a second change, which was to monitor far more neurons. He then claimed that there were nerve impulses before the subject knew of his/her action. However, it was not made clear which nerve impulses these were.

I put it to you that the conclusion (that we find out what we have decided only after subconsciously making that decision) is based on the deliberate suppression of thought prior to action, mimicking habit, and that the second experiment was deliberately flawed, because there is a political motivation behind the experiment.

DavidMcC wrote:Mr Samsa, the opponents of "free will" make specific claims that effectively define what they are denying the existence of. That is, they claim that Libet's experiment shows that we only find out about what we decided some time after we actually decided. I have argued that this result (and the aforementioned conclusion) is based on a serious procedural error. That is, Libet specifically asked his subjects to press a button effectively "on a whim", rather than after any conscious thinking. This allowed them to act on impulse, so emulating a learned habit. Although much of any mammal's behaviour is inevitably habitual (or instinctive), some mammals (including humans), clearly have the ability to "think before they act" - to exercise their "free won't" as philosophers have described it.
When Libet re-ran the experiment so as to supposedly answer the above criticism, he made a second change, which was to monitor far more neurons. He then claimed that there were nerve impulses before the subject knew of his/her action. However, it was not made clear which nerve impulses these were.

I put it to you that the conclusion (that we find out what we have decided only after subconsciously making that decision) is based on the deliberate suppression of thought prior to action, mimicking habit, and that the second experiment was deliberately flawed, because there is a political motivation behind the experiment.

I think those are fair enough complaints, but I think the bigger issue is that Libet's concept of free will assumes a 'dualist'-like understanding of free will, where decisions are made independent of brain processes. But for materialists who believe in free will, the fact that the self is a product of brain processes is necessarily true, so Libet's experiments don't affect that at all.

I personally think that the experiments in choice theory are more problematic for free will, as they highlight the fact that changing environmental variables (even ones that people are not aware of) can result in them behaving in ways we want them to behave and in highly predictable ways. The problem with this is that it muddies the water with regards to what an "agent" is, and what they are doing when we say they have made a 'choice', and so if "agent" now includes external forces then it becomes difficult to justify applying the term 'free will' exclusively to people.

Mr Samsa, thanks for your reply. I don't know if you have seen the long debates on the subject that have been held on richarddawkins.net in the last year or two, but it is apparent from them that there are differences of understanding as to whether "free will" is a matter of "all or nothing". I take the view that we have "a little bit" of it - and use it when it matters and there is time to think. In emergencies, our self-preservation instinct takes over, but when there is nothing much to worry about, habit tends to take over instead. However, this still leaves room for important decisions to be made "of our own free will", ie over-riding the other two, in accordance with whatever we want (not that we necessarily get to actually do whatever we want, but we at least get to think of it, as intelligent mammals).
As you can tell from my earlier posts I do not think that this kind of "free will" is uniquely human - to some extent, I think all mammals probably have it, especially primates. It probably plays a role in primate "politics", in which leaders try to manipulate the free will of the rest to suit their own ends, usually by trying to convince "the masses" that they have a common interest.

When we are taking a stroll, we no doubt perform a lot of muscular actions that would indicate that we have no free will, since we do not usually concern ourselves about each muscular movement. However, if, while walking, we are thinking about something we want to do later, then we are presumably exercising what free will we do have, on the basis of Libet's result, yes?

DavidMcC wrote: if, while walking, we are thinking about something we want to do later,

This thinking about what you want to do later has been thought earlier than you are consciously aware of however. Like the optical display trails our conscious vision creates from fireworks, the conscious mind is always playing catchup with what is going on unconsciously. Just as the eye takes time to register photons that are no longer there, the conscious mind gives the illusion of a train of thought from unconscious signals that have since moved on. This is what brain scans show us.