GrahamH wrote:

kennyc wrote:

GrahamH wrote:Yes, David, you explained the T_C loops, and the persistence of excitation. Those are all fair enough. I have no particular disagreement with you on that, but it goes nowhere at all in explaining why or how that produces experiences for a subjective mind. We can focus on the topology of loops and regions or we can think about information content in those loops and regions. My interest here is what it means to be conscious. How is experience known/had?

What it 'means' to be conscious it to survive, to have a survival advantage. It's nothing more than that.

What does it 'mean' to have fingernails? What does it 'mean' to digest food?

As far as 'how' we are conscious, we are trying to explain that to you, but you are not listening due apparently to your bias and/or beliefs.

You are trying to 'explain' that mind merely in terms of a benefit of some functions of mind. It seems you have nothing to say about consciousness.

digestion and fingernails are not semantic functions. Thinking is. Consciousness is about knowing and predicting ourselves and others, about recognising what physical extent is self vs not self. I don't want to down-play digestion, but it isn't like subjectivity. It doesn't help to explain phenomenal consciousness.

I shan't be 'listening' to your posts unless you engage with the subject.

Yawn.

DavidMcC wrote:

GrahamH wrote:Yes, David, you explained the T_C loops, and the persistence of excitation. Those are all fair enough. I have no particular disagreement with you on that, but it goes nowhere at all in explaining why or how that produces experiences for a subjective mind. We can focus on the topology of loops and regions or we can think about information content in those loops and regions. My interest here is what it means to be conscious. How is experience known/had?

It is not obvious that that can be answered. Nor is it obvious that it needs to be, scientifically, other than getting more and more precise information about what different qualia correspond to in terms of neural activity, in different people.

Thanks for being straight forward about that. Maybe it can't be answered. Maybe there is no advantage in answering it, but I'd not give up on it just yet. Anyway, it is the topic of this thread, and Michio Kaku's goal was to address it. It is what the likes of Damassio, Barr, Hofstader, Metzinger and others are pursuing. There are strong common themes to their approaches. Some people will not like where its leading. Some will struggle to comprehend it.

Uh, no, he is addressing quantification of consciousness/intelligence. Not what it 'means' to be consciousness. As David said, unless I'm misinterpreting what he is saying he is saying the same thing as me, it's a meaningless question in the same way as it is to ask what is the 'meaning' of life.

Michio points out at about 2:30 in that video the silliness of the approach you and others have taken/produced thus far. .....never have so many produced so much useless krap.... It's time to let the cognitive and neurological scientists work.

How does a flower or a thermostat 'understand temperature'? Do these things 'know what it is to be warm'? If not then they are not conscious.

More problematic, what is 'a thermostat'? It's just some atoms buzzing about, just like a rock or some air. Humans assign meaning to some configuration as 'a thermostat', but there is no understanding in the object itself. There is no integrated view (no view at all) of the thermostat as a part of any feedback loop. There is only a lot of atoms bumping into each other.

Searle makes this point, that meaning is only assigned by conscious minds. That we could map any meaning to any configuration of stuff, like the calculation of Pi to the atoms in a wall. It is arbitrary.

He argues that no physical system has inherent semantics. It's all meaningless without minds. Clearly I disagree with Searle, and I have given some reasons for a different view, a view of what 'meaning' is and, in scant detail, how brains might construct semantics to assign meanings. I think brains can classify things as feedback or thermostats or warm or thinking.

Can physical brains construct meaning and thus understand things? I think they can.

GrahamH wrote:How does a flower or a thermostat 'understand temperature'? Do these things 'know what it is to be warm'? If not then they are not conscious.

Of course they don't! Neither has a neural net at all, let alone one capable of retaining and analysing input.

More problematic, what is 'a thermostat'? It's just some atoms buzzing about, just like a rock or some air.
...

More to the point, they don't have a sophisticated neural net.

DavidMcC wrote:

GrahamH wrote:How does a flower or a thermostat 'understand temperature'? Do these things 'know what it is to be warm'? If not then they are not conscious.

Of course they don't! Neither has a neural net at all, let alone one capable of retaining and analysing input.

More problematic, what is 'a thermostat'? It's just some atoms buzzing about, just like a rock or some air.
...

More to the point, they don't have a sophisticated neural net.

No, indeed, but Michio Kaku refers to these things 'understanding'. Loose talk!

Do you see that we need to make sense of how brains generate meaning to get anywhere with understanding consciousness?

Some will argue that meaning is something unique to mind, That our subjective experience is the basis of our understanding. Nobody here is arguing that, I think.

So, I'll ask again, do you think brains construct meaning? Is there semantic content to the neural fireworks? Do brains understand, or understanding all down so some 'conscious bit'?

GrahamH wrote:

DavidMcC wrote:

GrahamH wrote:... Virtual mental states are as integrated into brain as sensory states. The brain selects what to 'render in the virtual space' and responds to that rendering.

...

IMO, there is no such thing as a "sensory state", only "mental states". Sensory input is handled by non-conscious areas of the cortex, and acts as input to conscious neural circuits (by which we become aware of the input), influencing mental states.

I know, and we are unlikely to agree. You think there are 'conscious neural circuits' and I don't. You are in Kenny's boat there, and he obviously hasn't got a clue.

Does feedback == consciousness? Why? How? What does that equality mean? What makes some neural feedback conscious and other feedback, neural or not, unconscious? It looks distinctly like a case of - 'and then the magic happens'.

If 'temperature control feedback' = consciousness then elementary particles are aware.

That's exactly what I am complaining about in your posts about the self-model.

GrahamH wrote:

kennyc wrote:No, you clearly don't understand what a feedback system is or how it is being used in the context of consciousness. You are making a fundamental logic error in an attempt to support your beliefs.

David's characterization of consciousness as a separate process of the brain which is fed input/monitors sensory input (as well as memories, emotional state, etc) is absolutely right-on.

I know what feedback is. Do you want to discuss PID loops, ANN adaptive controls, Control theory? Do you want to explain how two electrons interacting is not feedback?

Feel free to post your special sauce definition if you have one that explains anything about how it is that you are conscious.

I note you have nothing to say to explain how feedback is supposed to result in my feeling of amusement at your content-free 'you don't understand!' posts.

Of course consciousness is involved with sensory monitoring, memory, emotional state also forward planning, empathy, blah, blah blah. But that doesn't explain it. It gives us no concepts that could allow any understanding. It's your mantra - feedback = consciousness. try a bit harder, please!

Jesus Christ. You and kenny have switched places? WTF? I think I might start drinking again.

SpeedOfSound wrote:

GrahamH wrote:

DavidMcC wrote:

GrahamH wrote:... Virtual mental states are as integrated into brain as sensory states. The brain selects what to 'render in the virtual space' and responds to that rendering.

...

IMO, there is no such thing as a "sensory state", only "mental states". Sensory input is handled by non-conscious areas of the cortex, and acts as input to conscious neural circuits (by which we become aware of the input), influencing mental states.

I know, and we are unlikely to agree. You think there are 'conscious neural circuits' and I don't. You are in Kenny's boat there, and he obviously hasn't got a clue.

Does feedback == consciousness? Why? How? What does that equality mean? What makes some neural feedback conscious and other feedback, neural or not, unconscious? It looks distinctly like a case of - 'and then the magic happens'.

If 'temperature control feedback' = consciousness then elementary particles are aware.

That's exactly what I am complaining about in your posts about the self-model.

?

'Feedback' does not constitute a model of body or mind.
Naturally you would like to know what does constitute a model (of anything).
I think you have ideas on that.
Let's start with body. How does the brain model body motion. How does it plan movement, how does it locate senses with motor control? How do brains make maps?

SpeedOfSound wrote:....
Jesus Christ. You and kenny have switched places? WTF? I think I might start drinking again.

Uhhh.....uhhh.....switched places? I don't think so.

....duplicate post.....

GrahamH wrote:

kennyc wrote:No special sauce required. That's what you (and Chalmers and etc) are attempting to add.

again you express you ignorance when you claim feedback = consciousness. You clearly don't comprehend the basic issues at hand.

Come on Kenney, don't tease us if you think you can explain something about how it is that there are conscious entities then explain it!
How about starting by plainly stating how it is that you, me and thermostats experience warmth.

The same way you do but with less bits.

DavidMcC wrote:..
As discussed before, he excitation migrates, so that neurons are protected from damage by over-stimulation.

Happy to see that I taught you something and it stuck.

Metzinger on self-models:

Not a cognitive scientist or neurologist.

GrahamH wrote:Yes, David, you explained the T_C loops, and the persistence of excitation. Those are all fair enough. I have no particular disagreement with you on that, but it goes nowhere at all in explaining why or how that produces experiences for a subjective mind. We can focus on the topology of loops and regions or we can think about information content in those loops and regions. My interest here is what it means to be conscious. How is experience known/had?

A good start for your understanding would be to stop characterizing it as singular. Think on that for a night before firing off a post about it.

SpeedOfSound wrote:

GrahamH wrote:Yes, David, you explained the T_C loops, and the persistence of excitation. Those are all fair enough. I have no particular disagreement with you on that, but it goes nowhere at all in explaining why or how that produces experiences for a subjective mind. We can focus on the topology of loops and regions or we can think about information content in those loops and regions. My interest here is what it means to be conscious. How is experience known/had?

A good start for your understanding would be to stop characterizing it as singular. Think on that for a night before firing off a post about it.

I don't know what you mean by singular. What do you think I am characterising as singular?
My view is that consciousness, the self model, is widely distributed, that the 'qualitative' content is in the sensory subsystems (for sensory experience). No centre, no 'conscious bit', but we've been over that many times.

EVERY model MUST account for the singularness of consciousness. Even brain processes must somehow COME TOGETHER to produce an organism with singular goals.

jamest wrote:EVERY model MUST account for the singularness of consciousness. Even brain processes must somehow COME TOGETHER to produce an organism with singular goals.

There must be integration of information, but that need not be in a single spot. flocks and swarms can appear to be single entities with singular goals. I'm suggesting that the brain synthesises unified views without being a unified entity. distributed coordinated activity can bring multiple systems into communication with multiple systems as if there was a single 'observer' and a singular 'experience'.

This is the good bit from Kaku:
http://youtu.be/0GS2rxROcPo?t=4m21s