When it comes to the subject of consciousness there are three basic schools of thought : dualism / monoism / supervenience The dualist position is that there are two separate states - namely the mind and the body. And with regard to the latter the specific organ in question is the brain and the mind is the non physical state of consciousness which it produces. The monoist position [ better known as the physicalist or materialist position ] is that there is no distinction between the physical and non physical and that it is all one singular process that can be scientifically explained like other phenomena. The supervenience position is that there is a distinction between the physical and non physical just like the dualist position but that it is more nuanced and less rigid

Now it is important at this point to define precisely what physical means as all three positions reference it. The standard definition is that which has property or dimension. All physical objects possess this characteristic. Indeed nothing that is physical can be devoid of it as that would by implication render it non physical

Now when this definition is applied to consciousness it most certainly can be said to be non physical. As it is not something which can be measured mathematically or scientifically like all other phenomena. Its existence cannot be determined by such means as thought is not something which can be objectively or externally examined as it is an entirely subjective and internal experience. And as such is beyond the remit of the scientific method [ at least in part if not in whole ] Which is why it is frequently referred to as the hard problem [ there are of course others but they have exclusively scientific solutions to them whereas consciousness does not otherwise it would not be a valid topic for philosophy ] Although science nonetheless carries on investigating it within the relevant disciplines of medicine and biology and psychology

But anything by definition which is non physical can logically be supposed to be non existent too. Yet only the former applies to consciousness as it obviously exists even if it cannot be scientifically demonstrated as such. And this raises an interesting question with regard to the definition of physical here. Namely whether it is too rigid. Because although consciousness exists it is fundamentally non physical. So either the definition is more subtle than the standard one suggests or the non physical can exist within the physical Universe even if it does not interact with it as such

[ This would also apply too time. It is a temporal dimension but is not physical in the same sense that the spatial dimensions are. For all that is required for it to exist is space. Of course spacetime can be distorted by general relativity. But in flat empty space devoid of matter [ at the classical level ] this would not be possible. In point of fact most of space is flat and empty anyway so g r does not apply as it is only within galaxies that it occurs ]

But back to consciousness : if the definition of physical is more subtle than the standard one suggests with regard to it then this would either significantly undermine or completely invalidate the dualist position. Because then the distinction between the physical and non physical could be explained as variations on a spectrum rather than polar opposites with zero point of convergence. Indeed the fact that consciousness is a consequence of brain function is itself clear evidence that there is a connection between the two. The dualist position is therefore a false dichotomy since it is referenced as two states which are fundamentally non complementary when actually the opposite is true. That the process itself currently defies rational explanation is of zero relevance. That is not to say however that the mind and brain do not exist as separate entities. Just that the rigid binary between the two that the dualist position suggests is untenable. This is why monoism or supervenience are sounder positions. Because there is either no distinction between mind and brain or there is but it is all within a single spectrum [ albeit one that is not yet fully understood ]

However a more profound question is not what consciousness is or how it emerges but why higher order thinking evolved in humans in the very first place. The sole purpose of evolution is propagation of the species and anything which enables the process. The ability to think in abstract however is not a requirement of it so consciousness cannot simply be regarded as a by product of biology. Else it would be more common across the animal kingdom and especially amongst primates. Now it is obvious that at some point in our evolutionary development that non evolutionary traits came into existence also. But why they should or why they were unique to us is not so obvious. We take it for granted of course but its significance cannot be overstated in the grand scheme of things. Because we are not merely the most intelligent species but one that is light years ahead of the rest of the animal kingdom as a consequence of consciousness

One argument that addresses its emergence is our natural tendency for curiosity. But that alone cannot explain it. For one thing logic would suggest that curiosity would have to exist before consciousness not he other way round. And also curiosity itself is not exclusive to humans. So those two reasons would invalidate that particular theory. A more sound one is that consciousness is merely a random process that came into existence [ the definition of random here is something which is statistically improbable and not something which is entirely spontaneous as it is sometimes assumed to be ]

So even though its emergence from the brain remains a mystery this is arguably the real hard problem pertaining to consciousness - namely how it is unique to us and no other species. And even more so given that all life has one single common ancestor over three and a half billion years old. Which only makes that uniqueness even more remarkable

surreptitious57 wrote:
Now when this definition is applied to consciousness it most certainly can be said to be non physical. As it is not something which can be measured mathematically or scientifically like all other phenomena. Its existence cannot be determined by such means as thought is not something which can be objectively or externally examined as it is an entirely subjective and internal experience. And as such is beyond the remit of the scientific method [ at least in part if not in whole ] Which is why it is frequently referred to as the hard problem [ there are of course others but they have exclusively scientific solutions to them whereas consciousness does not otherwise it would not be a valid topic for philosophy ] Although science nonetheless carries on investigating it within the relevant disciplines of medicine and biology and psychology

I couldn't get by this first assertion in your long list of assertions. How do you know that consciousness can't be measured mathematically or scientifically? Just because it hasn't been done yet doesn't mean it can never be. I'm sure you don't have relevant access to the future to make such a claim.

I think it's called the hard problem because so many people seem to get a hard-on over it.

The hard problem is such a cop-out.

Going to the source,

It is undeniable that some organisms are subjects of experience. But the question of how it is that these systems are subjects of experience is perplexing. Why is it that when our cognitive systems engage in visual and auditory information-processing, we have visual or auditory experience: the quality of deep blue, the sensation of middle C? How can we explain why there is something it is like to entertain a mental image, or to experience an emotion? It is widely agreed that experience arises from a physical basis, but we have no good explanation of why and how it so arises. Why should physical processing give rise to a rich inner life at all? It seems objectively unreasonable that it should, and yet it does.

David Chalmers

So:
Premise 1:Qualia, experiences unique to oneself, exists
Premise 2:there is no reason to think physical processing are the cause of qualia.
Conclusion: there is something besides physical processing involved in cognition.

He's not show premise 1 or 2 to be correct so the conclusion can't be shown follow. Hell but that's not even important give him both premises and he's still only made an argument from ignorance. I don't know why x would do Y, so X doesn't do Y.

I have no idea what the future holds but my assertions are only true up until they can be demonstrated to be false. I do not hold anything to be absolute outside of mathematics. I may convey certainty but that is simply a consequence of my posting style. Philosophically I am as open minded as it is possible to be. I may think some things are true without evidence or proof but as long as they are possible in theory I see no problem. My other current one is Platonism. It cannot be proven but it has a logic to it that I find very convincing. However if at some point it is demonstrated to be false I shall discard it immediately
This principle extends to all positions I hold from now on on anything outside of mathematics - including consciousness itself

surreptitious57 wrote:I have no idea what the future holds but my assertions are only true up until they can be demonstrated to be false. I do not hold anything to be absolute outside of mathematics. I may convey certainty but that is simply a consequence of my posting style. Philosophically I am as open minded as it is possible to be. I may think some things are true without evidence or proof but as long as they are possible in theory I see no problem. My other current one is Platonism. It cannot be proven but it has a logic to it that I find very convincing. However if at some point it is demonstrated to be false I shall discard it immediately
This principle extends to all positions I hold from now on on anything outside of mathematics - including consciousness itself

No. Your position isn't true until it is shown to be false. Your position is true, or a close approximation, when the evidence supports it. Otherwise every and any ol' assertion is true until proven false.

An assertion only holds true when supported - not till demonstrated to be false.

The issue of consciousness simply requires a transparent self model. We have no evidence that other animals are incapable for abstract thought - but said thoughts could not be communicated to us if present. However the ability of monkeys to observe that a ladder could be moved to gain access to otherwise inaccessible food at least suggests the presence of abstract thought.

The advantage of a transparent self model, is that it would explain how we 'see ourselves' and have the capacity for planning different possible futures. This has clear evolutionary advantages and is entirely compatible with a purely physical model of consciousness.

The hard problem mightn't even be a real problem. We could simply be looking at the whole thing wrong based on age-old assumptions of what consciousness is and the subsequent language we're trapped into. It could be the case that a new approach will simply parry the hard problem and deliver a riposte.

surreptitious57 wrote:
Now it is important at this point to define precisely what physical means as all three positions reference it. The standard definition is that which has property or dimension. All physical objects possess this characteristic. Indeed nothing that is physical can be devoid of it as that would by implication render it non physical

Now when this definition is applied to consciousness it most certainly can be said to be non physical. As it is not something which can be measured mathematically or scientifically like all other phenomena.

Nonsense.

Do you mean to tell me that you cannot distinguish, make a dimensional / quantitative distinction, between that which is not conscious and that which is?

[/thread]

surreptitious57 wrote:The standard definition is that which has property or dimension. All physical objects possess this characteristic.

This would make time a physical thing.

surreptitious57 wrote:Now when this definition is applied to consciousness it most certainly can be said to be non physical.

Depends on what you mean by conciousness.

As a general rule I adopt positions which are supported by evidence or proof. For everything else I reference probability. But on some positions I am entirely neutral such as for example the existence of complex life elsewhere in the Universe. On that I have no opinion either way because that is the natural default position. As I get older I find myself being much less certain about things in general anyway because this life is just temporary at the end of the day. And so dogmatism seems somewhat superfluous in that respect. Far better I think to be as open minded as possible instead. Although how others think is not my concern as that is outside my remit. So I only apply such criteria to myself as my mind is the only one I have jurisdiction over

surreptitious57 wrote:
Now when this definition is applied to consciousness it most certainly can be said to be non physical. As it is not something which can be measured mathematically or scientifically like all other phenomena.

[/quote]
Besides the point already made by Campermon, this is simply begging the question.

There is no way for someone other than myself to know for certain what my mental state is. Now I could convey it through the medium of language but that does not determine whether what I am saying is true or false. As someone listening to or reading my words would not be able to determine with absolute accuracy which of the two it was. Only I would know that

Is there a good definition of 'consciousness' which isn't essentially a replacement with another word 'like 'awareness', and which doesn't use words of variable meaning 'like 'I''?

While people may have a decent understandimng or what people mean by 'conscious' or 'aware' in terms of clear examples, I'm not sure how the edges are defined for less-clear examples, and edges often seem to be where the interesting stuff is.

If I scan my eyes across a complex scene, like my workbench with its tangled mass of tools, wires, circuits, bits of scrap, tubes of glue, I 'see' different things to different extents, depending on what I may want, what I may be thinking of for other reasons, but I'd be hard put to draw a line between 'consciously seen' and 'not consciously seen'.

Obviously, it's a piece of piss if looking at extremes - something obscured by other things to the point of recognition being impossible, I can't see, and something I attend to enough to think about it in thoughts which engage my language hardware, I definitely have seen, but in between those two extremes, there are things which briefly light up recognition circuits (or 'recognition patterns' associated with various objects happen) as my eye moves across them, and 'I' feel that lighting-up happening or those patterns forming even if it only briefly, with them soon replaced by others. Possibly the lighting-up is erroneous if I mistake one tool's orange handle for another one, but there is still something happening, and I'm not unaware of it.

How sustained does an activation have to be before it qualifies as 'conscious'?
Much shorter than the brief flickers I can feel, and the transient activations I can feel would not only not be conscious, they wouldn't be anything at all - not enduring enough even for basic image processing to have started to converge on an identification which rose above the neural background noise.
Much longer than the brief flickers, and it would be hard to say that things weren't being consciously seen. Were I to slow my scan speed a little, I could unquestioningly 'observe' various objects, a little slower and I could explicitly name them, slower still and I could have brief trains of thought triggered by them.
But I don't get the feeling that there are some hard thresholds being crossed there - the feeling is very much one of a continuum from 'couldn't see' to 'could have made a limerick up about' with thresholds being essentially synthetic definition-related ones.

surreptitious57 wrote:
Now it is important at this point to define precisely what physical means as all three positions reference it. The standard definition is that which has property or dimension. All physical objects possess this characteristic. Indeed nothing that is physical can be devoid of it as that would by implication render it non physical Now when this definition is applied to consciousness it most certainly can be said to be non physical. As it is not something which can be measured mathematically or scientifically like all other phenomena.

How do you figure that? Since when is consciousness devoid of property?

Its existence cannot be determined by such means as thought is not something which can be objectively or externally examined as it is an entirely subjective and internal experience.

Citation please. What do “entirely subjective” and “internal” mean?

And as such is beyond the remit of the scientific method [ at least in part if not in whole ] Which is why it is frequently referred to as the hard problem [ there are of course others but they have exclusively scientific solutions to them whereas consciousness does not otherwise it would not be a valid topic for philosophy ].

You seem to be assuming that 1) consciousness is a “thing” rather than a process, and 2) that science is not capable of investigating processes. What can philosophy contribute to the question of consciousness other than more questions and speculations?

But anything by definition which is non physical can logically be supposed to be non existent too. Yet only the former applies to consciousness as it obviously exists even if it cannot be scientifically demonstrated as such.

How confident are you that consciousness “obviously” exists? Do rainbows “obviously” exist too?

And this raises an interesting question with regard to the definition of physical here. Namely whether it is too rigid.

I’m struggling to think of a broader definition of “physical” than the one you’ve provided which wouldn’t render the term meaningless!

Because although consciousness exists it is fundamentally non physical.

Since when? What aspect of consciousness can you point to which doesn’t have a basis in some aspect(s) of physical reality?

That the process itself currently defies rational explanation is of zero relevance.

It doesn’t currently defy rational explanation. The full details might not be worked out yet, but that does not mean that it currently defies rational explanation.

That is not to say however that the mind and brain do not exist as separate entities.

The mind is no more a separate entity from the brain than walking is a separate entity from legs.

However a more profound question is not what consciousness is or how it emerges but why higher order thinking evolved in humans in the very first place. The sole purpose of evolution is propagation of the species and anything which enables the process. The ability to think in abstract however is not a requirement of it so consciousness cannot simply be regarded as a by product of biology.

Evolution doesn’t have a “purpose”. Traits which are conducive to the survival of a species are more likely to be passed on and amplified from generation and generation. These traits often confer features which are incidental to their primary biological function. Abstract thinking is a by-product of neurological developments which help to amplify humans’ key evolutionary assets, i.e. cooperative social structures, language ability, and the ability to plan and strategize.

Else it would be more common across the animal kingdom and especially amongst primates.

1) What makes you think that other primates don’t have consciousness?
2) Evolved consciousness would only occur in species where it conferred a selective advantage. Not all species require a high level of consciousness to get by. Perhaps spiders are similarly incredulous about the idea that their remarkable web-making capability could possibly be due to natural causes, especially when so few other creatures possess such a capability?

Now it is obvious that at some point in our evolutionary development that non evolutionary traits came into existence also.

No it’s not.

But why they should or why they were unique to us is not so obvious. We take it for granted of course but its significance cannot be overstated in the grand scheme of things. Because we are not merely the most intelligent species but one that is light years ahead of the rest of the animal kingdom as a consequence of consciousness.

”But why they should or why they were unique to us is not so obvious. We take it for granted of course but its significance cannot be overstated in the grand scheme of things. Because we are not merely the most capable species when it comes to making elaborate, functional and resilient webs, but one that is light years ahead of the rest of the animal kingdom as a consequence of web-spinning.”

One argument that addresses its emergence is our natural tendency for curiosity. But that alone cannot explain it. For one thing logic would suggest that curiosity would have to exist before consciousness not he other way round.

Or maybe the co-arise. Or maybe “consciousness” is just a generic label that we give to a complex and interwoven suite of cognitive and perceptual activities.

So even though its emergence from the brain remains a mystery this is arguably the real hard problem pertaining to consciousness – namely how it is unique to us and no other species.

How do you know this?? You’ve just admitted that other animals demonstrate curiosity. That’s a pretty strong indicator of conscious activity. What is it that you think these curious animals are missing such that they can’t be considered to have consciousness?

And even more so given that all life has one single common ancestor over three and a half billion years old. Which only makes that uniqueness even more remarkable

No more remarkable than a spider’s web.

surreptitious57 wrote:.....

So even though its emergence from the brain remains a mystery this is arguably the real hard problem pertaining to consciousness - namely how it is unique to us and no other species......

First, the bolded statement is not even true, and secondly there is no hard problem, it's a figment of Chalmers philosophically deluded mind.

Scar wrote:I think it's called the hard problem because so many people seem to get a hard-on over it.

Only philosophers.

I think we need SoS and Graham to take over this thread, the OP is a nonstarter.

Animavore wrote:

surreptitious57 wrote:I have no idea what the future holds but my assertions are only true up until they can be demonstrated to be false. I do not hold anything to be absolute outside of mathematics. I may convey certainty but that is simply a consequence of my posting style. Philosophically I am as open minded as it is possible to be. I may think some things are true without evidence or proof but as long as they are possible in theory I see no problem. My other current one is Platonism. It cannot be proven but it has a logic to it that I find very convincing. However if at some point it is demonstrated to be false I shall discard it immediately
This principle extends to all positions I hold from now on on anything outside of mathematics - including consciousness itself

No. Your position isn't true until it is shown to be false. Your position is true, or a close approximation, when the evidence supports it. Otherwise every and any ol' assertion is true until proven false.

This.

(as is the case with most philosophical 'problems')